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Practical engagements with and theoretical reflections on “council democracy” have resurfaced 
periodically in the past, most notably in the interwar period, in the “long 1960s”, and since the turn 
of the century. There is a relative gap in the literature to analyze “council democracy” both 
comparatively, rather than singularly as individual empirical cases or intellectual currents, and as 
social movements, rather than primarily as theoretical debates or intellectual traditions. This thesis 
offers a comparative-historical analysis of some of the earliest and most radical instances of 
“council democratic” movements that developed after the First World War in Germany (1918-1919) 
and Italy (1919-1920) by looking at the processes that contributed to their emergence and their 
trajectories, using a strategic-relational approach. It grounds the analysis on a Marxian conception 
of the formal separation between the “political” and the “economic” spheres as a unique 
characteristic of capitalist social relation and interprets “council democracy” as a sublation of 
counter tendencies towards radical democratic control within each of these spheres. Such 
conception allows the analysis to capture the empirical diversities in the historical manifestations of 
“council democracy” and illuminates the links between “council democracy” and wider traditions 
such as radical republicanism and anarcho-syndicalism.  
In analysing the making of these movements, the study focuses on the particular characteristics of 
state-led war mobilization in Germany and Italy in contrast to those in France where such 
movements did not emerge after the war. It sees the militarised corporatist state form under which 
Germany and Italy were mobilized for the war as contributing directly to the emergence of these 
types of movements after the war. In exploring the trajectories of these movements, the study looks 
at the ways in which various organized forces came to shape the devolution of these movements in 
Germany and Italy in contrast to those in Russia where such movements temporarily “succeeded” in 
establishing a form of “council democracy”. It sees the organizational capacities of the forces 
involved, the programmatic vision of the radical demands, and the alliance patterns capable of 
stabilising the movement into an articulated whole as decisive in the movement trajectories. Aside 
from the comparative study of the two cases, this study also offers a novel way to study the “council 
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 “Council democracy” presents a model of democratic self-governance on the basis of active, 
free, and associated individuals working cooperatively within a federated council system in a de-
alienated society. As an idea, it is an emancipatory project towards a fundamental transformation of 
capitalist social relations, radically different from the “actually existing socialism” that dominated 
much of the Twentieth Century. Practical engagements with and theoretical reflections on “council 
democracy” have resurfaced periodically in the past, most notably in the interwar period (e.g. 
Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy), in the “long 1960s” (e.g. Hungary, Poland, Algeria, 
France, Italy, Chile, Portugal, Iran), and since the turn of the century (e.g. Argentina, Venezuela, 
Greece).1 It has attracted the attention of some of the major theorists of the 20th century, such as 
Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Anton Pannekoek, Karl Korsch, Antonio Gramsci, Paul Mattick, 
Hannah Arendt, Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort, among others.  
There has been a burgeoning literature in recent years on various aspects of “council 
democracy” both as a theoretical and an empirical question. However, there is a relative gap in the 
literature to analyze “council democracy” as a historical phenomenon both comparatively,2 rather 
than singularly as individual empirical cases or intellectual currents, and as social movements, 
rather than primarily as theoretical debates or intellectual traditions. This research analyzes the 
processes that contributed to the inception and evolution of “council democratic” movements. It 
takes two of the earliest historical cases of “council democratic” movements that emerged in 
Germany and Italy in the immediate aftermath of World War I (WWI), and draws comparative 
conclusions regarding their making (Part I) as well as their trajectory (Part II). To highlight the 
specificities of the processes that went into the making of these movements, it focuses on the 
particular characteristics of state-led war mobilization in Germany and Italy, in contrast to those in 
France where such movements did not emerge after the war. To explore the dynamics that led to the 
“failure” of these movements, it looks at the ways in which various organized forces came to shape 
the trajectories of these movements in Germany and Italy, in contrast to those in Russia where such 
movements, at least temporarily, “succeeded”. 
 The introductory chapter begins by grounding the study on a theoretical foundation based on 
a Marxian reading of capitalist social relations. Accordingly, “council democracy” is theorized as 
 
1 For general survey of some of these historical episodes, see Gluckstein (1985), Bayat (1991), Wallis (2011), Azzellini 
(2015), Vieta (2020). 
2 The two notable exceptions are Sirianni (1980) and Gluckstein (1985). 
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the dialectical unity of two indeterminate counter tendencies arising from the historically unique 
structure of capitalist social relations. The chapter then sets out the general scope and structure of 
the analysis of “council democracy” not as an exercise in the history of ideas but the history of 
movements. Secondly, the chapter lays out the key methodological considerations directly relevant 
to this research, namely, comparative historical analysis and strategic-relational analysis, before 
providing a methodological justification for the choice of case studies used in the research. Thirdly, 
the analytical framework for the study is outlined for the examination of both the making and 
trajectory of “council democratic” movements. The introduction concludes by providing a brief 
outline of the chapters to follow. Table 1 below provides an overview of the structure of the 
research.  
A Theoretical Foundation for “Council Democracy”  
 Practical engagements with and theoretical reflections on “council democracy” have 
resurfaced periodically in the past, most notably in the 1870s after the Paris Commune of 1871,3 the 
(inter)war period after the revolutionary waves starting from the Russian Revolution,4 in the “long 
1960s” in response to the revolutionary waves starting from the Hungarian Revolution,5 and since 
the turn of the century initiated by the wave of anti-globalization and anti-austerity movements.6  
 At the most basic level, the above conceptualizations tend to take the organizational form of 
councils as the defining characteristic of “council democracy”, further elaborated in reaction to the 
particular political contexts within which they emerged, be it Bolshevik communism, or Stalinist 
totalitarianism, or post-war liberal democracy, etc. “Council democracy” tends to be defined 
according to static organizational forms with innate democratic and socialistic qualities which 
counter the contingent ebb and flow of history in different periods. This is why all too often the 
emergence of councils is conceived as a “spontaneous” phenomenon. To conceptualize “council 
democracy” as a historical phenomenon requires historicizing both the emergence and the trajectory 
 
3 The chief theorist in this period who reflected on the council form is Karl Marx. He formulated these ideas most 
famously in The Civil War in France (see Demirović, 2015). Some of the other notable thinkers around the time of the 
Paris Commune who provided reflections on this historic phenomenon are Freidrich Engels, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter 
Kropotkin, Ernest Belfort Bax, and William Morris. Later socialist and communist intellectuals, notably Lenin and 
Leon Trotsky among others, continued to write on the implications of the Paris Commune for the socialist theory. For 
the legacy of the Paris Commune within the socialist tradition, see Forster (2020), Nicholls (2019), Ross (2015), 
Bergman (2014), Gluckstein (2011), Katz (1998). 
4 The chief council theorists in this period include Luxemburg, Lenin, Pannekoek, Gramsci, Richard Müller, Ernst 
Däumig, Korsch, Otto Rühle, Herman Gorter, and Paul Mattick. For the theoretical elaborations of this generation of 
council thinkers, see Quirico and Ragona (2021), Muldoon (2020b), Dubigeon (2019), Muldoon (2019), Thompson 
(2019a), Bourrinet (2017), Pinta (2017), Hoffrogge (2015), Linden (2004), Salvadori (1990), Shipway (1987), Bricianer 
(1978), Williams (1975), Bock (1969b). 
5 Notable theorists of this period include Paul Mattick, Arendt, Castoriadis, Lefort, and Guy Debord. For the 
contribution of these theorists to council democracy, see Popp-Madsen (2020; 2018), Muldoon (2020a), Smith (2019), 
Holman (2018), Lederman (2018), Adam (2011), Muldoon (2011), Medearis (2004).  
6 Notable theorists in this period include Popp-Madsen (2021), Marcelo Vieta (2020), Muldoon (2018), Medearis 
(2015), Thomspon (2018), Azzellini (2016). 
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of its particular manifestations, each of which is an instantiation of a general formal structure. 
Therefore, the phenomenon is delineated not merely or even primarily on the basis of the presence 
or absence of a certain organizational form (e.g. council form) but on the basis of a historically 
dynamic formal structure, itself in dialectical relation with other historically dynamic formal 
structures (e.g., capitalist social relations). This is not to deny the importance of councils as the 
organizational identifier of “council democracy”, but to conceive of their significance only insofar 
as they belong to the formal structure of a historically specific phenomenon of “council 
democracy”.  
One way to go beyond the organizational form of councils as the most basic common 
denominator while remaining sensitive to the diverse range of conceptions is to utilize a Marxist 
conception of capitalist social relation. This allows us to conceive of “council democracy” in its full 
realization as an anti-capitalist phenomenon while maintaining the conceptual flexibility to make 
sense of its elasticity, manifested in the wide range of theoretical attributions and empirical cases, as 
well as its vacillation, apparent in the theoretical slippages to other traditions and the “failure” of its 
empirical cases.   
Building on Karl Marx’s conception of capitalist social relations, Ellen M. Wood (1995b) 
argues that capitalism is a historically unique mode of production in which surplus value can 
formally be extracted and appropriated without direct “extra-economic” pressures, such as 
militaristic coercion, traditionalist oppression, or juridical pressure. Capitalist social relations are 
predicated upon a generalized wage-labour relation for production of commodities; that is the kind 
of labour, separated from the means of production, which is formally “free” in the double sense that 
the labourer is free to sell his/her labour-power to any employer who is willing to pay for it and free 
from means of subsistence (Marx, 1976, pp. 273, 874). In other words, in capitalism, “the social 
functions of production and distribution, surplus extraction and appropriation, and the allocation of 
social labour are, so to speak, privatised and they are achieved by non-authoritative, non-political 
means” (Wood, 1995b, p. 29).7  
Although the separation of producers from the means of production starts from and 
necessarily requires a legal basis,8 it progressively moves into more technical and ideological plains 
in the form of the separation between the mental and manual labour (e.g. managerial subdivision) 
 
7 This, however, does not imply that capitalism operates on the basis of “economic laws” in isolation from politics. 
What allows a system to engage in exploitation and domination formally through seemingly peaceful and equal 
economic transactions is a deeply political (but not necessarily politicised) social relation. 
8 The emergence of capitalism in a particular time and location (mid-15th century Britain) had nothing to do with the 
accumulation of wealth or a particular religious ethos and had everything to do with a specific form of the state and its 




that has been a way to deepen the effective separation between the producers and the production 
process (Poulantzas, 1978; Gunn, 2011; Marx, 1981, pp. 510-511; Egan, 1990). Owing to private 
property rights and “free” contractual relation with the working class, the capitalist class obtain 
tremendous control within the “economic” domain in a way that “appropriative power is integrated 
more closely and directly than ever before with the authority to organize production” (Wood, 
1995b, p. 30). Marx (1976) depicts the peculiar despotism of the capitalist organization of 
production as follows: 
An industrial army of workers under the command of a capitalist requires, like a real army, 
officers (managers) and N.C.O.s (foremen, overseers), who command during the labour 
process in the name of capital. The work of supervision becomes their established and 
exclusive function. (p. 450)  
This despotism need not be due to a personal vengeance by the capitalists against the workers. From 
the perspective of the capitalist, who is “capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a 
will” (Marx, 1976, p. 254), living labour enters into the production process as a commodity, as 
labour-power, for the sole purpose of valorization of capital. The capitalist is then compelled by the 
imperatives of accumulation and competition to organize the production process in a way that 
maximises surplus value. The possibility of the hierarchical organization of capitalist production 
lies in the fact that “it is not the worker who employs the conditions of his work, but rather the 
reverse, the conditions of work employ the worker” (Marx, 1976, p. 546; see also Hudis, 2012, pp. 
165-166).9 
The formal separation of the “economic” and the “political” spheres under capitalism also 
created a historically unique condition for the realization of democratic rights in the political sphere. 
Capitalism, with its formally separate economic sphere with its own power structure within which 
economic exploitation could take place independently of “extra-economic” force, made it possible 
“for the first time in history to conceive of political rights as having little bearing on the distribution 
of social and economic power; and it was possible to imagine a distinct political sphere in which all 
citizens were formally equal, a political sphere abstracted from the inequalities of wealth and 
economic power outside the political domain” (Wood, 2020, p. 56). Of course, democracy has a 
longer tradition that goes back to ancient times and its contentious unfolding has a history written 
with tears and blood. However, at no point in history prior to the emergence of capitalism was it 
 
9 Since Marx, labour process theorists, such as Harry Braverman (1974), Michael Burawoy (1978, 1985), David F. 
Noble (1984), and David Knights et al. (1985), have analyzed the complex and historically evolving methods deployed 
by the capitalist class to direct labour power of workers towards the production of commodities and to structure it under 
management control to maximize surplus value, labour conflict, and working-class organization. They have also shed 
light on the contradictions of labour process that opens rooms for the formation of class consciousness and resistance 
among workers.  
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conceivable to have the labouring masses intervene in the political domain without at the same time 
subverting the primary class relation. It was under capitalism that it became possible to include 
individuals into the political domain as juridically equal subjects under universal suffrage without 
having to transform the fundamentals of capitalist class relations.  
Just as the capitalist mode of production historically emerged out of fundamental 
transformations that took place within the existing feudal social relations, the modern conception of 
democracy underwent several metamorphoses whose conditions of possibility was laid out by the 
advent of capitalism. Two fundamental transformations in the evolutionary process of modern 
democracy took place in the work of early modern republicans in England (e.g. James Harrington, 
Henry Neville, and Algernon Sidney), whose notion of citizenship was based on a restricted but 
active propertied elite, and in the work of the American “Founding Fathers”, whose notion of 
citizenship was one of an expansive but pacified body (see Wood, 1995a). Therefore, as labouring 
masses gained citizenship rights regardless of their civic status or socio-economic position, their 
civic equality did not directly impact or significantly alter class inequality essential to capitalism (p. 
213). Such pacification of citizenship required the development of a form of representationalism 
that was fundamentally not a technical solution to an extended franchise but a barrier to the 
labouring multitude having direct influence in the political domain (pp. 216-17). This democratic 
expansion within liberal democracy, notwithstanding, generates its own contradictions since it is a 
channel, as mediated and limited as they were, through which popular will can potentially intervene 
in the state, based on the constitutional safeguards and rights. 
The profound democratic deficit that is created in capitalism within both the “economic” 
and the “political” spheres generated its own domain of resistance. The struggle against the 
dispossessing, disempowering, and dehumanizing effects of capitalism can be traced back to its 
very origins (Neeson, 1993; Thompson, 2013; Linebaugh, 2014; Dimmock, 2014). These struggles 
continued to evolve as capitalism matured in its transformation into mass industrial production 
(Thompson, 1967; Hobsbawm, 1968; Foster, 1977; Mann, 1993; Žmolek, 2013), and involved a 
broad range of ideological persuasions and socio-political forces. The struggle towards democratic 
control over working conditions and socioeconomic relations, which is broadly referred to here as 
“workers’ control”, is at the heart of these struggles.  
The notion of “workers’ control” has been used to refer to a wide range of organizational 
configurations with widely different ideological orientations (e.g. see Mattick, 1969; Brinton, 1970; 
Hunnius et al., 1973; Boggs, 1977; Bernstein, 1977; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986; Bayat, 1991; 
Dow, 2003; Azzellini, 2016). Some authors use it as an umbrella concept to cover everything from 
workers’ participation in the management of companies to anti-capitalist organizations of 
15 
 
revolutionary transformation (e.g. Atzeni, 2012). Others apply it as an indicator of the highest 
mode10 of workers’ participation in an ascending escalator that starts from one-way information 
exchange between workers and management, to communication, to consultation, to 
codetermination, and finally to control (e.g. Wilkinson et al., 2010). Finally, some draw a 
fundamental distinction between workers’ participation and “workers’ control”, pushing the 
boundaries beyond the confines of capitalist relations of production (e.g. Bayat, 1991, Gunn, 2011).  
In this study, “workers’ control” is conceptualized broadly as characterizing a two-
dimensional space defined on the basis of control and ownership.11 The former is concerned with 
the degrees to which workers are able to determine the conditions of production as well as the 
distribution of financial assets and economic returns. The latter revolves around the question of 
property relations regarding the means of production. These two essentially mirror the basic pillars 
upon which capital perpetuates the subordination of labour. Defining “workers’ control” as a 
conceptual space rather than an ideal point allows us to capture the diverse manifestations of the 
notion in practice,12 without losing sight of the demanding criteria for its full realization as a social 
arrangement in which workers, as opposed to capital or state bureaucracy, maintain control rights 
within a socialized mode of production, as opposed to a privatised or nationalized ownership 
structure.  
Taking “workers’ control” in its broad sense and along its two dimensions allows us to see 
the interventions of various forces, with widely different ideological dispositions and political 
strategies, in the process of articulation of the notion and its role in class struggle. In this sense, it is 
not an exclusive arena reserved for a definite set of political forces. Rather, contestation over its 
meaning and implementation can involve syndicalists, industrial unionists, trade unionists, 
socialists, communists, social democrats, progressive liberals, etc. Nevertheless, when “workers’ 
control” is taken radically as a generally sufficient pathway towards the transformation of society 
beyond capitalism without having to engage with the “political” sphere, it becomes particularly akin 
to the archetypical characteristic of the transformative vision of (anarcho-)syndicalism. This, in 
itself, stems from the fact that the formally separate “economic” domain under capitalism has made 
the localization of class conflict possible (Wood, 1995b, p. 45); thereby, class struggle can (and 
often does) take place in the “economic” sphere and can be contained “at the point of production”.13 
 
10 The term “mode” is used here to capture the multi-dimensional nature of some of the more sophisticated 
conceptualization of workers’ participation which takes into account not only the degree but also the form, the level, 
and the range of participation (e.g. Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005). 
11 For a similar approach to the definition of “workers’ control”, see Vieta (2020, pp. 299-306).  
12 For a historical survey of the concept of “workers’ control” up to the Russian Revolution, see Smith (2017). For a 
longer survey of the concept, particularly its reception in Latin America, see Vieta (2020, chapter 5). 
13 This does not imply the classical distinction between the economistic struggles (e.g. struggle for higher wages) and 
political struggles. The struggle for higher wages, for example, may remain within the “economic” sphere but it does 
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If taken to its logical end, it would become intelligible to speak of the total transformation of 
capitalist social relations solely by transforming the relations of production in the “economic” 
sphere. In other words, it is only within capitalism that syndicalism is even comprehensible.14 
However, since the condition of the possibility of the formal separation of the “economic” and the 
“political” is the profound interrelationship between economy and politics under capitalism, 
overcoming of capitalist social relation cannot be achieved without engaging with the forces that 
formally reside within the “political” sphere. Therefore, transcending capitalism requires 
fundamental transformations of both domains.  
 Struggle over “workers’ control” can take many organizational forms and institutional 
arrangements. Among these, the council form based on a directly elected recallable delegate 
structure stands out as particularly fit for democratic requirements of collective control as well as 
organizational militancy of the working class. It can be a vehicle not only to subvert the 
authoritative structure within the workplace and to maximize accountability towards workers but 
also to undermine the separation between mental and manual labour. This does not mean that it 
emerges on its own from the spontaneous disposition of the working class towards this specific 
organizational form. It also does not necessarily take an independent organizational form with 
respect to other organizations, especially those of the working classes such as unions. Nevertheless, 
its characteristics make it an appealing organizational form in the working-class struggle for 
“workers’ control” from the bottom up. 
 The contradictions created by the advent of capitalism in the “political” domain, involving 
both its structural possibilities and inherent limitations, led to distinct dynamism towards expansion 
and containment of democratic pressure from below. Classical republicanism and liberalism, which 
were shaping the debates on contemporary democracy and the meaning of citizenship as either 
small but active or extended but disempowered. Alongside these, radical republicanism,15 
particularly in the writings of American and French revolutionaries whose intellectual roots can be 
traced back to Levellers, Diggers and continued in Chartism and socialism, envisioned a republic 
based on popular sovereignty in which “active and equal political participation of citizens are seen 
as the core guarantors of liberty, equality, and solidarity” (Leipold et al., 2020, p. 1). The struggle to 
 
not necessarily have to. It is not possible to tell from the content of the struggle alone either where the locus of struggle 
would fall or what the level of militancy would be. This is precisely why we can have militant syndicalist action 
confining itself to “the point of production” and relatively routine struggle over wages (in certain circumstances) 
becoming revolutionary. 
14 Due to the inseparability of extra-economic factors from the production of surplus value in pre-capitalist societies, 
mass struggles against economic exploitation was already a political contest including more immediately and directly 
against the state itself (Wood, 1995, p. 46). 
15 For a recent attempt to present radical republicanism as a political tradition, see Leipold et al. (2020). See also, 
McCormick (2011), Nabulsi (2015). 
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democratize the institutional order and assert popular sovereignty over the “political” domain is 
what is referred to here as “citizens’ control”.16 
There is a multiplicity of ways in which “citizens’ control” can be defined and delimited 
both in principle and organizationally. The source of sovereignty and institutional arrangements 
define the framework within which “citizens’ control” can be understood. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, the sovereignty of the parliament (rather than the people) and the institutional 
separation of executive, legislative, and juridical powers define the basic parameters within which 
“citizens’ control” can be understood. Having popular sovereignty as the source of legitimacy of the 
political system, as was the case in America and France after their revolutions, already created a 
different set of possibilities for the people to assert democratic control and challenges for the elite to 
contain such attempts. For radical republicans, citizens not only maintain full sovereignty, but must 
also be enabled to meaningfully control the political institutions of the republic.17 Therefore, seeing 
“citizens’ control” as a conceptual space that encapsulates a range of possibilities rather than an all-
or-nothing notion allows us to make sense of the diverse ways in which it might manifest itself in 
reality, without having to give up the critical perspective on the criteria of its full actualization 
along with the core principles of non-domination and the common good.  
 Even when “citizens’ control” is pushed to its radical limits to realize a democratic republic 
on the basis of free, active, self-governing, cooperative, and civically virtuous citizens, it cannot 
realize its democratic aspirations as long as it leaves out the capitalist relations of domination that 
exist within the “economic” sphere. While a number of theorists in recent years have argued that the 
realization of radical republican ideas is inextricably bound to their extension into the “economic” 
spheres (e.g. see White, 2011; González-Ricoy, 2014; Gourevitch, 2015; Anderson, 2015), this has 
not always been an intuitive leap among radical republicans beyond critical remarks about 
economic inequality and market imperatives. Arendt presents a vivid example of how radical 
republican ideas of democracy, even in council form (Arendt, 2006; Muldoon, 2011; Lederman, 
2016), can be presented without engaging in, indeed actively dismissing,18 a critique of capitalism 
(see Medearis, 2004; Muldoon, 2016). Again, the possibility of decoupling the democratization of 
 
16 A possible objection to this terminology is that citizenship always already assumes the nation-state, therefore it is 
inherently linked to all the issues concerning nation building and othering. However, as Nabulsi (2015) argues “the 
creation of the citizen comes well before any democratic state can appear; their talents, commitments, political artistry 
and achievements are prerequisites for a republic that is truly free, and is able to maintain that freedom against the 
constantly developing power of elites” (p. 149).  
17 Thompson (2019b) characterizes radical republican vision of democracy as “one that sees human social life as 
essentially cooperative and interdependent, and that people must be able to frame laws and rules over all domains of 
society and make them accountable to as well as oriented towards the common benefit of society” (p. 395). 
18 She (2006) vehemently dismisses the economic aspects of council movements by saying the “so-called wish of the 
working class [for worker’s control] sounds much rather like an attempt of the revolutionary party to counteract the 




the “political” sphere from that of the “economic” sphere is only intelligible in the context of the 
formal separation of the two domains in capitalism.  
Among the various institutional forms that struggle over “citizens’ control” can take, the 
council form appears as particularly apt to meet the criteria of free, associative, and deliberative 
self-government. Despite its serious shortcomings and its profound misreading of the concrete 
historical experiences (Hobsbawm 1977, pp. 201-208; Sitton, 1987; Medearis, 2004), Arendt’s 
account of the democratic potential of councils in the “political” domain is noteworthy here. She 
links the ability of the citizens to participate in the government to the essence of political freedom 
understood as a communal activity (p. 210), which can only be achieved on the basis of equality 
and plurality. She argues that the political space within which such political freedom can be 
exercised is made possible under the council system (Lederman, 2018). This leads her to see 
councils not as means to some ends such as communism, but as an end in itself. In short, for Arendt, 
the political space created by the council system is what allows the citizens to experience “the 
political” (Lederman, 2018). Furthermore, the federal system of councils can not only provide the 
space for the political deliberation of citizens but also solve “one of the most serious problems of all 
modern politics” (Arendt, 2006, p. 270) that is how to reconcile equality and authority. As James 
Muldoon (2011) argues, the council system for Arendt is a way to balance the constitutional form 
and constituent power so that “power emanates from the grassroots but is constituted in a federal 
structure of councils” (p. 412).19  
However, as long as struggles towards “citizens’ control” concern themselves purely with 
the democratic constitution of the “political” domain without engaging squarely with the specific 
form of domination that governs the capitalist social relation, they essentially remain a quixotic 
endeavour. Conversely, if struggles towards “workers’ control” delude themselves with the idea of 
a fundamental transformation of capitalist social relation merely within the “economic” sphere 
without facing the capitalist state power, they inevitably run aground. In other words, if they are to 
push against definite limits, it soon becomes clear that “the very differentiation of the economic and 
political in capitalism – the symbiotic division of labour between class and state – is precisely what 
makes the unity of economic and political struggle essential, and what ought to make socialism and 
democracy synonymous” (Wood, 1995b, p. 48).    
 
19 The question of how to counterbalance the constituted power (i.e. the state) and the constituent power (i.e. the people) 
remains one of the central preoccupations of the theorists of radical democracy such as Antonio Negri (1999); also see 
Azzellini (2016, pp. 35-41). 
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“Council democracy” is the sublation (Aufhebung)20 of “citizens’ control” and “workers’ 
control” in their radically democratic forms to transform capitalist social relations into what Marx 
described as “the free exchange of individuals who are associated on the basis of common 
appropriation and control of the means of production” (Marx, 1986, p. 96). Given the formal 
characteristics of capitalism, the notion of citizenship operates within the “political” domain, in 
which juridically equal individuals, notwithstanding their position within the economic relation, 
have certain rights and bear certain responsibilities that are considered fundamental for a formally 
democratic society. However, those juridically equal individual citizens always already assume a 
position within the economic relation which place them in structurally exploitive social classes and 
fundamentally undemocratic relations of production.  
Conversely, the notion of worker operates in the “economic” domain, in which relations of 
production lay out the outlines of class structure and class domination, regardless of the civic 
equality as citizens, therefore resulting in the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the relations of 
production. However, the exploited and exploiting classes as structural collectivities simultaneously 
assume their juridico-political position as free and equal individual citizens. Hence, while each 
notion, under capitalism, is internally in conflict with the other (i.e. the boundary of citizens as 
juridically free and equal political subjects ends where the boundary of workers as an exploited 
class under the domination of capital begins), each necessarily assumes the other (i.e. the vast 
majority of citizens as individuals are always already workers as a social class and must engage in 
the exploitive economic relations in order to meet their basic needs).  
Therefore, as stated before, the struggle for their democratic expansion towards “citizens’ 
control” and “workers’ control” comes up against its own internal limits. Hence, for each to fully 
realize its own democratic potential, it not only needs to pass internally into the opposite, but must 
overthrow the formal condition that places them in a dialectical opposition with respect to each 
other, i.e. the formal separation between the “political” and the “economic”. This overcoming is 
neither a simple synthesis nor a rejection but a process that both cancels and preserves aspects of 
the two notions (hence, the concept of “sublation”). This associated mode of production on the basis 
of the council system is what makes “council democratic” movements unique in their attempt to 
overcome the division between the “political” and the “economic” (see Demirović, 2015). Its 
socialization project necessarily requires not only the democratization of the production process but 
also a profound transformation of the political organization of the society as a whole.21  
 
20 G. W. F. Hegel elaborates explicitly on the concept of “sublation” in (1977, §113; 1991, §96; 2010, pp. 81-2). For the 
definition of this Hegelian concept of “sublation” (Aufhebung), see Maybee (2020; 2009) and Palm (2009).  
21 Significant differences of opinion remain regarding how socialization should take place and how areas beyond 
productive sectors are to be integrated. For an overview of the socialization question, see Muldoon (2018).  
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The precondition for this is a social relation in which the socialized mode of production is 
controlled by freely associated producers who coordinate their actions through a federated council 
system. Such a profound transformation of existing social relations is a tremendously complicated 
process. Understanding the development of such transformative processes, therefore, requires 
historical investigations into the actual movements that have tried to carry out such revolutionary 
projects. This research is a contribution to the study of particular movements that moved towards 
what is here defined as “council democracy”. To this end, the analytic decoupling of the two 
constitutive modes of “council democracy”, namely, “citizens’ control” and “workers’ control”, 
themselves mirroring the formal separation between the “political” and the “economic”, allows us 
to conceive of their asynchronous developments in concrete cases. Conceiving “citizens’ control” 
and “workers’ control” themselves as open-ended outcomes of popular and class struggles avoids a 
teleological or endemic understanding of the transformative process towards “council democracy”. 
Therefore, political and economic crises themselves are seen not as determining factors in 
overcoming capitalism but at best as possibilities within which radically democratic struggles may 
develop. 
Methodological Considerations in the Analysis of “Council Democratic” Movements  
On Comparative Process Tracing  
 The central emphasis on processes in the formation and evolution of the constitutive 
elements of “council democracy” in two particular historical cases (Germany and Italy) makes 
process tracing a suitable methodology for the study. At a very general level, process tracing is a 
method of establishing causal mechanisms between a specific set of causes to a specific set of 
outcomes (Lange, 2013; Bennett, 2008; Checkel, 2008; George and Bennett, 2005). David Waldner 
(2012) specifies this further by stating that process tracing uses “longitudinal research design whose 
data consists of a sequence of events (individual and collective acts or changes of a state) 
represented by nonstandardized observations drawn from a single unit of analysis” (p. 69). Among 
the variety of process tracing (see Beach and Pedersen, 2013), explaining-outcome process-tracing, 
rather than theory-driven process tracing, is most apt for the within-case study. It is defined as 
“seeking the causes of a specific outcome in a single case”, with the aim to construct “minimally 
sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that 
accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present” (p. 
18). This variation has a strong affinity to historical scholarship as it needs to delve into the 
historical particularities of each case to decipher the specific processes that led to the outcome in 
question. In explaining-outcome process-tracing, the notion of causal mechanism is understood 
more broadly than in theory-driven process tracing, and may need the inclusion of “nonsystematic 
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parts in the causal mechanism, defined as a mechanism that is case-specific” (p. 19).22 It uses both 
deductive and inductive methods iteratively to reduce the number of explanatory factors to arrive at 
a sufficient explanation.  
Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen restrict the use of process tracing to single-case 
studies (p. 28). However, Bo Bengtsson and Hannu Ruonavaara (2017) have recently suggested 
ways to use process tracing as a comparative method.23 They apply process tracing both in within-
case and cross-case analyzes. In the former step, “the processes leading ‘from A to B’ are 
reconstructed and analyzed in terms of ideal-type social mechanisms” (p. 45). Before moving to the 
second step, they examine counterfactual outcomes that “from some plausible perspective would 
have been expected” (p. 46) by “comparing the history in that country with what happened in the 
other countries, drawing on an assumption about general similarities between contexts” (p. 48). In 
the second step, “these processes are compared by making use of the identified mechanisms and 
some ideal-type periodization” (p. 45). They define ideal-type generalization as a two-step process, 
involving the abstraction of mechanisms from empirical observation, and inferring those 
abstractions to other comparable contexts as expectation of similar mechanisms (p. 54). The 
purpose of the comparison in their framework is ultimately to illuminate path-dependent characters 
of a certain phenomenon that explains the divergence in the outcomes of selected cases in the long 
run after the critical juncture.24 However, they offer a less deterministic account of path dependency 
compared to other scholars such as James Mahoney (2000) by allowing for endogenous institutional 
changes and counter-factual cases.  
Even though some findings in the present research might be reasonably interpreted as 
having path-dependent characteristics, demonstrating path dependency, even in its “weak 
definition” suggested by Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017), is not the focus of this study. This is 
because the most relevant processes are relatively ephemeral and highly volatile to demonstrate 
longer-term self-reinforcement mechanisms that are so central in the conception of path-
dependency. Nevertheless, the comparison will make use of the general outlook of the above 
methodological model. It preserves the two-step procedure by first conducting an in-depth within-
case analysis and then a cross-case analysis of the selected cases. For its counterfactual analysis, the 
research takes France for Part I (i.e. the making of the movements) and Russia for Part II (i.e. the 
trajectory of the movements) essentially to examine the causal weight of the identified processes 
 
22 David Waldner (2012) has defined mechanism as “an agent or entity that has the capacity to alter its environment 
because it possesses an invariant property that, in specific contexts, transmits either a physical force or information that 
influences the behavior of other agents or entities” (p. 18). 
23 Also see Wendy S. Parker (2010) for an earlier attempt to formalize comparative process tracing.  
24 They define critical junctures as “transitional situations in which actors have the possibility to make choices that 
would open up a new path” (2017, p. 52).  
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leading to specific outcomes in Part I, and specific trajectories in Part I. Cross-case analysis also 
seeks to explain notable differences between the German and Italian cases in both parts. 
Furthermore, rather than invoking the concept of critical junctures and focal points, both of which 
are more attuned to path-dependence analysis, the study utilizes the notion of conjunctures.25 The 
two major conjunctures concerning the “council democratic” movements around WWI are the 
outbreak of the war and the post-war crises.  
Within each conjuncture, periodization is used to organize the temporally ordered processes 
into causally significant segments. Periodization goes beyond the organization of the events in 
smaller and more manageable temporal segments. Just as there are a multiplicity of forces 
influencing any given process, there can be several time scales that regulate a variety of complex 
conjunctural developments within the process. As Bob Jessop (2007) emphasizes, periodization 
“classifies actions, events, and periods into stages according to their conjunctural implications (as 
specific combinations of constraints and opportunities on the pursuit of different projects) for the 
actions of different social forces on different sites of action over different time horizons” (p. 88). In 
this study, the logic of periodization is principally based on modes of class struggles that are 
causally relevant to the making and the trajectory of the movements. What counts as a causally 
relevant mode of class struggle relates to the structure of form analysis described below.  
Similarly, the formation of ideal type mechanisms in both parts of the study is guided by the 
analysis of forms. The making of the “council democratic” movements in Germany and Italy is 
analyzed in Part I by focusing on the transformation of state form during the war and its impact on 
the form of class struggle after the war. The central role given to the state in the analysis is due to 
the massive increase in state power in the course of the war to coordinate the war effort, thereby 
fundamentally shaping the contours of class struggle. Such an expansive transformation of state 
power was not unique to Germany and Italy, but common to all belligerent countries. However, as 
will be argued in Part I, the particular transformation in the formal structure of the state during the 
war laid the ground for the emergence of the particular form of class struggle after the war. The 
analytical framework through which the state is conceptualized is discussed in the next section.  
The trajectory of the “council democratic” movements in Germany and Italy is analyzed in 
Part II by examining the transformation of the movement after the war. While the state continues to 
play an important role, the analysis in Part II is anchored on the evolution of the constitutive modes 
of “council democracy” (i.e. “citizens’ control” and “workers’ control”) in each case studies as 
shaped by various forces involved in the movement.  
 




On Case Selection 
The WWI era saw the most radical manifestation of the council movement in history. This 
goes beyond the case of Russia where the movement played a central role in the revolutionary 
processes especially between the February Revolution and the October Revolution. It also 
dominated the radical movements during the German Revolution, Austro-Hungarian Revolution, 
and the biennio rosso. Furthermore, compared to the central role that the Soviet Union and the 
Third International played in relation to the development of communist movements around the 
world in later years, the “council democratic” movements in the WWI era evolved in relative 
isolation from the developments in Russia.26 Another factor that contributes to the relative 
disentanglement of these cases is that national economies and national political systems in the WWI 
era were still much less integrated compared to later periods. Lastly, since the trajectory of these 
movements preceded the development of “council democracy” as a distinct theoretical school that 
emerged around 1921 (van der Linden, 2004), the study illuminates the historical processes that 
underpinned the later theoretical elaborations which the movements engendered.  
 It should be first clarified that each within-case analysis is carried out at a country level, 
even though there was a considerable variation in the level of intensity and the timing of these 
movements across each country. There have been many studies that focused on particular cities and 
regions (e.g. Mazzacurati, 2017; Smith, 2017; Gluckstein, 1986; Tobin, 1984; Comfort, 1966; 
Mitchell, 1965). Of course, the appropriateness of the unit of analysis depends on the analytic angle 
of the study. Since the primary focus is on the way state strategies shaped, and in turn were shaped 
by, the development of these movements, taking the country as the unit of analysis seems more 
appropriate. Even though a war economy often made a few cities with war industries 
asymmetrically more important, state strategies had to take larger aggregates into account. This 
made the evolution of these movements within smaller localities such as a city symbiotically linked 
to the developments outside.  
 Among the “council democratic” movements in the WWI era, the German and Italian cases 
are instructive as each gravitates, at least at the time of the emergence of the movement, towards 
one of the two constitutive modes of “council democracy”, with the former leaning towards 
“citizens’ control” and Italy towards “workers’ control”. The analysis first aims at illuminating the 
reasons for the emergence of “council democratic” movements, at least in one of its two constitutive 
 
26 Of course, this is not an absolute isolation. The news of the Russian Revolution indeed had a tremendous impact on 
militant labour movement in Europe and beyond (Retish and Rendle, 2020; Rodney, 2018; Pasquali and Pozzi, 2017; 
Fayet et al., 2017). However, the details of the council movement in Russia were not known outside the country and the 
newly form Bolshevik government plunged into a civil war did not yet have the capacity or the interest to functionally 




modes, in Germany and Italy. It does so by looking at the particular form that the state-led war 
mobilization took in these countries and compares that with the case of France where such 
movements did not emerge. The analysis will then trace the subsequent development of the 
movements to see the factors that contributed to shaping their devolution and ultimate demise. 
These processes are then contrasted with the dialectical synthesis of the two modes in the case of 
Russia.  
On Strategic-Relational Approach to the State  
Different approaches to the state can be categorized into three groups organized in terms of 
their underlying ontological presupposition about the state, namely, instrumentalist, structuralist, 
and strategic-relational approaches.27 Instrumental understanding of the state can be found in both 
non-Marxist and Marxist approaches. The former tends to take the state as an instrument that is 
used by the state officials to implement their distinct projects which are generally concerned with 
the control of territory and people and are shaped by the field of intrastate competition.28 The latter 
takes the class composition of state managers as the indication of the class character of the state.29 
Although they differ profoundly in terms of the link between who controls the state and the nature 
of the state projects, they both analyze the state in terms of who controls it; therefore, taking the 
state itself as an instrument. They fail to understand the ways states are fundamentally rather than 
accidentally linked to different modes of social relations of production. Apparent class biases in the 
state policies or reactions are explained away either by stating that they are the smoothest ways to 
maintaining the internal order or most beneficial in the intrastate competition, as “state-autonomy” 
school tends to argue, or by making them contingent on the class affiliation of the beholders of state 
institutions.  
An alternative to this would be a structuralist view of the state. This approach, which has 
been quite influential within the Marxist tradition, takes the view that the state plays an essential 
role in the reproduction of the social relation of production within which it is embedded. It does so 
not because its institutions are occupied by members affiliated with the dominant classes but 
because it is structurally biased to fulfil that role. The core puzzle of the structuralist approach lies 
precisely in explaining how such a structural bias is possible. This has naturally led to many 
different solutions. With regards to the capitalist state, some use the notion of market imperatives 
and “capital flights” to explain how state policies on average come to be stirred towards favouring 
 
27 For more nuanced overview of various critical approaches to the state, see Barrow (1993) and Jessop (1990).  
28 An example of this would be Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions (1979). 
29 The polemical account of the state by Marx and Friedrich Engels in Manifesto of the Communist Party would be an 
example of this.  
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the reproduction of the capitalist social relation (Barrow, 1993, p. 60).30 Some begin with the 
structural tendency of capital towards crises or class struggle and argue that the state plays the 
essential role in mitigating the social costs and mediating between (and within) classes without 
which capital cannot reproduce itself. It is not difficult to see how a functionalist ontology of the 
state – as playing a necessary role in the reproduction of the mode of production – lurks in the 
background of this approach. Jessop (1990) highlights the weaknesses of the structuralist view of 
the state. It assumes, first, that the reproduction of the social relation of production is always the 
priority of state managers; secondly, that the politicians always know what needs to be done to 
reproduce the social relations; thirdly, that reproduction can ideally be done without itself 
generating or deepening crises; and fourthly, that the same recipe can fulfil the needs of different 
factions of capital (p. 117).  
The third alternative is to conceive of the state essentially as a relation.31 Within Marxism, 
this view is found explicitly in the later writings of Poulantzas where he begins to recognize the 
state not as an entity or a subject but as a relationship. In a key passage, he (1980) suggests, “the 
(capitalist) state should not be regarded as an intrinsic entity: like ‘capital’, it is rather a 
relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among 
classes and class fractions, such as this is expressed within the State in a necessarily specific form” 
(p. 128; emphasis in the original). He explicitly mentions that this relationship of forces among and 
within classes and class fractions has certain materiality that is inscribed in the state apparatus itself 
(i.e. state policies and the institutional network and personnel that carry state power forward). 
Furthermore, we always have to take the specific form of the state into account when we examine 
this condensation of the relationship of forces between classes and class fractions (i.e. the state). 
The direct implication of this is that the relationship between the state and social classes is no 
longer something external to the state but traverses through the state as a “strategic field and process 
of intersecting power networks” (p. 135), albeit in the form-specific materiality of the state.  
 The relational conception of the state affects how popular struggles are to be conceived. 
They are not to be understood as movements external to the state seeking to penetrate into its 
fortress or set up their own independent counter-state outside the walls of the state. These struggles 
affect what Poulantzas (1980) calls “the unstable equilibrium of compromises between [and within] 
 
30 There are others, such as Fred Block and Stephen Elkin, who give less emphasis on the “laws of the market” and see 
them as “merely promoting a natural alliance between state and capital” (Barrow, 1993, p. 62).  
31 This conception can be found again in both non-Marxist and Marxist approaches. The former appears within field-
theoretical and game-theoretical approaches. These approaches conceive of the state either as a legally privileged locus 
of overlapping fields (see Loyal, 2016, and Fligstein and McAdam, 2011; 2012) or as a complex web of non-unitary 
sub-players such as bureaucrats, legislators, police, and parties that interact with each other on the basis of a set of rules 
(see Jasper and Duyvendak, 2015a). They generally fail to explain the selectivity of the capitalist state towards some 
strategies over others. 
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the dominant classes and the dominated” (p. 31), and in doing this, they “constantly call into 
question the unity of the state personnel as a category in the service of the existing power and 
hegemonic fraction of the dominant classes” (p. 155). Therefore, movements traverse the strategic-
relational field, which itself is a form-specific material condensation of past and present social 
relations and struggles, and open new antagonisms and contradictions within this field. 
Furthermore, since the state is not a monolithic block, the resources and the capacities that it 
potentially gives access to are obtained through a strategic process of interaction of forces with one 
another within the state. Moreover, because this engagement must transmit through the state 
apparatus, this strategic field is by no means symmetrical for all forces. The biases that are 
structurally built into the state apparatus also include the material condensation of past struggles.  
On Strategic-Relational Approach to the Movement  
Similar to our conceptualization of the state, the movements involved in these 
transformative processes are analyzed fundamentally in strategic-relational terms. There have been 
attempts in recent years within social movement theory towards a (strategic-) relational theory of 
social movements.32 A number of Marxist theorists (e.g. Modonesi, 2019; Nilsen and Cox, 2014; 
Barker et al., 2013) have sought to incorporate class struggle as an essentially relational concept 
into social movement theory. Their framework conceives of collective action along the principle 
axis of subalternity-antagonism-autonomy between the “dominant” and the “dominated”, with the 
former pursuing its interest through movements from “above” and the latter through movements 
from “below”. However, their theorization does not go far enough into the reciprocal process of 
mediated effects between the subaltern and the forces especially within the state. Therefore, the role 
of formal organizations within and outside the state, including political parties and trade unions, in 
movements from below are not sufficiently theorized.  
Subaltern struggles are rarely completely independent or isolated from the organizations that 
formally (or informally) represent them and seek to further their collective interests. “Autonomous 
subalternity” is an oxymoron. This is not to say that emancipatory movements towards self-
determination, and therefore eventual dismantling of a particular dimension of subalternity, are not 
possible. Subaltern struggles are often formed in, through, sometimes simultaneously against, or at 
 
32 See Fligstein and McAdam (2011; 2012), and Jasper and Duyvendak (2015a; 2015b) as two recent examples of 
defining social movements relationally outside a Marxist framework. The former offers a collaborative definition of 
strategic action, operating within dynamic, issue-dependent, and interactive fields, that aims towards stability of social 
worlds. It emphasizes on the importance of accounting for change as much as of stability; however, it does so by 
reducing change and transformation to an incidental rather than a fundamental feature of interactions within and 
between fields. The latter offers a game-theoretical understanding of strategic dynamics and between different “players” 
within particular “arenas”. Taking structures as metaphoric and static, dynamism of social world is deposited on the 




the very least in an external relation to such organizations. Precisely due to the mediating effects of 
such organizations, the struggles towards self-determination are not always necessarily waged 
between the subaltern and the dominant groups. But it is also, and sometimes even more crucially, 
within the existing and evolving organizations of subaltern politics that the conditions for self-
emancipation should be advanced – hence, the importance of struggles for the democratization of 
unions, parties, etc. Furthermore, the conditions for the development of organizational and 
ideological capacities of the subaltern groups do not always emerge entirely as a result of a direct 
struggle between the dominant and dominated groups, but sometimes as a consequence of the 
operations of the state and changing balance of forces within it, always in relation to and sometimes 
directly involving formal or informal organizations of subaltern groups.  
Therefore, the attempts to incorporate Marxism into social movement studies, and hence to 
integrate the analysis of class relations and class struggle, need to bring organizational analysis 
centrally to their study of subaltern struggles. This research can be seen as an attempt towards that 
goal. Its insistence on the centrality of organizational mediation follows from the fact that subaltern 
struggles always emerge within the pre-existing mesh of subaltern struggles, themselves mediated 
by their own network of subaltern organizations. Even if there are organizing forces surfacing 
originally out of the emergent subaltern movements, they are bound to come into contact with the 
existing organizations and movements.  
A strategic-relational approach to movements allows conceiving of movements themselves 
as terrains of strategic struggle and contestation between both emergent and existing organizing 
forces, with their own historicity that includes organizational capacities, programmatic 
commitments, and ongoing or forthcoming alliances. This implies that the emergent movement is 
never a blank slate – or at best not for long. Rather, it carries historical residues of the ensemble of 
forces involved in the movement. Moreover, the multiplicity of forces within a movement implies 
that the movement is prone to conflicts, fragmentations, and crises in ways that the integrity of the 
movement cannot be assumed. Possible coalitions between organizing forces are not necessarily 
based on common belief and collective solidarity but part of a strategic engagement. Furthermore, 
the movements come into relation with the state (itself understood as a relation) through the 
mediation of organizing forces in various degrees depending on their types (e.g. political parties, 
trade unions, etc.) and to a different extent depending on their relations within the state and other 
forces. Therefore, any emergent subaltern movement cannot be isolated from either the ensemble of 
pre-existing organizations or wholly outside the state. The strategic aspect of the analysis connects 
the movement and the larger context through part of which it evolves and upon part of which it 
operates. This means that the context is never passive but always active partially with regards to the 
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movement; and that the context is never static but always dynamic partially influenced by the 
movement in evolution. These interconnected nuances are what strategies are essentially and 
primarily concerned with to determine the next course of action, henceforth impacting both the 
movement and the context.  
Analytical Framework  
 This section presents the analytical framework to conceptualize the discussion in Part I and 
Part II of the study. Part I takes a strategic-relational approach to the state. The analytical 
framework used to characterize the state follows Jessop’s conceptualization (2016; 2007; 1990). It 
distinguishes between the formal and substantive dimensions of the state. The former is constituted 
by modes of representation, institutional architecture, and patterns of intervention. The latter is 
constituted by social base, state project, and hegemonic vision. The most relevant dimensions of the 
state for the present research is the state form. This makes the analysis in Part I largely a form 
analysis. However, among the substantive dimensions, hegemonic vision also plays a crucial role. 
Part II also takes a strategic-relational approach to the movement. The movement is conceptualized 
as having both formal and substantive aspects. The former is composed of relation with the state, 
internal structure, and material/symbolic capacity. The latter is composed of social base, 
programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns. In contrast to the analysis in Part I, Part II focuses 
mainly on the substantive aspects of the movement. However, it also takes into account movement’s 
relationship with the state.  
Analytical Framework for the Study of the State 
Since state power can only operate through institutions, the general architecture of power 
distribution governing the institutional ensemble is essential in understanding the concrete ways in 
which state power manifests itself. Furthermore, since the constitution of social classes as political 
forces cannot exist outside and independently of the state, the mode of representation that state 
structure facilitates is essential in understanding the formation and the dynamics of the relation of 
class forces and patterns of (inter- and intra-) class alliances. Lastly, state institutions operate on the 
basis of diverse modes and mechanisms of intervention to extract from and deploy resources to 
society and to mobilize political and social resources for various state projects. State intervention 
influences the contested and changing state-society boundaries and patterns of (inter- and intra-) 
class alliances. The modes of representation, institutional architecture, and patterns of state 
intervention together constitute the form of state power (Jessop, 2016, pp. 59-71). State-form 
profoundly influences class struggle in its structure and its effect upon the balance of class forces. 
As Jessop (1979) argues, “[state-form] enables us to examine the effects of the inadequate 
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articulation of representation and intervention on accumulation and domination and this provides 
concepts useful in the analysis of a structural crisis of the state apparatus” (p. 193)  
State form is neither static nor stable. Since the state is a terrain of class (and non-class) 
struggle riddled by internal contradictions and tensions, the form of the state undergoes partial or 
fundamental transformations over time and at different conjunctures to facilitate the possibility of 
maintaining what Poulantzas called “the unstable equilibrium of compromises between [and within] 
the dominant classes and the dominated” (1980, p. 31). A transformation of state form is not 
required to overcome every internal or external challenge that the state has to face. However, any 
particular state form presents the state with certain capacities and limitations for maintaining its 
unity and for promoting the reproduction of capitalist class relation. These, in turn, deeply affect the 
strategic terrain within and outside the state upon which agents and forces (inter)act. This is why 
state form analysis offers an entry point into understanding the forms of state crises and 
revolutionary ruptures but also the strategic-relational terrain upon which the revolutionary forces 
and movements evolve.  
The institutional architecture of the state concerns “the internal vertical, horizontal, and 
transversal organization of the state system as expressed through the distribution of powers among 
its parts, considered territorially and functionally” (Jessop, 2016, p. 66). It concerns the formal and 
substantive relationship between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, the 
bureaucratic structure of the state apparatus (p. 66). The institutional architecture of the state 
provides the background upon which the unity of the state apparatus is forged, forces involved in 
various state projects are coordinated, and tensions and contradictions traverse through the state. 
The vertical organization of the state system might increase the efficient coordination of action. 
However, class contradictions and characteristic tensions of hierarchical structures tend to run more 
deeply through the vertical structure of the state apparatus and affect its unity more fundamentally. 
Non-vertical organization of the state system reduces hierarchical tensions and facilitates the 
refraction of class contradictions across different branches of the state, thus making the equilibrium 
of compromises more sustainable.  
The militarized state discussed in this research is considered as a subset of top-down state 
architecture. It differs from other types of top-down structure such as bureaucratized state because 
in the militarized state the military apparatus of the state has extended itself into the general 
bureaucratic apparatus of the state. To avoid sliding into an instrumentalist understanding of the 
state, we should emphasize that the presence or absence of military personnel per se does not 
necessarily indicate the militarization of the state or lack thereof. If the militarized state is 
understood as a condition of rigid institutional verticality in which the lower echelons are strictly 
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subordinated to the upper echelons, and of sharp skewness of the strategic selectivity of the state 
towards the fulfilment of the material (and immaterial) needs of the military and the fractions of 
capital represented or supported by it, then it can potentially be achieved also under a centralized 
bureaucratic order. Conversely, it is also possible that the presence of military personnel in 
positions of power by itself would not result in a militarized state if, for example, the institutional 
architecture of the state is not conducive to centralized control. Therefore, we cannot just look for 
the presence or absence of military personnel in positions of power as indicative of the militarized 
state. In war conditions especially at the scale that WWI demanded, there was already a tendency 
towards a militarization of the state through rigid centralization of state institutions and sharp 
concentration of resources and sociopolitical forces to the military effort. If the military apparatus is 
allowed to impose itself structurally and strategically within the state, then such tendency is more 
likely to be actually realized. In this sense, having the military apparatus under civilian control 
could potentially (but not necessarily) be a deterrent strategy against the militarization of the state. 
 Jessop (1979) suggests a scheme, though not an exhaustive one, that divides the possible 
modes of representation and intervention into three categories, namely, parliamentarism, 
corporatism, and tripartism. Parliamentarianism is based on indirect participation of formally equal 
citizens in policy-making of an elected government. State intervention is devised “in the form of 
legislation or general policies enforced by a permanent rational-legal administration in accordance 
with the rule of law” (p. 194). Parliamentarism diffuses political pressure from below by atomizing 
the social base into formally equal individual citizens whose political representations and interests 
are mediated through political parties. Such mediated diversification encourages fragmentation of 
economic categories and allows various classes and class fractions to (potentially) channel their 
political interests into the state and compete on formally equal grounds to broaden their social base 
and to increase their political power. This, on its own, has a stabilizing effect on competing forces 
and interests. However, at times of acute socio-economic crisis when the state needs to swiftly and 
decisively mobilize economic and social forces, this form of representation can acutely strain the 
political system.  
Corporatism involves “the fusion of political representation mediated through a system of 
public ‘corporations’ which are constituted on the basis of their members’ function within the 
division of labour [in a given economic space]” (p. 195). Corporatism manufactures a framework of 
class collaboration and compromise between politically equivalent and functionally heterogeneous 
socioeconomic producer groups, often with the active support of a sovereign authority to overcome 
disturbances and impasses. It facilitates the mutual interaction of these groups at the leadership 
level to coordinate their actions and to mobilize their base in order to push state projects forward. It 
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nevertheless requires that they maintain functional unity within their socioeconomic bloc and 
control of their base. Hence, it creates a system of coordination and control rendered through these 
“corporations”. But while it may achieve effective coordination among major socioeconomic 
producer groups and mediated forms of social control, corporatism brings class conflict right in the 
heart of the state. Furthermore, due to the limited, predetermined, and functional representation of 
different class fractions, it may reduce the relative autonomy of class forces to agents of 
mobilization behind state projects, which in turn can create tensions between the leadership and the 
members of these class forces. 
 Tripartism is a hybrid configuration that combines aspects of parliamentarism and 
corporatism into “a contradictory unity owing to the formal participation in corporatist decision-
making of representatives of the parliamentary executive (‘government’) and/or the delegation of 
corporatist policy implementation to the parliamentary bureaucracy and/or the formal participation 
of corporations in the decision-making of the parliamentary executive and/or the delegation of 
parliamentary policy administration to the corporations” (pp. 195-6). The mode and mechanism of 
state intervention are themselves the result of a particular combination of the corporatist and 
parliamentary aspects in a given case. Tripartism is a hybrid system of representation in the form of 
“liberal corporatism” that has certain adaptive capacities which could potentially help to overcome 
some of the deficiencies of parliamentarism and corporatism. It can facilitate the formal 
representation of not only the major economic-corporate entities but broader aggregate (economic 
or non-economic) entities as well as individual citizens at the state level. It can, therefore, achieve 
more direct economic coordination and more mediated social control than parliamentarism while 
attaining more diverse political articulation and a broader spectrum of interests at the state level 
than corporatism. It can also give more autonomy and flexibility to the corporate groups to toggle 
between class conflict and class collaboration, enabling them to maintain a closer relationship with 
their base while benefiting from active participation in state projects. As a hybrid structure, 
tripartism is also subjected to various contradictions and tensions inherent in parliamentarism and 
corporatism.  
The hegemonic vision of the state is an essential dimension of state power precisely because 
the state bears the responsibility of creating social cohesion and general institutional integration 
beyond the ruling classes, even though it is only a part of a complex social order (Jessop, 2017, pp. 
58-60). Hegemonic vision pronounces “the nature and purposes of the state for the wider society”, 
thereby legitimizing the state as upholding the common good (pp. 57-8), although in fact always 
partially and selectively (pp. 86-7). The formal separation of the “political” and the “economic” 
under capitalism enables the state to play this role ever more effectively than in the previous eras. 
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However, since the state is in fact essential for the reproduction of the capitalist social relation and 
capitalist class relations, this remains always partial and deeply contradictory.  
Jessop distinguishes between “one nation” and “two nations” projects (p. 87) as two types of 
hegemonic visions, each of which opens up different strategic horizons for the state. The former 
“aim at an expansive and inclusive hegemony, based on widespread popular support mobilized 
through material concessions and symbolic rewards [...]” (p. 87). In contrast, the latter “aim[s] 
explicitly or implicitly at a more limited hegemony, based on the support of strategically significant 
sectors of the population, and seek to pass the costs of the project to other, excluded sectors [...]” (p. 
87). Each of these legitimization strategies opens up different horizons of possibilities, with their 
own set of contradictions, for the state. While the “one nation” strategy can potentially expand the 
legitimacy of the state within broader social classes under one unified vision of the nation, it can 
both strengthen the material and symbolic capacity of popular classes to challenge the ruling 
classes, and lead some fractions of the ruling class to withdraw their support from the state in 
protest against the concessions to the popular classes. While the “two nations” strategy can keep the 
potentially challenging sectors at bay and consolidate the ruling classes more tightly, it can both 
result in a crisis of legitimacy among the popular classes by losing its image of promoting the 
common good, and lose the support of some fractions of the ruling classes which reject 
exclusionary policies.  
Analytical Framework for the Study of the Movement 
To expand on what has been mentioned earlier, all the relevant substantive aspects of the 
movement are rendered through organizing forces involved within the movement since the 
movement is taken to operate through collective organizations. The analysis of organizing forces 
takes into account both the preexisting organized forces (e.g. pre-existing political parties or trade 
unions) that engage with the movement and those forces that are endogenous to the movement (e.g. 
a new political party that emerged from the movement). These organizing forces, with certain 
capacities, leadership, etc., all of which are implied under the notion of “organizational forces”, 
must enter into the terrain of the movement with some programmatic vision on the nature of the 
movement, its goals, and practical steps forward. These are themselves linked strategically with pre-
existing programmatic visions and commitments of those organizing forces – hence the extreme 
unlikelihood of the pre-existing forces abandoning all their previous organizational linkages, 
programmatic visions, and ongoing and forthcoming alliances to embrace the new, purportedly 
emancipatory movement upon its emergence.  
The historicity of preexisting organized forces may affect the way they interact with other 
forces within the movement due to their prior organizational links, prior programmatic 
33 
 
commitments, prior ideological positions, etc. Furthermore, since organizing forces on their own 
and beyond the movement are themselves prone to internal conflict, occasional crisis, and potential 
splits, all of which can impact the relationship with other forces within the movement, the 
movement itself is seen as a field of contestation. Moreover, while recognizing the different forms 
and extents of relations within the state, the analysis incorporates the discussion of both political 
organizations such as political parties, the military apparatus, the bureaucratic apparatus, etc. and 
civil society organizations, such as trade unions, cooperatives, etc. relevant to the movement. 
Political organizations are more directly involved within the state than civil society organizations; 
although the latter is, at least by proxy, linked to, therefore never entirely outside of, the state.33 
This involvement may impact the type of strategic considerations that political organizations have 
to make (e.g. electability and governability) compared to those that civil society organizations 
might have to make (e.g. membership and partnership) with respect to their engagement with the 
movement.  
Programmatic effort concerns with a whole series of considerations about the movement, 
including its goals, strategies, tactics, boundaries, membership, historical role, class/group identity, 
etc. At the most basic level, programmatic effort provides the movement with an operational unity 
for those involved to be able to orient themselves effectively and their actions strategically “in the 
service of the movement”. However, that unity cannot be assumed as stable or conclusive since 
programmatic efforts are not singular. Since the movement is essentially a strategic-relational 
terrain, its nature and the principal strategies, etc. to achieve its goals are not a given attribute of the 
movement but itself an unstable result of contestation between the programmatic efforts of the 
organizing forces. Since, as stated above, the organizational forces do not have to always be 
endogenous to the movement, the engagement of some organizational forces with programmatic 
efforts concerning the movement can be an appendage to or a subset of their larger programmatic 
visions. This highlights the crucial fact that programmatic efforts are not merely an intellectual 
exercise of clarification but a strategically oriented activity that can and often does extend beyond 
the boundaries of the movement.  
Furthermore, the complex assemblage of these programmatic efforts does not have to be 
coherent, homogenous, or comprehensive. It may contain contradictory aspects due to contradictory 
elements not only within a programme posited by any particular organizing force but also as a result 
 
33 This is not a statement about the effective power of political organizations relative to civil society organizations on 
the state. In fact, some civil society organizations might have significantly larger effect on the state than some political 
parties. Rather, it is derived from the definition of political society as the sphere of forces within the state. Civil society 
organizations may include those formally active in state-society mediation process (e.g. certain trade unions in their 




of the compilation of several programmes. Therefore, programmatic efforts may result in 
contradictory unities. The resulting unity may include the outlines of possible new coalitions 
between the organizational forces engaged within the movement. Moreover, in the work of defining 
goals and ways to achieve them, programmatic efforts may inscribe the outlines of possible 
alliances with forces outside the class/group nature of the movement, whatever that is defined 
within a given programmatic vision. The latter is different from the consideration of alliance 
formation since that includes the concrete work of forming such possibilities in an attempt to 
expand the sphere of movement’s hegemony.  
 The analysis of alliance patterns is concerned with the horizon of strategic alliances with 
social classes/groups and/or organized forces outside the movements but whose support is needed 
for the success of the hegemonic project of the movement within the bounds of its transformative 
vision. While alliance can bring strategic unity between various forces, it does not by itself resolve 
preexisting tensions or underlying contradictions between the allied forces.  
There has been a significant gap in social movement theory with regards to the study of 
alliance formation. If the relation between organizing forces and social classes are taken not as 
necessary that can be assumed essentially but as contingent that has to be (re)constructed strategic-
relationally, then incongruities between patterns of organizational alliances and patterns of class 
alliances have to be considered. Hence, for example, “a party entente may last longer than a class 
alliance, in so far as a class may maintain its agreement with another through the intermediary of its 
party (or parties) on the political scene, even though they have effectively broken their alliance in 
the field of the class struggle” (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 252). But since class alliances require 
organizational mediation, such incongruity implies that shifting patterns of class alliances within 
organizational mediations depends on organizational capacities and programmatic efforts of 
collective entities involved. This implies that changing alliance patterns should be analyzed by 
looking at changing patterns of active collaborations among organizations but without assuming 
that these necessarily mirror patterns of class alliances. For example, observing an alliance between 
the socialist party and the Catholic party, while significant on its own account, cannot necessarily 
be taken as an alliance between the working class (or certain fractions within it) and the landowning 
classes or the peasants. It should be taken into account that the persistence of alliances, once they 
are formed, cannot be assumed. Just like any informal organizational links, their preservation 
requires a certain amount of organizational work and continued strategic interest.  
Concluding Remarks  
Following the general outline of the research as shown in Table 1 below shows, the 
introduction had to present many different aspects of the research. The following empirical chapters 
35 
 
will present the historical sociology of the “council democratic” movements in Germany and Italy 
in the WWI era. Part I, Chapters 2 to 4, presents the within-case studies of the making of the 
“council democratic” movements in Germany and in Italy, followed by a comparative chapter that 
starts by presenting the contrasting case of France and discussing comparative conclusions that can 
be drawn from the analysis. Part II, Chapters 5 to 7, presents within case studies of the trajectories 
of “council democratic” movements in Germany and Italy during the Germany Revolution (1918-
20) and the biennio rosso (1919-1920), followed by a comparative chapter that first gives an 
overview of Russia as the contrasting case before presenting comparative conclusions. The 
concluding chapter recaps the findings and connects them with the larger phenomenon of “council 
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The Making of the “Council Democratic” Movement in Germany 
 
Introduction 
 The conceptual characterization of “council democracy” outlined in the introductory chapter 
demands a broader approach to the making of “council democratic” movements that goes beyond 
tracing the lineages of councils as an institutional form. Therefore, this analysis does not offer an 
institutional genealogy of the council movement but a class analysis of the condition of its 
possibility in an evolving context. The making of “council democratic” movements should be 
analyzed in terms of transformative processes that laid the political, economic, and ideological 
grounds for their emergence.  
The primary source of such transformative processes in the WWI era was state-led war 
mobilization. A total war at the scale that was waged by the belligerent countries required nothing 
less than an unprecedented intervention of the state in both extent and form into all aspects of social 
life. It is by tracing the processes through which state-led war mobilization transformed the 
contours of class struggle, creating new contradictions and capacities which in turn shaped its 
further evolution, that we can understand the making of “council democratic” movements in their 
particular form in a particular country. While the extraordinary intervention of the state (eventually) 
helped reveal the class character of both the state and the economy to a massive number of people 
in the belligerent countries (Carsten, 1982; Horne, 1991; Corner and Procacci, 1997; Gatrell, 2014; 
Akın, 2018), class and popular struggles evolved through the way in which state-led war 
mobilization was conducted. Therefore, the analysis should examine the precise ways that the state 
shaped and was shaped by class struggle during the war.  
The pre-war structure of the German state and the relations of class forces prior to the war 
predisposed the state architecture to transform into a militarized state. The militarized state 
architecture assisted the later intervention of the state into social relations (including the economic 
relations) increasingly under a corporatist mode of representation.  
A detailed overview of how the struggle of classes and class fractions within and outside the 
state since 1871 came together to constitute the structural foundation and institutional order of the 
state, as well as state-society relations is outlined in Appendix A. It outlines that the hybrid class 
structure of the ruling bloc composed of a Protestant landed aristocracy (Junker) and large capitalist 
interests, which left the German state far from an ideal type of a capitalist state. This further created 
a series of tendencies and contradictions within and outside the state. The basic structure of the 
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German state after the unification was precisely to shield large landed interests of the Prussian 
aristocracy, an essential pillar of which was the military, from the influence of other powerful 
political forces as well as democratic pressures from below. This structural insulation was designed 
in such a closed way that even universal male suffrage that had already been imposed was thought 
not to have any significant political consequence.  
Nevertheless, both Catholic and socialist forces were seen as a threat that had to be 
repressed by force as well as by a series of reform measures to weaken their popular appeals. The 
combination of repression and reforms before the turn of the century in the context of universal 
suffrage yet in an undemocratic state structure had profound impacts on the socialist and labour 
movement. The state measures that tried to repress the socialist movement without banning their 
organizations to run in the Reichstag elections not only made the socialist movement more widely 
popular among the working class but also made electoral strategy the primary preoccupation of the 
socialist party. However, the functional weakness of the Reichstag within an undemocratic state 
structure allowed the socialist party to aim for electoral success as a show of defiance and to direct 
its attention towards a republican vision of democratization of the state and economy while 
maintaining its unsubstantiated revolutionary overtone. This strategy, formulated in the Erfurt 
Programme of 1891, enabled them to leave the question of the transformation of the capitalist state 
insufficiently theorized. Furthermore, the leadership of trade unions became increasingly interested 
in taking part in the management of some of the state’s reform measures especially after the turn of 
the century when the state showed a more consolidatory attitude towards working-class 
organizations.1 The relative exclusion of small capitalist interests from the ruling bloc and the later 
collapse of the Bülow Bloc made the socialist party interested in the prospect of collaborating with 
non-socialist forces to democratize the state. Hence, while the German state remained predisposed 
to a vertical organization of power and a corporatist mode of representation, the socialist forces 
were inclined towards democratization of the German state through electoral and alliance strategies 
with a view towards potential collaboration within the corporatist institutions.  
As the state architecture that developed during the war amalgamated the contradictions of 
the military and that of the state, the crisis of the military due to pressures for democratization from 
the lower echelon of the military as well as struggles among the top echelon of the military 
translated itself into a general crisis of the state. In turn, the military order was made more 
 
1 On the evolving relationship between the socialist union and the party, see Appendix A. 
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susceptible to pressures for democratization from outside the military as well as struggles between 
the top echelon of the military and the political leaders.2  
Furthermore, under the impact of the massive requirements of a total war, the state’s mode 
of representation continued certain trends already present in pre-war years and developed into 
corporatism. To facilitate the corporatist arrangement during the war, the German state 
systematically created and integrated rank-and-file organizations which then became the 
institutional epicentre of radical democratic movements in the form of councils. But this corporatist 
arrangement also increasingly involved working-class organizations, particularly their leadership 
strata, in the management of the war.  
The growing tensions between the state’s militarized architecture with its top echelon 
standing as representatives of the Prussian landed aristocracy, and the state’s corporatist mode of 
representation with growing empowerment of certain fractions of capital and dominant working-
class organizations (as well as elements within other social classes and groups) created pressures for 
democratization from within the state. At the same time, bottom-up struggles for democratization 
both inside and outside factories and the army, which was predicated upon bringing the war to an 
end, surpassed the relatively limited and largely unsuccessful attempts by the forces within the state. 
These bottom-up movements were not completely aliened from or in principle opposed to struggles 
within the state. But the inability or unwillingness of the leadership of these popular organizations 
to effectively channel their grievances and demands into the state, due significantly to their position 
in the corporatist arrangement, further encouraged the bottom-up struggles to develop their 
capacities outside the formal channels of their established organizations.  
The analysis is organized into three periods according to their conjunctural relevance to the 
making of the “council democratic” movements. The first section marks the period between the 
beginning of the war in August 1914 until July 1916. This marks the period between the advent of 
the militarization of the state on the back of a hegemonic vision essentially based on a “two 
nations” social truce, until July 1916, right before the establishment of the Third German Supreme 
Command (Oberste Heeresleitung; OHL), which not only intensified the militarization of the state 
but also moved firmly towards implementing a corporatist arrangement. The discussion of the 
second period, between August 1916 and August 1917, analyzes the impact of a systematic 
integration of working-class organizations into the militarized corporatist state under the 
“Hindenburg Program” on the contours of class struggle within and outside the state. The third 
period, from September 1917 to November 1918, examines the final measures by the state to 
 
2 This latter consideration is added since a militarized state is never purely militarized but always accompanied by 
certain elements in the political society outside the formal sphere of the military. 
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consolidate its deepening crisis and their consequences on the evolution of democratic struggles 
within and outside the state. The last section highlights the specific factors that contributed to the 
emergence of “council democratic” movements in Germany.  
The Character of the German War Mobilization  
First Period (August 1914 – July 1916) 
At the outbreak of the war, Germany was one of the most industrialized countries in the 
world. It was also the second major producer of industrial product in Europe after the United 
Kingdom (see Broadberry, Federico, and Klein, 2010, pp. 69-77). However, its peculiar state 
structure and decentralized infrastructure for production3 were not suited for the unforgiving 
requirements of a total war. German society underwent tectonic shifts in the span of the war whose 
form, scale, and pace exhausted the old state structures and transformed the balance of class forces 
in ways that led to a profound reconstitution of the state.  
There was a serious fear that if the Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) refused to comply, the military government would 
use the pretext of war and the law of siege to suppress the party organizations. There was also a 
perception within the party that the war had large support among workers. The Free Trade Unions 
(Freie Gewerkschaften) was similarly fearful of losing its achievements under government 
repression, gripped by a strong sense of patriotism, and hopeful of potential benefits from its 
cooperation (Kocka, 1984, p. 65). However, after it was given assurance by the Office of Interior 
that the government would be glad to collaborate with the union during the war if the union 
refrained from disturbing the war effort, it took the first step on 2 August and called off all pending 
or ongoing strikes and announced that it will divert its strike funds for the duration of the war to 
unemployment relief and support of war victims (Schorske, 1983, pp. 288-9). After this 
independent decision by the leadership of the Free Trade Unions, the SPD’s options to formulate a 
coherent opposition to the war was severely limited even if there was enough willingness within the 
party to do so. Therefore, following the party discipline, the SPD deputies unanimously voted in 
favour of the war credit on 4 August and agreed to a social truce (Burgfrieden) with other parties for 
the duration of the war. The SPD was hoping that its compliance would create an opportunity to 
demand substantial concessions from the ruling classes and eventually democratize the state 
structure from within.4  
 
3 At the break of the war, only 1,378,000 of nearly 11 million German workforce were employed in firms that were 
larger than 1000 employees (Harman, 1997, p. 21). 
4 For example, only a few weeks after the beginning of the war, the SPD began pushing for the reform of Prussian 
three-class voting system (Dreiklassenwahlrecht), recognition of trade unions, and constitutional reforms (Dahlmann, 
2014, p. 45). 
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While the Burgfrieden brought the socialist leaders psychologically closer to the ruling 
classes (Schorske, 1983, pp. 293-4), it did not entail their active inclusion in the management of the 
war. The “two-nation” hegemonic vision of the state had its roots in the constitutional structure of 
the state (see Feldman, 1976, pp. 122-3; Förster, 2014, p. 94) and the relative power of the ruling 
classes within and outside the state.5 Deep antagonism between the ruling bloc and the socialist 
forces whose widespread and multifaceted activities in the prewar years were seen as creating a 
“state within the state”, as well as the anti-democratic structure of the German state had strongly 
hindered that possibility. Therefore, the Burgfrieden sought to temporarily halt the class conflict on 
the back of a “one nation” rhetorical symbolism while effectively maintaining a “two nations” 
hegemonic vision towards the conduct of the war – hence the notion of “truce” rather than “unity”. 
Given the dubious ideological foundations of the Burgfrieden based on the idea that Germany was 
fighting a defensive war, it became increasingly difficult to sustain its contradictory hegemonic 
vision. While many agencies were set up in the first year of the war to mobilize public opinion for 
the war (Welch, 2014, p. 26), neither the government nor the military apparatus instituted a 
centralized and coordinated propaganda campaign in the first period of the war. The military 
government relied heavily on self-mobilization of civil society and the population, as well as on 
repressive measures such as censorship (Chickering, 2004, pp. 46-50; Hirschfeld, 2010, pp. 433-5).  
The state architecture was reshaped through a number of measures that came into effect at 
the beginning of the war. Under the Law of Siege,6 the Deputy Commanding Generals took control 
of the civilian government at local and regional levels. Being accountable solely to the Kaiser, the 
military personnel enjoyed “almost unlimited power over a broad range of public affairs in their 
respective districts” (Chickering, 2004, p. 33) and became “something of regional rulers and there 
was no one to control them” (Förster, 2014, p. 118). Such overriding of civilian government by the 
military apparatus already shifted the state architecture closer to a militarized structure. The 
democratic channels of the state suffered further when the Reichstag delegated its legislative power 
to the Bundestag, which had far less democratic legitimacy. Although the Reich reserved the right 
to veto any legislation, it never exercised such power during the course of the war with over 800 
legislative orders passed by the Bundestag. This led to the marginalization of the Reichstag in this 
period (see Chickering, 2004, p. 34; Förster, 2014, p. 118). 
 
5 An example of the constitutional structure that structurally isolated key aspects of the state from the democratic 
influence was the complete independence the General Staff, the Military Cabinet, and the War Minister in ways that 
would prevent the War Minister, who presented the military budget to the Reichstag for approval, from answering any 
questions about the military policy (see Feldman, 1976, pp. 122-3). At a broader level, the triangular structure of the 
German state that constitutionally separated the German Supreme Command from the Chancellor while connecting 
each directly to the Emperor was designed to isolate the top echelon of the military from the influence of the parliament 
(see Förster, 2014, p. 94). 
6 The Law of Siege was first formulated in 1851 in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutionary upheavals. 
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The reorganization of the “economic” sphere towards an industrial mobilization for the war 
moved at a slower pace than the rapid changes that took place at the “political” sphere at the 
beginning of the war. All expectations and planning at the beginning of the war were based on the 
assumption that it would be a short war to victory (Harman, 1997, p. 25; Feldman, 1992, p. 56; c.f. 
Förster, 1995). Therefore, there was not much centralized coordination to reorganize production 
until the autumn of 1914 (Ullmann, 2014). Under the assumption of a short war, the military 
planning until autumn 1914 relied primarily on the stockpiles and the state-run factories7 that had 
been reserved before the war (Ullmann, 2014; Strachan, 2001, p. 781). An important early state 
initiative to regulate the distribution of raw material essential for the war effort was spearheaded by 
the industrialist, Walther Rathenau, the President of the German General Electric Company 
(Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft; AEG). He envisioned and led the creation of the Raw 
Material Department (Kriegsrohstoffabeilung; KRA) to supply raw material to the firms to produce 
for the war under state contracts. Established a few days after the start of the war, the KRA was 
dominated by representatives from various levels of industry but was formally subordinated to the 
Prussian War Ministry (Strachan, 2001, pp. 777, 783-4). To coordinate their collective capitalist 
interests and influence the state from outside the Central Association of Employers of Germany 
(Centralverband deutscher Industrieller; CDI) and the Federation of Industries (Bund der 
Industriellen; BdI),8 established the War Committee for German Industry (Kriegsausschuß der 
deutschen Industrie) in the summer of 1914 (Chickering, 2004, p. 38).  
In the meanwhile, industrialists were initially reluctant to make dramatic changes to switch 
to war production as the cost-benefit analysis of such an endeavour was questionable for them. In 
the absence of any intention within the state to significantly encroach on the capitalist relations of 
production, the War Ministry was put in charge of creating sufficient economic incentives for the 
industrialists to produce for the war. The War Ministry’s approach to this problem, antithetical to 
cost-effective production and collectivist spirit required for large scale war mobilization, was 
through the so-called “cost-plus-profit” system in which the state pays for the production cost, 
including raw material and labour, and guarantee a fixed profit rate of 5 per cent (Strachan, 2001, p. 
783; Feldman, 1992, pp. 56, 60). This outlined the initial mode of state intervention in the first 
period of the war. However, as the blockade of Germany by the Allied forces tightened, the 
shortage of raw material and food supplies became more severely felt. This boosted the stature of 
the KRA and demanded further planning towards more refined economic coordination.9 To achieve 
 
7 At the beginning of the war, these state-run factories provided 40 per cent of the supply required by the Ministry of 
War (Chickering, 2004, p. 36; Feldman, 1976, p. 124).  
8 For the origins of the CDI and the BdI in the prewar years, see Appendix A. 
9 By 1918, the KRA employed more than 20,000 staff (Strachan, 2001, p. 784). 
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this, a series of joint-stock War Raw-Material Corporations (Kriegsrohstoff-Gesellschaften) were 
established in each category of raw material.10  
As soon as it became clear to the army generals that their hopes for a short war were in vain, 
the most crucial question was the distribution of manpower between the army, and industry and 
agriculture. The mass mobilization of 3.8 million of soldiers at the beginning of the war (Bruendel, 
2014) created a spike of labour shortage for a while, reaching more than 22 per cent in September 
1914 (see Ritschl, 2005; Ullmann, 2014). Furthermore, as a result of the rapid growth of the war 
industry, the unemployment rate was reduced sharply. Therefore, the government had to develop 
institutional capacities to rationally determine the exemptions and the army reserves (Bessel, 2000, 
p. 441). However, the institutional deficiencies to handle this led to crippling inefficiencies in the 
army as well as the industry (see Feldman, 1992, p. 73).  
Given the universal conscription system that had existed in Germany and the initial 
enthusiasm for the war within certain segments of the population (Bessel, 2000, p. 438; Ziemann, 
2007, pp. 30-2), the social composition of the lower echelon of the army was relatively diverse, 
from highly skilled industrial workers to peasants. However, in continuation of prewar trends that 
was sharply skewed towards drafting the rural population (Förster, 1996, p. 465), about two-thirds 
of male agricultural workers were called up to the German army during the war (Offer, 1989, p. 62). 
This inevitably strained the agricultural capacities of the country. 
German agriculture was not nearly as modernized as that of Britain and still relied heavily 
on manual workers who composed more than 30 per cent of the workforce in 1914.11 Furthermore, 
a significant proportion of agriculture labour was composed of foreign workers especially from 
Russia (Ziemann, 2014, p. 384). The exodus of agricultural workers after the outbreak of the war to 
find jobs in war industries, the significant decline of foreign workers (Bessel, 2000, p. 442), and a 
large number of agricultural workers who were drafted into the army contributed to the reduction of 
the agricultural production in the first period.12 The agricultural policy of Germany shifted from 
protectionism to consumer-oriented policies in the autumn of 1914 (Ziemann, 2014, p. 385; Offer, 
1989, p. 64). A central state policy used to protect the urban population from the rising food cost 
was to introduce a maximum price on key agricultural products such as cereals and flour. These 
policies not only failed ultimately to meet their basic objective but also became a source of deep 
resentment among the peasants against the state and widening rift between the rural and urban 
 
10 By the end of the war, there were 200 of these war companies (Strachan, 2001, p. 784; Kocka, 1984, p. 29). However, 
their power remained limited in the first period of the war since “neither the civilian nor the military authorities wished 
to permit wartime exigencies to transform the structure of the economy” (Feldman, 1976, p. 125). 
11 This is in contrast to about 8 per cent in the United Kingdom. 
12 Agricultural products dropped by 15 per cent in 1915 and by 40 per cent in 1918 compared to 1913 (see Table 2.2 in 
Ritschl, 2005, p. 46).  
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population (Ziemann, 2014, 385-8, 404). In the face of food shortages, the state took the first step 
by introducing bread rationing in Berlin in January 1915. This initiated the “compulsory economy” 
(Zwangswirtschaft) which became the paradigm of the state’s organization of food supply 
(Feldman, 1992, p. 102). To give coherence to the patchwork of policies and enhance the regulatory 
power of the state, the War Food Office (Kriegsernährungsamt) was established in 1916 (Offer, 
1989, pp. 28, 64; Davis, 2000, pp. 114-22).  
The lucrative war industry, backed by the benefits and guarantees that came with state 
contracts, and the free movement of labour caused significant sectoral shifts towards war industries 
and away from so-called “civilian industries” and agricultural production.13 This created a rift 
between the fractions of capitalist class, extending the fault lines of class struggle more deeply 
within the power bloc itself. Maintaining the balance of class forces then became a more 
challenging task. In the face of increasing labour shortage and high turnover, certain proposals 
gained traction that called for limiting the free movement of labour and introducing industrial 
conscription. However, the War Ministry resisted these calls not only because it believed high 
wages would solve the issue of high turnover but also because it did not want to upset the socialist 
union leaders (see Feldman, 1976, pp. 127-8). Nevertheless, the War Ministry largely avoided to 
incorporate trade unions into the management of labour relations in the first period and limited their 
contribution at an advisory level.14  
Tightening food supply and declining purchasing power of workers were fueled by the 
soaring rise of inflation which reached 100 per cent in 1916 and made the real wages of male 
workers in war industry down by 20 per cent and in the civilian industries by 40 per cent (Comack, 
2012, p. 36-7). This situation incited high degrees of resentment and discontent among the 
population. The labour movement organizations had so far been able, in conjunction with the 
nationalistic sentiment of the population, state repression, and limited propaganda campaigns, to 
contain its members in a state of industrial peace.15 However, workers’ patience was running low 
and the position of unions was becoming more precarious as the unions needed to push for a wage 
increase in the light of steep inflation. Being bound by the Burgfrieden that prevented the unions 
from exercising their traditional method of class struggle, they had to find ways to collaborate with 
the state. The socialist organizations needed the government to exhibit clear signs of their sincerity 
that the sacrifices of their members and institutions had made to go along the war efforts were 
 
13 There was an important gendered aspect to the skewed redistribution of labour within various economic sectors (see 
Table 2.3 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 46). As more women entered the job market following the prewar trends, increasing 
percentage of them were relocated to the war industries from 1915 (Frevert, 1989, p. 157; Daniel, 1997, p. 38).  
14 The leader of the German Metalworkers’ Union (Deuscher Metallarbeiterverband; DMV), Alexander Schlicke, 
became the labour delegate in the War Office (Welch, 2014, p. 99).  
15 In 1915, there were only 141 strikes involving 13,000 participants (Carsten, 1982, p. 42). 
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worth it. In the meanwhile, the union movement was growingly concerned with the prospect of 
postwar demobilization process which would entail large unemployment and consequently the 
ineffectiveness of strikes for wage increases. This fear fuelled their demand from the government to 
establish an imperial conciliation bureau on the basis of parity (Feldman, 1992, p. 118).  
To address the anarchy caused by the free movement of labour and competition between 
firms for skilled workers while winning the support of the unions, the War Ministry recommended 
setting up reconciliation agencies (Einigungsämter) in each firm on the basis of equal parity 
between employee and employer representatives. These agencies were to review cases of workers 
demanding to change employment and to issue leave certificate (Abkehrschein) if they found 
legitimate grounds (Feldman, 1976, p. 127). This marked the formation of a corporatist mode of 
representation in its embryonic form.  
There were 70 per cent more strikes and about 10 times more strikers in 1916 than the 
previous year. The majority of these strikes were for higher wages (Carsten, 1982, p. 89). The 
illegal May Day demonstration, which had brought out some 10,000 people, took a radical turn 
when Karl Liebknecht was arrested and put on trial on high treason charges and ultimately 
sentenced to two and a half years of prison. Following these events, a radical group of about 30 
lathe operators’ representatives in Berlin, who later in 1918 obtained the name Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards (Revolutionäre Obleute) (Hoffrogge, 2015, pp. 27-8) was formed. They organized a mass 
strike to be held on June 28 to call for Liebknecht’s freedom.16 On the day, an impressive 55,000 
Berlin workers answered the call and went on the first political strike in the wartime period. The 
union and the party leaders were absolutely against the strike and openly defended the importance 
of maintaining the Burgfrieden (p. 37). It was clear to them that this was a serious breach of their 
authority and their ability to control their members.  
The crippling tension between the War Ministry and the representatives of capitalist 
interests in the war industries, and between the union leaders and the rank-and-file made it clear that 
the structure of industrial mobilization should be fundamentally revised. Meanwhile, as the prospect 
of a victory in the war was becoming untenable after the summer of 1916 (Asprey, 1991, p. 284), 
Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg escalated his confrontation with the Chief of the 
General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn. To open a path towards a potential peace negotiation, the 
Chancellor decided to neutralize the right-wing forces by throwing his support behind Paul von 
Hindenburg, the Chief of the Great General Staff, who had become a folk hero after the victory of 
the German army under his command in the Eastern front (Feldman, 1976, pp. 133-4; Chickering, 
 
16 See also Luban (2013) on the role of the shop stewards in the DMV and the June 1916, as well as April 1917, and 
February 1918 strikes.  
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2004, p. 71; Welch, 2014, p. 89). But the ascension of Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff as his 
righthand man into the OHL led to the exact opposite as they proved determined to throw 
everything behind a cavalier attempt to achieve a total victory (Kitchen, 1976; Greyer, 1986).  
Second Period (August 1916 – August 1917)  
Soon after the formation of the third OHL in August 1916, fundamental changes took place 
in the structure of German economic relations and the architecture of the German militarized state. 
The OHL believed that the deficiencies of the German army should be compensated for quickly by 
doubling the output of munition and weapons. The OHL proposed a series of changes necessary to 
achieve this overambition plan in the Hindenburg Program. Two of its most important components 
were the establishment of the War Office (Kriegsmat) to bypass much of the functions of the War 
Ministry, with General Wilhelm Groener as its head, and to regulate the workforce through a new 
scheme called Auxiliary Services Act (Gesetz über den vaterländischen Hilfsdienst).17 The former 
deepened to the militarization of the state form; the latter shifted the mode of representation 
decisively towards corporatism. The military, whose control over the state apparatus was extended 
radically under the Hindenburg Program, could not realize these aggressive policies without 
bringing both the industrialists and the organized labour onboard to collaborate towards an 
ambitious industrial mobilization.  
Among the most contentious issues between the War Ministry and the capitalists in heavy 
industries since the first period of the war were the supply of manpower and exemption programs, 
as well as the free movement of labour. Besides the institution of War Office (Kitchen, 1976, p. 73; 
Welch, 2014, p. 96), to increase its command over the economic policies, the OHL sought to 
resolve this issue by disallowing the free movement of labour and imposing compulsory labour on 
all German males between the ages of 18 to 60 years old, prisoners of war, and the unemployed 
Belgian workers.18  
It was clear from the past attempts to limit the free movement of labour that the unions 
would not accept such measures at least without significant compensations. The OHL was well 
aware of the long-time union demand for work committees based on parity between the workers’ 
and employers’ representatives. In the eyes of the union representatives, this was the only way they 
could ensure some level of protection for their members by negotiating with the employers on an 
 
17 The institution of War Office was a tactic by the OHL to increase its command over the economic policies by going 
around the War Ministry. Although the War Office was formally within the War Ministry, it was practically 
subordinated to the OHL (Kitchen, 1976, p. 73; Welch, 2014, p. 96). The rivalry between the War Office and the War 
Ministry were not just a bureaucratic matter but was linked to the particular alignment of capitalist interests, with those 
in iron, steel, and mining sectors more closely behind the former and those in the electro-chemical sectors behind the 
latter (see kitchen, 1976, p. 144). 
18 Paragraph 2 of the Act excluded those who were already engaged in agriculture or forestry.  
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equal basis (Feldman, 1992, p. 206). These work committees fell into three general categories (pp. 
210-17): determination committee (Feststellungausschüsse), responsible for deciding whether a 
company was essential for the war to be included under the provision of the law; draft committee 
(Einberufungsausschüsse), responsible for drafting the workforce redundancies who were not 
already under the Auxiliary Service Act, and assigning jobs those who were but could not find 
employment within two weeks; arbitration committee (Schlichtungsausschüsse), responsible for 
settling any disputes between an employer and a worker who would like to be issued a leave 
certification without which the workers could not be hired.19 This institutional arrangement was a 
significant advancement towards establishing a corporatist mode of representation. 
The most consequential concession that the labour union managed to win during the drafting 
of the Auxiliary Service Act was reflected in Paragraph 9 of the law concerning the appeal 
committee. In clarifying what would count as “significant grounds” for leaving the employment and 
requesting the leave certification, the clause merely stated that “a suitable improvement in 
conditions of labour in some form of national Auxiliary Service shall count in particular as 
significant grounds.” The vagueness of “suitable improvement in conditions of labour” was 
certainly a venue through which the union could and did press for a host of improvements such as 
wages.  
Under the Act, all firms engaged in Auxiliary Service with at least fifty employees had to 
establish a workers’ committee based on a direct and secret ballot and according to the principle of 
proportional representation.20 The stated purpose of these workers’ committees was to “bring to the 
employer’s notice and state its position on all suggestions, wishes, and complaints from the 
workers, insofar as these have to do with the firm’s facilities, wages, and other matters of labour 
relations and welfare.” In case of a deadlock between workers’ committees and employers, the 
arbitration committees would stand as mediators unless both parties agreed to take the case to an 
industrial court or mediation office of a craft association. Furthermore, the Act recognized the right 
to association and assembly.21 
It is true that during the drafting of the Axillary Service Act, the unions fought the bitter 
opposition of the industrialists who were adamant about the consequence of empowering the unions 
 
19 The Determination Committee and Draft Committee were composed of military officers as their chairmen, two 
government officials, one workers’ representative, and one employers’ representative. The Arbitration Committee was 
composed of a military representative from the War Office as the chairman and three employers’ and three workers’ 
representatives (of the three being permanent members with the third representative to be selected from the same 
occupation as the worker who is requesting the appeal). 
20 The unions made a concession here as they had asked for the threshold to be set at firms with more than twenty 
employees. 
21 See paragraphs 11 to 14 of the Act. 
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(Kocka, 1984, pp. 70-1).22 However, there was no chance that the plan could work without the 
active cooperation of the unions. The state loosened its restrictions on union activities in January 
1917 by allowing them to hold public meetings to inform the workers about the law and work 
committees and pacify workers’ militancy (Feldman, 1992, p. 321). The unions no longer dwelled 
in the uncomfortable margins of the state but were integrated deeply into the very logic of its 
corporatist projects, not only at the national but also at the regional and municipal levels.23 Once 
they got the significant concessions that they hoped for, they were more interested in 
operationalizing the law since they were able to utilize its institutional means to advance towards 
higher wages and better working conditions and extend their reach to areas where they previously 
had a difficult time to expand into. The official newspaper of the SPD, Vorwärts, defended the bill. 
Furthermore, even though the rank-and-file were very much against the Hindenburg Program (see 
Weber, 1966, pp. 54-5), the trade union leaders called on their members to accept the bill “whole-
heartedly”, arguing that it could set the stage for a new role that the organized labour could play 
after the war (Welch, 2014, p. 102). 
 Although one of the core motivations behind the Hindenburg Program was the reduction of 
turnover in war industries, its final form did the exact opposite (Bessel, 1997, pp. 214-15).24 It 
created a chaotic situation in the labour market in the early months of 1917 as workers used every 
opportunity to find a better job and employers offered higher wages and more food to attract more 
skilled workers. The differential wages between the sectors created further chaos as skilled workers 
moved from transportation and submarine industries to munition factories. The military tried to 
mitigate this by issuing a decree in August 1917 to state the reason for the exemption of individual 
workers and prohibiting them from changing jobs to another sector after exemption. Nevertheless, a 
vast majority of workers were still not exempted from any specific industry and therefore were not 
affected by the decree (pp. 309-15). 
 Looking back at the economic consequences of the Hindenburg Program broadly, it 
becomes apparent that it had widely different effects on the real profits across the industries. It was 
explicitly formulated to advance the large capitalist interests in the heavy industries and mining to 
the detriment of what the Program called “nonessential” firms. However, even though these 
 
22 On 25 October 1916, the CDI and BdI established a new federation called German Industrial Council (Deutscher 
Industrierat). Even though the federation did not become active until the beginning of 1918, its aim was to bring 
together the interests of the affiliated associations to “provide the whole of industry with more bargaining power vis-a-
vis both government and Parliament, as well as in the ‘difficult battle against enthusiasts and champions of state-
socialist ideas’ during the changeover to a peacetime economy and during the period of reconstruction” (Kocka, 1984, 
p. 75).  
23 Rudloff (2013) points out the growing penetration of social democratic workers’ organizations within the municipal 
governments especially with regards to providing basic social provisioning and food distribution measures (pp. 113-18). 
24 Even though Bessel’s (1997) assessment to this point is well taken, his characterization of the revolutionary upheaval 
of 1918-1919 as essentially a “political demobilization” (p. 212) differs from the claim made in this study. 
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interests could not be simply ignored given the powers that they still maintained within key state 
institutions such as the War Ministry and liberal political forces, the Hindenburg Program sent a 
clear sign to small and medium-size capital about the divisive orientation of the OHL towards 
fractions of capital (Kitchen, 1976, pp. 94-5).25 Only a very narrow fraction of capital, namely the 
chemical and metal/machinery, really profited from the war (see Table 4 in Baten, and Schulz, 
2005, p. 43). This weakened the hegemony of the large capitalists and thereby the ruling bloc, hence 
pushing the unstable equilibrium among political class forces further towards a crisis.  
The fragmentation within the dominant classes was accompanied by an increased loss of 
state legitimacy in the eyes of the German population. Soon after the Auxiliary Service Law came 
to effect in December 1916, Germany was hit by harsh weather, resulting in the loss of potato 
harvest which caused severe food shortages throughout the country. The employment of 339,900 
foreign workers and 735,000 prisoners of war in 1916 in the agricultural sector did not help to cover 
for labour deficiencies in German agriculture which still relied on labour-intensive techniques (see 
Table 2.9 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 53). In the context of the blockade, food prices sharply increased from 
143 per cent in 1915 to 198 per cent in 1916 (see Table 2.16, p. 65). As the food shortage worsened, 
the inadequacies of the state’s price and rationing policies gradually turned the vast majority of the 
German population against the state (Daniel, 1997, p. 231; Davis, 2000, p. 110). While these 
policies continued to antagonize the rural peasants against the state and the urban population 
(Ziemann, 2014), they put urban working-class families under increasing pressure to maintain their 
basic consumption habits.  
The epicentre of the working-class struggle for subsistence was working-class women. The 
industrial mobilization had massively skewed the patterns of female employment towards the war 
industries. But even in war industries, wages could not keep up with inflation (see Table 2.10 in 
Ritschl, 2005, p. 54; Daniel, 1997, pp. 97-8; Rudloff, 2013, p. 104). Working-class women were the 
ones who bore the bulk of responsibility to provide food resources. Since they were not 
systematically threatened by the coercive measures of the state, were less directly affected by the 
propaganda efforts of the state, and remained largely outside the corporatist operation of trade 
unions, working-class women were at the forefront of the articulation of general working-class 
displeasure towards the failure of the state to fulfil its basic social functions (Daniel, 1997, pp. 231-
9, 248; Daniel, 1987; Stibbe, 2013, pp. 46-7, 53).  
These grievances against food shortages progressively turned against state authorities. As 
Ute Daniel (1997) vividly demonstrates, working-class women engaged in a range of “illegal” 
 
25 A total lack of attention to other industries led to the catastrophic decline of goods such as textile and residential 
construction material (See Table 2.5 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 49). 
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means and local mutual aid activities particularly in the second half of the war to provide basic 
means of subsistence for their families. In the context of the collapsing money and consumer-good 
market in the second period, these collective strategies laid the ground for nonmonetary local 
mutual-aid activities (Weinhauer, 2017; Daniel, 1997, p. 289). Furthermore, working-class women 
extended their anti-state intervention through the creation and propagation of a complex network of 
informal and subversive communication through jokes, rumours, folk stories, etc. (Daniel, 1997, pp. 
241-50; Welch, 2014, pp. 215-16; Stibbe, 2013, pp. 49-50). The urban working-class women 
bridged the contradictions inside and outside the factories under the conditions of “total 
mobilization”. Their actions, both in their material and immaterial aspects, were instrumental in 
undermining the legitimacy of the state both concretely and abstractly. 
 For the leadership of the organized labour movement, stakes were high to hold up their end 
of the bargain and prevent industrial disturbances to war production. Strike data makes it clear that 
the unions could no longer prevent strikes to erupt.26 But in addition to the quantitative increase in 
the number of strikes, there was a qualitative change in their demands to more politically orientated 
ones. There were a series of strikes between January and March of 1917 especially in the Ruhr 
region and Berlin, but the turning point came in April 1917.  
The oppositional forces were growing rapidly not only among the workers but crucially 
within the SPD. The genesis of irreconcilable differences and the ultimate split goes back to 21 
December 1915, after the internal truce had ended, when a group of delegates under the leadership 
of Hugo Haase voted against extending the war credit. The lines of splits became irreconcilable in 
March 1916 after the opposition group voted against the budget bill that was approved by the 
majority of the party delegates, causing the expulsion of 18 delegates from the party. The 
discussions on the Auxiliary Services Law stirred bitter oppositions from a sizable segment of the 
party that saw the Act as a way to tie workers to the military-industrial complex. However, the 
leadership of the Free Trade Unions was steadfast about continuing the working-class struggle 
through the corporatist structure set up by the Hindenburg Program.  
 In January 1917, the majority within the party used the pretext that the oppositional group, 
the Social Democratic Working Group (Sozialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft; SAG), had held 
a separate conference and used party machinery for its own political purpose to expel the 33 
deputies from the party. Hence, this split was forced upon the minority opposition preemptively to 
preclude its cohesive formation. This group, which included prominent figures such as Hugo Hasse, 
Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein, Luxemburg, Liebknecht, Däumig, Kurt Eisner, Paul Levi, Wilhelm 
 
26 The number of strikes soared from 14,000 (42,000 days lost) in 1915, to 129,000 (245,000 days lost) in 1916, and 
667,000 (1,862,000 days lots) in 1917 (See Table 2.12 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 57). 
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Dittmann, and Clara Zetkin, held a conference in Gotha on 6 April 1917 and formed a new party 
under the name the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (Unabhängige 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, USPD). The new party essentially adapted the Erfurt 
Program but with much less intense centralization and bureaucratization and much more freedom at 
regional and local levels (Broué, 2005, p. 84). What glued the USPD together was their opposition 
to the war but beyond that, it captured exceedingly diverse orientations on sociopolitical questions 
(Eley, 1987, p. 69).  
From 16 April, there was a wave of strikes that erupted across Germany involving between 
200,000 to 300,000 workers from hundreds of firms (Broué, 2005, p. 93).27 These workers were 
emboldened by the news of the “February Revolution” in Russia (happened on 8 March) 
(Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 42; Kitchen, 1976, p. 83). Both the union leaders and the leadership of the 
SPD denounced the April strikes (Kitchen, 1976, p. 83; Luben, 2013, pp. 125-6). This highlights 
their position towards rank-and-file militancy and the extent to which they had embodied their 
corporatist functions.  
The shop stewards used the general assembly of the DMV in Berlin on 15 April, 
representing all the large metalwork firms in the city, to call for a mass strike with the release of 
Müller as its first demand. The union tried hard to get a hold of the movement by forming a strike 
committee to negotiate with the government to try to secure the release of Müller and additional 
food supply. Once Adolf Cohen, a leader of the DMV, got verbal promises from the government 
representatives on both counts, he called off the strike and the majority of the workers in Berlin 
went back to work on 17 April.  
Nevertheless, in a show of defiance against the order of the union, about 50,000 workers 
continued the strike. They elected two however short-lived workers’ councils (Kolb, 1962, p. 58). 
These were essentially strike committees, albeit with the potential to be used as platforms for 
radical elements within the labour movement. Their meetings were attended by the USPD deputies 
and their actions were supported by the USPD delegates in the Reichstag (Broué, 2005, pp. 42-43); 
this marked the beginning of the involvement of the USPD in the council movement. The demands 
of these strikers, which they largely adapted from the striking workers in Leipzig, included 
“commitment to peace without annexations, an end of the state of siege and censorship, the repeal 
of the [Auxiliary Service Act], and universal equal voting rights with a secret ballot to replace the 
three-class electoral system” (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 43; Stibbe, 2013, p. 52). They also called for the 
formation of similar councils to be formed in every firm (Broué, 2005, p. 96). The government was 
 
27 This happened despite the arrest of some of the leading organizers such as Richard Müller on April 13. 
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not satisfied with a peaceful resolution of the strike and, to the delight of the industrialists in seeing 
what they understood as Groener’s less consolidatory attitude towards the labour (Kitchen, 1976, p. 
84), wished to exhibit a clear show of force. Besides arresting some of the strike leaders and 
drafting them to the military, the army forces took over some of the munition and weapon factories 
in Berlin on April 19 and put them under the command of military personnel (Feldman, 1992, p. 
339). This forced the remaining strikers to go back to work on 21 April.  
The mass mobilization in Leipzig actually proceeded that in Berlin. It was initiated on 12 
April by a group of women who marched on the streets to demand more bread and were confronted 
by the police who arrested 16 of them. When the announcement came the next day that the bread 
ration was to be cut by 60 per cent, workers decided to go on strike. In addition to an increase in the 
supply of food and coal, the demands of the 10,000 striking workers in Leipzig included “a 
government declaration stating its readiness to conclude a non-annexationist peace, annulment of 
the Law of Siege and the Auxiliary Service Law, an end to all restrictions on the press and meeting, 
the liberation of political prisoners, and the introduction of universal and equal suffrage throughout 
the Empire” (p. 338). Although mainly in name, the striking workers formed the first “workers’ 
council” (Arbeiterräte) in Germany on 16 April. It then elected a delegation composed of one 
representative from the USPD and two from the DMV to present these demands to the Chancellor. 
However, the government decided not to receive the delegation before the strike was called off. 
After the strike leaders were arrested and drafted into the army, employers promised to reduce the 
working week to fifty-two hours and increase the wages, the workers went back to work on 18 April 
(p. 338).  
The general tension was still rising among workers as evident by two mass strikes in the 
summer of 1917, in Cologne on 6 July and Silesia on 14 July. Even though the demands of these 
strikes were focused on wages and working hours, their critical position in the war industry, 
especially amid the coal crisis, forced the government to take more dramatic actions to infuse new 
hopes among the population and pacify their militancy. On 11 July, the Emperor signed an order to 
the Prussian cabinet to prepare for a bill to give equal suffrage. In the meanwhile, unions were using 
the pretext of labour militancy to force the employers, who preferred to deal with the conciliation 
agencies and arbitration committees, to sign collective agreements. Unions were arguing that it 
would be far more efficient for the employers to deal with unions and accept collective bargaining 
agreements rather than to settle thousands of individual cases (p. 337). This should not be 
interpreted as a way for unions to bypass workers’ committees or arbitration committees but to 
bring the institutions that had been created through the Auxiliary Service Act under the union 
leadership. In fact, at the end of June, unions sent a petition to the government to extend these 
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institutions beyond the wartime period. In the meanwhile, the state renewed a Bismarckian initiative 
to establish a “People’s Economic Council” (Volkswirtschaftsrat) to bring together various interest 
groups, including the representatives of industries, commerce, agriculture, and labour, into an 
advisory board and expand its scope to the national economy. The growing severity of the 
transportation crisis and coal shortages made the national coordination of the war economy ever 
more pressing.  
The rising social tension was coupled with an escalating political pressure within the state. 
Bethmann-Hollweg’s position to maintain a balance between the OHL’s desire to expand the war 
effort unrestrainedly and the Reichstag’s calls for a reasonable peace plan and some democratic 
reforms was becoming impossible. While the OHL was pushing its aggressive policies forward,28 
the Reichstag was becoming a more significant player in the politics of Imperial Germany. The 
failure of the Chancellor in finding a compromise29 helped to unite diverse forces within the 
Reichstag behind certain democratic reforms by March 1917. This was manifested in the formation 
of the Intergroup Committee (Interfraktioneller Ausschuss; IFA) in early July comprised of a broad 
coalition of parliamentary forces with the SPD, the left-wing of the liberal Progressive People’s 
Party (Fortschrittliche Volkspartei; FVP), and the Catholic Centre Party (Deutsche 
Zentrumspartei). The formation of this majority coalition was no small matter as it was effectively a 
parliamentary government that sought to make constitutional changes to the state. The actual power 
of the parliament was growing (Kocka, 1984, pp. 128-9) to a point that, for the first time in the 
history of Germany after the unification, the representatives of Reichstag were asked on 12 July to 
submit their opinion on the replacement for the Chancellor. Therefore, there had begun a parallel 
movement to democratize the state from within and by forces beyond the socialist bloc. 
 Conservative forces including the top echelon of the military were by no means ready to 
give up to the democratization pressure. The right-wing nationalist and conservative forces reacted 
to these developments by forming the Fatherland Party (Deutsche Vaterlandspartei). The OHL 
engaged in a series of political manoeuvring to install Georg Michaelis as the new Chancellor and 
neutralize the peace resolution. These effectively curbed the ascension of the Reichstag and put the 
political process back in the hand of the OHL (Kocka, 1984, p. 132; Asprey, 1991, p. 359). The 
militarized state reached its maturity after the July crisis, although it alienated a large coalition of 
political forces; it could move forward with the idea (or fantasy) of total mobilization and total war 
 
28 This is evident in the securing the unrestricted submarine warfare on 9 January 1917. 
29 An example of such an effort was Bethmann-Hollweg’s handling of the Fidei Commiss bill in January 1917, and his 
successful lobbying to convince the Kaiser in April 1917 to promise constitutional reforms after the end of the war. 
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more effortlessly at the political level, although it had to deal with explosive social unrest within 
and outside the labour movement.  
Third Period (September 1917 – November 1918)  
 Even though some of the most resilient barriers against further militarization of the state 
were temporarily and relatively offset, leading to the political ascendency of the OHL as its 
institutional embodiment, the growing tensions within and outside the state persisted. The IFA 
continued to press for peace resolution and constitutional reform while the legitimacy of the state 
and its corporatist structure was progressively subverted among the general public and the industrial 
workers. It was in this context that the OHL embarked on a series of initiatives to consolidate its 
power.  
 It was towards the end of the second period and beginning of the third that the state 
instituted a centralized propaganda campaign, under the title of “Patriotic Instruction” 
(Vaterländische Unterricht), to systematically boost the morale of army soldiers and the civilian 
population. Furthermore, given the declining popularity of the Kaiser, one of the aims of the 
campaign was to restore the Emperor (Welch, 2014, p. 211-13). The campaign was highly 
centralized, with Ludendorff overseeing the operation, with standardized instructions disseminated 
down to the Deputy Commanding Generals (p. 216). It also fostered a deeper penetration of the 
military into civilian life as the campaign was applied equally to the home front and through the 
same organizational structure as that of the army (pp. 217-18). However, despite these concerted 
and multifaceted efforts to maintain the hegemonic vision of the state,30 a general counter-
hegemonic perception against the war and the militarized state, with its own broad and organic 
channels of dissemination, has been developed among the population.31  
 Soon after the Russian Revolution in November 1917, the Bolshevik government sought 
immediate withdrawal of Russia from the war. This gave hopes to the German military that it could 
divert its troops from the Eastern to the Western Front. However, the strength of the annexationist 
forces within the state turned the peace process into a protracted battle against the large majority of 
the forces within and outside the German state. This process further isolated the upper echelon of 
the military and the annexationist conservative forces from other forces within the state, as well as 
the Junker-industrialist class alliance from other classes. This catastrophic equilibrium was 
 
30 Other notable aspects of the campaign include the institution of a huge public-private film company in December 
1917, known as Universal Film Corporation (Universum-Film-Aktiengesellschaft), as well as the establishment of the 
Woman’s Home Army (Heimatscheer der Frauen) in June 1918 to distribute pro-war messages within the population 
especially among women (Welch, 2014, pp. 222-6, 244-5). 
31 In 1918, there were alarming signs that the popular resentment against the war had also extended to the professional 
staff and state functionaries as well (Rudloff, 2013, pp. 112-13). 
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maintained based on the structural-constitutional position of the military in the state and the 
hegemonic dominance of the Junker-industrialists in the power bloc,32 as well as the corporatist 
structure that had functionally integrated the working-class organizations into the state. However, 
all the chips in this political gamble were resting on the ability of the German military to win the 
war or at least score a victorious peace settlement.   
The centralization effort of the militarized state in this period extended beyond the 
consolidation of its hegemonic vision. In an attempt to bring the soaring food prices under control 
through the centralized food supply, the War Food Office (Kriegsernährungsamt; KEA) began to 
crack down on the firms which supplied food to their workers through the black market (Feldman, 
1992, p. 461). This not only antagonized the industrialists who used the food supply as leverage to 
stay competitive in the labour market but also farmers and peasants who had relied on higher prices 
in the black market to partially mitigate the acute suffering that they had been experiencing during 
the war. The resentment of this class against the state became even more profound after the treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk with Russia was signed. The treaty had deprived them of a large pool of their labour 
force which was composed of political prisoners (p. 463).33  
Furthermore, despite all its scepticism regarding the Auxiliary Service Law, the OHL 
realized that it had to abandon any hopes of pushing the war efforts forward without the active 
support of the trade unions. The more conservative successor of Groener to the head of War Office, 
General Heinrich Scheüch, still preferred to work with the union leaders to improve on the 
Auxiliary Service Law and find a way to prevent workers from changing jobs too frequently. In 
October 1917, Gustav Bauer, one of the leaders of the SPD, Legien, as well as other labour leaders 
were invited to the headquarters of the OHL to discuss their plans to control their base (Kitchen, 
1976, pp. 147-8). Therefore, as the state crisis was deepening, the socialist union and party were 
being brought closer into the state. 
The news of the overthrow of the provisional government in Russian by the Bolsheviks and 
the transfer of power to the Soviets inspired at least the radical elements within the German labour 
 
32 Although those capitalists linked to heavy industries were able to maintain hegemony within the power bloc, their 
dominance was by no means uncontested. For example, the representatives of medium size light industries in the War 
Office, led by General Richard Merton, push Groener to place a cap on the profit in the heavy industries. Groener’s shift 
in favour of such proposals antagonized the OHL as well as the representatives of the heavy industries. Consequently, 
in August of 1917, the Association of German Iron launched an attack on Groener and the War Office and pressed him 
to backtrack on controlling their profits and to redraft the Auxiliary Service Law that they saw as giving too much 
power to the working classes. Although Groener agreed to those requests, he was removed by the OHL in mid-August 
(see Kitchen, 1976, pp. 143-6).  
33 In 1917 alone, 49.1 per cent of the 1,703,500 prisoners of war was assigned to the agricultural sector (see Table 2.9 in 
Ritschl, 2005, p. 53). 
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movement.34 Nevertheless, the majority of the USPD did not share the revolutionary inspiration of 
the Obleute in late 1917 (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 47). A massive wave of strikes in the opening month 
of 1918 swept across Central Europe. Following hundreds of thousands of workers who went on 
strike throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire in June 1918 (see Beneš, 2016), German radicals 
were engaged in agitation and propaganda campaigns for a mass strike in Germany (Hoffrogge, 
2015, p. 48).  
  On 28 January, at least 400,000 workers in Berlin went on strike (Bailey, 1980, p. 159f),35 
bringing the entire armament industry to a standstill. Within a few days, workers in major cities 
across Germany, such as Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Kiel, Cologne, and the Ruhr region, went on strike. 
The 414 delegates gathered in the Berlin union hall and produced a set of demands, including peace 
without annexation or reparations with the participation of workers in the process, an end to the 
state of siege and the Auxiliary Service Act, amnesty for all political prisoners (p. 160), as well as 
“restoration of freedom of the press, an end of military interference in union affairs, and a ‘drastic 
democratization of the entire state apparatus, beginning with universal suffrage – including 
women’s suffrage – for the Prussian Landtag or [Reichstag]” (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 49). In addition 
to the highly political nature of the demands, which was quite close to the programme of the USPD, 
the way of carrying out the strike exhibited explicit defiance against the leadership of the organized 
labour movement and an embryonic form of workers’ council practices: “rank-and-file delegates 
directly determined demands and actions, the Action Committee received its mandate from them 
and its legitimacy was not mediated by parties or unions” (p. 50).  
State repression descended hard on workers as early as 29 January. Strike committees and 
assemblies were banned, strike leaders were arrested, Vorwärts suspended, and a number of 
factories were put under military occupation (Bailey, 1980, p. 163; Luban, 2013, p. 129). The Free 
Trade Unions, which had issued a plea to the workers on 26 January not to go on strike, refused to 
extend its support in any way to the striking workers after the strike erupted. The participation of 
the SPD, albeit limited, was primarily due to the pressure of the USPD and the Obleute (Luban, 
2013, pp. 131-2). Furthermore, the leadership of the SPD tried actively to bring the trade union and 
the state representatives to the negotiating table. At first, the USPD took a neutral position against 
this approach but after the military occupation of factories began to take place on 1 February, it 
 
34 It would be a mistake to exaggerate the influence of the Russian Revolution on the development of workers’ councils 
in Germany. News about the Russian soviets reached the German press in connection with the news of the February 
Revolution and the peace proclamation of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils of Petersburg in 1917. Moreover, the 
details about them were not known to the general public outside the revolutionary activists in Germany. The news from 
Russia was severely restricted and the Russian propaganda did not gain real momentum until the summer of 1918 and 
even then, only through illegal means and mainly among radical circles (Kolb, 1962, p. 56).  
35 This number reached 500,000 on the following day (Harman, 1997, p. 31). 
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changed its position to that of the SPD.36 In a union conference on 1 February, the union leadership 
passed a resolution condemning the repressive measures deployed against the strike but also 
reaffirmed their commitment to their corporatist function and promising to do everything in its 
power to “secure the national defence” (Luban, 2013, p. 133).37 In the face of the growing 
repression and the shifting political opposition, the Obleute decided to call off the strike on 3 
February (Hoffrogge, 2015, pp. 54-55). The military continued its repression of the strike leaders by 
making arrests and drafting the strikers and strike leaders, including Müller, into the army.38    
The leadership of the SPD committed itself to carry out the demands of the strikes to reform 
the three-class suffrage system of Prussia and realize a peace agreement with Russia. However, the 
Reichstag failed to push through constitutional reform and prevent the annexationist momentum of 
the pro-war forces behind the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations.39 As the limitation of the SPD to 
realize the widely popular and urgent demands of the working class and the corporatist position of 
the leadership of the Free Trade Unions towards the militancy of its rank-and-file became clear, the 
radicals directed their attention towards improving their organizational capacities and 
popularization of the notion of workers’ councils.40  
In their effort to extend the workers’ committees that were created under the Axillary 
Service Act, the unions proposed a bill in May to legislate the formation of worker chambers based 
on parity between workers and management. They were meant to be institutions through which 
workers could influence legislation and settle their differences with management. This was also a 
way for the trade unions to better maintain the control of their base at the factory level. The 
government objected to making these chambers on a territorial rather than an industrial basis and 
the inclusion of the state railroad workers unless the bill guaranteed that these workers were 
prevented from striking. Finally, the vote on the bill was postponed to September after weeks of 
talks reached a deadlock (Feldman, 1992, pp. 473-5).  
After the German offensive on the Western Front failed in July 1918, the OHL finally 
conceded a defeat in September and advised the Emperor to seek an armistice based on President 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. This was communicated to the American government on 6 
 
36 The Spartacus Group, which was still part of the USPD at the time and included prominent radical left figures such as 
Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Zetkin, Levi, and Ernst Meyer, vehemently opposed this and instead supported an escalation 
of the strike towards a revolutionary overthrow of the state.  
37 The crisis of confidence between the leadership and the rank-and-file became apparently also within the DMV in its 
general meeting in June 1917 (Schönhoven, 2013, p. 67). 
38 About 10 per cent of the Berlin strikers (i.e. 50,000 workers) lost their military exemptions after the strike (Broué, 
2005, p. 110). 
39 The SPD deputies ultimately merely abstained from the final vote on the Brest-Litovsk treaty. 
40 Although Bailey’s (1980) assessment of the shift of Spartacus Group towards “Leninism” is questionable, see his 
argument about the consequences of the strike (pp. 164-7; see also Broué, 2005, p. 109; and Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 56).  
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October by the newly appointed Chancellor, Prince Maximilian of Baden, who had come to office 
the day before and formed a government that included two socialist representatives, Philipp 
Scheidemann and Gustav Bauer, alongside representatives from the Centre Party and the FVP. To 
fulfil the pre-conditions for armistice negotiation, a series of constitutional reforms were pushed 
through the Reichstag in October, including making the Chancellor answerable to the Reichstag, 
abandoning the three-class suffrage in Bundesrat, and amnesty to political prisoners such as 
Liebknecht. However, it became increasingly apparent after a series of communications with the 
United States in October that the monarchy could ultimately not be saved (Mayer, 1968; Wheeler, 
1976).41 The collapse of the military order became ever more evident when Ludendorff was asked 
to resign on 26 October. This paved the way for a fundamental class realignment to the detriment of 
the Juncker-industrialist towards a labour-industrialist alliance.  
As the collapse of the monarchy becoming eminent, industrialists intensified their efforts to 
take control of the direction of demobilization. Influential members of the German capitalist class 
came to realize the inevitability of working directly with the trade unions in the process of 
demobilization towards an ideal of working community (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) between capital and 
labour (Feldman, 1993, pp. 92-4; Lesch, 2019, p. 329-30). But behind such an abstract ideal, there 
was an institutional reliance on the militarized state apparatus and its personnel as long as 
possible.42  
The negotiations that the leading industrialists initiated with the union leadership on 9 
October to reach an agreement on the form of transition to the peacetime economy and their support 
for the abdication of the Emperor in early November were manifestations of such a fundamental, 
albeit temporary, shift of class alliance (Feldman, 1993, p. 93; Schönhoven, 2013; Lesch, 2019). 
The industrialists were willing to make serious concessions towards this goal including recognition 
of trade unions and the factory committees, the introduction of the eight-hour day, and the 
establishment of mediation agencies on the basis of parity. Given the depth of antagonism of large 
capital towards the organized labour especially since the second period, these radical moves were 
necessary steps towards striking a strategic alliance with the organized labour in the hope that they 
 
41 The actual process of reaching an agreement with the United States for armistice involved much more restrictive 
measures as communicated to the Germans by Robert Lansing, the Secretary of the State at the time. In his first 
response to Max von Baden on 8 October, Lansing required the withdraw of German troops from all the invaded 
territories. After the German government tried to assure the Americans that the “arbitrary power” to wage war would 
not happen in the future upon the constitutional reforms, Lansing noted on 23 October that if the Allied forces were to 
deal with “the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany,” the terms of the armistice would not be one 
of peace negotiation but surrender. “Correspondence Between the United States and Germany Regarding an Armistice” 
(p. 93). 
42 Business leaders lobbied Baden even after the Revolution to put Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koeth, the head of the 




could control their base. Given the level of militancy of the rank-and-file and their distrust of the 
leadership, the trade union leadership was hoping that these concessions from the employers would 
prevent a revolutionary upheaval after the war (Lesch, 2019, p. 330; Schönhoven, 2013, p. 69). But 
while such fundamental changes were taking place at the heart of the state, and such negotiations 
were being held behind closed doors, something far more revolutionary was in the making among 
workers and soldiers which burst out on 9 November.  
Concluding Remarks 
 The transformations that the German state underwent during the war mobilization, 
preconditioned by the pre-war balance of class forces and the material condensation of past 
struggles inscribed on the state apparatus, laid the ground for the emergence of “council 
democratic” movements during the German Revolution. While these state transformations in 
different periods of the war came about as particular resolutions of the limitations and 
contradictions of previous periods, they profoundly configured the relation of forces within and 
outside the state, which in turn created their own tensions, contradictions, and capacities. Even 
though a militarized corporatist state form was embedded deep in the structural foundation and 
institutional order of the state from the beginning of the war, different aspects of the state-form, 
namely, institutional architecture, mode of representation, and patterns of intervention, did not all 
develop uncontestedly and synchronously or carried the same relative weight in different periods.  
 After the outbreak of the war, the institutional architecture of the state rapidly moved 
towards relative centralization and militarization.43 The shift in the institutional architecture of the 
state at the beginning of the war was made possible due not only to the particularity of the German 
constitution and the balance of class forces but also to the initial success of the social truce that 
commenced under the Burgfrieden. However, the widespread expectation of a short war prevented 
the patterns of state intervention to change dramatically in the first few months of the war. With 
some notable exceptions such as a centralized control of raw material, the government relied largely 
on pre-war market mechanisms until the autumn of 1914 when the crisis of raw material and the 
disillusionment of a short war prompted the state officials to engage in a wider intervention. The 
overall level of state intervention in the first period nevertheless remained relatively modest. In 
terms of the mode of representation, the suspension of the elections for the duration of the war froze 
the composition of political forces within the Reichstag. Having abdicated its legislative power to 
 
43 Even though the military apparatus gained strong footing in key state institution at the outbreak of the war, its 
insistence on projecting an apolitical image of itself prevented the process of centralization of the state to necessarily 
imply militarization of the state at an equal pace. This is reflected in the consequential conflicts between various state 
institutions such as the War Ministry and the OHL. The process of militarization of the state continued to unfold to its 
maturity at the end of the second period. 
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the Bundestag with much less democratic legitimacy and stronger presence of the ruling classes, the 
Reichstag severely limited the parliamentarian mode of representation. There were some attempts to 
promote larger aggregates of business to be systematically formed and incorporated into the war 
mobilization schemes (e.g. War Raw-Material Corporations), but these attempts remained limited in 
scale and scope in the first period.  
 As the industrial mobilization got underway in the first period, manpower soon became a 
dire issue for the war industries. This required the militarized state to intervene in the labour market 
to supply manpower in various ways including issuing exemptions from the army and introducing 
unskilled and semi-skilled labour, most notably women, into the war industries. However, these 
measures could not meet the demands of the war industries that were growing massively due to the 
military requirements of the expanding war and the huge economic incentives for the war 
industries, especially under the “cost-plus-profit” policy. Capitalists in the heavy industries could 
afford to compete for scarce skilled workers by offering higher wages and counting that towards 
their cost of production. Yet, this stimulated high turnover as these workers changed jobs frequently 
in the search for higher wages at a time of rising inflation. Furthermore, the fundamental 
redistribution of labour that funneled the manpower into the war-related industries created 
detrimental deficits in many other sectors. Those complications required more direct forms of state 
intervention. However, the way this was to be done depended on the balance of class forces.  
 The specific form of war mobilization disproportionally empowered a certain fraction of 
industrial and extractive capital that produced for the war. The structural and institutional power of 
these fractions of capital was one of the driving forces behind the particular resolution of these 
tensions in the second period. But the scale of the issue with labour supply and the hesitation of the 
military government towards and the adamance of capitalists against taking direct control of private 
production meant that the trade unions had to be brought into active management of the war. 
Therefore, there was a transformation in the mode of representation. These were taking place while 
the “two nations” hegemonic vision formulated under the Burgfrieden was becoming progressively 
untenable, and chronic food shortages under the rising inflation were intensifying popular 
indignation.  
Hindenburg Program was a corporatist resolution to the tensions and contradictions of the 
first period. However, knowing their structural importance at that conjuncture and their 
organizational power, the trade unions would not have agreed to the OHL’s fantastical attempt to 
total mobilization without significant concessions. Industrialists would not accept such concessions 
to labour unless the Program could entice them with even larger profit margin than before while 
solving the labour issues. Ultimately, the Program integrated capital and labour within the state in 
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an unprecedented way but failed to satisfy the bases of either of these pillars. While the Program 
strained the hegemony of the large industrial capital within the capitalist bloc due to the wildly 
different structural position of various fractions under the agreement, its corporatist integration of 
the trade unions at the time of intensified rank-and-file militancy caused a rift between the 
leadership and the base. Therefore, the cooperative mode of representation heightened the tension 
between the lower echelon of both sides.  
 In the meanwhile, the militarization of the state was extended further in this period through 
the establishment of War Office and the subordination of the Deputy Commanding Generals to the 
OHL. But the dwindling prospect of a victory led to growing calls outside and inside the state for a 
swift end to the war. It was in this period that the political parties in Reichstag coalesced to regain 
their parliamentary power and limit the power of the military apparatus within the state. Hence, 
seeking to transfer the state architecture towards a less vertical structure. This political project was 
tied as much to curbing the forlorn project of the military with associated conservative forces and 
the large capitalist interests seeking to achieve a non-annexationist peace as to expanding the 
democratic basis of the state through suffrage reform. Given the centrality of the military within the 
German state, both in its institutional apparatus and its associated social classes, as well as the deep-
rootedness of the Prussian three-class system in preserving the class structure of Imperial Germany 
both structurally and symbolically, these initiatives, as timid as they were, certainly carried a 
republican aspiration.44 Predictably, the upper echelon of the military and the ruling classes fought 
tooth-and-nail to derail these attempts. In managing the July 1917 crisis, they succeeded in 
temporarily suspending the political project of the Reichstag.  
  Under the layers of formal politics, the legitimacy of the state was in a deepening crisis 
among growing segments of the population. Working-class women were at the forefront of these 
subversive actions. Having flocked to the war industries to fill the shortage of manpower while the 
male workers were away in what Ute Daniel called “emancipation on loan” (1997, p. 283), these 
working-class women had to bear the responsibility of securing basic means of subsistence for their 
families. The inability of the state to provide the basic means of subsistence forced these women to 
create ways to sustain their families through illegal and communal means. They articulated their 
grievances against the state and the war broadly and indiscernibly in a variety of creative ways, 
further undermining the popular legitimacy of the state and war aims.  
 Militarization of the state reached maturity in the third period after the political ascendency 
of the OHL. In an effort to recover from its subverted hegemonic vision, the military government 
 




embarked on an intense propaganda campaign to improve the morale of the army and the 
population. But, in the face of the depth and the scale of the counter-hegemonic vision and further 
disillusionment after the annexationist peace with Russia, this state-led ideological project proved 
largely in vain. Furthermore, the contradictions of the corporatist scheme of the second periods 
failed to contain the upheaval within the society and the power bloc.  
The rank-and-file militancy, which found direct and intensified articulation of its basic pro-
peace and democratic demands within the state after the emergence of the USPD, was spiralling 
into a revolutionary zeal. And yet, the relative success of the state’s corporatist structures to create 
institutional mechanisms that elevated the organized power of labour within the state and in relation 
with capital allowed a new class alliance to form between capital and labour. This began to take 
shape at the time when the downfall of the military and the abdication of Kaiser profoundly 
weakened the power of Junkers and led to a fundamental transformation of the power bloc. 
Therefore, paradoxically, the state-led war mobilization laid the ground for the emergence of 
emancipatory movements while simultaneously providing the structural pathways to venture into a 





The Making of the “Council Democratic” Movement in Italy 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter primarily shows how state-led war mobilization laid the political, economic, 
and ideological grounds, each with their partial and indeterminate translations into institutional 
materiality, for the emergence of the “council democratic” movements during the biennio rosso. 
The chapter highlights the ways by which state operations forged the potentials for the radical 
democratic movements to emerge through creating new contradictions and capacities. This chapter 
elaborates on the particular transformation of the Italian state in its form and hegemonic vision 
throughout the war. It shows how the militarization of the Italian state during the war put it directly 
in charge of the conflicts and contradictions of labour relations. Therefore, it internalized them into 
the state as contradictions of the state. As such, the question of the state was wedded with the 
working-class struggle. Moreover, in order to sustain itself over the course of the war, the state 
eventually and increasingly created a corporatist system of industrial governance involving key 
elements of working-class organization. However, due to the general incapacity and unwillingness 
of the military government to fully establish a corporatist state, its internal contradictions were 
manifested in not only the institutions but also the ideological operations of the state. 
Just as in the case of Germany, the pre-war structure of the Italian state and the relations of 
class forces in Italian society predisposed the state architecture to transform into a militarized state. 
A detailed overview of the pre-war era from the unification in 1861 to 1915 is outlined in Appendix 
B. It shows that the political structure of the Italian state made the role of political parties 
superficial. This laid the foundation for clientelist politics. As such, the political system was 
thoroughly reluctant to extend the limited franchise. As far as formal politics was concerned, the 
parties that did exist, particularly before the 1890s, had loose and contradictory relations with social 
classes. The destra storica (Historic Right) and the sinistra storica (Historic Left) were archetypical 
examples of this. The power of aristocratic families rapidly declined after 1848. This was reflected 
in their diminishing influence within the state institutions. The agrarian structure of Italy1 
geographically segregated the aristocracy from the locus of the political power in Piedmont. 
Therefore, they did not assert themselves into formal politics through the formation of a strong 
conservative party. Neither could they utilize the popularity of Catholicism to advance their own 
interests through a Catholic party, largely due to the deep antagonism between the Church and the 
 
1 For an outline of the agrarian structure in Italy, see Appendix B. 
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state. Although less frontal than the German Kulturkampf, this antagonism between the state and the 
Church dragged on. Thereafter, the process was cautious, slow, and conciliatory, making the 
formation of a Catholic Party a relatively late phenomenon.  
Therefore, while Italy was a largely agrarian country economically up to WWI, it did not 
have a proximally corresponding structure of class forces politically to systematically coordinate 
these interests within the state. Hence, in the light of this institutional incongruity, the Italian state 
turned into a clientelist space to administer the interest of various fractions of the ruling classes. 
After the emergence of mass movements in Italy, particularly after the formation of the Chamber of 
Labour (camera del lavoro) in 1891 and the Socialist Party of Italy (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI) 
in 1893 as well as the rising Catholic movement since the beginning of the 20th century, forced the 
liberals to rethink clientelist politics. This contributed to the formation of the Italian Radical Party 
(Partito Radicale Italiano) in 1904 which pushed for a democratization of the state along republican 
principles. These new political formations imposed more cohesion within the party system. 
However, the weakness of the state to effectively extend that relative cohesion across the political 
system on the basis of the existing institutional infrastructure led to the continuation of clientelist 
politics under an updated version of the old trasformismo.  
Instead, Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, who dominated Italian politics from 1901 until 
WWI, updated trasformismo into a process of pacification through strategic inclusions and 
appeasement of political rivals. Such a political arrangement, however, essentially requires shrewd 
politicians with strong characters and extensive political networks to maintain the unstable balance 
of compromises between contradictory interests and classes. This essential requirement makes the 
system fundamentally vulnerable to a crisis if and when such political leadership fails to play the 
mediating role. At the same time, the political leadership is a singular largely non-institutionalized 
node, with its own possible class interests and preferred alliances – hence strategically selective – 
that has to balance contradictory interests through a politics of appeasement. Therefore, it operates 
on a borrowed time before the looming crisis erupts. Therefore, in the context of the economic 
downturn in Italy in the second decade of the 20th century and the political consequences of the 
Libyan War in 1911, leading to the eventual resignation of Giolitti in 1914, the stage was set for the 
militarization of the state in case of large scale war. The military took over the role of providing 
singular political leadership in a clientelist state in order to maintain the unstable equilibrium of 
class forces not by appeasement but by force. Additionally, other structural and historical factors, 
including the position of the King in the state architecture as formulated in the Statuto Albertino of 
1848 and the crucial role of the Italian military in the process of nation-building as outlined in 
Appendix B, created further tendencies that made the state prone to militarization. 
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 The effects of trasformismo on the development of the socialist movement were also 
significant. Having come to the conclusion that modernization of the country could not be achieved 
without some form and extent of collaboration with the socialist forces, Giolitti tried to entice the 
reformist elements within the socialist movement. The emergence of the General Confederation of 
Labour (Confederazione General del lavoro, CGL) in 1906 with strongly reformist leadership as a 
result of internal conflict between reformists and the revolutionaries within the Chamber of Labour 
as well as the split of the syndicalists from the PSI in the same year facilitated this process of 
cautious and limited cooperation with the state’s policies. At the same time, Giolitti pursued 
strategies to disorganize the socialist movement by passing various modest reform measures to pre-
empt the socialist appeal for the working class. He also tried to push the movement into crisis 
through calculated offers to prominent socialist leaders to take positions within the state (e.g. the 
Bissolati affair). Nevertheless, these strategies backfired in the lead-up to the Libyan War, causing 
the radicalization of the PSI with Maximalists taking over the leadership of the party, and hardening 
the reformist ideology within the CGL exemplified in the expulsion of syndicalists from its ranks in 
1912. The latter development resulted in the formation of the Italian Syndicalist Union (Unione 
Sindacale Italiana, USI) in 1912.  
The multifaceted bifurcation of the socialist and labour movement before the war, between 
the party and the union, between the syndicalists and socialists, between the Maximalist and 
reformist socialists, and between the Chamber of Labour and the Federation of Unions, had 
paradoxical consequences. On the one hand, it weakened the movement to stage a united action. On 
the other hand, it allowed for different types of actions to be carried out with less internal tensions if 
it was launched in the appropriate working-class organizations. Also, state repressions or 
consolidatory projects could be directed more discriminately to more different working-class 
organizations. And yet, this bifurcated structure shaped the ideological orientation of the Italian 
socialist forces towards the war; hence, fundamentally moulding the hegemonic vision of the state. 
Such contradictory unity within the socialist movement, captured under the slogan of “neither 
support nor sabotage” (né aderire né sabotare), allowed for a peculiar form of (non-) compliant 
(non-) participation of the organized labour movement in the war project.  
 The impact of the entry into the war extended beyond the working-class movement. The 
question of which side of the war the country should align itself with carved fault lines within the 
capitalist class forces. These fragmentations had their roots in the economic and political alignment 
of the fractions of capital in the pre-war years (see Appendix B). The ambivalence of the working-
class organizations and the fragmentation of the capitalist classes gave more reason for the 
militarization of the state and direct intervention of the state into the relations of production down to 
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the factory floor. However, this linked the state more intimately to the tensions and contradictions 
of the relations of production and made it more susceptible to radical democratization pressures 
even at the factory level.  
Given the pre-war dynamics of relations between classes within and outside the state and the 
ambiguous orientation of the working-class forces towards the war, the militarized state was at first 
quite reluctant to incorporate the socialist forces into the war-mobilization project. However, the 
unforgiving requirements of a total war compelled the state to transform its mode of representation 
towards corporatism. This process relied on the state-sanctioned working-class organizations at the 
factory level, internal commissions (commissioni interne). Trade unions were brought into the 
corporatist arrangement for a period as the mediating organizations between the state and the 
internal commissions. However, the rapid expansion of labour supply, with the massive presence of 
women workers who were not subjected to the harsh disciplinary measures and could tie together 
more effectively the social tensions outside and inside the factories, exhausted the organizational 
capacity of the trade unions. As social tensions spiralled out of control, the state corporatist 
arrangement circumvented the trade unions and refocused its energy back to the internal 
commissions, while simultaneously engaging with new hegemonic strategies to stabilize the state 
intervention, which in turn ideologically empowered the internal commissions. These organizations 
created the space for militant and relatively independent rank-and-file actions and later became the 
epicentre of radical democratic struggles after the war.  
The first section of the chapter delves into the character of the Italian war mobilization. 
Based on their conjunctural relevance to the making of the “council democratic” movements, 
analysis is organized into three periods. The first period marks the beginning of the Italian 
involvement in the war starting in May 1915 which set out a rapid militarization of the state, until 
the time when the urgent need to transform the state strategy towards industrial mobilization 
became apparent around June 1916. The discussion of the second period, between July 1916 to 
November 1917, examines the (trans)formation of the state’s mode of representation into 
corporatism until it underwent another transformation after the battle of Caporetto in November 
1917. The third period, December 1917 to November 1918, looks at the final transformations of the 
state’s mode of representation and their consequences on the evolution of democratic struggles 
within and outside the state. The last section recounts the significant factors that laid the ground for 
the emergence of “council democratic” movements in Italy.  
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The character of the Italian War Mobilization 
First Period (May 1915 – June 1916) 
 The war was deeply unpopular among the Italian people and a number of social classes. The 
Catholic Church was against declaring war on another Catholic nation, Austria-Hungary (Papadia, 
2016; Webster, 1961, pp. 50-6). The peasants felt little attachment to the national project embodied 
in the war. The PSI, under the leadership of the Maximalists, was fiercely against the war. The CGL 
was more ambivalent about the war as it could see the potential gains from war mobilization; but in 
the light of intransigent opposition of the PSI and the anti-war elements within the confederation, it 
was reluctant to throw its support behind the war effort.  
The ambiguous condition upon which the PSI and the CGL went along with the war, 
captured in the slogan of “neither support nor sabotage”, created dualistic flexibility in their 
strategic actions within the state. The PSI as a whole or certain elements within it (e.g. see Papadia, 
2016) could pursue its intransigence outlook under the auspices of “neither support”, especially in 
the context of effective marginalization of the legislative body. The CGL in its national or local 
levels (e.g. see De Grand, 1989, p. 29) could justify its passive compliance and limited 
collaboration under the auspices of “nor sabotage”, which was eventually implemented. Similar 
interpretations could be utilized by elements within the party and the union to provide the 
ideological background for their particular orientation towards the war mobilization. This situation 
limited the hegemonic vision of the state to a “two nations” ideological strategy. However, the 
fragmentary nature of national formation in Italy burdened the realization of that ideological 
strategy even further and challenged the cohesion in the hegemonic vision of the state.  
There was also significant resistance within the capitalist bloc against the war or the 
particular side that Italy should take. In the face of such fragmentations, the form of the state that 
could possibly impose a unity among the key forces was an authoritarian regime, taking a 
militarized form in the context of total war. Therefore, the parliament was substantially 
marginalized and effectively replaced by a government-by-decree well beyond matters that 
immediately concern the conduct of the war (Procacci, 2010, p. 20; Papadia, 2016; De Grand, 1989, 
p. 31). Civil rights were seriously compromised throughout the country (Procacci, 2010, p. 18) and 
the militarized zone was expanded inside large parts of the country.2  
 A series of decrees issued in the first few months after Italy’s entry into the war laid the 
formal parameters of the war mobilization. A decree (no. 506) allowed the government to 
 
2 By the end of the war, about 30 per cent of the Italian population were living in territories under military jurisdictions. 
These were disproportionately located in the North (Mondini, 2016).  
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requisition any factory and manage it directly if the owners failed to comply with the war 
requirements. Another decree (no. 993) authorized the government to impel the factory owners to 
modify their production line and to fix prices according to war purposes.  
A number of crucial decrees, issued between July and September 1915 (notably, no. 1065, 
no. 1277, no. 1437), established the structure of industrial mobilization (Tomassini, 1991, pp. 59-
60; Forsyth, 1993, p. 80-1; Galassi and Harrison, 2005, pp. 284-5). The Under-secretariat for Arms 
and Munitions (armi e munizioni, AM), headed by General Alfredo Dallolio, was formed within the 
Minister of War to decide the daily affairs of the Supreme Committee of Ministers. The AM was 
organized into three main branches, namely, “General Tasks”, “Industrial Mobilization”, and 
“Technical Services”. The Industrial Mobilization was operated by the Bureau of Industrial 
Mobilization (ufficio di mobilitazione industriale, UMI). The UMI, whose total staff reached 5,700 
(Gibelli, 2010, p. 469), was given enormous powers to assign “auxiliary” status to particular firms, 
allocation of non-military personnel, exemption from the military service, coordination of 
transportation and fuel, and war propaganda.  
The UMI was managed by the Central Mobilization Committee (comitato centrale di 
mobilitazione, CCM). The CCM was comprised of “technicians”, who were appointed directly by 
Dallolio, industrialists, and workers’ representatives. Until the second phase of the war 
mobilization, these workers’ representatives were not chosen from the labour unions but by the 
management on the formal basis of technical experience and competence. The CCM managed its 
national operation by initially dividing the country into seven regions and managing each through a 
Regional Mobilization Committee (comitato regionale di mobilitazione, CRM).3 Each CRM, 
chaired by a military General chosen by Dallolio, included technicians, who were supposed to be 
civilians but in practice were often business representatives (Adler, 1995, p. 103; Tomassini, 1983, 
pp. 82-3), representatives of industrialists, which were often drawn from the Chamber of Commerce 
of important industrial centres, workers’ representatives, and representatives from the CCM. The 
CRMs were not only headed by a military officer, but they also imposed a stringent military-
bureaucratic structure (Tomassini, 1991, p. 61; Tomassini, 2010, p. 29; Procacci, 1983, p. 51). The 
imposition of the military apparatus with its hierarchical organization onto the organizational 
architecture of the state amounted to the “militarization” of the state.  
 Although industrial and financial mobilization is the backbone of military engagement, the 
army is its anatomy. The militarized state-form manifested itself in this period also in the formation 
and management of the armed forces. The Italian army had a markedly class character, with the 
 
3 The headquarter of these seven CRMs were in Turin, Genoa, Milan, Bologna, Rome, Naples, and Palermo. 
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majority of its soldiers drawn from the peasant population. Furthermore, given the weakness of the 
modern weaponry of the Italian military, it had to rely on a massive army (Cappellano, 2014). This 
negatively impacted agricultural production which eventually led to severe food shortages and 
social upheaval (Dentoni, 2014). However, peasants, especially from the South, did not identify 
much with the nation. Therefore, to hold the army together (Gibelli, 2010; Cappellano, 2014; 
Wilcox, 2016), the militarized state enforced extreme punishment for draft dodging, dissidence, and 
desertion.4 Nevertheless, there was still a significant number of draft dodgers, reaching 470,000 by 
the end of the war, prominently from the South and islands (Wilcox, 2016).  
 At an organizational level, strategic selectivity of the state towards the capitalist interest was 
manifested in the modelling of key institutional structure within the UMI, namely, the CCM and the 
CRMs, after the suggestions of key industrialists such as Olivetti and the influence of the Italian 
Confederation of Industry (confederazione Italiana dell'industria, CIDI) (Adler, 1995, p. 103).5 
Also, as noted above, industrialists were often selected as the civilian representatives to serve on the 
CRMs boards and other regulative bodies. This arrangement already put the industrialists in a 
privileged position in industrial mobilization; therefore, enforcing capitalist class control over the 
process. Nevertheless, either due to ideological stance or organizational weakness, the industrialists 
did not take full advantage of this situation to assert their hegemony over the UMI (Adler, 1995, pp. 
104, 111). This hesitation made the relative marginalization of the CIDI in the second phase of the 
war possible.  
On practical levels, despite the aggressive extension of the power of the state over private 
interests such as requisitioning and nationalization, such measures were not implemented. Instead, 
the capitalist interests, especially but not exclusively those linked to the war efforts, were facilitated 
more intensely than in the pre-war periods. The government initiated a significant level of 
protectionism over heavy industries (Coppa, 1970, p. 767).6 It also shunned imposing cost controls 
on war production and profit rates despite the knowledge of costing (Vollmers et al., 2016). This 
wariness to interfere with the market was indeed the relics of free-market ideology that left its mark 
on the state and government personnel.7 Instead, it used lucrative state contracts and price 
 
4 Such disciplinary measures included summary executions by firing squad and life sentences. As Cappellano (2014) 
recounts, “during the conflict, military tribunals operated actively, imposing 4,000 death sentences, of which 750 were 
carried out, as well as numerous summary executions and 15,000 life sentences. 101,000 were convicted of desertion, of 
which about 6,000 were convicted of going over to, or deserting in the presence of, the enemy.” See Gooch (2014, p. 
363) for detailed data on executions handed down by officially constituted war tribunals between 1915 and 1918.  
5 See Appendix B for an overview of the development of employers’ organization in the pre-war years. 
6 Even though Italy did not declare war on Germany until 28 August 1916, its siding with the Entente created 
disruptions in the importation of goods from Germany that were essential for Italy’s industrial production. 
7 We can see such ideological orientation in a ministerial report written in 1915: “let us not deceive ourselves...the 
government is bound to be slower, and perhaps even less efficient, industrialist than the private concerns; so that 
production, in its hands, instead of increasing, would probably decrease and become more expensive” (as quoted in 
Tomassini, 1991, p. 61).  
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mechanism to motivate the private interests to turn their operation towards war production 
(Tomassini, 1983, p. 83).  
Furthermore, to provide financial support for war mobilization, three national loans were 
issued in the first phase of the war until the spring of 1916, despite the weakness of the Italian 
Central Bank in the pre-war years (Galassi and Harrison, 2005, p. 295). The deep ties between 
Banca Commerciale and the German capital made it more difficult to rely on private banks to 
finance the war mobilization in the face of strong anti-German sentiment. Empowering the Central 
Bank was also an extension of the internal hostility between different fractions of capital. 
Crucially, the militarized state facilitated capitalist interests by imposing stringent measures 
towards disciplining the labour and allocating the workforce to the war industries. The trade unions 
were paralyzed in their traditional functioning at the beginning of the war when strikes were banned 
and labour contracts were frozen. All disputes between workers and employers were obligatorily 
referred to the CRMs entrusted with the arbitration function (Ermacora, 2014).8 Furthermore, union 
representatives were not actually included in the corporatist structure of the CCM and the CRMs, as 
mentioned above. Hence, trade unions were effectively excluded from negotiations and their area of 
activity was severely limited. This situation put the state in charge of regulating the labour market. 
Therefore, in the first phase of the war in the area of labour relation, the government preoccupied 
itself primarily with the problem of the labour market, while avoiding direct interference with 
industrial management. It hoped to regulate the labour market by the militarization of workers 
involved in war production, prevention of free movement of labour, and assignment of the labour 
force to particular war industries. 
A considerable percentage of workers working in auxiliary factories were subject to military 
discipline, enforced by army soldiers on factory floors, and to military penal code, sanctioned by 
military tribunals (Procacci, 1989, p. 34).9 The conscripted workers in these factories fell into two 
categories: exonerated and militarized (see Tomassini, 1991, p. 64). The former formally belonged 
to the army and subject to military discipline but could appear and live like other civilian workers. 
The latter resembled a soldier much more closely as they had to wear a military uniform, eat at the 
barrack, and contribute part of the salary to the military administration.10 For workers in both 
groups, resignation or leaving one’s job for any reason were equivalent to desertion and punished 
 
8 However, the details of arbitration process were not specified under decree no. 1277 (see Tomassini, 1991, p. 77f). 
9 Overwhelming majority of auxiliary plants (almost 70 per cent by the end of the war) were located in the Industrial 
Triangle. The number of plants under the control of UMI grew rapidly during the war from 276 by the end of 1915 to 
988 by the end of 1916, 1,857 at the end of 1917, and 1,976 (with 903,250 workers) at the end of the war (Procacci, 
1989, p. 36). 
10 By the end of 1916, there were 69,677 exonerated workers, 57,957 military workers, and 26,0544 civilians 
(Tomassini, 1991, p. 65). 
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according to the military penal code (Procacci, 1989, p. 38). Therefore, by militarizing part of the 
workforce and other sanctions against collective action, it was hoped that the disciplinary order over 
the workforce as a whole could be maintained while providing the necessary mechanism to fix the 
essential workforce to the auxiliary firms.  
Despite the stringent measures, there was still a considerable level of intersectional mobility 
of labour in this phase of the war. The shortage of skilled workers became apparent by the end of 
1915. As a result, the government recalled those skilled workers from the front back to the factories 
and exempted the skilled workers from military service at the front (Tomassini, 1983, p. 84). This 
created an impetus for the skilled craftsmen in smaller workshops to join the workforce in auxiliary 
factories to avoid being dispatched to the front. There was also a large-scale flow of labour from 
smaller to larger factories (Tomassini, 1991, p. 67).  
The banning of traditional forms of collective actions such as strikes and strict disciplinary 
measures led to the emergence of alternative forms of labour protest including obstructionism, 
slowdown, and sectional shut-downs (see Procacci, 1989, p. 38; Tomassini, 2010, p. 44). These 
were added to the repertoire of collective action and resurfaced in a profoundly different context 
and towards a different goal during the biennio rosso. But in the first phase of the war, these served 
as less risky ways for workers to voice their grievances and exert their collective power. 
As beneficial and desirable as the UMI auxiliary arrangements towards war production were 
for certain fractions of capitalists due to lucrative state contracts without cost control, labour 
discipline and industrial peace, as well as the availability of workforce and raw material, it entailed 
a fundamental breach of the managerial authority of capitalists over the workplace. Even though 
much of the power of the state over private production remained on paper, the fact that the supreme 
authority within the factory was not the private owners but the state in its various manifestations 
(military personnel, military codes, arbitration boards, etc.) was a profound challenge to the 
sovereignty of capital over private production. The militarized state-form, therefore, materialized 
itself visibly to the workers in its repressive form on the factory floor and in its conciliatory form 
outside the factory. The repressive apparatus of the state both reduced itself to the level of brutal 
executioner of workplace discipline and elevated itself to the level of neutral arbiter of industrial 
conflicts. Having effectively bypassed the trade unions in this phase despite the corporatist structure 
of the CCM and the CRMs and having practically severed its power over capital, the government 
under the militarized state-form had to manage various tensions and contradictions more directly. 




The first signs of such a crisis emerged towards the end of 1915 when industrial unrest in 
Liguria and San Giorgio, led by revolutionary elements within the trade unions, prompted the CCM 
to process the first serious case of industrial dispute (see Tomassini, 1983, p. 89). Previously, all 
case of labour disputes was resolved privately outside the UMI arbitration process. Partly due to the 
ideological standpoint and partly due to the fear of contagiousness if precedence were set, leading 
industrialists such as Olivetti advised the industrialists “to concede all that was possible in the hope 
of avoiding any resort to compulsory arbitration” (Adler, 1995, p. 108). However, this method 
eventually expired, and it became apparent that the UMI was far from prepared to handle the 
arbitration process. As it became evident that the war would prolong much longer than initially 
anticipated, the UMI was forced to rethink its strategy towards industrial mobilization.  
Second Period (July 1916 – November 1917) 
 Initially, the slow but definite growth in the number of disputes referred to the CRMs in 
1916 (Procacci, 1989, p. 37), as well as the sharp increase in labour demand to 92 per cent of the 
labour supply in 1916 (Tomassini, 1991, p. 67), convinced the UMI of the need to change its labour 
relation strategy. It needed the collaboration of the trade unions and more assertive position towards 
the industrialists especially with regards to the arbitration process and the incorporation of new 
unskilled workers. Therefore, labour and capital were integrated deeper the mode of representation 
of the state became more corporatist through more active use of the corporatist structure of the 
UMI. The relative position of the UMI itself within the state improved in this period as it was 
elevated from an undersecretary to a ministry in July 1917 (Procacci, 1989, p. 49). 
 The first signs of this strategic shift towards the trade unions emerged when General 
Dallolio reversed his opposition and occasional personal attacks towards the leaders of trade unions 
and met with the representatives of the Federation of Metalworkers (Federazione Impiegati Operai 
Metallurgici, FIOM) in the summer of 1916 (see Tomassini, 1983, p. 89). Later in 1916, the 
General Secretary of FIOM, Bruno Buozzi, received an invitation to join the CCM (see Tomassini, 
2010, p. 41). The inclusion of top representatives of trade unions continued into 1917, with 
Ludovico Calda, the Secretary of Genoa Chamber of Labour, and Emilio Colombino, a member of 
the national secretariat of FIOM, both were included in the CCM (see Ermacora, 2014). To dilute 
the presence of the socialist labour representatives in the state, representatives from the Catholic 
labour organizations were brought to the CRMs. However, this was not very effective in damping 
down the influence of the socialists in the state (Tomassini, 1983, p. 90). 
 To address the shortage of workforce in the context of accelerating war production, the state 
facilitated the influx of new unskilled and cheap workers, especially women and minors, into the 
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war industry.11 This was nothing short of a fundamental recomposition of the workforce. Given the 
reservations of trade unions, especially with regards to their skilled members, and the industrialists 
particularly with regards to the cost and disciplinary measures associated with the reorganization of 
production to absorb a large number of unskilled workers (Tomassini, 1991, p. 70; Bartoloni, 2015), 
the UMI had to intervene actively to advance the project. Therefore, the UMI established a Bureau 
of Women’s Work and initiated a series of studies towards this goal. Furthermore, the UMI 
introduced a series of reforms from March 1917 (see Tomassini, 1991, p. 71) specifically to address 
concerns about the exploitation of women and minors.12 Notably, the female and child workers 
were from the beginning of this process not classified as militarized workers and therefore were 
subjected to substantially lighter disciplinary measures. Even though they could not freely change 
jobs, they could protest without the risk of breaching the military code and being sent to the front or 
tried in front of a military tribune.   
 The state introduced a series of reforms in this phase in the hope of containing the rising 
unrest among workers and the general population as the war dragged on. One of the most notable of 
such reforms came through in August 1916 after the Piecework Commission, which included 
industrialists and labour representatives, came out in favour of freezing the existing piece rate until 
the conclusion of the war (Ermacora, 2014; Tomassini, 1982, pp. 98-101; Tomassini, 2010, p. 42). 
Other reforms included wage increase, injury insurance, and unemployment insurance (see 
Ermacora, 2014; Procacci, 1989, p. 49; Tomassini, 1983, p. 88). These were among some of the 
goals that the PSI and the CGL had struggled to get before the war but never quite achieved (see 
Horowitz, 1963, p. 55; Salomone, 1960, p. 71). The flipside of this cooperation for the trade unions 
was that they not only had to suspend some of their top demands such as the eight-hour working 
day but also maintain industrial peace and ensure higher labour productivity.  
 To improve the arbitration mechanism to address “economic disputes”, which were bound to 
increase especially in the light of the intensification of work, the UMI created more specific 
provisions. Accordingly, when workers of a particular plant thought that higher wages were 
necessary to keep up with the rising living cost, they could meet (even on the factory floor) to form 
a commission in order to formulate their request and represent them in front of the CRM. Therefore, 
the process legitimized the factory-based intersectoral collective representation of the rank-and-file. 
As before, an appeal had to be referred to the CCM. This was a method to adjust wages to the living 
costs without engaging in large scale contractual changes in the industrial sectors. Although wage 
 
11 By the end of 1916, there were 75,989 women and minors in auxiliary plants. This number grew to 145,574 by 1 June 
1917 (see Table 1 in Tomassini, 1991, p. 65). 
12 The CGL had made an explicit request to the UMI in the autumn of 1916 towards a number of reforms to protect 
women and minor workers (see Tomassini, 1983, p. 87). 
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adjustment was against the original decree that froze all labour contracts until the end of the war, it 
was not too unpalatable to the industrialists as long as the costs were not controlled by the UMI. 
The increase in wages could be offset by an increase in price in the state contracts. Furthermore, the 
state bureaucracy would slow down the wage adjustment process enough for the existing high 
inflation to effectively nullify the increase in wages.   
 Despite these state provisions, however, popular discontent in this phase was on the rise to 
insurgent levels.13 The news of the February Revolution in Russia was received broadly, albeit 
diffusely compared to the later October Revolution,14 as a symbol of a popular revolt against the 
despotic ruling class. Besides the psychological and geopolitical effects of these momentous events 
earlier that year, the high living costs and food shortages were among the leading factors behind the 
popular revolts in 1917.15 As the military cut the rationing for soldiers in December 1916, it 
extended the promise to give land to the peasants to reduce the likelihood of revolts in the 
agricultural sector. However, in 1917, there was a resumption of land occupations in the south and 
the centre, pro-peace demonstrations in share-cropping regions, and agricultural union actions in 
Lombardy and Piedmont (Bianchi, 2014).  
Protests against the high cost of living erupted in large cities including Milan (May 1917), 
Turin (August 1917), Genoa (August-September 1917) (Dentoni, 2014). Besides the high cost of 
living and war-weariness, another reason for the rapid spread of the protests in the industrial 
triangle was the arrest of many socialist and trade union leaders during the insurrectionary actions 
in summer 1917 (Levy, 1999, p. 90). The government gained control of the situation after 
dispatching the military to quell the movement in Turin.  
The Catholic forces did not remain passive towards these anti-war developments. Their 
unwillingness to grant their tacit support to the state project was captured in Pope Benedict XV’s 
condemnation of the war as “useless carnage” and call for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, 
issued in August 1917 shortly before the Turin revolt. Hence, while the state sought to integrate 
different forces within its corporate structure in this phase, it was losing their support under the 
weight of the popular discontent and militant actions against the war.  
This phase of the war saw a change in not only the intensity but also the pattern of labour 
protest. From scattered and spontaneous protests involving few workers in individual firms, there 
 
13 For an account of these unrests in Turin and Liguria in 1917, see Bertrand 1976, pp. 109-111; Procacci, 1989, p. 48; 
Levy, 1999, pp. 84-88. 
14 The February Revolution was received positively even among the interventionists as reminiscent of their revolt 
against the political elite linked to the Giolittian project in 1915 and as an inspiration for their imagined political project 
of a seizure of power as the Russians did (see Procacci, 1968, pp. 157-8).  
15 There was a 50 per cent increase in food prices by the end of 1916. The prices increased further in 1917 (see 
Procacci, 1997, pp. 54, 84). 
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was a shift from the end of 1916 towards large strikes involving thousands of workers with 
collective demands. These demands became increasingly more political and directed against the war 
effort in 1917. Women played a central role in this phase of popular and labour militancy. Between 
December 1916 and April 1917, there were 450 protests by women (Dentoni, 2014). The 
percentage of female strikers grew from 43.9 per cent in 1916 to 64.2 per cent in 1917 (Procacci, 
1989, p. 46). They also initiated the Turin revolt in August 1917 which began as a food riot. In the 
sphere of work, women strikers protested against low wages, timetables, and shift work (Procacci, 
2010, p. 76). Women’s particular position in social relations helps to explain their leadership 
capacities in these actions (see Pisa, 2010). Bearing the bulk of responsibility towards social 
reproduction, they were acutely sensitive to the rising cost of living and food prices. Furthermore, 
women’s entrance en masse into the factories in this phase acted as a bridge that extended the 
troubles “outside” the factories “into” the fortress of private production. The different disciplinary 
measures that the female workers were subjected to lower the risk of engaging in industrial actions 
such as strikes. Therefore, their actions were instrumental in expanding the industrial militancy in 
this phase and generalizing it as intimately linked to the struggles outside the factory floors.  
The state plunged into a crisis after the October Revolution in Russia (November 7-8) and 
the defeat in the battle of Caporetto (October 24-November 19). The schism was reinforced within 
the socialist movement due to the revolutionary zeal inspired in the Maximalist wing of the PSI 
after the October Revolution and the patriotic sense induced in the reformist wing of the PSI and the 
GCL after the defeat at the Caporetto (see Bertrand, 1976, p. 114; Papadia, 2016). This strained the 
capacity of the socialists to effectively participate within the state. Already before these far-reaching 
events, the growing protests made the position of the trade unions within the state more difficult as 
they seemed unable to control their members and maintain industrial peace. After Caporetto, the 
trend towards repression and incarceration of socialist leaders intensified (Procacci, 1989, pp. 48-9; 
Bertrand, 1976), further paralyzing their ability to function within the state regardless of their 
willingness to do so.  
Henceforth, in the context of the alienated socialist and Catholic forces, the state-form 
underwent another transformation to overcome the limitations of the second period. The change in 
the government, after Vittorio Emanuele Orlando succeeded Paolo Boselli as the Prime Minister on 
30 October 1917, and the top echelon of the military, after General Armando Diaz replaced Luigi 
Cadorna as the Chief of Staff on 9 November 1917, paved the way for the next phase. 
Third Period (December 1917 – November 1918) 
 To renew the war effort after the terrible demoralizing defeat at Caporetto, the state engaged 
in a widespread propaganda campaign within the troops, workers, and peasants, as well as the 
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general population (Bertrand, 1967, p. 120; Procacci, 2010; Cappellano, 2014). The Orlando 
government invited Filippo Turati, Claudio Treves, and few other reformist socialists in April 1918 
to participate in a commission to study the post-war problems. However, to avoid a split in the 
party, Turati declined the offer (De Grand, 1989, p. 33).16 Propaganda was a largely neglected 
aspect of the Italian war mobilization until then. But in this period, it was pushed forward fiercely 
on various fronts, through the distribution of leaflets and newspapers, to achieve patriotic stability. 
The state also renewed its appeal to the rural population and widely disseminated the campaign of 
the “land to peasant” in 1918 (Bianchi, 2014).  
 Although it is difficult to isolate the effect of these efforts from other measures such as 
reforms and repressions, they presumably had some effects on recovering the general morale among 
the troops (see Wilcox, 2016; Cappellano, 2014) and patriotic feelings among the workers 
(Procacci, 2010).17 But they also had more profound and unintended effects on the consciousness of 
different social classes. With messages such as “the war is for the soldier: the peasant, the worker, 
the clerk. It is fought for all those who suffer and who are hard up, in the countryside and in the 
cities in Italy and outside Italy. The war is for the proletariat: this is the war of the workers” (as 
quoted in Bertrand, 1967, p. 120), the propaganda campaign induced a sense of indispensability in 
the life of the nation among workers and soldiers (Corner and Procacci, 1997, p. 232).  
The government propaganda had more specific effects in developing key ideological 
concepts which were profoundly different from the pre-war understanding. It popularized the notion 
of “man as producer”, uprooting the liberal notion of “man as citizen” (Adler, 1995, pp. 121-2). The 
concept of “man as producer” was used after the war by both the socialist theorist, Gramsci, and the 
Fascist leader and theorist Benito Mussolini.  
In the rural context, the popularization of the slogan of “land to peasant” and the state’s 
legal activities to set up arbitration courts to deal with rural property helped develop the concept of 
“communal property” within the property law. It was understood as a type of property that is to be 
used collectively for social purposes according to the needs of the community (see Latini, 2014, pp. 
 
16 Despite these appeals, the government did not scale back its repression of the working-class organizations. The 
Orlando government intensified the crackdown on the socialist leaders after Caporetto, while the interventionists were 
popularizing the myth of “enemy within”. This further hardened the intransigent position of the Maximalists within the 
PSI (see Procacci, 1968, pp. 162-3; De Grand, 1989, pp. 33-4). Also, one third of the workforce in the auxiliary 
factories were punished with fines and 25,840 workers were imprisoned in this phase of the war. Moreover, overtime 
became obligatory and work shifts were extended to 12 hours, and holidays were suspended (Ermacora, 2014).  
17 While preserving the tough measures such as capital punishment, General Diaz made key reforms in the army 
including better system of troop rotation and leaves as well as a more generous life insurance and pensions for the 
soldiers (Wilcox, 2016; Cappellano, 2014). There were also reforms in other areas in this phase of the war. For 
example, redundancy funds due to involuntary unemployment was broadened. The fund covered cases of suspension of 
employment resulting from lack of not only raw material, as it was established in 1917, but also electricity (Tomassini, 
1983, p. 92). The state also implemented more protective measures towards the female and child workers (Tomassini, 
2010, p. 46; Procacci, 2010, p. 19; Ermacora, 2014). 
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245-9). Such notions provided the conceptual and legal basis for the widespread land occupation 
movements by Italian peasants after the war. 
However, despite the government’s efforts to improve its relationship with the peasants, 
tension was rising in the countryside. The last year of the war experienced a different pattern of 
rural protest from pressuring the government to grant state subsidies to rural families to rejecting 
such measures in the hope of accelerating the end of the war (Bianchi, 2014). The peasants also 
engaged in many disruptive actions in the southern and central regions in February 1918. By May 
1918, such anti-government and anti-war rural protests reached the other regions (Procacci, 1989, 
pp. 50-1). In the urban centres, there was a decline in the number of protests in 1918 which was 
probably due to a combination of the government crackdown on socialist and labour organizations, 
toughening of disciplinary measures on workers, and the propaganda campaign. Nevertheless, there 
were still hundreds of protests by thousands of workers in 1918.18  
 A squeeze in international credit provided by the allies (Esposti, 2015) meant that the 
economic pressure intensified in late 1917. Francesco Saverio Nitti, the new Minister of Finance in 
the Orlando government, was working to swing the Italian credit supply towards the United States 
and securing the fifth and the largest war loan (Forsyth, 1993, p. 121). The structure of war finance 
and monetary policy remained more or less the same throughout the war in terms of general 
subordination to the exigencies of the Treasury, so the banks were making direct advances to the 
treasury. However, Nitti’s intervention, besides approaching the USA for credit supply, in a way 
changed the significance of financial mobilization. Before taking office, he criticized the previous 
government for not engaging with financial mobilization with sufficient vigour. So, when his term 
began, he thoroughly embraced productivism and rigorous financial mobilization19 and flagged the 
5th war loan as a symbol of national unity and productivism. It was in this sense that perhaps we can 
see Nitti’s intervention in this phase as fitting into the larger project of the hegemonic vision.  
Nevertheless, the cost of living and inflation continued to rise making the wage adjustment 
provisions in the second phase completely insufficient to catch up with the basic needs of ordinary 
people. The government had to come up with another wage adjustment method. It opted for the 
“sliding scale” scheme that indexed wages based on the cost of one “basket” of the normal diet of a 
working-class family (see Tomassini, 2010, pp. 44-5; Tomassini, 1991, pp. 81-2). This was a way 
to formally uphold the provision of wage-freeze imposed at the beginning of the war while 
addressing the cost of living more urgently and directly. It was also believed that this method could 
 
18 The official statistics reported 303 protests involving 158,035 in 1918 (see Procacci, 1991, pp. 171, 177). 
19 The combination of productivism and rigorous financial policies in the context of the unwillingness of the 
government to control costs of industrial production is a contradiction which ultimately resulted in the collapse of the 
Italian fiscal system in the post-war period (Forsyth, 1993, p. 76; Galassi and Harrison, 2005, pp. 302-4). 
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avoid the legal complications associated with the previous scheme and would enable the 
government to skip the organized efforts of the unions (Tomassini, 2010, p. 45). However, the 
scheme was in practice very imperfect and achieved limited success (Procacci, 2010, p. 16).  
 The bypassing of the unions required a more direct and sustained channel to the internal 
commissions (Tomassini, 1991, p. 83). It was also needed in the process of more rational 
distribution of resources that the UMI began in the last phase of the war to reallocate the labour 
force based on productivity, and organizational functionality of the individual firms (Tomassini, 
1991, p. 72).20 Therefore, the CCM began a process of legal recognition of the internal 
commissions from November 1917. Prior to this point, the internal commissions had a difficult life 
and had limited impact on the workplace hierarchy or autonomous input into the CRMs (Adler, 
1995, p. 107). Until the end of 1917, the question of the internal commissions revolved around the 
technical aspects regarding the particularity of their tasks. It was in the third phase that the question 
of the recognition of the internal commissions became a centre focus (Ortaggi, 1983, p. 215-17).  
 The CCM was cautious in its legislative proposal towards the recognition of the internal 
commissions. Two members of the CCM, Pio Cabonelli and the industrialist Giovanni Silvestri, 
drafted a scheme that was designed to curb the most dangerous aspects of the recognition project 
(see Ortaggi, 1983, p. 217). But the political objective behind this was clear to the forces involved: 
to facilitate a more direct involvement of the state in the industrial regulation by excluding the 
unions while confining the internal commissions to the factory levels under the firm control of the 
employers. The legislation sought to enforce these through a series of clauses including the 
management’s right to appoint a certain number of members in the internal commissions, the 
prohibition of any external interference by a person or an organization into the conducts of the 
internal commissions, and the absolute subordination of the internal commissions to the decisions 
of the rank-and-file (see Ortaggi, 1983, pp. 217-18).  
 The attitude of industrialists towards the question of recognition was mixed. Some fiercely 
opposed the proposal even though they had already acknowledged their existence in previous years, 
believing that the recognition would lead to a flood of claims by the workers. Some were open to 
the idea and hoped that doing so would allow them to maintain control over the internal 
commissions. This diversity of opinions already created confusion in the process. Ultimately, the 
LIT’s opposition to the proposal was decisive in formulating the industrialists’ political position 
(Orgaggi, 1983, p. 218). The major trade unions such as the FIOM and their leaders (e.g. 
Colombino and Angiolo Cabrini) were also against the measure, even though previously they in fact 
 
20 This move not only created tensions between smaller and larger firms but also between the UMI and some 
industrialists (see Tomassini, 1991, pp. 72-3). 
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pushed for the formal recognition of the internal commissions, believing that it was intended to 
exclude the union access to the rank-and-file. They were also concerned about the controllability of 
these movements if they were legalized as was outlined in the legislation (Ortaggi, 1983, p. 218).  
 In the face of such opposition, the government dropped the legislation in its original form. 
However, through a decree issued on 23 January 1918, the state recognized the internal 
commissions (although named differently) in a limited sense insofar as they stand until the end of 
the war as a simple and direct representation of workers to negotiate strictly economic issues with 
the UMI bodies (Ortaggi, 1983, p. 219). This was the last major intervention of the state into the 
labour relation before the end of the war.  
 The alienation of the major industrialists and labour unions from the state resulted in a rapid 
dismantling of the UMI after the war. Both the CIDI and the trade unions were eager to go back to 
the pre-war liberal order with its “free-market” labour relations and different state functions. While 
the PSI hardened its intransigence stance after its August 1918 Congress abandoned the remaining 
reformist aspects and reject any reformist solution to the post-war reconstruction including any 
alliance with the bourgeois parties (De Grand, 1989, p. 33-4), the CGL went back to the faith in 
gradualism, laissez-faire, and evolutionism (Tomassini, 1991, p. 86). The influence of the CGL on 
the PSI was institutionally strengthened after the Pact of Alliance was signed between the two at the 
end of September 1918, sharply distinguishing the “economic” and the “political” strikes and giving 
the leadership of the former to the union and the latter to the party. Likewise, while many 
industrialists experienced the material benefit of state intervention into the economy and labour 
relations, the CIDI upheld its ideological commitment to the imagined liberal order as the only 
possible path for the post-war reconstruction. However, the old and new tensions and contradictions 
burst after the war, shaking the Italian society to its core.  
Concluding Remarks  
From the beginning of the war, the state-from that emerged from the specific pre-war 
context to carry out the war project already laid out the foundation of a militarized corporatist state 
with a particular hegemonic vision embedded in its structural foundation and institutional order. For 
example, the foundation of the UMI not only imposed itself militarily (via decrees no. 506 and no. 
993) but also already established a corporatist structure (via decrees no. 1065 and no. 1437) and 
retained the possibility of manufacturing its hegemonic vision (via decree no. 1277 and propaganda 
powers). However, different forms gained prominence during different phases of the war. The state-
form underwent a series of transformations to overcome the limitations and to resolve 




 Having effectively nullified the parliament, the militarized state organized social relations 
between class forces in a rigidly vertical order. This meant that any crisis within the state would 
traverse vertically and affect the stability of the state as a whole. Moreover, the localized crises had 
the tendency to be generalized and, therefore, required more direct and immediate interventions. 
Furthermore, the stability of the state was more susceptible to disturbances within the military 
hierarchy. All this implied that the fate of the state was existentially and simultaneously tied up to 
absolute control over not only the classes and class fractions but also the military order from the top 
to the bottom. This situation gave acute disruptive power to challenges from various social classes 
as well as the lower echelons within the army. It also demanded significant state capacity and 
relative flexibility within the rigid parameters of its militarized form.  
 Initially, the militarized state fundamentally breached the axiomatic principle of managerial 
authority in the workplace and established a brutal military order within the sphere of private 
production. This was a radical departure from the nominal liberal order in relation to the extent of 
state interference into the private sphere of capitalist production. But due to its unwillingness to 
exercise its hegemony over the capitalist class even at the level of cost control over war production 
let alone requisitioning, it lost its ability to implement effective fiscal policies and effectively 
reduced its operation to strict regulation of the labour market and a military discipline of the 
workplace. Nevertheless, the penetration of the state into the sphere of production meant that any 
challenge to the managerial structure and any movement towards democratization of the workplace 
was simultaneously a challenge to the militarized state form and implied democratization of the 
state. Therefore, the struggle for the democratization of the workplace and the state were vertically 
bridged.  
In the meanwhile, the particular composition of the Italian army, with its large armies drawn 
mostly from the peasant population, required brutal disciplinary measures to hold the lower echelon 
of the army under control. However, the social composition of the army also implied that 
agricultural production was significantly weakened and led to food shortages from the second 
period of the war.  
 During the first period, the government believed that it could maintain industrial peace 
through military discipline and manage the labour market by banning strikes and the free movement 
of labour. These not only led to new forms of resistance such as slow-downs which were used again 
during the biennio rosso but also showed their fundamental limitations as soon as it became 
apparent that the arbitration scheme originally envisioned by the UMI could not handle the 
increasing industrial disputes. Also, due to rapidly growing war industries in the second period, the 
government had to secure new and cheap sources of labour for war industries. It did so by a 
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significant increase in the number of unskilled workers, notably women and minors. To overcome 
the deficiencies in the arbitration process and to facilitate the integration of the unskilled workers 
into the production process, the UMI more actively incorporated the trade unions into its corporatist 
structures. 
 While overcoming some limitations, the state generated new tensions and contradictions. As 
the female workers entered the factories, the struggle for social reproduction “outside” the factory, 
such as protest against high living cost or food shortages, were linked to the struggle “inside” the 
factory via the militant activities of women, who were not categorized as militarized workers and 
could strike without the fear of being sent to the front. In other words, the same agents who were at 
the forefront of struggles outside capitalist production since they bore the bulk of the burden of the 
reproduction of labour now had entered the factories en masse and could strike with much more 
immunity from the brutality of the repressive apparatus of the state than their male counterparts. 
Therefore, the struggles “outside” and “inside” the factories were horizontally bridged. 
Furthermore, the new arbitration procedure, though under the formal liaising power of the trade 
unions, empowered factory-based intersectoral collective representation of the rank-and-file.  
 As social unrest grew due to the internal tensions and the external developments towards the 
end of this period, the corporatist structure of the state reached its yield point. The trade unions 
could no longer be trusted in maintaining control of their members. Also, after the defeat at 
Caporetto, the government had to rethink its approach to total mobilization. In the third period, the 
state engaged in more direct and consensual approaches to social mobilization and labour relations. 
Its intense propaganda campaign within the military, the peasants, and the working classes 
generally elevated the self-consciousness of the agrarian and working classes, and produced specific 
concepts such as “man as producer”, “associational property”, “land to the peasants” that partly laid 
the ideological foundations for post-war radical movements. Moreover, the state sought to bypass 
the trade unions and regulate the working classes through wider utilization and official recognition 
of the internal commissions. This move antagonized both the trade unions and many capitalists. It is 
true that the recognition of internal commissions as such was halted and only established in a more 
limited form through a decree. However, the penetration of the state into the sphere of private 
production has now created the institutional and political road map that could be used to channel the 
radical rank-and-file movements in relative independence from the reformist unions.   
 The rapid rewinding of the state back to its liberal form after the war was greatly desired by 
both the major industrialist associations and the major trade unions. However, on the one hand, the 
strategic selectivity of the state in favour of capitalist reproduction as well as the particular 
corporatist approach to war mobilization weakened the associational capacities of capitalists and 
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prevented them from developing a strong cohesive national association to be able to stand for their 
interests firmly after the end of the war. This made the capitalist fractions particularly vulnerable to 
movements by the working classes and the agrarian classes (Adler, 1995, pp. 151-2). On the other 
hand, the CGL’s stringent faith in a reformist path to the post-war reconstruction, while confining 
its activities to the “economic” sphere and relying on the now-firmly-intransigent PSI to carry out 
the “political” struggle, crippled its ability to either effectively contain or radically generalize the 
post-war rank-and-file militancy. 
Since state capacity was insufficient to swing the situation back into a normal liberal regime 
after the war in a gradual manner (due also to the huge resistance by both major industrialists and 
unions who were so attached to the myth of liberal order), the country went into a process of near 
social revolution. Why that attempt took the form of “council democratic” and why it was 





The Making of “Council Democratic” Movements in a Comparative Perspective 
 
Introduction  
The past two chapters presented case studies of the making of “council democratic” 
movements in Germany and Italy. It was discussed through analyzes of transformations that the 
German and Italian states undertook during WWI. It showed how the transformations of state-led 
war mobilization in each case laid the foundation for the emergence of “council democratic” 
movements after the war.  
This chapter looks at the making of the “council democratic” movements from a 
comparative perspective to examine the extent to which case studies can offer more generalizable 
and theoretical conclusions. It takes up the question of the making of “council democratic” 
movements by a comparative analysis of Germany and Italy as positive cases, and France as a 
negative case.  
The comparative analysis here deploys the theoretical framework discussed in the 
introductory chapter. It focuses on the form of the state and its hegemonic vision. The former is 
understood on the basis of three dimensions, namely, mode of representation, institutional 
architecture, and patterns of state intervention. The latter defines the nature and purpose of the 
state’s project for the wider society. Using this theoretical framework, the chapter offers an 
overview of the key characteristics of French war mobilization as the negative case. The 
comparative analysis starts by discussing the particular characteristics of the two positive cases that 
laid the ground for the emergence of “council democratic” movements by putting them in contrast 
with the negative case. The analysis then moves to a comparative study within the positive cases to 
link the specific form of the “council democratic” movements that emerged in each to the particular 
dynamics that unfolded in Germany and Italy. 
Overview of the Case of France 
  This section limits the historical account of the French war mobilization to its most 
essential factors needed to conduct the comparative analysis in the next section. The evolution of 
the relevant dimensions of the French state during the war can be organized into three periods: 4 
August 1914 – 21 December 1914, which marks the formation of the union sacrée and the initial 
phase of war mobilization through governance by decrees, 22 December 1914 – 15 November 
1917, which marks the reopening of the Chamber of Deputies and the progressive enhancement of 
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tripartism, 16 November 1917 – 11 November 1918, which marks the ascension of Georges 
Clémenceau to power and the end of the union sacrée.  
 In the face of the military invasion of Belgium by the German army at the beginning of the 
war and its rapid advancement towards the North-East part of France, it was made possible for the 
French state to bring together diverse political forces. It included the French Section of the 
Workers’ International (Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière, SFIO) and, the anti-
imperialist wing of the revolutionary syndicalist union, the General Confederation of Labour 
(Confédération Générale du Travail, CGT), under the leadership of Léon Jouhaux, in support of a 
defensive war (though not without internal tensions). They came together under the rubric of the 
union sacrée (sacred union) against German aggression.1  
The union sacrée, operating on a “one nation” hegemonic strategy, went beyond the 
rhetorical level of national unity and took steps towards a cautious broadening of the state to the 
opposition. This process began after two socialists, Jules Guesde (Minister without portfolio) and 
Marcel Sembat (Minister of Public Works), entered the reshuffled government of René Viviani on 
26 August 1914. Later in May 1915, Albert Thomas, the leader of the reformist wing of the SFIO, 
was appointed to the crucial role of Under-Secretary of State for Artillery and Munitions, becoming 
the Minister of Munitions a year later. 
 The legislative branch was suspended at the start of the war upon the ratification of a state of 
siege by the Chamber of Deputies. This allowed the executive branch to manage the war through 
decrees. In one of its first steps, the government re-appropriated the 1877 law that allowed 
requisition of industrial establishments by the state authorities and imposition of censorship to 
control the flow of information.2 Ultimately, the power of requisition remained merely as a threat 
and proved to be the least active mechanism used by the state to manage the war industry. However, 
the concentration of power in the hands of the government that was strictly focused on advancing 
the military objectives and the compulsory national military service that scooped up millions of 
people into the army, enabled the military to hold control over civilian life (Horne, 1991, pp. 50-1, 
57).  
The loss of the Northern territories, the industrial heartland of France after Paris, was a 
major blow to the war effort in this period and pushed the state to delve into the question of 
 
1 For a comparative analysis of the CGT’s support of the war in relation to other syndicalist movements, see Darlington 
(2012). On the decline of militant activities at the outbreak of the war and the general compliance the party and the 
union to the union sacrée, see Becker (1985, pp. 64-74).  
2 A more notable aspect of the French propaganda campaign than the state’s direct involvement is the degree to which 
civil society (e.g. see Robert, 1997; Audoin-Rouzeau, 1997) and public intellectuals (Smith et al., 2003, pp. 53-9; 
Hanna, 1996) got involved in the ideological operation. This highlights the level of self-mobilization that went well 
beyond the centralized mechanisms implemented by the state.  
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industrial mobilization and social provisioning.3 On 20 September 1914, Alexandre Millerand, the 
Minister of War, called on leading bankers and industrialists to come up with plans for industrial 
mobilization. The industrialists immediately started demanding the return of drafted workers to the 
factories (Hardach, 1992). Millerand divided the industrialists into 12 regions, each of which was 
led by one person responsible for distributing raw material, allocating military contracts, and 
coordinating actions towards efficient production, and controlling prices (Godfrey, 1987, pp. 48, 
106-26). It was at this moment when the members of the comité des forges (Heavy Industry 
Committee), the most powerful and organized employers’ association in France at the time, were 
able to dominate the leadership position of these regional committees (Godfrey, 1987, p. 49). This, 
in turn, empowered the comité des forges and prompted it to develop its own bureaucratic structure 
to strengthen its organizational capacity (Godfrey, 1987, pp. 221-30). The French system of 
delegating private employers’ organizations to manage the supply of raw material to metallurgical 
industries was unique among the belligerent countries (Smith et al., 2003, p. 63; also see Hardach, 
1992).  
The delegation of employers’ associations to coordinate industrial production was not the 
only mode of state intervention. This mode was true in the metallurgical sector where there were 
pre-existing employers’ associations organized and influential enough to be able to coordinate the 
actions among the producers. Different modalities of state intervention emerged in other industries 
as the war went on. In chemical industries, the state had to step in and form a bureaucratic 
organization of its own to organize the sector and establish public-private entities such as National 
Dye Company that were “not fully nationalized, not directed by bureaucrats, but yet an instrument 
of state policy, defending the interests of one group of chemical industrialists against another...” 
(see Godfrey, 1987, p. 180; also see pp. 51-2; 157-70, 295). In the textile industry, the state’s 
intervention took the form of regulatory standardization as exemplified in the case of the National 
Shoe company (see Godfrey, 1987, pp. 150-6). Despite the differences between these modes of 
intervention, there is a common thread that runs through them. Generally, the state intervention 
avoided getting directly involved in control and management of production and limited its operation 
to coordination and regulation.  
Under the condition of severe limitation on the right to strike after the war began (Horne, 
1992, p. 268) and rapid decline in the membership of the union and the party in this period largely 
 
3 The number of unemployed increased sharply, reading 2 million workers, at the beginning of the war. The government 
responded to these by establishing employment agencies (see Chancerel, 2015; Smith et al., 2003, pp. 67-8).  
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due to national conscription,4 the SFIO and the CGT began to overcome the traditional gap and 
work more closely together. They formed the comité d’action (Action Committee) in early 
September 1914 as a joint lobbying group, a “united front” of the two major working-class 
organizations, to defend the interest of the working-class producers (especially skilled workers) and 
consumers. Through the comité d’action, “labour leaders, in cooperation with socialist 
parliamentary deputies, pressured politicians and civil servants by criticizing government policy and 
advancing counter-project for a variety of problems” (Horne, 1992, p. 251; see also Horne, 1991, 
pp. 69-70).  
In the first period of war mobilization, a move towards the development of a tripartite mode 
of representation can already be observed. Even though the architecture of the state system 
underwent a centralization in this period, it (cautiously) broadened its executive branch to 
opposition parties and institutionally legitimized the union sacrée. Despite the influence of the 
military High Command in this period over civilian life, the civilian politicians were able to 
maintain control of the government and avoid militarization of the state. As discussed above, it also 
averted the militarization of industrial relations. The state laid the initial foundation for a corporatist 
inclusion of industrialists into the state through the creation of regional committees in heavy 
industries whose leadership was delegated to members of the comité des forges.  
Despite the compliance of the CGT to the union sacrée at the beginning of the war, the state 
in this period was not keen to actively involve the union in its industrial mobilization scheme. This 
situation prompted the formation of the comité d’action which later operated mainly as a pressure 
group. Although the cooperation between the party and the union within the comité d’action was 
weakened after the reopening of the Chamber of Deputies (Horne, 1991, p. 57) and became more 
closely linked to the leadership of the CGT (especially its majoritarian wing), the organization 
continued to pressure the government to make improvements on welfare, employment relief, and 
living costs. The comité d’action also allowed the CGT to maintain its relative independence from 
the state and the negative aspects of its war effort. 
The two legislative chambers reopened on 22 December 1914 but suspended any new 
national elections until the end of the war. The aim was to gain democratic legitimacy while 
avoiding electoral instabilities. Yet, the suspension of elections also entailed freezing of the current 
composition of forces in the chambers for the duration of the war. This meant that the largest 
parliamentary block, dominated by the centrist Radical and Radical-Socialist parties, could maintain 
 
4 The membership of CGT fell from 350,000 prior to the war to 50,000 in 1915. The membership of the socialist party 




their 1914 electoral success throughout the war. The chambers began reasserting their authority 
over the government by scrutinizing the ministers on a host of issues, especially regarding its war 
efforts. They did so in a variety of ways, first through parliamentary committees (reaching its peak 
between November 1915 and February 1916), then through direct delegation (though this was 
hardly implemented in reality; Godfrey, 1987, p. 55), and through its constitutional prerogative to 
hold secret sessions (eight of such sessions were held between 16 June 1916 and 10 October 1917).  
The revitalization of the parliamentary process entailed a transformation of the architecture 
of the state into a more transversal structure owning to the formal accountability of the executive 
branch to the legislative body in the context of the progressive involvement of the government into 
the developing tripartite structures. The extent to which the legislative bodies had a substantive 
impact on the government’s industrial policies during the war is debatable.5 However, the inability 
or unwillingness to influence the war effort more directly and decisively led to catastrophic tensions 
at the heart of the state which were exacerbated as social unrest intensified in 1917. This in turn led 
to the fragmentation and ultimate collapse of the fragile coalition of forces under union sacrée by 
mid-November 1917.  
The appointment of Thomas as the Under-Secretary of State for Artillery and Munitions in 
May 1915 ushered a period of profound changes to the industrial relations in French war 
mobilization. Even though Thomas was fully committed to the sanctity of private production and 
even resisted proposals to impose a tax on war profits (Hardach, 1992, p. 95; Hennebique, 1992), 
his presence as a socialist deputy in charge of one of the most important positions in the state, his 
rhetorical strategy towards the working class, and his reformist measures to reduce the acute burden 
on the working class was significant in sustaining the image of incorporation of the working class 
into the state. To address the severe shortage of skilled workers in heavy industries at the time when 
it had become clear that the war would take longer than originally expected, Thomas asked 
industrialists to draw up lists of skilled workers who were drafted into the army but whom they 
needed for their operation as well as the number of unskilled workers to be recalled from the 
frontline back to the factories. The exemption process of skilled workers was systematized and 
codified in August 1915 under the Dalbiez law, under which 500,000 workers were recalled back to 
 
5 Godfrey (1987) argues that “traditional methods of French parliamentary control, such as debate, procedural sabotage, 
and the work of commissions had very little influence on the course of state industrial intervention” (p. 296). However, 
one can point to the profound impact of the legislation, pushed through the Senate by Clémenceau in March 1917, that 
banned any imports into France unless it is regulated by government committees, on the development of corporatist 
structures in the metallurgical sector as evidence of the influence of the parliamentary process on state industrial 
intervention. Furthermore, the bill passed in the summer of 1915 also imposed certain parliamentary control over the 
industry according to which “the state oversees orders, the reception of manufactured goods, and the rational use of 
labour, etc.”, and “the state had the right to impose a service representative ‘invested with control over the technical, 
industrial, or commercial management of the company insofar as manufacturing related to contracts signed with the 
state is concerned” (Hardach, 1992, pp. 100-1). 
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industrial work, recovering much of the labour force shortage that hit the industries in the first year 
of the war (Smith et al., 2003, pp. 61-2).6  
In order to stop employers from abusing this situation, the government required the 
conscription workers to be paid the same as the current regional wage and allowed union 
representative to examine the qualification of each recalled worker (Bonzon, 1997, p. 180). 
Furthermore, the law established tripartite commissions to oversee the condition of the conscripted 
workers with members appointed by the prefects based on the lists provided by trade unions and 
employers’ associations (Vichniac, 1990, p. 172). The continued shortage of workers, especially in 
unskilled and semi-skilled positions, was addressed by introducing new categories of workers into 
the factories. These included women, children, colonial workers, and prisoners of war.7  
One of the ways by which the trade unions were incorporated into the state project in this 
period was carried via consultative commissions such as the Commission Consultative du Travail 
(Labour Advisory Board) between June to December 1916, as well as joined consultative 
committees such as Commission Nationale du Placement (National Placement Commission) in June 
1916 (Horne 1991, pp. 71-3). Thereby, the role of the CGT as an interlocutor between its members 
and the government ministers and deputies continued into this period along the lines that had started 
in the previous period. Also, once in January 1917 the government announced the introduction of a 
wage scale to adjust for the rising cost of living (in addition to a minimum wage), it pursued three 
methods to implement this policy: based on direct negotiation between the employers and workers’ 
representatives, based on a tripartite commission established by the government, or based on direct 
administrative order (Vichniac, 1990, p. 176).8  
All these efforts could not dampen the upsurge of militancy in 1917 among workers and 
soldiers in the form of strikes and mutinies.9 In the hope of improving industrial relations, Thomas 
 
6 In a significant ideological shift behind national conscription, the law replaced the notion of “blood tax” to “the right 
man in the right place” to justify the distribution of military service between the home front and war front based on 
efficiency in the overall war effort (see Chancerel, 2015; Beaupré, 2014). To avoid favouritism, the law also changed 
the basis of request for skilled workers from specific workers to the category of skilled workers (Vichniac, 1990, p. 
172). These both indicate a shift in the state’s policy towards an efficient and rational distribution of manpower both in 
the home front and war front.  
7 The employment of women especially in war industries increased sharply during the war. In the Department of the 
Seine, this number increased from 5 per cent in 1914 to 30 per cent of the workforce in 1918 (Dubesset et al., 1992, p. 
186). Under the pressure of groups such as the Comite Intersyndical d'Action contre l'Exploitation de la Femme (the 
Inter-Union Committee Against the Exploitation of Women Workers) associated with various unions and workers’ 
organizations (Horne, 1991, pp. 222-3), the government implemented a series of measures to protect female workers 
(Dubesset et al., 1992, p. 192). Also, see Darrow (2000) for a more recent account of the participation of French women 
in the war.  
8 To resolve possible conflicts arisen from this process, the government instituted compulsory arbitration commissions, 
albeit without the participation of the representatives from employers’ associations or workers’ unions and with 
considerable objection from but the socialist party and the CGT (see Becker, 1985, p. 206). 
9 Although the number of mutinies was quite high, the vast majority of the cases were pardoned or reduced to 
imprisonment. Between August 1914 and January 1917, there were 424 cases of imprisonment in total and between 7 to 
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called for the institution of the delegues d'atelier (workshop delegates or shop stewards) in early 
1917. Contrary to the case of Britain, the purpose of the delegues d'atelier was not the protection of 
craft boundaries but bread and butter issues (Vichniac, 1990, p. 192). The idea of establishing the 
delegues d'atelier was initially supported by the CGT because it could potentially be used to 
strengthen union presence in the shop floors. Most employers were not supportive of this initiative 
in the fear that it could fall under the control of the unions or be used to generalize collective 
grievances beyond individual workshops. Therefore, the election of delegates and their jurisdiction 
became hotly debated issues.  
Internal tension within the CGT with regards to the form of interaction with the state after 
1917 found its locus on the question of shop floor representation (Horne 1991, pp. 190-1). The 
majority-wing of the CGT demanded an industry-wide system that could reflect the general 
transformation of labour relation during the war and empower the union to stand for the industrial 
workers. They also wanted the union to be able to send their own candidates. They wished to use 
the delegate system as “agents of syndicalist ‘management and control’” (Horne, 1991, p. 195). But 
the minority-wing of the CGT disagreed with the reformist direction of the majority CGT and, 
instead, wanted to utilize these to intensify anti-war campaigning in revolutionary syndicalist 
directions. Ultimately, however, the government followed the instruction of the comité des forges 
on this issue not only about who could vote but also the inability to present collective demands (see 
Vichniac, 1990, p. 178). Despite the systematic efforts to prevent radicalization of these institutions, 
these workshop delegates in some cities such as Paris extended their militancy to political issues 
such as pacifism.  
The tripartite structure gave working-class organizations a level of flexibility to switch 
between lobbying and parliamentary efforts, and cooperation in the corporatist structure. For 
example, in 1917 and 1918, when the establishment could not reduce industrial action, “The official 
CGT leadership was fully involved in the strike negotiations and in consultation over the law” 
(Horne 1991, p. 179; see also Becker, 1985, p. 205-16). This allowed the syndicalist leaders to take 
responsibility for the militant industrial actions and the victories (p. 179), while also (in the case of 
majority CGT) distancing itself from the anti-war efforts. The tension within the CGT during the 
1917 and 1918 strikes between minority and majority reflect the tension in the gravitational pull 
within tripartism between parliamentarism and corporatism (see Horne, 1991, pp. 189-90). In line 
with corporatist tendencies, the majority GCT saw an opportunity to enhance the contractual 
relation with employers based on collective bargaining in exchange for a disciplined workforce. 
 
8 executions per months (Keiger, 2000, p. 251). On the question of mutinies and remobilization of soldiers after 1917, 
see Smith (1994; 1997).  
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Yet, in line with parliamentarism, especially the minority CGT sought to gain concessions from the 
employers through radicalization and generalization of class struggle into wider industrial circles.  
The contradictions of tripartism exacerbated under the pressure of the war on the French 
military at the war front and the growing social unrest at the home front, as well as the impact of 
international events such as the Russian Revolution and the defeat of the Italian army at Caporetto. 
Calls for ending the war on a negotiated peace were growing not only outside the state among the 
strikers and mutinies but also at the heart of the state even among influential deputies of Radical 
parties, spearheaded by Joseph Caillaux. On the right, there was a concerted campaign, led most 
notably by Clémenceau, to escalate the economic and industrial efforts to achieve a total military 
victory. The political crisis began in the secret sessions. The government, and particularly Thomas, 
came under increasing pressure by the chamber in two secret sessions in June and July 1917 
regarding his war policies. The crisis resulted in the fall of two governments, headed by Alexandre 
Ribot and then the Paul Painleve, within a short span of time. Furthermore, the refusal of Ribot’s 
government on 2 June 1917, under the instruction of President Raymond Poincaré, to issue 
passports for the socialist delegates to attend the socialist Peace Conference in Stockholm created a 
deep disdain among the SFIO and the GCL against the state. In September, the SFIO decided to 
leave the union sacrée. Respecting the party discipline, Thomas announced his resignation as the 
Minister of Munition. All these developments made the critical task of Poincaré, who had actively 
work to maintain the unstable equilibrium of forces under the union sacrée until 1917, impossible. 
On 15 November 1917, Poincaré asked Clémenceau to form a government, effectively ending the 
union sacrée and entering a new period in the state structure.10  
What happened under Clémenceau was far from a transformation into a dictatorship, 
military or otherwise. It was essentially a change in the architecture of the state back to a more 
centralized configuration through extensive use of decrees by the executive branch.11 This was 
similar to the first period albeit without the suspension of the chambers. In this vein, although 
Clémenceau concentrated the power in his hands, he continued to seek the approval of the chamber 
on key issues and to appear in front of the chamber for parliamentary inquiries.12 As Keiger (2000) 
argues, “what allowed Clémenceau to act independently and govern so strongly, was his popularity 
and the fact that, for all his authoritarian manner, he operated within the bounds of the constitution 
and maintained republican legality” (p. 260). Clémenceau was well aware of the deep-seated 
 
10 For the detailed account of the decisions that led to the selection of Clémenceau as the Prime Minister, see Keiger 
(2000).  
11 On 10 February 1918, the chamber passed legislation into law that expanded the government’s use of decrees into 
specific areas.  
12 In this period, however, the use of secret sessions of the chamber was abandoned.  
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resentment towards him by the SFIO and the CGT which had roots in his role during the miners’ 
strikes in 1906. Given the antagonistic position of the socialist deputies towards the state in this 
period and the generally supportive disposition of the CGT towards the strike actions, Clémenceau 
took a “carefully nuanced” attitude towards the organized labour and the strikes by distinguishing 
between “reasonable” economic demands and “unacceptable” pacifist demands (Horne, 1991, p. 
172; Horne, 1997).  
 This centralization of state structure did not lead to a qualitative change in the tripartite 
structure of representation and state intervention. The role of the comité des forges in heavy 
industry as the only legitimate entity to negotiate with the British government and distribute raw 
material among the French producers had been irreversibly solidified by the beginning of the third 
period. Furthermore, a vast network of consortia13 had been developed largely by the state during 
the previous periods to facilitate the state’s supervision on material distribution and commodity 
prices in almost every area of production, military or civilian (see Godfrey, 1987). Although the 
state played a constitutive role in creating the corporate aggregates among the private interests, it 
limited its further engagement at the level of coordination and regulation. It never crossed the 
boundaries of capitalist ownership and control and left capitalists in charge of production. The 
private industry maintained the right to accept or refuse government contracts (Smith et al., 2003, p. 
65; Hardach, 1992, p. 72).  
The alienation of the working-class organizations from the state and a rather cautious 
attitude of the government towards them in this phase prevented the development of the working-
class leg of a corporatist arrangement. Conversely, this relative distance of the CGT especially in 
this period, from the war effort allowed the union as a whole, albeit to a different extent between the 
majority and minority wings, to maintain the control of the strikes and their relationship with the 
rank-and-file. This becomes clear when looking at the strike actions that erupted in the spring of 
1918, most notably in the Paris region and Loire.14 The delegues d'atelier were radicalized in these 
two industrial centres by the end of 1917 and they were organizing workers along openly anti-war 
demands. Despite their initial success in rallying up a large number of rank-and-file workers behind 
the anti-war strike actions, the movement died out after a few days without significant state 
repression. These strike movements faced serious problems that prevented their generalization and 
success. First, the hesitations of the CGT leadership with regards to the nature or timing of these 
actions15 and the failure of the militant delegues d'atelier to coordinate their activities effectively 
 
13 These were manufacturing groups that were subordinated to a leading company.  
14 The following account draws on Jean-Jacques Becker’s (1985, pp. 251-301) account of these movements in 1918. 
15 This extended beyond the leaders of the majority wing of the CGT such as Jouhaux who were completely against any 
action that would disrupt the war effort. In the most militant centres of the anti-war actions, it was also largely true of 
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with anti-war elements within the CGT leadership prevented the union (or even the anti-war 
fraction) to extend its support to these movements. Furthermore, the delegues d'atelier themselves 
were unable to overcome the contradiction between their outright rejection of “defeatism” even 
though the logical conclusion of their revolutionary anti-war actions required accepting the potential 
defeat of France in the war.16 Such fundamental problems made these potentially revolutionary 
movements susceptible to the gravitational pull of the contradictory unity that the CGT was able to 
maintain because of its insider-outsider position in the war effort. This ambiguous position 
prevented the alienation of the rank-and-file from the leadership.  
To sum up, despite the momentum behind the self-mobilization of society, parliamentarism, 
in the context of a weak civil society, was not feasible in France after the outbreak of the war. A 
direct, active and coordinated state intervention in industrial mobilization was required. France 
needed a rapid and vast mobilization especially after the loss of the Northern territories. It had to 
overcome the weakness (or non-existence) of collaborative structures, most notably, between 
producers in key economic sectors such as chemical and textile, and between employers and 
workers’ organization generally. This demanded a state form that could enable assertive and 
constitutive actions needed to carry out the war effort. Yet, the underlying republicanism of the 
French state and its constitutional structure prevented a militarization of the state that might have 
been needed to aggressively and perhaps directly organize social classes under the state project. 
Furthermore, the weakness of the labour unions with their rapidly declining membership in the first 
period and state’s reluctance to recognize them as an active partner in war mobilization until late in 
the war, on the one hand, and the relative weakness of state bureaucracy and authority in heavy 
industries such as the metallurgical sector compared to those of employers’ associations, on the 
other hand, soon made it clear that the corporatist path was not feasible either.  
During the course of the war, the French state took a tripartite mode of representation. At 
first, the union sacrée provided a strong basis to nurture the tripartite state, despite the fragile 
equilibrium of forces that composed it. After the effective collapse of the union sacrée at the end of 
the second period, the pattern of state intervention and its institutional infrastructure had been laid 
out in ways that could still sustain the tripartite form despite the shift in the architecture of the state 
towards a relatively more vertical distribution of power. The hybridity of tripartism in terms of 
political representation and modes of state intervention facilitated flexible and diverse ways through 
which capitalist and working-class forces were “incorporated” into the state.  
 
the leaders of the minority wing of the CGT, such as Alphonse Merrheim and Albert Bourderon, and, to a lesser degree, 
the Trade Union Defense Committee, the explicitly anti-war contingency within the CGT. 
16 Even one of the most radical individuals among the delegues d'atelier, Clovis Andrieu, went to a great length to 
distance themselves from charges of “defeatism” while emphasizing their “pacifism” (see Becker, 1985, p. 284).  
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Under the tripartite state, new employers’ associations were created, and prominent ones 
strengthened. In this way, capitalist forces gained more coherence as a class and were incorporated 
into the state project as a more unified force. Although they maintained a significant level of 
autonomy from and leverage over the decisions of the parliamentary executive, the parliamentary 
oversight and powers reserved by the government, including formal, constitutive, and coordinating, 
gave certain leverage to the parliamentary bureaucracy to participate in the corporatist decision-
making process and implementation of policies.  
Regarding the incorporation of the working class, the inclusion of socialists into the union 
sacrée government, first symbolically with Guesde and Sembat and then substantially with Thomas, 
implied a significant yet limited opening for the working-class forces to expand the horizon of class 
struggle deeper into the heart of the state. As discussed above, the socialist deputies abandoned the 
comité d’action after the reopening of the Chamber of Deputies at the end of the first periods since 
they saw a shift in the locus of class struggle. The inclusion of organized labour into the state was 
limited largely to consultative inputs and, later into the second period, to union representations on 
certain tripartite commissions (Hardach, 1992, p. 68).  
The state still relied on the self-mobilization of organized labour behind the war effort to 
sustain their precarious inclusion into the state projects. Incorporation of the working-class in the 
tripartite state implied that the class struggle that the working-class forces could wage was both 
diversified (in the sense that it could be waged at different levels inside and outside the state) and 
diffused (in the sense that it could be externally countered at multiple loci and internally obscured). 
Given the weakness of the working-class organizations, the ambiguities of their programmatic 
orientation, the internal fragmentations, and the strength of their adversaries, their inclusion within 
the tripartite state diffused its class struggle across the state and in effect disorganized it. Further 
implications of tripartite state-form on class struggle in comparison with the Italian and German 
cases are discussed in the next section. 
Comparing the making of the movements France with Germany and Italy  
 Political processes through which the state-forms evolved in each of these countries are 
elaborated separately in the case studies. Here, the key differences are recounted and their 
implications for working-class movements are explained. The comparative analysis between the 
positive and negative cases anchors itself on a characterization of the cases based on the hegemonic 
vision of the state and the principal dimensions of state-form, namely, institutional architecture, 
modes of representation, and patterns of state intervention. While providing an overview of the 
principal characteristics of the cases, the consequences of such characterization on the processes are 
discussed through which class struggle, especially those of working classes, in these countries are 
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rendered through the state. It is precisely in the diverse processes within which class contradictions 
and tensions evolve that the emergence of the “council democratic” movement can be understood.  
 An important factor that lies in the background of the evolution of state-form is the 
hegemonic vision underpinning the war effort. Although not always directly relevant to the 
transformations of state institutions and the balance of class forces, hegemonic vision may facilitate 
or hinder certain resolutions and therefore affect the transformation of the state-form. Regarding 
this factor, there was a qualitative difference between France, and Germany and Italy. The ability of 
the French state to rally diverse political forces behind the union sacrée until late in the war 
contributed to a high level of self-mobilization by social and political forces. The union sacrée was 
more sustainable not only because it was easier to argue that France was fighting a defensive war 
but also because it went beyond rhetorical measures by introducing diverse political forces into the 
heart of the state.  
Consequently, this freed the state to a large extent from having to develop institutional 
structures and modes of intervention necessary to control organized labour either through overt 
coercion or intense integration. Furthermore, the success of this “one nation” ideology contributed 
to the reduction of antagonism of working-class organizations within the state and a large segment 
of the rank-and-file against the capitalist classes. The depth and breadth of the self-mobilization 
process behind the French war effort also multiplied the number of layers, especially outside the 
state and within various levels of civil society, that could actively intervene to justify actions and 
normalize ideological tensions if and when occurred. In other words, the maintenance of the 
ideological unity behind the war effort was decentralized and cascaded beyond the state.  
The situation was profoundly different in Germany and Italy. In the case of the former, the 
preservation of the Burgfrieden was much more precarious in the face of military aggression against 
Belgium and France from the initial phases of the war. This hegemonic vision was further impaired 
by the failure of the state to go beyond symbolism and actually bring together diverse political 
forces under a unified ideological project. Most notably, the socialist party and unions, which went 
along with the Burgfrieden following a patriotic duty and in the hope of future concessions from the 
state, continued to be seen as untrustworthy allies and a necessary evil that should be kept at bay. 
The safeguarding of the governing bodies responsible for the management of the war from the 
direct participation of the socialist representatives and the lack of any serious incorporation of the 
organized labour into the organization of the war until 1916 made it apparent that the spirit behind 
this social truce was but an attempt to establish a “two nations” hegemonic vision. The hegemonic 
vision in the Italian case was even more limited due to the process through which it abandoned its 
neutrality and joined the Entente side but also the refusal of the socialists and the Catholic forces to 
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throw their active support behind the war effort. What the working-class organizations were willing 
to formally agree on at best was a noncompliant non-interference with the war effort under the 
slogan, the né aderire né sabotare. This made the state even more cautious than in the German case 
to involve socialist representatives and working-class organizations into the war effort in direct and 
substantial ways. The existential problems embedded in the fragmentary national formation under 
Risorgimento continued to cripple the ability of the Italian state to even conceive of a cohesive “two 
nations” hegemony strategy.  
Consequently, the fragility of the hegemonic visions in both Germany and Italy required 
more direct interventions and creative integrations, in repressive and consensual forms, to preserve 
the unstable equilibrium of compromise between different class forces. Therefore, the state became 
responsible for carrying out large bulk of the ideological operation to manufacture consent as it 
could rely less extensively and spontaneously on the diverse and decentralized ideological nodes 
within the civil society. This put the state’s war project on a more perilous and contentious path 
towards the effective mobilization of class forces. The active role of the state in these two countries 
in this regard becomes more apparent after 1916 which often created disunity among the social and 
political forces.17 
As the historical account above depicted, the architecture of the French state underwent 
changes in different periods, but it eventually adapted a relatively non-militarized transversal 
structure. For constitutional and historical reasons, the French military and the major institutions of 
the state was kept under the control of and accountable to the civilian representatives. The 
reinstitution of the parliament from the second period reversed the centralization process that had 
commenced at the outbreak of the war and empowered the legislative body to hold the executive 
branch and the conduct of the war formally accountable through diverse methods such as secret 
sessions and parliamentary delegation system. Although the state reverted back to a relative 
centralization in the third period, as shown above, it remained essentially non-militarized. 
Furthermore, even though the French state had a relatively high degree of centralized bureaucracy, 
its institutional capacity was quite limited in certain key sectors, most notably the metallurgical 
sector, to meet the needs of its war mobilization. It, therefore, had to rely on preexisting non-state 
bureaucratic structures of employers’ associations such as the comité des forges which retained a 
considerable level of autonomy. In other key sectors, such as the chemical, the state actively 
 
17 One of the most consequential symptoms of such a pluralizing process was the emergence of the embryonic forms of 
the myth of “enemy within” primarily by the nationalist right-wing forces.  
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proliferated such networks of consortia. It was then possible for the state to limit its intervention to 
coordination and regulation, and to offset the pressing needs of the military and the society.18  
The non-militarized state architecture in France relatively decoupled the dialectical 
processes within the military order from those of the state. Therefore, the contradictions within the 
military order did not translate more directly to a crisis of the state. For example, even though the 
French army experienced far more numerous and intense mutinies especially in 1917 compared to 
the German army up until the Revolution and the Italian army including the crisis of Caporetto, 
such large-scale direct challenges to the military hierarchy did not traverse deep into the state 
relative to the protracted effects of tensions within the German and the Italian military apparatuses 
on the entire states.  
The non-militarized transversal state architecture also increases the chance of diversifying 
the strategic selectivity of the state institutions in favour of broader political forces and, therefore, 
balancing more effectively between the needs of the military, the industry, and the public. 
Furthermore, since the relations of production were not militarized, the formal separation between 
the “economic” and the “political” was maintained, creating a buffer between economic and 
political crises. This allowed the capitalist state to present itself as hovering neutrally above the 
relations of production and upholding the “general will”.  
The state’s architecture in both Germany and Italy, though under different constitutional 
preconditions and political processes, underwent a process of militarization which profoundly 
affected the key institutions of the state and the relations of forces within it. The militarization of 
the German and Italian states was due to a combination of constitutional preconditioning and 
political processes which came about due not only to particular developments during the war but 
also the historicity of past political struggles between classes and class fractions as outlined in each 
case study. The militarization of the German state had its roots in its constitutional structure which 
severed any control of the military High Command by the Chancellor or the Reich. This made the 
military High Command structurally immune from interference by both executive and legislative 
branches. What the government could do at most to exert some influence on the military was 
through the military budget. The Italian constitution (if one can call the statuto albertino a 
constitution) was even more complicated due to the equivocal nature of the statuto in defining the 
relationship between various aspects of the state and branches of the government (see Cassese, 
2011). The monarch was the absolute centre of the political system. As far as the military apparatus 
 
18 The attempt to balance the needs of the military, the war industries, and the public is exemplified in the way the 
French government conceived the exemption process of skilled workers and protective measures of conscripted workers 
under the Dalbiez law. 
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was concerned, all significant matters relating to foreign policy and the military high command 
were reserved to the monarch. The executive power was also constitutionally vested in the King. 
The German state underwent a definite process of militarization and centralization after the 
outbreak of the war starting from the abdication of the legislative power to the executive, coupled 
with the empowerment of the military apparatus to substantially control the key institutions of the 
state such as the War Ministry and its KRA (under the leadership of Major Josef Koeth from April 
1915). This process reached its maturation after the advent of the Third OHL under Hindenburg in 
August 1916. After the failure of the parliamentary coalition in the third period between the Centre 
Party, the SPD, and the FVP to curb the power of the militarized state and push for a peace 
negotiation, the state moved further towards militarization by replacing Michaelis with Hertling as 
the Chancellor, therefore, leaving all the important decisions to the military apparatus. The 
militarization of the Italian state came about under a precipitate process after joining the war effort 
in 1915, beginning from the abdication of the legislative power at the outbreak of the war to an 
extensive transfer of executive power to the Supreme Command. Upon the declaration of a large 
part of Italy as a military zone, the militarization process expanded beyond the state and explicitly 
into the social sphere. The centralization process also intensified in Italy especially during the 
second period with the institution of the CCM under the directorship of General Dallolio.  
In both of these countries, the influence of the military apparatus within the state grew over 
time during the war. The militarization process also led to a more direct intervention into the 
management of labour relations and a more vertical configuration of the relation of forces. In 
Germany, this was formalized under the Hindenburg Program and its Auxiliary Service Law under 
which the state introduced industrial conscription. In Italy, this took the form of direct militarization 
of labour relations down to the factory floors. However, the strategic selectivity of the capitalist 
state towards the reproduction of capitalist interests exhibited itself in the asymmetrical 
reorganization of relations of production. Neither in Germany nor in Italy was the relation with the 
private interest militarized to the extent that would lead to requisitioning of factories, even though 
the threat of such an action was made and the legal basis for it was laid out. Even though the 
capitalists were infuriated by the state’s interference in their managerial authority to the extent and 
in the form that it was realized, the benefits of such a militarization of labour relations quelled their 
dissent.  
The consequences of the militarized state were profound for the dialectical processes within 
and outside the state. Besides the distorted strategic selectivity of the militarized state sharply 
towards hierarchical subordination of the state to the military order and the fraction of capital linked 
to it, such a state also has the tendency to militarize labour relations as a way to bring the working 
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class under its chain of command.19 To the extent that it militarizes labour relations, it precludes the 
formal separation of the “political” and the “economic” and, thereby, transmits the class 
contradictions of capitalist social relations more directly to the state. It, therefore, ties up with 
struggles of working classes more intimately to the struggle against military order and the 
militarized state. Its vertical structure tends to focus class contradictions at different levels and 
channel them through the state to the top echelon of the military. Conversely, the challenges to the 
military order within the army ranks can threaten to destabilize the state more directly. Altogether, 
the contradictions of the military, the state, and capital are intertwined.  
It is important not to conceive of the military either as an autonomous force or the mere 
embodiment of the repressive state apparatus that affect all class forces and fractions 
indiscriminately. Even though it affects the constellation of forces through a vertical organization of 
the state architecture as an image of its own hierarchical structure, it also reconfigures the balance 
of forces between class fractions into a new unstable equilibrium. This implies that the military 
order is caught up in class struggle between classes and class fractions not just as an outsider to 
these forces but as part of the constellation. The determination of the latter depends on particular 
cases in terms of the dynamic relation of military forces to a specific fraction of capital, especially 
those related more immediately to the material and strategic needs of the military command.20 In 
the case of Germany and Italy, the militarization of the state facilitated a more direct intervention 
into the management of labour relations and a more vertical configuration of the relation of forces. 
Furthermore, it crystalized the domination of certain fractions of capital within the state – in both 
cases but to different extent and in diverse forms, the fraction of capital linked to heavy industries 
and finance. The rigid structure that it sets up in favour of certain fractions of capital smother the 
struggle within the capitalist bloc, thereby elevating such struggle potentially to the level of 
opposition against the military and the state.21  
The negative and the positive cases differed crucially on the mode of representation and 
intervention. Even though none of these countries perfectly and statically map onto archetypical 
models, it can proximally be said that France developed a tripartite mode, and Germany and Italy a 
corporatist mode of representation. Tripartism in France is characterized as structural hybridity and 
flexibility in the form and extent to which the employers and working classes were incorporated 
 
19 The realization and the form that such tendency takes depends largely on the strength of the working-class 
organizations both within and outside the state via political parties and labour unions. 
20 In rare but crucial cases, the military might represent the working class or other popular classes. 
21 The extent to which such challenges are articulated or realized depends on many factors including the level of 
antagonism of such fractions to the balance of class forces struck by the military order, the strength of their collective 
organization and social bases, and the ability of the state to contain/preempt such challenges either through coercion or 
concession. Nevertheless, the support of smaller fractions of capital in Italy and Germany for the takeover of fascist and 
reactionary forces after the war is a case in point.  
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into the state. This did not always take the form of associational integration. France had to move 
rapidly towards re-organizing its industrial production after the loss of its Northern territories. This 
initiated a process of associational organization of the economy either by empowering the existing 
employers’ organizations or creating new ones. While the intensification of the war and the external 
pressures22 in later periods entrenched such associational organization of the economy, the 
reopening of the parliament and the appointment of Thomas in the second period paved the way for 
a different mode of representation and intervention. The mode of representation was diversified 
between some level of corporatism, especially with regards to the representation of employers’ 
interests through the constitution of relatively autonomous syndicates, and parliamentarism, 
especially with regards to the representation of workers as citizens through parliamentary actions.  
Consequently, the French state actively engaged in organizing the capitalist class through 
the formation of consortia and strengthening the organizational power of existing employers’ 
associations while disorganizing the working classes through dilution of working-class struggle. 
Even though the tripartite structure gave the working-class organizations a level of flexibility to 
alternate between lobbying and governmental efforts, and cooperation in a corporatist structure, it 
resulted in strategic confusion and diffusion. In the meanwhile, the working-class organizations 
could in effect contain the rank-and-file militancy, not by disciplinary actions but by the underlying 
positional ambiguity as an insider-outsider that this mode of representation had granted it. 
Furthermore, the systematic presence-absence of the socialist deputies in the functioning of the state 
also contributed to the overall containment of the working-class grievances.  
  In the case of Germany, the state approached a corporatist militarized state especially after 
the Hindenburg Program in 1916. However, the fact that the socialist deputies and labour leaders 
were kept outside the direct management of the war from the very beginning and the military 
rapidly increased its dominance over the state apparatus already made the state-form prone to 
corporatist arrangement. An example of this is the KRA which was designed and led by the 
prominent industrialist, Walther Rathenau, but fell under the direct control of the military after he 
was replaced by Major Koeth in April 1915. In the first period of the war, the state tried to align 
private industrialists behind the state project by creating huge economic incentives and limiting 
state intervention to the supply of raw material for the army and food provisioning. Until the end of 
1916, the working-class organizations were not integrated into the state in a systematic and 
meaningful way. Therefore, while the state architecture was relentlessly becoming militarized, the 
 
22 The most notable of such external pressures was the demand of the British state to deal directly with the comité des 
forges to organize the import of raw material into France. 
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mode of representation and intervention were still quite different from a corporatist arrangement in 
the first two years of the war.  
 As the war dragged on, the pressure over the state’s economic arrangement and hegemonic 
vision became paramount. The fundamental shift necessary to dislocate the contradictions and 
tensions of the first period was realized in the Hindenburg Program. It intensified the verticalization 
and militarization of the state architecture by centralizing all exports and war-related industries 
under the newly established War Office led by General Groener. But more importantly, it moved 
decisively towards setting up a corporatist arrangement. Under the leadership of Groener, the state 
corporatist capacity was expanded through establishing war corporations (Kriegsgesellschaften) in 
various branches of the industry.23 As the militarization of the state intensified, these entities (with 
important exceptions such as the iron and steel industry) became less self-governing and more 
channels of state authority (see Roth, 1997). The gains that capitalists made under this program well 
outweighed the relative tightening of control and freedom under this corporatist arrangement. Their 
profit margin was not to be restrained and the closure or consolidation of inefficient industries was 
left to be decided among the industrialists themselves. Furthermore, the industrial conscription that 
restricted labour mobility and compelled them to work where they were assigned gave capitalist a 
massive advantage.  
The integration of the trade unions into the state project was facilitated not only through 
their participation in the joint committees (determination committees, draft committees, and 
arbitration committees) and creating mandatory workers’ committees, but also by agreeing to some 
of the key demands of the union, particularly articulated under the Paragraph 9 of Auxiliary Service 
Act,24 in exchange for the union support in the implementation of industrial conscription and the 
control of their members against industrial agitations. The unions now had a more concrete stake in 
the game to ensure the working of the Auxiliary Service Act. Amidst a considerable loss of 
membership in 1916 and the persisting restrictions on union collective actions, the unions found it 
increasingly difficult to control the workers. This was made even more complex since the state 
sought to address the labour shortage in war industries by facilitating the introduction of new types 
of workers, most notably female workers and prisoners of war, despite the resistance of the 
employers and concerns of the trade unions. Large-scale introduction of female workers in key 
industries at the time of severe food crisis created a bridge between the agitations outside and inside 
 
23 More purely corporatist ideas were pitched in this period by prominent individuals such as Wichard von 
Moellendorff, an engineer and one of the leading members of the KRA since its inception, to establish a social economy 
(Gemeinwirtschaft) through “people’s economic councils”.  
24 This clause allowed “a suitable improvement in conditions of labour” to count as “significant grounds” for issuing 
leave certification for the workers who wanted to change their job. For other concessions to the unions, see Feldman 
(1992, p. 225).  
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the factories. Therefore, the integration of the trade unions into the corporatist structure of the state 
at the time of increasing sociopolitical agitations created a swelling gap between union leadership 
and rank-and-file.  
The inability of the trade unions and the socialist party to maintain the social truce became 
ever more evident in early 1917. Despite the failure of the unions to maintain discipline among the 
workers, the corporatist arrangement persisted because some of the leading figures within the 
militarized state still thought it could win the war through a more total mobilization that the 
Hindenburg Program envisioned and even if Germany is defeated, the monarchy could be saved if 
the unions could regain control of the workers. To regain legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the 
SPD pushed for reforms in the Prussian three-class suffrage system. However, the campaign 
achieved only a vague rhetorical promise by the Kaiser for reconsideration of such reform measures 
after the war. The attempt to change the balance of political forces that commenced after July 1917 
further tied the socialist party to the prospects of such fragile consolidatory measures to reform the 
state from within. However, the new equilibrium of force proved too unstable and weak to plough 
its way through the militarized state. Therefore, the reforms never took place and the peace 
resolution proposed by the coalition was discarded by the OHL. Instead, the internal tensions within 
the SPD reached their peak amidst mass protests for peace and industrial agitations in 1917 and 
caused a split within the party.  
 The case of Italy is more complex because of the relative weakness of both the unions and 
the employers’ associations. Nevertheless, following schemes suggested by leading industrialists 
such as Olivetti and the CIDI, the basic corporatist structure was laid out in the first period through 
the establishment of the CRMs. These institutional entities brought together representatives of the 
industry, workers, civilians, and the military to organize regional economic activities under the 
centralized directorship of the CCM. Labour disputes were obligatorily referred to the CRMs for 
arbitration.  
Despite some unpalatable aspects of the arrangement from the perspective of the private 
producers, the overall trajectory of state intervention through this corporatist structure was 
overwhelmingly beneficial to the industrialists. Similar to Germany, the state avoided restricting 
profits of the capitalist producers or controlling their costs. The Italian state limited state 
intervention to protectionist measures especially for the heavy industries. It linked the private 
interests to the war effort by offering lucrative state contracts. The situation was significantly 
different for the organized labour movement in the first period. Due to the noncompliance of Italian 
organized labour with the war effort, the representatives of trade unions were not formally included 
in the CRMs in the first period. Having lost their traditional forms of action due to the banning of 
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strikes at the beginning of the war and having been pushed outside the formal participation in the 
war efforts, the trade unions were completely marginalized in the first period.  
The contradictions that resulted from the direct intervention of the state in the labour 
relations compelled the state to bring in the representatives of the trade union in the second period 
in the hope of managing the growing industrial unrest that had exhausted the arbitration capacity of 
the corporatist structure. This process pushed the mode of representation further in the direction of 
corporatism. Similar to Germany, the state sought to address the shortage of labour by facilitating 
the introduction of a large number of female and child workers into war industries. This not only 
created difficulties for trade unions to maintain the rank-and-file discipline but also created a bridge 
between the tensions outside factories and the industrial unrest inside the workplaces. Furthermore, 
to reduce the tensions at the shop level, the state proliferated the factory-based intersectoral 
collective representation of the rank-and-file. The unions initially welcomed this step since they saw 
these intuitions as a means of improving union representation. In the context of further alienation of 
the socialist and catholic political forces from the war project and the inability of the trade unions to 
maintain control of workers, the militarized state reverted back to its earlier approach to corporatist 
arrangements. It bypassed the trade union as the formal workers’ representatives in the CRMs and 
instead worked towards formal recognition and direct integration of the internal commissions into 
the corporatist structure. This angered not only the trade unions but also the industrialists as they 
both saw their authority undermined by this process.  
 The diverse effects of the corporatist transformation in the case of Italy and Germany will be 
analyzed in the next section. Here, the focus is on the consequence of corporatist arrangements on 
class struggle within and outside the state more generally. In both Germany and Italy, the effective 
isolation of the political parties from influencing the management of the war crippled the possibility 
of maintaining the balance of class forces through parliamentary representation. It was the 
functional representation of class forces in corporatist structures that became the dominant mode to 
maintain the unstable equilibrium of class forces. Corporatism created a level of cohesion among a 
significant segment of the capitalist class and empowered them economically and politically. The 
restriction of the working-class forces, either coercively or voluntarily, from exercising their class 
power through industrial militancy and the limitations of the socialist deputies in channelling 
workers’ interests through parliamentary means left organized labour reliant on the corporatist 
channels to protect their members and improve their conditions. This was, of course, only allowed 
as long as these working-class organizations did not partake in militant agitations. The crucial 
condition for their functional participation in the corporatist structure was in their ability to maintain 
control of the workers. However, their further incorporation into the state was accompanied by a 
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rising level of social tensions which rapidly span out of their control. The level and form of 
workers’ grievances could not be addressed within the confines of the corporatist structure. But 
with the labour unions deeply embedded in such structure and hopeful of their prospects, the gap 
between the rank-and-file and the union leadership widened.25  
 Overall, the French state relied on a stronger hegemonic vision and a more flexible state 
form that allowed it to contain class contradictions and tensions within the boundaries of “normal 
politics” during extraordinary times. The relative success of the union sacrée eased the threshold for 
sustaining the unstable equilibrium of class forces by building on sociopolitical self-mobilization 
both within and outside the state. This allowed the hegemonic vision to develop more markedly 
along its axis of consensus, making the state more lenient toward the integration of key actors into 
its project.  
It was against the background of such a hegemonic vision that the war project in France was 
pursued through the transversal tripartite state. Its state-form better facilitated the formal separation 
of the “political” and the “economic” by avoiding the militarization of the state and the industrial 
relations. This resulted in the relative decoupling of class contradictions and tensions at the level of 
production as well as those within the military order to traverse immediately through the state and 
turn into a generalized state crisis. The tripartite state broadly organized the capitalist class by 
proliferating consortia, strengthening the powerful existing employers’ associations, and facilitating 
capitalist production through coordinating and regulation. It disorganized the working-class struggle 
in two main ways: a vertical diffusion of working-class struggle at different levels of potential 
intervention, and a horizontal tie between the union leadership and the rank-and-file through a 
relative decoupling of the unions from the functional requirements of a corporatist arrangement.  
The fact that the French parliament, with a significant presence of the socialist 
representatives, could exercise authority over the conduct of the war and that a socialist deputy had 
occupied a powerful position in the government meant that working-class struggle could be waged 
at different levels including the government, the parliament, the workers’ unions, and the factory 
level. Furthermore, due to the contradictory role of trade unions in the French tripartite structure as 
neither autonomous organization of the working class nor functional agents of the state policies, the 
unions were able to generally maintain control of workers during the peak of labour militancy. This 
is how the militancy of the French working class, to the extent that it did occur, did not manifest 
itself in a generalized radicalization of the delegues d'atelier. However, the structural weakness of 
 
25 The trajectories of the socialist parties were rather different in Germany and Italy due to their different dispositions 
towards the war effort. The SPD was initially compliant and remained generally committed to the war project. But the 
PSI was initially reluctant and later distant itself from the war effort.  
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the trade unions within the French state that this tripartite arrangement ensued allowed the French 
employers to continue their hostile dismissal of the trade unions and consolidated the functional 
mediation of the state between capital and labour.  
 Class contradictions and tensions were rendered differently in the militarized corporatist 
state in the case of Germany and Italy. The weakness of the hegemonic visions in both countries 
required the state to intervene more directly to maintain the highly unstable equilibrium of 
compromises between classes and class fractions and to implement more comprehensive functional 
mediation to incorporate key class fractions into the state project. The militarization of the state and 
the more direct state intervention in labour relation coupled more intimately class contradictions 
and tensions at the level of capitalist production and those along the military hierarchy in ways that 
would channel them through the state. Therefore, the crisis of the military and relations of 
productions could more easily translate into a generalized state crisis.  
The corporatist arrangement organized broad segments of the capitalist class in the effort to 
coordinate industrial mobilization. However, given the dominance of the military apparatus within 
the state, the fractions of capital that were closest to the military, in either substantive or clientelist 
way, received exceedingly preferential treatments.26 To bring the representatives of capital and 
workers to collaborate in formally equal groups on fundamental issues concerning the regulation of 
labour relations and the organization of the economy, the state empowered the collective 
representation of the working class through their participation in these corporatist structures. 
However, they could not fulfil the basic expectation of their functional role in maintaining the 
discipline of the workers. Yet their integration into the state alienated the rank-and-file from the 
trade unions. Militant elements within the rank-and-file began to organize at the factory level 
outside the corporatist parameters set by the trade union leaderships.  
Comparing the making of the movements in Germany with Italy 
 Despite the general similarities between Germany and Italy which laid the foundation for the 
emergence of “council democratic” movements, their differences generated tendencies towards 
different dimensions of “council democracy”, namely, “citizens’ control” and “workers’ control” in 
Germany and Italy respectively. This section explains such diverse tendencies by focusing on the 
differences in the underlying counter-hegemonic predispositions and the characteristics of the 
incorporation of the working-class forces into the state.  
 
26 This is one of the reasons why more morbid distortions are seen in economic arrangements under militarized states 
compared to non-militarized states especially in the condition of large-scale wars. 
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 The left-wing forces in Germany and Italy evolved within significantly different contexts 
during the pre-war years. The absence of the liberal phase in Germany before the war turned the 
republican demands for the democratization of the state structure into a principal calling within the 
socialist movement under the leadership of the reformists. Bismarck’s strategies of switching 
alliances fundamentally weakened the liberal forces before the turn of the century. The National 
Liberal Party increasingly shifted to the right and rallied behind large capital interests. The left-
liberal parties before the war were too weak to monopolize the republican values under the liberal 
flag, leaving the ideological space on that front open for the socialist forces to manoeuvre within. 
The socialist forces could potentially gain massively from suffrage reform and democratization of 
the state both in terms of electoral strength and parliamentary power. After a short hibernation 
during the first two periods of the war, these demands resurfaced once again resolutely after 1917. 
As evident in the historical trajectory of the German state before the war outlined in the case study, 
the militarized state could be seen as a morbid yet logical extension of the profound democratic 
deficit within the German state. In contrast, Italy had a nominally liberal period before the war and 
the strong pressure within the Liberal Bloc by the Italian Radical Party to push forward republican 
values somewhat quelled the republican demands within the socialist movement under the 
leadership of the Maximalists.  
The militarized state could be seen as an exceptional state required by harsh conditions of 
the war that could revert back to a normal state after the war. Giolitti’s strategy towards the (left-) 
liberal forces was markedly different from that of Bismarck as Giolitti sought to integrate them 
under trasformismo by accommodating their principle demands some of which included suffrage 
expansion and democratization of the state. Given the general weakness of party structure and 
relatively loose connection between political parties and class interests in the Italian political 
system, such reforms were less consequential for the ruling classes than was the case in Germany. 
This limited the ideological horizon of the socialist party to anchor its demands principally on 
republican values. Additionally, the limitations in the social basis of the socialist movement in Italy 
and the changing leadership of the PSI increasingly towards Maximalism also contributed to the 
relative lack of enthusiasm to pursue republican aims towards democratization of the state from 
within. 
A notable distinction between the two labour movements was the relative absence of 
syndicalist and anarchist trends in Germany compared to Italy which produced different counter-
hegemonic tendencies within the working-class movement. The ideological and institutional 
strength of the Italian syndicalist movement, as well as the symbolic and popular profile of the 
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anarchist movement, created a stronger inclination inside the Italian labour movements towards 
syndicalist praxis.  
 Besides these ideological predispositions, the working-class organizations were integrated 
into the corporatist structure of the German and Italian state in different ways. The analysis is 
divided here into three segments, namely, the conditions of the two working-class movements at the 
beginning of the war, the form and status of the incorporation of the working-class organizations 
into the two states in the second period, and the specific form and implications of state crisis in 
Germany and Italy.  
 At a basic level, the development of capitalist social relations was much more advanced in 
Germany than in Italy. The much larger size of the German working class empowered the working-
class organizations to be an undeniable force to be reckoned with. This was less of an issue within 
the Italian political landscape, though unevenly so in different industrial sectors. The German 
socialist movement was also much more well-organized, both bureaucratically and ideologically 
than the Italian counterpart.  
Nevertheless, the active participation of the German working-class movement in the 
Burgfrieden made it less immediately threatening to the war effort than was the case in Italy. This 
had paradoxical effects on the development of the working-class movement during the war. On the 
one hand, the active cooperation of the German working-class organizations in the war effort made 
them into a relatively reliable ally that could be worked with in the industrial mobilization; on the 
other hand, such an integrationist orientation not only betrayed their pre-war internationalism but 
also deprived them of utilizing their institutional capacities in the pursuit of disruptive methods of 
struggle. Therefore, despite its organizational and numerical strength, the German working-class 
movement became but a toothless partner in the war effort which had to gear its institutional 
capacities profoundly towards fulfilling its function within the corporatist structure.  
The ambivalence of the Italian working-class movement towards the war project at the 
beginning of the war had its own paradoxical effects. On the one hand, it helped the Italian 
working-class organizations to maintain a continuity with its pre-war ideological and tactical 
positions, and to potentially maintain closer links with the rank-and-file; on the other hand, this 
made the government deeply cautious of collaborating with them in industrial mobilization and led 
to harsher militarization of labour relations and bypassing of the organized labour unions. 
Therefore, despite its relative organizational and numerical weakness, the Italian working-class 
movement presented itself as a serious threat to the war effort which could not be trusted much as a 
necessary partner within the corporatist structure. This was despite the eagerness of the trade union 
leadership, especially after the start of the war, to participate in such arrangements.  
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Within the working-class movement, there were undoubtedly dissenting voices within the 
party and the unions in both countries. However, there was more cohesion between the socialist 
party and the union in Germany than between those in Italy. These dynamics had their roots in the 
pre-war years that shaped the relationship between the party and the union. In Germany, the party 
and the union answered the call to war in unison by extending their consent to the Burgfrieden. In 
Italy, the discord between the socialist party, under the leadership of the Maximalists, and the 
socialist unions, under the leadership of the reformists, was reflected in the very term that the 
working-class movement went along with the war effort, namely, the né aderire né sabotare. This 
essentially ambiguous formulation allowed for the dissonance between the party and the union not 
only in their attitude towards the war but also their supposedly separate sphere of activities. 
Thereby, it created further hurdles in the way of transmitting the “economic” to the “political” 
agitations not only materially but also ideally by transforming the abstract-formal separation 
between the “economic” and the “political” spheres into a concrete-real separation.  
The two countries saw similar patterns in their second periods of war mobilization as labour 
organizations and their representatives were integrated systematically into the evolving corporatist 
structures. It was also in the second period in both countries when the state initiated the 
proliferation of rank-and-file organizations to facilitate its corporatist arrangement. However, the 
above characteristics created diverse dynamics in Germany and Italy in the way this integration was 
realized.  
In Germany, the corporatist structures of the state facilitated the integration of organized 
labour into the state much more extensively than was realized in Italy. This had as much to do with 
the organizational capacity and numerical strength of the German working-class forces as the 
particular architecture of the corporatist state in Germany, itself affected by the balance of class 
forces, that allowed for broader and deeper integration of the organized labour. This bounded the 
German working-class organizations more comprehensively and thoroughly to the state project than 
the Italian counterpart; yet it obstructed effective communication between workers’ organizations 
and the rank-and-file and redefined the relationship between the unions and their members in 
functionally corporatist terms. As a result of the comprehensiveness of this integration, the 
organizational and ideological capacities of the working-class organizations, and the particular form 
of the regulation of labour relations in Germany, the German unions were relatively more 
successful in maintaining control of their members and slackened the sociopolitical tensions to be 
channelled inwardly towards workplace agitations.  
The response to the unfolding crisis of the German state, especially since the second half of 
the war, manifested itself first and foremost outside the factories within the numerous local 
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initiatives that emerged in response to the food and coal crisis in 1916-17. They were community-
led self-help initiatives, often outside the network of trade unions, which sought to fill the gap left 
by the state’s growing failure to provide the basic means of subsistence, first at the local and later at 
translocal levels. These initiatives preceded the activities of militant labour delegates who started a 
process of articulation and agitation on the factory floors independently of the union activities and 
link their activities to the local initiatives. The “council democratic” movements that emerged after 
the Revolution were rooted precisely in the generalization and radicalization of such initiatives, 
fueled by the militarization of rank-and-file. From the start, they were primarily preoccupied with 
subversive activities against the militarized state. They sought to compensate for the inability of the 
state to meet its basic functions, with a particular emphasis on local control, in matters that went 
beyond the factory floor and concerned the social reproduction more broadly. They already 
contained an embryonic form of “citizens’ control”.  
The third period of the German war effort coincided with direct negotiations between the 
labour unions and the employers’ organization in the situation of increasing sociopolitical unrest 
and deepening state crisis. In the eyes of the upper echelon of the military and the leading 
capitalists, the organizational and numerical strength of the unions made them an indispensable 
actor in the survival of the monarchy in the postwar era and a smooth transition to the postwar 
economy. As a consequence, the unions and the SPD were ever more invested in operationalizing 
the smooth transition along the lines of the agreement with the employers. Furthermore, the SPD, 
now in the context of the opposition from the USPD, sought to fill the gap to enable the necessary 
continuity at the political level that was required for such smooth transition to the postwar order. 
In Italy, the more direct militarization of the relations and forces of production directed the 
locus of sociopolitical struggles to the agitations at the factory level. Due to the mistrust in the 
socialist movement, the organizational capacity of the trade unions, and the particular form of the 
regulation of labour relations in Italy, the integration of the organized labour in the corporatist 
structures was relatively more limited and unstable. Furthermore, the type of institutions that the 
state helped to proliferate in order to facilitate its corporatist project, namely the internal 
commissions, was much more firmly rooted in the factory-floor activities than the German workers’ 
commissions. The internal commissions already contained an embryonic form of “workers’ 
control”.  
In the third period of the Italian war effort, the state once again bypassed organized labour 
through more direct utilization of the rank-and-file organizations. In this phase, the distance 
between the socialist party and the union grew even larger as the events of 1917 strengthened the 
intransigence orientation of the PSI and its increasing hostility in this period towards the war effort. 
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However, the weakness of the reformist wing within the PSI and the relative flexibility of the CGL 
towards localism prevented the split within the two.  
A significant difference between the two cases lies in the fact that the central authority of the 
state apparatus, including the military order, did collapse at the end of the war in Germany but not 
in Italy. The political vacuum that this situation created allowed the radical movements in Germany 
to take a decisively “political” orientation. This was not as readily possible in Italy where the 
central authority and the military order remained largely intact despite the deepening crisis and led 
the way to postwar transition. As the Italian labour movement resumed its traditional method of 
agitation to improve the condition of its rapidly increasing members, the focus of radical 
movements fell primarily on the “economic” struggles.  
 To summarize, the German organized labour under the Burgfrieden became a more reliable 
partner in the war mobilization project than the Italian organized labour under the né aderire né 
sabotare. As a result of the general disposition of the organized labour towards the war project and 
in the light of the relative numerical and organizational power of the German organized labour, the 
German trade unions were integrated within the corporatist structures of the German state more 
deeply than was the case in Italy. Even though such integration eventually burdened effective 
communication between the union leadership and the rank-and-file, the German unions were 
relatively more successful in maintaining control of workplaces. Compared to the German 
corporatist structures with their intermediate institutions of workers’ commissions, the corporatist 
structures in Italy that sought to integrate organized labour into the state project were more limited 
and precarious.  
Although the state did involve the socialist trade unions in the second period of the war 
mobilization, its corporatist structures relied more heavily on institutions that operated at the factory 
level. In the third period of the war, the German unions (and eventually, the SPD) became more 
indispensable to the efforts to keep the state intact and facilitate the postwar transition. In this 
context, the German employers became more interested in working with organized labour more 
directly to layout the structure of the postwar labour relations. In the context of the collapse of the 
state apparatus after the war, these rank-and-file militant actions linked up with the local initiatives 
outside factories towards democratic governance. In the case of Italy, the state increasingly 
bypassed the established trade unions in the face of growing social and political unrest in the third 
period and worked more directly than before with the internal commissions. The Italian employers 
also were more intransigent towards working with the organized labour in the last period of the war. 
In the context of the post-war crisis, the rank-and-file militant actions resulted in a generalized 
radicalization of internal commissions.  
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These were the factors and dynamics which came together to create a relative divergence 
between the German and the Italian cases in gravitating towards different moments of “council 
democracy”, with Germany inclining towards “citizens’ control” and Italy towards “workers’ 
control”. The next chapter delves more deeply into the concrete process through which the 










The Trajectory of the “Council Democratic” Movement in Germany (1918-1920) 
 
Introduction  
Part I examined the transformative processes that laid the foundation for the emergence of 
“council democratic” movements. While these developments were conditioned by pre-war struggles 
within and outside the state, they were shaped by the particular form of state-led war mobilization.  
 The sudden collapse of the German military apparatus pushed the militarized state into an 
existential crisis. It created a unique political space for the exponential growth of the movements for 
democratization that had already emerged in institutional and non-institutional forms during the 
war. Due to the entanglement of the military apparatus within the state apparatus under the 
militarized state form, struggles and crises in the military would propagate through the rest of the 
state. Therefore, the initial impetus ignited by the mutinous soldiers quickly took the generalized 
form of democratization of the state. This situation gave the council movement in Germany in its 
initial period a distinctly political character directed towards the democratization of the state.  
 The chapter analyzes the trajectory of the “council democratic” movement during the 
German Revolution in strategic-relational terms, on the basis of organizational linkages, 
programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns. The discussion of the trajectory is divided into three 
periods. The first period is between 4 November 1918, when the first soldiers’ council was formed, 
to 21 December 1918, marking the end of the First Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils 
(First Congress, for short). During this period, the movement is analyzed along its constitutive 
mode of “citizens’ control”. The second period is between 24 December, marking the “Christmas 
Battles”, to 14 April 1920, when the second Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils ended. 
After the first period when the institutional path towards radical democratization of the state ceased 
to appear feasible, certain elements of the movement continued to push towards radical “citizens’ 
control” outside the formal-institutional path. Furthermore, workers in industrial regions could no 
longer accept the deferral of their demands for democratization of the economic relations and began 
a series of militant actions. In this way, the trajectory of the “council democratic” movement in the 
second period took a bifurcated form with one branch seeking to establish radical “citizens’ control” 
and another to realize radical “workers’ control”, both on the basis of council system. These 
“branches” were largely disconnected not only geographically but more importantly in terms of 
formal and substantial aspects. The third period is between 15 April 1919 and 7 October 1920, 
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when the subordination of factory councils (Betriebsräte)1 to unions was formalized at the end of 
the first National Conference of German Factory Councils. After the onslaught of paramilitary 
forces and series of legislative hurdles against the council movement during the second period, the 
locus of struggle had shifted decisively towards the issue of “workers’ control” in the third period 
and was largely confined to the question of the relation between the factory councils and the trade 
unions.  
The Trajectory of “Council Democratic” Movement of the German Case 
First Period (1 November 1918 – 21 December 1918) 
The trigger for the volcanic emergence of workers’ and soldiers’ councils throughout the 
country was the mutiny of Wilhelmshaven sailors. The mutiny itself was a consequence of the 
refusal of the sailors to comply with the Naval order to attack the British fleet in the North Sea on 
31 October. Faced with the sailors’ revolt, the plan was called off and the ships were ordered to go 
to Kiel while holding the rebellious sailors as prisoners on-board. The Kiel sailors gathered in 
Union Hall on 1 November to formulate a set of demands to free the imprisoned sailors. After the 
commanding officers refused to meet their delegates, the sailors organized a large public 
demonstration on 3 November which turned bloody when the police opened fire. The following 
day, the sailors formed the first soldiers’ council, effectively took control of the city, and issued a 
list of 14 demands. They included the recognition of the authority of the soldiers’ councils and 
some democratization measures within the military.2 This was followed by the joint call from the 
local representatives of the USPD and the SPD for a general strike and the formation of a workers’ 
council to fuse with the soldiers’ council. 
Kiel soldiers’ councils went as far as demanding “the immediate end of the war, the 
abdication of the Hohenzollern, … [and] the implementation of general, equal, and secret suffrage 
for men and women” (Artelt, 2012, p. 21). This shows how amidst the crumbling militarized state, 
the demand for peace and democratization of the military were naturally linked with the demands 
for democratization of the state and society. In this sense, the question of democratization of the 
military was not seen as an internal affair but explicitly linked to the question of “citizens’ control”.  
Once the central government in Berlin learned about the revolt in Kiel and the formation of 
councils, Gustav Noske, an SPD representative from the right-wing of the party, was sent to Kiel 
with the order to offer amnesty to the revolting soldiers as long as they surrender their weapons and 
end their standoff. Although he failed to gain the chairmanship of the Central Soldiers’ Council, 
 
1 The term Betriebsräte is sometimes translated as “works councils”. I follow Ben Fowkes’ translation of the term as 
“factory councils” also to highlight the analogy with the Italian case of factory councils (consiglio di fabbrica). 
2 See http://www.kurkuhl.de/docs/kieler_14punkte.pdf for their list of demands.  
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Noske’s popularity as the new governor grew over time, especially among the soldiers. This 
involvement at the advent of the movement demonstrates how quickly existing organizations can 
get entangled with subaltern movements. In addition to this attempt to contain the movement at its 
inception, the government mobilized a real or perceived fear of the potential interference of the 
Russian state and closed the Russian embassy on 5 November. This marked the beginning of a long 
process of casting radicalism of the council movement as a “Bolshevik threat” by the government 
(Buse, 1972, pp. 244-6).  
The early strategy of containment was not enough to prevent the spread of the movement 
elsewhere. As the news about the events in Kiel spread out, workers and soldiers in many other 
cities followed suit by forming their own councils. By 10 November, councils were formed in 
numerous cities across the country. Despite some variations in the formation of these councils (e.g. 
see Tobin, 1984, p. 157 and Comfort, 1966, pp. 35-36), ultimately, workers and soldiers joined 
forces in all cases in the early days of the revolution. The formation of workers’ councils in small 
and medium-sized cities was generally much faster than in large cities in this period.  
The spatial patterns of revolutionary protests in the early days of the revolution (5-9 
November) almost everywhere in Germany reveals a pattern of starting from outskirts of towns or 
cities in places associated with socialist politics such as union buildings and moving into city 
centres in and around places that symbolized the imperial state (see Jones, 2015). Indeed, 
contemporaries saw the transformation of the political space as the foremost reason for conceiving 
the events as a revolution (p. 48). This pattern highlights the rapidly evolving aspiration of the 
revolutionary movement towards a radical democratic understanding of “citizens’ control” 
manifesting itself symbolically in spatial terms in controlling the public spaces.  
The SPD leadership generally considered councils as unrepresentative units due to their 
class (or sectional) orientation and called for the election of a National Assembly on the basis of 
universal suffrage as soon as possible.3 Furthermore, they saw councils as short-lived entities whose 
possible usefulness extended only to the distribution of food and demobilization of soldiers. While 
some figures such as Philipp Scheidemann rejected any use for the councils after the 
commencement of the National Assembly, others such as Max Cohen reserved vague but always 
subordinated role for the continued existence of the councils alongside the National Assembly. 
Regardless, the SPD soon mobilized its organizational network at the local level to bring as many of 
the councils as possible under its leadership in order to maintain control of the revolutionary 
process.  
 




There was much less homogeneity in the USPD’s orientation towards the councils. It was 
essentially the opposition to the war that had initially brought together quite a wide range of 
tendencies under the USPD. The formal end of the war on November 11, shortly after the outbreak 
of the revolution, diminished the internal cohesion of the USPD and widened the ideological rifts 
between various factions. This manifested itself most distinctly in USPD’s programmatic 
orientation towards the council movement. These positions became increasingly clear, contentious, 
and divisive as the question of the political role of the councils in the emerging republic took the 
centre stage. Hence, the internal diversity of the USPD’s programmatic orientation towards the 
council movement hindered its ability to provide a unified articulation of the movement’s political 
aspiration.  
The position of those who could be considered as the “right-wing” of the party, such as 
Eduard Bernstein, was quite close to the SPD with regards to the councils. Having recognized 
council republic (Räterepublik) as inevitably falling into the “Bolshevik” model in which “a 
minority exercises its rule with the help of paid guards” (Bernstein, 2020a, p. 363), he identified the 
parliamentary democracy as the path for the new republic (Bernstein, 2020, pp. 381-2), pending 
important reforms (Bernstein, 2020b, pp. 381-4). Furthermore, Bernstein saw the socialization of 
the economy as a slow and gradual process into a distant future (Bernstein, 2020a, pp. 361-6). 
Similarly, Hugo Haase and Wilhelm Dittmann argued that only a national assembly elected on the 
basis of universal suffrage would have the legitimacy to determine the future of the German State 
(Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 94). Bernstein called for a speedy convocation of the National Assembly.  
The USPD “centre”, represented by figures such as Kautsky and Rudolf Hilferding was 
more open to the possibility of an independent role of councils in the new republic. This often 
implied a mixed system that could combine the parliament and the councils. Kautsky noted the aim 
of the revolution in general in the democratization of state institutions and revival of production. 
However, he considered councils not as an alternative state but instruments of mass organization 
that could keep a democratic check on the bureaucratic apparatus and could prevent the emergence 
of counterrevolution (Kautsky, 1918; Salvadori, 1990, pp. 227-28). In their social tasks, Kautsky 
believed that councils could facilitate far-reaching reforms for both producers and consumers 
(Kautsky, 1918). Kurt Eisner, a leading USPD representative in Bavaria, had a similar view about 
the role of councils in the revolutionary process. In the early days of the revolution in Bavaria, 
Eisner coined the notion of “Nebenparlament” which was intended to replace the upper house of 
the Bavarian state with a representative body composed of delegates from revolutionary councils 
and other “vocational organizations”. He considered the power of the councils, albeit transitory, as 
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instrumental in preventing counterrevolution and Bolshevism and in pushing the parliament to the 
left (Mitchell, 1965, pp. 107-16, 161-172).  
The “left-wing” of the USPD can itself be divided into two groups, the Obleute and the 
Spartacus League. They both believed in the possibility of a council republic in Germany and 
rejected the liberal parliamentary path that they saw would begin from the convocation of a 
National Assembly. In a preliminary program prepared by Ernst Däumig, a leading figure of the 
Obleute, argued that,  
the new political power is embodied in the revolutionary organization of the workers’ and 
soldiers’ councils...This cannot happen if the German state is transformed into a bourgeois 
democratic republic. Germany needs to become a proletarian republic on the grounds of a 
socialist economy, in which only the working people, that is, all manual and intellectual 
workers, have public rights. The ambitious of the bourgeoisie to convoke a national 
assembly as fast as possible will rob the workers of the fruits of the revolution (as quoted in 
Müller, 2012a, p. 62).  
In a similar vein, Luxemburg warned in early November that “the fight for the national 
assembly is led under the rallying cry, ‘Democracy or Dictatorship!’”; however, in rejecting that 
dichotomy, she argued that “‘Dictatorship of the proletariat’ means to use all means of political 
power to realize socialism and to expropriate the capitalist class for the benefit—and by the will—
of the proletariat’s revolutionary majority, that is, in the spirit of socialist democracy” (Luxemburg, 
2012, p. 92). However, the Obleute and the Spartacus League differed in the method of pursuing 
their revolutionary goals. The Obleute members, including Richard Müller, were deeply skeptical of 
what they saw as putschist tendencies within the Spartacus League (Morgan, 1975, p. 316). This 
prevented these factions to coordinate effectively during the critical days of the revolution in the 
first period. 
Besides these major programmatic fragmentations, the organizational capacity of the USPD 
was far inferior to the SPD. This further complicated its ability to facilitate the expansion of the 
movement across the country and effectively mediate the political project of the movement in 
various localities. At the dawn of the revolution, the distribution of political power between the two 
socialist parties varied across the country.4 Nonetheless, due mainly to the organizational limitation, 
the USPD did not actively try to influence the creation of the councils in the early days of the 
revolution (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 75; Broué, 2005, p. 203). This was in contrast with the SPD which 
 
4 In large cities in some states, such as Prussia and Saxony, there was a parity between the SPD and the USPD. In some 
states or territories, such as Württemberg and Hess, the SPD dominated and in some other cities and states, such as 
Brunswick, Hamburg, Bremen, and Thuringian, the USPD had the upper hand (Kolb, 2004, p. 9). 
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intensely engaged in agitation campaigns to encourage the formation of councils but under the SPD 
leadership.  
Political parties were not the only organizations that significantly influenced the trajectory 
of the council movement. Another important organization that influenced the evolution of the 
movement was the Free Trade Unions. Kolb (1962, p. 91) identifies two types of workers’ council 
with respect to their pattern of formation: those workers’ councils which initially constituted 
committees whose composition was determined by the party (either the SPD or the USPD 
depending on the city);5 or those negotiated between the party and the trade union and subsequently 
send delegates to the committee.6 Therefore, the role of the socialist trade union was not only 
central in the later development of the council movement, as we will see, but also in its early stages. 
However, its influence in the first period was rather covert in line with the cautious and hands-off 
approach of the union leaders such as Carl Legien. And given the relative alignment of the Free 
Trade Unions with the SPD, the organizational presence of the union within the movement often 
boosted the SPD line. 
As we saw in Part I, there was growing dissatisfaction within the socialist party and the 
union regarding their involvement with the state’s war project. However, contrary to the case of the 
SPD, these tensions within the Free Trade Unions did not result in a formal split within the 
organization, even though the opposition against the union leadership and the post-war settlement 
was no less militant.7 In the absence of a formal split, the militant opposition within the union 
movement founded channelled their grievances through the councils, especially in the third period. 
In the first period, the union leadership conceived of the councils as a transitional phenomenon and 
not as an immediate threat to the internal cohesion of the union movement and was more concerned 
about the political implications of the movement on the trade union. As the revolution unfolded in 
the first period, the union leadership appeared willing to accept councils as the political organ of the 
revolution as long as the union’s authority in the “economic” sphere remained unchallenged 
(Krüger, 2018, pp. 135, p. 153).  
Already in October 1918, leading German industrialists had begun serious planning for 
demobilization and transition to a peacetime economy in October 1918. Despite the diversity among 
the capitalist class on their vision of post-war Germany, it had become evident that any viable plan 
would require an active engagement of the trade unions, particularly the Free Trade Unions. 
 
5 These were more typical in Ruhr area, Koln, Bielefeld, Karlsruhe, Offenbach, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Braunschwig, and 
others. 
6 Although, in these cases, sometimes their composition was those that emerged in large gatherings of factory delegates 
which issued practical guidelines to the managing committee. 
7 This was particularly the case not only in Berlin but also in Hamburg, Bremen, Mülheim and the Ruhr region (Krüger, 
2018, pp. 125, 140). 
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Conversely, the union leadership was quite enthusiastic about the prospect of such corporatist 
schemes (see Krüger, 2018, pp. 111-17; see also Henicke and Hesselbarth, 2009). While the basic 
legal structure of the agreement was already laid out between the two sides (p. 120), they initiated a 
series of formal negotiations with the General Commission of the Free Trade Unions and the 
Central Association of Employers of Germany between 9 and 15 November in Berlin. The 
revolution that erupted in the middle of these negotiations apparently gave an upper hand to the 
position of the unions. However, unsure of their authority over their members, the unions were also 
quite worried about economic devastation and the complexity of demobilization that, in their view, 
the revolution might lead to if they did not cooperate with the employers on securing the economic 
position of the workers (Feldman, 1970; Krüger, 2018, p. 135).  
The result of the ratification was the Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft (ZAG; also referred to as 
Stinnes-Legien Agreement) which established collective bargaining in Germany. At the core of this 
12-point agreement, recognition of trade unions as the bargaining partner on issues concerning 
wages and working conditions, the introduction of the eight-hour day without a reduction in 
payment, “joint supervision and control of employment records”, “the establishment of a workers’ 
committee in every factory with at least 50 employees to supervise the compliance with the 
collective agreement”, “the creation of arbitration committees on the basis of parity between 
employers’ and workers’ representatives”, and bilateral demobilization committees in each trade on 
the basis of parity to ensure the implementation of the agreement.8 The trade unions in their turn 
promised to uphold “the continued existence of private property and employer organizations … and 
even went so far as to join with the employers in the creation of an Arbeitsgemeinschaft [social 
partnership] to institutionalize and organize future collaboration in the formulation of joined 
economic and social policies” (Feldman, 1970, p. 313).  
These measures aimed at a structural integration of both the German capitalist class and the 
working class into the now-emerging state and facilitated the transition to a new class relation in the 
relative absence of the Junkers. This not only gave huge incentive to defend the framework of the 
agreement but also gave the leadership a great advantage in fending off the challenges of the 
council movement towards radical democratization of the economic relations by flagging the 
concrete and significant reform measures under the corporatist scheme of the ZAG. 
Regarding lesser industrialized and predominantly agrarian regions in Germany, the state of 
Bavaria stands as a special case in the first period. A prominently agricultural region with peasants 
forming a strong majority, Bavaria had very little industries even until the beginning of the war. The 
 
8 For the full text of the agreement, see German History in Documents and Images, “The Stinnes-Legien Agreement 
(November 15, 1918),” 2018, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/stinnes_eng.pdf. 
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outbreak of the war brought the momentum towards a gradual reform of the monarchic state in 
Bavaria into a temporary halt, but they were taken up again in September 1917 (Mitchell, 1965, pp. 
16-30). As a result of SPD’s parliamentary pressure and their alliance with the liberals in the last 
year of the war, a constitutional amendment was passed on 2 November 1918, effectively creating a 
constitutional monarchy in Bavaria.  
In the meanwhile, Eisner met with Ludwig Gandorfer, the leader of the left-wing of 
Bavarian Peasants’ League (Bayerischer Bauernbund; BBB) on 3 November to plan to topple the 
Bavarian regime. Under the leadership of Eisner, a coup was staged on 7 November and a People’s 
State of Bavaria was proclaimed on 8 November. Eisner was elected the Chairman of Council of 
Workers on the same day (pp. 91-9). The presence of a significant number of peasants’ councils as 
well as the alliance between the USPD and the BBB, which was due not only to the personal 
friendship between Eisner and Gandorfer but also the left-leaning tendencies of the BBB, makes 
Bavaria a unique case in the German Revolution. The initial formation of hundreds of peasants’ 
councils in Bavaria came from the organizational work of the BBB, often to balance the influence 
of workers’ councils (Carsten, 1972, p. 179). On formal grounds, peasants’ councils were not given 
meaningful political role in the new republic and were seen primarily in their economic function to 
ensure food distribution to the cities and facilitate with the demobilization process (pp. 188, 205). 
This subordinated role for the peasants in the revolutionary process effectively in the service of the 
working-class minority already made the relationship between the councils and its peasant base 
precarious.  
At the organizational level, although the USPD-BBB alliance stabilized the rapid transition 
to a republic in Bavaria in the initial period, it impended the possibility of engaging with 
socialization in agriculture given the opposition of the BBB to any such radical measures (Mitchell, 
1965, p. 186; Carsten, 1972, p. 183). But the BBB was not the only peasant organization in Bavaria. 
The two most powerful agrarian organizations in Bavaria were, Bavarian Peasants’ Association 
(Bayerische Bauernverein) and the Farmers’ Association (Bund der Landwirte; BdL), both of which 
were pro-monarchic conservative Christian organizations, and stood for the interest of large 
landowners. These other agrarian groups got involved with the organization of their own peasants’ 
councils (Mitchell, 1965, p. 156-7), thereby pursuing their interests through the new organizational 
vocabulary of the revolution. After taking power, Eisner had to navigate between these major 
interest groups.  
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Compared to Bavaria, the events in Berlin were happening at a rather slower pace. The 
Obleute and Spartacists were engaged in intense debates in secret meetings before the Kiel revolt.9 
There were considerable disagreements between them especially about the method of revolutionary 
uprising. Even though the Obleute was in touch with the Bolsheviks starting in September 
(Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 65), they did not believe that insurrectionary methods would be appropriate in 
the case of Germany. Unsure of the readiness of workers to stage an uprising, the Obleute finally 
decided to issue an announcement for a mass political strike to be held on 11 November. However, 
as the other cities were caught in the revolutionary wave, Berlin workers spontaneously took to the 
streets on 9 November.  
After the abdication of the Kaiser was announced by Prince Maximilian of Baden, the future 
form of the state could take the form of a constitutional monarchy, a democratic republic, or a 
socialist republic. Scheidemann’s proclamation of a (democratic) republic from the balcony of the 
Reichstag while Ebert was planning for a transition to a constitutional monarchy (Buse, 1972, p. 
245f49), at the same time when Liebknecht, surrounded by a massive crowd on the streets, 
proclaimed Germany a socialist republic was a dramatic indication of these possibilities and the 
initial fluidity of the situation. 
The SPD leaders were extremely wary of letting the councils determine the course of the 
revolution. So, they immediately began negotiating with the leaders of the USPD in the Reichstag 
to come to an agreement about the composition of the provisional government – the so-called 
Council of People’s Deputies (Rat der Volksbeauftragten). The USPD leaders put forward six basic 
demands to the SPD leaders as the precondition to joining the coalition: to proclaim Germany a 
socialist republic; the executive, legislative, and juridical branches to be composed of 
representatives elected by workers and soldiers; no bourgeois representative to become a minister; 
the coalition to expire after the conclusion of the armistice; technical ministers to be accountable to 
purely political staff; and the cabinet to be on the basis of parity between the SPD and the USPD 
(Broué, 2005, p. 150). At first, when the SPD leaders refused to accept these demands except the 
last two, the USPD representatives decided to abstain from the coalition but they changed their 
mind on 10 November and announced three candidates.10 The SPD’s rejection of the first three 
demands left the door wide open to steer the new republic towards establishing a liberal democracy 
while remaining within the general framework of the SPD’s Erfurt Programme. 
 
9 See Luban (2009) on the secret conference on Spartacus League before the revolution on 12-13 October 1918 during 
which they decided on founding of councils in Germany and plans for socialization. 
10 The three candidates were Wilhelm Dittmann, Hugo Hasse, and Emil Barth. The three SPD candidates were Ebert, 
Scheidemann, and Otto Landsberg.  
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In its first act, the Council of People’s Deputies announced nine reform measures. They 
included the lifting of the state of emergency, granting of the right of assembly and association, 
giving freedom of speech and religion, repealing the Prussian servant law, and reinstituting worker 
protection measures that were suspended at the beginning of the war. In addition to these, the 
socialist coalition fulfilled one of the key points of the Erfurt Programme by issuing a decree on 12 
November to pass universal suffrage that included women. The latter had a paradoxical effect on 
women’s mobilization, especially in the context of the generally male composition of the council 
movement (Boak, 2019) and the tendency towards replacing women workers with returning soldiers 
either organically or as part of demobilization plan (Sneeringer, 2002, p. 20; Boak, 2013, p. 66). 
While a significant achievement on its own in paving the way for formal participation of women in 
the political life, it transformed women, who have been side-lined within the council movement, 
from relatively active political subjects, to a relatively passive voting bloc which different political 
parties had to compete over. 
The radical elements within the council movement in Berlin were trying to take control of 
the rapidly developing process. Following a proposal drafted by Müller, the delegates of the 
workers’ councils, had been elected on 10 November in factories across Berlin,11 gathered in the 
Circus Busch, one of Berlin’s largest meeting halls, to elect an Executive Council of the Workers’ 
and Soldiers’ Councils of Greater Berlin (Vorsitzender des Vollzugsrats der Arbeiter- und 
Soldatenräte Groß-Berlins) as well as the Council of the People’s Deputies. After fierce and chaotic 
debates and rejecting the Obleute’s plans to form an action committee made up exclusively of its 
members and Spartacists, the delegates agreed to elect a 24-member executive council, composed 
of an equal number of soldiers and workers. There was already a significant imbalance in the party 
affiliation of the executive council since, on the one hand, the soldier representatives were under a 
strong influence of the SPD and, on the other hand, the worker representatives were to observe a 
parity between the SPD and the USPD. In the end, six leading members of the Obleute joined the 
Executive Council with Müller as its chairman.12  
 At this point, there were then two parallel governing organs, the Executive Council and the 
Council of People’s Deputies, whose unclarified spheres of power overlapped especially with 
regards to the executive power. After the signing of the armistice on 11 November, thereby 
initiating a six-month peace negotiation between the German government and the Entente countries, 
it was ever more important to clarify the boundaries of power, given the predominant presence of 
 
11 In Berlin, the election to the councils was based on one delegate per 1000 votes in large factories and small 
proportions for smaller factories. This proportionality was different other cities such as Stuttgart (1 per 180), Hamburg 
and Leipzig (1 per 600), and Frankfurt (1 per 400) (Broué, 2005, p. 160).  
12 They were Müller, Barth, Paul Eckert, Georg Ledebour, Paul Wegmann, and Paul Neuendorf. 
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radical democratic organizations and popular currents, this implied defining “citizens’ control”. On 
18 November, the two organs held a joint session to discuss these issues. But it took until 22 
November to reach an agreement. The Executive Council was given the authority to control 
(“Kontrolle”) the activities of the Council of People’s Deputies while putting it in charge of the 
peace talks.13 Given the political environment both external and internal and the fear of the 
Executive Council towards radical policies that might cause an economic collapse (Hoffrogge, 
2015, p. 81), the ambiguity of the notion of control left the effective executive power in the hands 
of the Council of People’s Deputies.  
As a result of the internal pressure by the USPD members such as Emil Barth and external 
pressure by the Executive Council, the Council of People’s Deputies decided on 18 November to 
begin immediate socialization of the appropriate branches of industry. Consequently, the 
Socialization Commission (Sozialisierungskommission) was formed on 24 November to study the 
feasibility of socialization in certain economic sectors and advise the government on practical steps 
towards that goal. It brought together some of the most prominent economists, social theorists, and 
politicians in Germany, including Kautsky, Hilferding, Joseph Schumpeter, Emil Lederer, and Otto 
Hué, with Eduard Heimann as its General Secretary. The task of the Commission was to prepare 
reports and legislative framework for the socialization of coal mining, nationalization of fishing and 
insurance, as well as municipalization of certain facilities. The initial report from the Commission 
was not published until 7 January 1919 (Frambach, 2019, p. 5). In this way, the question of 
“workers’ control” was relegated to a panel of experts to contemplate on. Therefore, it deposited 
active class struggles from the bottom-up into a top-down legal-administrative form. However, it 
was an effective way to put this, at least temporarily, on hold. 
The rapid and largely organic demobilization of soldiers at the end of the war and the 
strength of the SPD within the soldiers’ councils were the main reasons behind the general 
deradicalization of the soldiers’ councils and the reduction of their size. The soldiers’ councils 
declared their support for the government and their desire for a speedy formation of a National 
Assembly (Carsten, 1972, p. 70). However, this did not mean that the initial demand of the soldiers’ 
councils to democratize the military was completely forgotten. They continued to push for some 
measures towards that goal in this period. There were also some attempts by radicals to form their 
own armed units.14 Nevertheless, the core of the armed wing of the revolution fell under the control 
 
13 As evident in Richard Müller’s speech on 16 December 1918, the Executive Council saw its own power as 
provisionary which should be replaced by “a different body, appointed by a broader electorate [...] as soon as possible” 
(Müller, 2012b, p. 34). 
14 After the Executive Council was forced under the pressure of the soldiers’ representatives to reverse its decision the 
day after it unanimously agreed to form a Red Guard on 12 November, the Spartacus League began organizing a Red 
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of the SPD as the party formed a hegemony over the soldiers’ councils. The SPD also led the 
formation of the People’s Militia (Volksweher) on 12 December for the general maintenance of the 
public order, and the use of the paramilitary group funded by the government, Free Corps 
(Freikorps) units that began to be formed from mid-December.15  
 As the battle to take charge of the direction of the new republic was being waged at the 
national level, the councils continued to pursue the initial momentum behind the revolution to 
democratize the state at the local level. The nature of their demands certainly varied significantly 
between different localities, ranging from calling for the socialization of the means of production 
and formation of a council republic to the general maintenance of public order, organizing food 
distribution, and overseeing orderly demobilization. The way the councils saw their role ranged 
from those, typically in large cities with armament industries, which immediately began the 
democratization process at the local levels to those, typically the SPD-controlled councils, which 
saw themselves as provisional power to maintain public order, organize food distribution, and to 
oversee orderly demobilization until the national election (Tobin, 1984, pp. 158-61). In most cases, 
the councils sought to exercise a control function over the local government.16 Eisner, for example, 
explicitly invoked the notion of “right to control” (das Kontrollrecht) over the conduct of the 
bureaucratic officials (Mitchell, 1965, p. 154).17 Therefore, either implicitly or explicitly the 
movement was engaged in defining the scope of “citizens’ control” in relation to the old and new 
state organization.  
 On the whole, the bureaucratic structure of the local governments remained largely intact 
after the revolution. Coupled with the political development at the national level and the lack of 
confidence among almost all councils in their ability to govern without the expertise of local 
bureaucrats, the recovery of local governments in the first period after their initial vulnerability 
played a crucial role in the inability of the councils, even those dominated by the USPD, to succeed 
in restructuring the local government in significant ways (Tobin, 1984, p. 166; see also Carsten, 
1976, p. 25). In specific cases, the dynamic between the councils and the local governments was the 
result of the way the councils saw their own role in the revolutionary period and the level of their 
 
Soldiers’ League (Der Rote Soldatenbund) in several cities. Its stronghold in Berlin reached a maximum of 12,000 
members (Moore, 1978, p. 299). 
15 For a comprehensive study of the activities of these paramilitary units, see Jones (2016). 
16 For example, working in conjunction with the local city government (e.g. Cassel), acting under the supervision of the 
local government (e.g. Dortmund), joining the existing local government in advisory capacity (e.g. Göttingen), forming 
specific task committees to work on specific issues such as postal work, railway work, or policing (e.g. Frankfurt), 
ordering the occupation of certain factories (e.g. Hanau), dismissing government officials like the Chief of Police (e.g. 
Berlin and Düsseldorf). Only in exceptional cases, they went further and dissolved the local governing bodies (e.g. 
Gotha) or declaring a republic (e.g. Brunswick) (Tobin, 1984, p. 162). 
17 In the “Provisional Regulations for the Workers’ Councils” issued in Bavaria on 26 November, the notion of “right to 
control” was no longer mentioned (Mitchell, 1965, p. 155). This indicates not only the difficultly in delimiting the 
notion but also its subversive potential. 
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militancy (itself affected by the organizational composition of the councils and the developments in 
the ongoing at the national level) and the way the old bureaucracies interacted with the councils 
(itself influenced by the changing alliance structure with the national government and powerful 
class interests). Hence, as the organizational structure of the old state advanced in its consolidation 
of power, the space for the articulation of “citizens’ control” shrank rapidly. 
The turning point for the council movement came during the First Congress that took place 
between 16 and 21 December. The organizational affiliation of its 489 delegates tells a lot about the 
relation of forces within the movement: 288 SPD-affiliated delegates, 90 USPD, 25 Democrats, 10 
“United Revolutionaries”, and 47 unaffiliated (Herwig, 1968, pp. 152-153).18 The SPD had been 
quite successful in establishing itself within the council movement beyond its hegemonic basis in 
the soldiers’ councils. The USPD and the more radical elements were well outnumbered within the 
council movements. This made it hard for the council movement to engage in organizational 
appropriation independently of the policies of the SPD leadership at the national level.  
The core discussions in the congress can be divided into three main topics: democratization 
of the state and the future form of the new republic; democratization of the economy and the 
process of socialization; and democratization of the military and the concerns over demobilization. 
On the question of socialization, the delegates unanimously passed a resolution based on a speech 
given by Hilferding (USPD) on 18 December.19 He firmly rejected the syndicalist path of the direct 
takeover of factories by the workers and cautioned against a simple confiscation of property. 
Instead, Hilferding called for a gradual transformation to put the whole of production at the disposal 
of the community (Hilferding, 2014, pp. 24-5; Carsten, 1972, p. 135). The resolution called on the 
government to initiate the socialization process immediately in industries that were ready for it, 
notably the mining sector. As it became evident in later period, the socialization process created a 
conflict between the unions and the councils since it was unclear which of these two working-class 
entities were in charge of the socialized units (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 80).  
With regards to the democratization of the military, the delegates passed a resolution, known 
as “Seven Hamburg Points”, that was proposed by Walther Lamp’l (SPD). It sought to protect the 
young republic from counter-revolution and to empower citizens, including soldiers-citizens, to 
control the military structure by putting it under the command of People’s Representatives and 
 
18 Among these delegates, which included 84 soldiers, there were 179 workers (including both blue- and white-collar 
workers), 71 intellectuals, 164 journalists and professional staff of the socialist parties or trade unions (Broué, 2005, p. 
184). Leading members of the Spartacus League, namely Luxemburg and Liebknecht were not allowed to attend the 
First Congress in person, even in an advisory capacity. 
19 Some aspects of Hilferding’s conception was challenged by a number of USPD colleagues. For example, Barth called 
for immediate socialization as a necessary measure to keep the workers in the factories. 
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under the supervision of the Executive Council.20 It also involved making the elected soldiers’ 
councils in charge of maintaining the military discipline. This struggle led by soldier-citizens should 
be seen as part of the larger process of “citizens’ control” after the war. As such, it deeply 
threatened the old military establishment. A group of top military figures (e.g. Hindenburg, 
Groener, and von Schleicher) met with Ebert and threatened to resign if the government did not find 
a way to reverse the decision. The democratic shock also pushed a critical fraction of the top 
echelon to get prepared to reclaim their power by forming paramilitary units. 
On December 19, Congress moved to the crucial topic of the future form of the republic. 
The Congress first witnessed a series of passionate debates on the relationship between the 
Executive Council and the Council of People’s Deputies by prominent figures on both sides such as 
Müller and Dittmann respectively. Thereafter, the delegate discussed a motion by Herman 
Lüdemann from the SPD that proposed the transfer of legislative and executive power to the 
Council of People’s Deputies until the convocation of a National Assembly. The motion also 
suggested the appointment of a new governing organ called the Central Council of Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Councils (Zentralrat der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte) with important monitory 
(Überwachung) responsibilities. These included supervision over the German and Prussian cabinet 
and the conduct of the Reich Offices, the right to appoint and recall members of the Council of 
People’s Deputies until a normal state of affairs was established and to be consulted before the 
appointment of ministers and assistants. This motion was passed by a large majority. In the later 
days, some of the USPD delegates tried to retain a veto right for the Central Council over the 
legislative power of the Deputies. However, the Council of People’s Deputies reasserted its 
exclusive executive and legislative authority.  
For many USPD-affiliated and revolutionary delegates, this was a manoeuvre by the SPD to 
cut off the council movement from the Executive Council as the only institution that could 
potentially push it to the left. The USPD boycotted the election and abstained from participating in 
the Central Council after the rejection of its demand for giving the Central Council veto power over 
the legislative process. This left the SPD to present a list of 27 candidates from its own ranks for 
this important organ (Carsten, 1972, p. 134). The abstention of the USPD resulted in severing their 
influence on one of the most important organs in the revolutionary process, giving the SPD a 
tremendous advantage to push forward its vision of the future state (see Henicke and Hesselbarth, 
 
20 The resolution also included a host of important symbolic operations (e.g. removal of military medals, prohibition of 
carrying arms off duty, etc.) to abolish democratically illegitimate forms of military authority especially in its extension 
outside the military.  
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2009, p. 65). In the meanwhile, the internal tension had been rising between the key members 
within the Obleute and the USPD in December.21  
After the above resolution came one of the most consequential discussions in the First 
Congress revolving around the question of the future form of the republic as a council system or a 
parliamentary system. The former vision was presented by Däumig from the Obleute and the latter 
by Max Cohen from the SPD. Cohen argued that the only possible means for Germany to be able to 
grapple with the difficult circumstances towards postwar recovery was the institution of the 
National Assembly that had its mandate from the whole of the people and could deal with these 
issues effectively and efficiently. He saw the step towards a speedy convocation of the National 
Assembly as a precondition for economic recovery and the possibility of implementing any socialist 
measures. On the contrary, Däumig argued that “the council system is, and has to be, the 
organizational structure of modern revolutions” (2012, p. 42); and that if the delegates accepted 
Cohen’s argument, the election of a national assembly would be a “death sentence” for the councils 
(p. 43). He contended that a National Assembly would not be able to realize socialism in the sense 
of the radical transformation of property relations towards an economic system democratically 
determined by the people “with equal rights to producers and consumers” (p. 46). At best, it would 
create institutions that could implement some state-capitalist measures. Arguing that socialization 
could only be undertaken on the basis of a council system, he called for “the implementation of the 
council system in the workplace [in which] workers [are] in charge of their shops and factories 
through councils they trust” (p. 48). Therefore, he proposed a counter-motion in which councils 
were to be “the highest legislative and executive authority” and called on the delegates to elect a 
commission to determine the electoral system for the next election of councils across the country 
which would then determine the future constitution. Until such an election, he proposed the Central 
Council to be the “highest monitoring body of the Council of People’s Delegate and the ministers” 
(Müller, 2012a, p. 74). 
The Chairman of the USPD, Haase, argued that since councils would still retain some of 
their significance even in the case of the convocation of the National Assembly, the dichotomy 
between a council system and National Assembly was incorrect. Therefore, he cautioned against a 
hasty election of the National Assembly without clarifying these matters. Scheidemann spoke 
afterwards in which he restated his opposition to the very existence of councils as it would result in 
“the absolutely certain demise of trade and industry, the ruin of the Reich, and incalculable misery 
of our people” (as quoted in Bernstein, 2019, p. 156). Finally, despite the efforts of a minority of 
 
21 The Obleute expelled Barth from the ranks on 21 December due to his support of the SPD policies. 
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delegates to postpone it as much as possible, the date for the election of the National Assembly was 
set on 19 January 1919.  
To summarize this period in terms of organizational links, programmatic efforts, and 
alliance pattern, the unexpected revolution that erupted at the downfall of the military apparatus 
took the form of council movement that aimed at democratization of the state, the military, and the 
economy. Given the collapse of the state, as partial as it was especially at the local level, councils 
quickly proliferated across the country. Their significant sociopolitical role turned them into the 
base of the political vocabulary of the emerging republic. The exclusively socialist composition of 
the provisional government made the socialist parties keenly interested in the councils as 
organizations through which they could gain legitimacy among the politicized populous and control 
the direction of the revolution by transforming these organizations. Therefore, councils became the 
political battleground for the socialist parties to establish their hegemony within, thereby becoming 
hegemonic over the revolutionary process itself. These included the SPD, USPD, Spartacus League, 
Free Trade Unions, and Obleute. Other political forces could not deny the centrality of councils and 
therefore had to involve themselves with councils either directly or indirectly. However, the 
working-class character and composition of these councils made it more difficult for the elements 
affiliated with non-socialist forces to involve in their leadership directly and openly. These battles 
were fought at different council levels, from local councils to the Executive Council, and in 
different localities, from North to South. The relative organizational capacity of these organizations, 
their internal cohesion, and their relative power within the emerging state, laid the ground rules for 
strategically-determined relative dominance of these organizational forces to become hegemonic 
within the council movement. This put the SPD (and the Free Trade Unions) as a far more 
influential force than others engaged within the movement. Nevertheless, the strategic operations of 
the SPD did not remain seriously unchallenged. This was most notably due to the presence of the 
USPD (and the Obleute) in strategically important councils, either due to their spatio-sectoral 
significance or their politico-hierarchical position.  
The SPD mobilized its vast organizational capacity throughout the country to bring as many 
councils under its direction as possible. It generally succeeded in achieving hegemony over the 
councils particularly in small and medium-size cities and rural area, and among the soldiers’ 
councils. The SPD leadership also moved aggressively and intentionally at the national state level to 
curb the ability of more radical elements to determine the course of the events. On the other hand, 
the USPD, whose raison d’être before the revolution was primarily a united front against the war, 
suddenly found itself as the party to push for the revolutionary demands of a movement it could not 
effectively and cohesively represent. Given its organizational limitation and programmatic 
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multiformity towards the council movement, the USPD could not provide a coherent articulation 
and effective organization for the radical possibility of the movement. Furthermore, the 
organizational influence of the USPD over political developments at the national level was severely 
limited by its decision not to participate in the Central Council created at the end of the first period.  
Given the collapse of the state (as partial as it was especially at the local level), the 
programmatic efforts of the movement in this period revolved heavily around the question of the 
political form of the future state and the question of “citizens’ control”. Calls for the transformation 
of the economic relations could be deferred at least temporarily and relatively not only because of 
the urgency of the issues in the “political” sphere, but also because of the ability of the Free Trade 
Unions to maintain organizational unity and flag significant gains that it had been able to achieve 
under the ZAG. Even the militant rank-and-file groups such as the Obleute did not pursue a frontal 
attack against the union leadership. Furthermore, the institution of the Socialization Commission 
early in this period justified the temporary postponement of the question of implementation of more 
radical measures towards economic democracy. Therefore, the question of “workers’ control” was 
largely postponed to the following periods. Having said that, there was a variation among socialist 
groups with regards to the socialization question, with some seeing it as a long, gradual, and 
effectively top-down process, some reserving certain roles for councils to facilitate reforms, and 
some calling for rapid socialization.  
On the “citizens’ control” dimension, failing to realize a constitutional monarchy in 
response to the radical demands of the movement, the SPD leadership stood well within its Erfurt 
Programme and opted for a liberal democratic republic. This required a coordinated effort to push 
for the election and convocation of a National Assembly as soon as possible, while limiting the 
power of the councils both at the national and local level to a mere, and often practically hollow, 
supervisory [Kontrolle] role. At best, they saw councils as a transitory phenomenon and useful in 
the immediate tasks of demobilization. The USPD encapsulated a wide range of programmatic 
articulations of the movement, from liberal democratic to council republic with different 
combinations of the two in the middle. The incommensurable diversity of these visions and the 
method of achieving them deepened the internal fragmentation within the USPD that resulted in a 
split shortly after the first period. The Spartacus League articulated a radical, though not always 
clear and detailed, programmatic vision for the councils to the left of the USPD on the political and 
economic questions. However, its serious organizational limitations, both in terms of geographic 
reach and social base, hindered its ability to determine the programmatic direction of the movement 
if taken as a whole. 
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In terms of alliance patterns, the revolution erupted in the middle of a process of 
disintegration of the Junker-industrialist class alliance and its replacement with a corporatist 
alliance between capital and labour that had already been set in motion especially in the third period 
of the war. This shift was formalized under the ZAG that was signed in the early days of the 
revolution. It raised the stakes massively for the trade union leaders to avoid sacrificing both 
significant material gains in exchange for the union movement and the promise of a corporatist path 
to postwar recovery for unknown plans for a transition to socialism (unless this was defined in very 
modest and vague terms projected into a distant future). While the SPD was forced to work within a 
formal alliance with the USPD in the provisional government, it had no patience for what was 
broadly defined as “Bolshevik” tendencies within the USPD. The SPD formed conditional alliances 
with powerful elements of the old military apparatus both to have access to armed forces 
independent of the soldiers’ councils and to prevent a possible counterrevolutionary reaction to be 
launched by the old military generals.22 The internal fragmentation of the USPD hindered the 
ability of the party to form an alliance with other forces. With regards to peasants, there was a 
general failure of the socialist bloc to form a meaningful alliance with peasant organizations. The 
only notable exception in this period was the case of the Bavarian revolution in which a formal 
alliance between the USPD and the BBB was formed. However, this did not lead to a significant 
and expansive infusion of Bavarian peasants into the emerging political order. This was due to a 
combination of relative marginalization of peasant councils (even those linked to the BBB) in the 
emerging state apparatus, the power of competing organized agrarian interests to swing peasants 
away from the revolutionary path, and the reluctance of the peasants themselves to pursue their 
interests through a socialist revolution. Shortly after the end of this period, this fragile alliance 
collapsed, further disconnecting the peasant population from the revolution.  
Second Period (24 December 1918 –14 April 1920) 
 At the end of the first period, the possibility of achieving radical “citizens’ control” and 
substantive self-governance in the new republic was largely lost at the formal political level. After 
the decision by the delegates at the First Congress to hold an early election for a National 
Assembly, the abstention of the USPD from the Central Council, and the resignation of the USPD 
representatives from the Council of People’s Deputies on 28 December,23 the locus of “political” 
struggle among most political parties shifted primarily towards electoral politics and considerably 
away from the council movement. However, not all political forces saw the development in the first 
 
22 For a discussion of the conditional alliance between the SPD leadership and the old military, see Buse (1972). 
23 The USPD justified this resignation by referring to the government’s reaction to the so-called “Christmas Battles” 
(Weihnachtskämpfe), the failure to implement the Hamburg Points, and the failure to initiate the socialization process 
(USPD, 2014, pp. 56-57). 
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period as irreversible. They continued to agitate outside the parameters of rapidly consolidating 
formal politics to restore the political power of the councils. This was done in a diverse set of tactics 
including demonstrations, protests, putsch attempts, and coup d’etat. In parallel to this trend, aspects 
of the council movement shifted the focus towards the “economic” struggle for “workers’ control”. 
Therefore, the trajectory of the council movement in the second period experienced a bifurcation 
along radical articulations of “citizens’ control” and “workers’ control”. But these attempts were 
often disconnected from each other in terms of organizational links, programmatic efforts, and 
alliance patterns.  
 While political parties began to aggressively mobilize for the election, the USPD found it 
difficult to convince some of its key members such as Hass, Däumig, Müller, and Ledebour to work 
together to prepare a list of candidates for the National Assembly. The isolation of the Obleute in 
the USPD pushed them towards the radical left and the Spartacus League. They attended the 
national conference on 29 December organized by the Spartacus League to discuss expanding their 
organizational capacities on the ground as well as creating a new political party. In this process, the 
Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands; KPD) was officially formed 
on 1 January 1919 after the Spartacus League broke from the USPD and merged with the Bremen 
left communists. Uncomfortable with what Müller called “anarcho-syndicalist-putschist mentality,” 
(as quoted in Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 98) the Obleute leaders had a considerable reservation about 
joining the new party. At the end of the conference, the Obleute refused to join the new party after 
its five pre-conditions were rejected.24 This disunity was costly for the KPD as it was cut off from 
an invaluable source of organizational influence among workers in key industries in Berlin. This 
pushed the newly formed party further into agitational politics on the streets, as manifested in the 
so-called Spartacus Uprising (Spartakusaufstand) between 5-12 January. Conversely, the Obleute 
missed the opportunity to switch its political affiliation from a party which had little room for its 
political project into a party with a much greater level of militancy, including in radical cities 
outside Berlin, and with more compatible programmatic vision. This pushed the programmatic 
vision of the group increasingly towards “pure councilism”.  
The bifurcation phase took place between December and January. As its first act in the New 
Year to cleanse the police force in Berlin from the influence of the revolutionary sympathizers, the 
SPD dismissed Eichhorn from his post as the Chief of Police arguing that he refused to comply with 
the orders to contain the demonstrations during the Christmas Battles. However, the decision 
 
24 These conditions, stemming from the profound distrust of the Obleute in the Spartacist revolutionary methods, were: 
“renunciation of fundamental antiparliamentarianism, total parity between Shop Stewards and Spartacists on the 
executive board, a revision of the Spartacists’ ‘street tactics’, Shop Stewards’ influence on the party’s publications, and 
removal of the word ‘Spartacus’ from the future party name” (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 99). 
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backlashed when thousands of workers went on a general strike on 5 January in protest against the 
decision. Seizing upon this opportunity, the radicals formed a 52-member Provisional 
Revolutionary Committee (Provisorischer Revolutionsausschuss) on 6 January with Ledebolur, 
Liebknecht, and Paul Scholze as its co-chairmen (Broué, 2005, p. 244). However, the uprising 
quickly came to an end as a result of the split between the revolutionary forces once the negotiation 
between the USPD members of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee and the SPD began on 6-
7 January, and the bloody suppression by the troops and Free Corps (pp. 248-50). However, over 
the following days, amidst a widespread wave of militant demonstrations across the country,25 the 
Free Corps units extended their brutal crackdown by targeting the leaders of the revolutionary 
movements, most infamously the arrest and the subsequent murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg 
on 15 January. 
This was the context in which the election of the National Assembly on 19 January took 
place. The result was a disaster for the USPD which gained only 7.6 per cent of the vote (22 seats). 
Although the SPD came on top, its 37.8 per cent vote (163 seats) was far behind what they might 
have expected given their dominance in the political currents or compared to what they gained (34.8 
per cent) in the last Reichstag election before the war in 1912 (Nohlen and Stöver, 2010, p. 762). 
The non-socialist parties did quite well, considering how soon the election took place after the 
revolution and especially for the liberals and the conservatives whose parties were newly formed 
after the revolution.26 The overall strength of these parties made the socialists dependent on their 
cooperation in drafting the new constitution. Therefore, the “Weimar Coalition” between the SPD, 
the Center Party, and the DDP was formed.  
The influence of the struggles for democracy after the Revolution had a considerable impact 
on the electoral programme of non-socialist parties. Simultaneously, the coalition with some of 
these forces severely limited the possibility of implementing a far-reaching socialization program. 
While insisting on the preservation of private property and class cooperation, the DDP presented 
itself firmly on the side of the new liberal democratic republic with equal rights for all citizens, as 
well as basic worker rights such as freedom of association, collective bargaining, and minimum 
wage. The DDP rejected “the transfer [...] of all means of production into the possession of society” 
and called for socialization to be limited to “purely factual[] for each individual case” (as quoted in 
Bernstein, 2020c, p. 284) and only when it results in economic growth and rise of productivity. The 
 
25 The January unrest was not limited to Berlin. There were demonstrations in many cities including Dresden, Stuttgart, 
Hamburg, Halle, Düsseldorf, and Bremen (for details see Broué, 2005, pp. 263-265).  
26 The Catholic Centre Party gained 19.6 per cent (91 seats), followed by the newly formed liberal German Democratic 
Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei; DDP) with 18.5 per cent (75 seats), and new formed conservative German 




Catholic Central Party claimed to stand in favour of the liberal democratic republic, what it called 
“a free social people’s state [Volksstaat]...” in which people have equal right to “participate in the 
administration of all affairs without the spirit of caste and class [preference]” (as quoted in 
Bernstein, 2020c, pp. 288-9). It also stood firmly for the sanctity of private property but rejected 
capitalist monopolies and in favour of strong domestic agricultural production. On the socialization 
question, there was a belief in the Center Party that workers had to become “internally mature” first 
before embarking on a social experiment such as socialization (Eissrich, 2019, p. 35). Within the 
programmatic framework effectively delineated by the governing coalition, any meaningful 
socialization would soon reach definite limits.  
As we saw in the previous section, the question of democratization of the economy took a 
back seat in the first period while the primary focus of the movement was on the political form of 
the emerging republic. Nevertheless, the theme of democratic transformation of the economic 
relations was by no means absent from the demands of the councils. But due to series of decrees at 
the beginning of the revolution, the announcement of the ZAG agreement, and the institution of the 
Socialization Commission created the impression that the socialist government was attentive to the 
economic democratization demands. But, given the resolution passed in the First Congress that 
called on the government to immediately socialize all eligible sectors and the deteriorating 
economic condition of the country, the stakes were high for the Socialization Commission to lay out 
a concrete plan for socialization especially the mining sector. The initial report of the Socialization 
Commission was released on 7 January 1919 on the principles of socialization. However, the more 
comprehensive report did not come out until 15 February 1919.  
There were several reasons why the mining sector was singled out to start the socialization 
process. It was not only because coal was a vital resource for all industries and household heating 
but also because the sector was already largely state-owned due to the war policies (Frambach, 
2019, p. 14). However, the private entrepreneurs in the mining sector had a long history of fiercely 
asserting their “master of the house” position more than any other industry in Germany (von 
Oertzen, 1963, p. 128; Moore, 1978, p. 202; Frambach, 2019, p.14). The uncooperativeness of these 
employers could make the socialization process extremely contentious. Conversely, miners in the 
Ruhr region, but not necessarily the leaders of their collective movement, shared syndicalist ideas of 
workers taking over and running the mines themselves and distributing the profit (von Oertzen, 
1963, p. 129; Lüpke and Kruppa, 2009, p. 107). This made controlling the socialization process in 
the mining sector further difficult. It was also at this juncture that the syndicalist Free Association 
of German Trade Unions (Freie Vereinigung deutscher Gewerkschaften, FVdG) became a mass 
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organization, after having been severely districted during the war due to its rejection of the 
Burgfrieden.27  
The issue of socialization resurfaced among miners in the Ruhr region and they took a more 
proactive role in the process from the beginning of the new year (von Oertzen, 1963, p. 112). The 
miners in the Ruhr region, who were suffering not only from food shortages but also a soaring rise 
of coal prices by 50 per cent in December, were quite keen to initiate the socialization process in the 
mining industry following its ratification in the First Congress. On 6 January, for example, a group 
of miners (Victoria mine in the town of Lünen) expelled the managers and elected a three-person 
council to run the mine. On 9 January, the workers’ and soldiers’ councils in Essen proclaimed the 
socialization of mines based on a council system. After a large strike on 11 January, the office of 
Mining Cooperation and the Coal Syndicate were occupied and the occupiers took control of all 
wages and process. On 13 January, a conference of workers’ and soldiers’ council and the trade 
unions in the Ruhr region was held to discuss the issue of socialization. They elected a commission, 
composed of three SPD, three USPD, and three Communists, the so-called “Commission of Nine” 
[Neunerkomission], to prepare concrete plans for socialization of the mines (Carsten, 1972, pp. 153-
154; Lüpke and Kruppa, 2009, pp. 116-17). The congress decided unanimously that socialization 
should be carried out on the basis of a council system and proposed that mining council 
organization be established on a district basis (von Oertzen, 1963, p. 113). During a state-wide 
conference of workers’ and soldiers’ councils in Baden in January, the delegates announced that the 
councils would continue to exist until the key demands of the revolution, including democratization 
of the state and socialization of appropriate industries, were realized (Tobin, 1984, p. 168).  
Amidst the revival of the council movement in the Ruhr region, predicated on the 
democratization of the economy through a relatively radical articulation of “workers’ control”, the 
Socialization Commission was finding it exceedingly difficult to gain the willing cooperation of the 
government.28 The majority in the Commission believed neither private capitalist control nor a 
centralized state control in the mining sector was appropriate for the post-war context. Instead, it 
saw the solution in rigorous socialization through the expropriation of the existing private and state 
enterprises in the mining sector and the formation of an autonomous cooperative, the German Coal 
Association [Deutsche Kohlengemeinschaft] whose board of directors would be composed of 
capitalist, worker, consumer, and state representatives (Frambach, 2019, p. 7). But soon it became 
abundantly clear that the government has no intention to take up the recommendation of the 
 
27 Its membership reached 60,000 in August 1919 and 111,675 in December 1919 (Bock, 1969, pp. 134, 156), far higher 
than any time in its history. For an overview of the history of the emergence of FVdG since 1901, see Jenko (2007) and 
Bock (1969b).  
28 For examples of such tensions, see Frambach (2019, p. 9) and Eissrich (2019, pp. 34-7). 
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Commission. In protest, the Commission tendered its resignation in a letter to the government on 3 
February; although it continued to work until its dissolution on 7 April 1919.  
Of the notable programmatic visions of the Commission on the question of socialization 
were those of Kautsky and Heimann.29 In a pamphlet published in January 1919, Kautsky saw the 
economic revival of the country and maintaining production as “the prerequisite for any attempt to 
socialize production” (as quoted in Salvadori, 1979, p. 233). Therefore, he preferred not to rush the 
process before the capital flow was revitalized. However, he maintained that besides the question of 
the immediate socialization of certain eligible sectors, other industrial sectors should be put under 
the control of “syndicates”, led equally by employers, workers’ councils, consumers, and state 
representatives, “whose task would be to provide for the supply of raw material, the sale of 
products, and the regulation of the conditions of production” (p. 233). The call to expand the 
representative base of the syndicates was in line with Kautsky’s view about the limits of democratic 
legitimacy of workers’ councils as local workplace-based institutions (see p. 237; Thompson, 
2019a, p. 165). He suggested that in each company, workers’ committees should be set up to 
“monitor the implementation of the resolution of the syndicate and [...] to ensure the safeguarding 
of workers’ interests”. He emphasized that all nationalizations should be accompanied by 
compensation of the owners. He further proposed the nationalization of the land by turning 
landowners into tenants but without breaking up the large farms or expropriating the peasants 
(Kautsky, 1919).  
For Heimann, who came from the tradition of Christian socialism, socialization was not a 
method of democratic control over economic relations but of increasing economic efficiency 
(Backhaus and Backhaus, 2019, pp. 65-6). This sprang from his idea that, in a competitive market, 
the profit generated from innovation should not be associated with the labour of workers but that of 
the entrepreneurs. Similarly, in a monopolistic context, the profit of a monopoly should belong to 
the consumers who were behind building up the monopoly rather than the employed workers. 
Therefore, he concluded that “the material benefit of socialization, when looking at it merely as a 
task of distribution among various stakeholders, at best would be disappointingly small” (as quoted 
in p. 66). He saw the role of the state, rather than workers’ councils, as a possible remedy for the 
concentration of power at the top of capitalist enterprises. Ultimately, the legislative proposals 
produced by the Commission were closer to Heiman’s vision than Kautsky’s (p. 68). 
More radical theoretical elaborations on councils in this period were published in the newly 
founded weekly journal, Arbeiter-Rat, under the editorship of Däumig, which became publishing 
 




from late January 1919. It was there that Müller and Däumig sought to clarify and popularize their 
notion of “pure councilism” as distinct from both social democratic and Bolshevik model, in which 
radical democratic project based on class dominance of the working class was realized through 
workers’ self-management (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 111). In their model of “pure council”, they 
envisioned a parallel system of economic and political workers’ councils in which delegates were 
elected on workplace and district bases respectively.30 There were federally structured levels of 
larger aggregation with respect to both economic and political councils, whose delegates were 
indirectly elected by councils in the lower levels, and whose final point of contact was a central 
council at the national level. In this system, the executive and legislative powers were amalgamated 
and placed under the democratic control of councils (see pp. 111-17). The relation between the 
political and the economic councils remained largely unclear. But besides the abstract merit of this 
model, the theoretical form of “pure councilism” reflects the bifurcated trajectory of the movement 
in the second period into struggles for the revival of council democracy in the “economic” and 
“political” spheres.  
Back in the Ruhr region, the council delegates were becoming increasingly impatient with 
government’s response to their demands (Lüpke and Kruppa, 2009, p. 110). The leaders of the 
movement in Essen went to Berlin and Weimar to negotiate with government representatives on 13-
14 February to achieve recognition of the council movement and gain a firm commitment to 
socialization. The negotiations led to the formal recognition of factory councils (Betriebsräte) but 
their representatives had to be selected independently from the exiting workers’ committees. This 
made it possible for the government to give formal recognition to the councils while depriving them 
of any interference with management even to the extent that was possible with workers’ 
committees. And yet, it enabled these councils to potentially break out of union control under which 
workers’ committees operated.  
This situation facilitated the gravitation of the councils towards syndicalism. However, the 
relative organizational weakness of syndicalism in Germany slowed down the process. The 
programmatic shift towards syndicalism emerged while similar negotiations were taking place 
between the government and the council movement representatives in Central Germany. The 
workers’ councils in Halle published a “Provisional Instruction for the Factory Councils” on 13 
February. The provision envisioned factory councils represent all workers within the plant, whose 
primary task is “to democratize the company without delay and prepare it for socialization”. This 
required giving the councils full control over management and the workforce to ensure maximum 
 
30 They envisioned each individual workplace to be managed jointly by the workplace as well as district councils so that 
the interest of the community outside the workplace was included in the decision-making process.  
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productivity. The factory councils representatives, who were on a one year term but could be 
recalled at any time if the majority of workers pass a vote of no confidence, were to meet in the 
plant during the working time and given full compensation for their activities.31 On that basis, the 
workers’ councils of Central Germany held a conference in Halle on 23 February. However, given 
the fierce resistance of the SPD representatives in the government against councils’ right to 
intervene in management,32 even the USPD representatives such as Wilhelm Koenen, a member of 
the USPD central committee, moved away from program of top-down socialization and called for 
bottom-up socialization.33 This was indicative of a programmatic shift of the forces involved in the 
movement in the Ruhr region and Central Germany towards a syndicalist understanding of 
“workers’ control” as a path towards a full development of the council system. Given the 
concentration of the mining sector in the Ruhr region compared to the industrial sector in Central 
Germany, the question of socialization through the councils was more central to the movement in 
the former compared to the program of factory control by the councils in the latter. Amidst these 
contentious negotiations, the Free Corps began a series of assaults against the councils in the region 
in February. In response, workers’ and soldiers’ councils in the Ruhr under the strong influence of 
the FVdG and despite the opposition of the SPD and its threats to resign from the Commission of 
Nine, the Ruhr workers initiated a General Strike that lasted until 21 February.34 
Around the same time of these strikes in Ruhr and Central Germany, workers in Berlin 
decided to strike on 3 March. Müller assumed the chairmanship of the strike committee. Despite his 
best efforts to form a united front among the socialist and syndicalist forces, both the KPD and SPD 
refused to participate in the action (Hoffrogge, 2015, pp. 118-23). Berlin Workers’ and Soldiers’ 
Councils put out its demands on 3 March. Besides the calling for recognition of the workers’ and 
soldiers’ councils as well as the Hamburg Points, it highlighted the role of councils in workplaces 
“to exert a thorough supervision (Kontrolle) over those enterprises” and engage in “the rapid 
socialization of economic and state life” (see Fowkes, 2014, pp. 61-2). Three days later, the USPD 
published its Programmatic Declaration (see pp. 337-9) which in some respects reflected the 
leftward shift within the party as a result of the developments in this period. Having placed the party 
“on the ground of the council system”, the Programme identified the council system as the fighting 
organization of the proletarian revolution which “creates the right...to proletarian self-government 
 
31 For the full resolution, see “Vorläufige Dienstanweisung für die betriebstäste” in von Oertzen (1963, pp. 262-3). 
32 In response to council representatives from Essen, the SPD representatives – specifically the Minister of Economic 
Affairs, Rudolf Wissell and the Minister of Labour, Gustav Bauer, unwaveringly rejected these demands, arguing 
“under no circumstances should the workers’ councils intervene in the management” (von Oertzen, 1963, p. 141). 
33 Koenen argued that “[socialization from below] requires a democratic expansion and development of the council 
system, in which the factory councils above all secure the workers’ right to co-determination in all production” (as 
quoted in von Oertzen, 1963, p. 143).  




in factories, local councils, and the state, and implements the transformation of the capitalist order 
into a socialist one.” Although it called for “integration of council system into the constitution”, it 
echoed much of the previous positions of the party on the programmatic details such as 
socialization. Similar to the events in Ruhr, Berlin strike ended after a few days of intense and 
bloody battle with the Free Corps and government forces. 
On 30 March, council delegates, now dominated by the USPD and KPD, from the whole of 
Ruhr region met at a conference and decided to withdraw from the Free Trade Unions and founded 
the General Miners Union (Allgemeine Bergarbeiter-Union) based on council system. They 
formulated a set of demands including six-hour shift, approval of the council system, disarming of 
the Free Corps, arming the workers, and reestablishing diplomatic relation with Russia (von 
Oertzen, 1963, p. 117). In the following month, the Free Trade Unions lost a quarter, and in some 
districts more than half, of its members in the Ruhr region. While the second national Congress of 
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils (Second Congress, for short) took place (April 8-14), Ruhr 
workers went on another General Strike between 10-14 April, involving 300,000 workers affecting 
75 per cent of the mines in the region. Most of these workers joined the General Miners Union (p. 
117).  
Face with mass arrest and suppression, the General Miners Union (Bock, 1969b, p. 127) saw 
a decline at the end of April strikes. When the Central Mining Council called in early May 1919 for 
the formation of a new organization, the KPD now under the Chairmanship of Paul Levi who had 
strong anti-syndicalist views (p. 139), extended its support for the initiative. The syndicalists who 
previously composed a significant part of the General Miners Union branched out and began 
constructing their own union, soon dwarfing the General Miners Union (pp. 127-8). From here on, 
the effective alliance between the communists and syndicalists that had existed from the beginning 
of the revolution through the first few months of the second period came to an end (Jenko, 2007, p. 
16). The trend towards syndicalism (and later towards anarcho-syndicalism) in the Ruhr region and 
Central Germany continued until the end of the second period.  
The trajectory of the movement in this period within the “political” sphere manifested itself 
most sharply in Bremen and Bavaria. As noted earlier, Bremen was a stronghold of radical forces. 
This was reflected in the composition and orientation of the executive council. After the revolt of 
the Bremen executive council upon the decision of the First Congress in favour of a National 
Assembly, it became apparent to the radicals that the fundamental transformation of the state as 
they conceived it could not be done along the strategic lines of the USPD leadership. After a dispute 
between the left-wing forces over the result of the new council election held on 6 January in 
Bremen, the newly formed KPD organized a demonstration, took over the legislative assembly, 
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formed a nine-member Council of People’s Deputies,35 and declared Bremen a Soviet Republic. A 
fifteen-member Executive Council was formed to “control” (supervise) the conduct of the Council 
of People’s Deputies. Furthermore, a People’s Commissars who were subordinated to both the 
executive and legislative bodies of the Soviet Republic, were assigned top administrative role. 
Overall, the state structure of the Bremen Soviet Republic was not much different from what had 
emerged organically at the beginning of the revolution in several radical cities. The difference was 
the strict exclusion of the SPD and bourgeois forces from taking office. The immediate decision in 
front of the Bremen Soviet government was to decide on holding an election for the National 
Assembly in Bremen. This was taking place amidst rapidly worsening economic and financial 
situation of the city and increased pressure by the financial sector to block further loans unless the 
Soviet government reversed some of its initial decrees and open the government to other forces. 
Both the decision-making process to call for the election and the result of the election exacerbated 
the tensions between the KPD and the USPD within the Bremen Soviet Republic. Under such 
economic and political conditions and regardless of the internal debates on economic policies, no 
socialization plans could be undertaken.  
Despite the initial peculiarity of the revolutionary process in Bavaria in the first period 
especially with regards to the alliance patterns, the overall trajectory of the councils towards the end 
of the first period and the beginning of the second period was similar to the rest of Germany. The 
Basic Law of the Republic of Bavaria passed on 4 January gave the state a firmly parliamentary 
democratic framework, without any structural role for councils. By mid-January, all the individual 
Bavarian councils with the notable exception of the Munich Workers’ Council, while retaining their 
symbolic power, had either directly or indirectly relegated their authority to the government 
ministers (Mitchell, 1965, pp. 242-4). Just before the National Assembly election, the militant 
leaders of the Bavarian councils began organizing and planning to secure the position of councils 
within the state based on radical proposals. Among these was the proposal to completely replace the 
state bureaucracy with a council system, or instituting the councils as the supreme legislative body 
of the republic, as opposed to a parallel supervisory body as appeared in Eisner’s scheme, strictly 
subordinating the Landtag in the legislative process (pp. 245-8). The result of the National 
Assembly election and its disastrous outcome for the USPD in Bavaria (2.5 per cent of the vote; 3 
seats) increased the agitational activities of the radicals against the convocation of the Landtag and 
brought left-wing socialist and anarchist forces closer together in their effort to retrieve the 
structural power of councils within the state. By the beginning of February, the lines in the political 
 
35 This was composed of equal delegates from the USPD, KPD, and soldiers’ councils. The SPD’s delegates were 
excluded from the Council of People’s Deputies as well as all workers’ councils, and were replaced by representatives 
from the KDP and USPD.  
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struggle were drawn clearly between those in favour of a liberal parliamentary government and 
those who favoured a council system (pp. 252-3). This made Eisner’s “third-way” position 
politically infeasible and his position in the government inadmissible. A dramatic turn of events 
took place when Eisner was assassinated. This happened on the day when he was delivering his 
signed letter of resignation to the government. An hour later, Erhard Auer, the leader of the 
Bavarian SPD and the primary political rival of Eisner, was shot.  
The political shock of this event created the space for the council activists to hold a general 
meeting of the Munich councils and declare martial law. This put the newly created Central Council 
(Zentralrat), consisting of equal representations from workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ councils, at 
the head of the Bavarian state. The Central Council moved immediately to form a socialist unity 
government, with representatives of the USPD and SPD. It also called for securing councils in the 
state constitution to appear in all ministries in “advisory” capacity, a representative of the BBB to 
join the new Ministry of Agriculture, recalling of the elected Landtag when conditions permit, 
standing army to be abolished, and freedom of the press to be restored under some temporary 
restrictions (Mitchell, 1965, pp. 278-80). These proclamations, precisely in their ambiguous 
formulations, shifted the line of political struggle back to the parliamentary versus council republic. 
The shift, although still quite Munich-centric, was already visible in the debates in the congress of 
Bavarian councils that was commenced on 25 February (pp. 282-5).  
On the last day of the congress, the motion to declare Bavaria a soviet republic was rejected 
by a large majority and the motion to recall the Landtag immediately was approved (p. 286). After a 
series of negotiations between the two socialist parties and the BBB during which the debate 
expanded beyond Munich into less revolutionary provinces, an Accord was signed which required a 
new council election, deprived of the Central Councils of any executive or legislative authority, but 
gave the councils power to demand a referendum on any decision by the Landtag (p. 288). On that 
basis, a new coalition government headed by Johannes Hoffman (SPD) was formed on 7 March. 
Hoffman used the pretext of socialist unity and a sweeping program of socialization to suspend 
strikes and factional discord.36  
While the Bavarian state was rapidly consolidating around a social-democratic program, the 
revolutionary council activists began to regroup in the city of Augsburg and passed a resolution in 
favour of the Bavarian soviet republic and a full socialization program (pp. 300-1). By 4 April, 
 
36 Even at the rhetorical levels, the proposed plan for “full socialization” was devoid of even the most modest measures. 
On 25 March, Otto Neurath, the head of newly appointed Socialization Commission presented the outline of the plan 
where he said “we do not believe that we can today operate the factories in a communist fashion; for a time being we 
must work within the framework of capitalism and create socialistic foundations. We will then automatically grow into 
a socialist economy” (as quoted in Mitchell, 1965, p. 293). 
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Augsburg workers, with the support of the Central Council in Munich, initiated a general strike 
against the convocation of the Landtag. In a move to curb the militancy and bring the radicals under 
control, the Deputy Prime Minister, Ernst Schneppenhorst (SPD), offered to declare Bavaria a 
soviet republic if a coalition government that included the Communists could be formed. But the 
KPD representative, Eugen Leviné, refused the offer on the ground of a deep distrust of the social 
democrat’s intentions, unfavourable political and economic conditions in the country, and the cost 
of potential failure of the soviet republic for the Communists. Shortly after this, the SPD held an 
extraordinary congress and renounced Schneppenhorst’s offer.  
Nevertheless, on 7 April, the USPD, the Central Council (now under the control of the 
radical forces), and the Revolutionary Workers’ Council declared Bavaria a soviet republic. The 
revolutionary government, under the chairmanship of Toller (USPD), passed a series of sweeping 
measures to including the socialization of mines, banks, and the press, formation of a Red Army 
and revolutionary tribunal, and confiscation of foodstuff. However, none of the substantial 
measures could be implemented in the short lifespan of the soviet republic and its limited authority 
was confined largely to Munich. The Bavarian KPD refused to recognize the authority of the 
revolutionary government as it deemed it unrepresentative of the Bavarian workers. Nonetheless, it 
committed itself to fighting counter-revolutionary forces. 
After a failed attempt by the Right-wing forces on 13 April to topple the revolutionary 
government in Munich, the Factory and Soldiers’ Councils of Munich, under the direction of the 
Communists, proclaimed Bavaria a Communist soviet republic. The legislative and executive 
authority was transferred to an action committee headed by Leviné, and supported by the leading 
figures within the USPD such as Toller, and (at least initially) anarchists such as Gustav Landauer. 
Soon, under brutal military suppression led by Noske and supported by the Free Corps, the council 
republic in Bavaria came to an end.  
Both Bremen and Bavarian soviet republics represented the particular characteristics of the 
bifurcated form of council movement’s trajectory in the second period as it manifested itself in a 
struggle largely within the “political” sphere. The principle organizing links behind these were the 
left-wing of the USPD, the newly formed KPD, and the anarchists (especially in the case of 
Bavaria). The programmatic effort to articulate this struggle drew a sharp distinction between 
parliamentary republic and council republic as two fundamentally incommensurate forms of 
“citizens’ control”. The sharp opposition to the developments in the first period nurtured new and 
wider alliances between radical left forces, notably between socialists and anarchists, while severing 
some of the previous ties particularly between the left-wing of the USPD and the left-peasant 
organizations in the Bavarian case. 
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In response to the fear that the wave of general strikes in central Germany and Saxony 
towards the end of February would reach the Ruhr area, the government issued verbal concessions 
towards the implementation of socialization in the mining sector. The government issued a 
proclamation on 4 March that “the Coal Syndicate is to be socialized immediately” and “the 
socialization of potassium mining is being prepared with the utmost rapidity.” It gave assurance that 
“the framework law on socialization, which has been laid before the National Assembly, will 
provide a foundation for the Communal Economy (Gemeinwirtschaft)37 for Germany in place of the 
previous unrestricted private economy” (in Fowkes, 2014, pp. 30-31). However, a few days later, on 
23 March, when the government announced the Socialization Law, it became clear that the 
government had no interest in a real and immediate process of socialization. It prompted some 
vague notions of welfare, called for legislative measures to transfer industries such as extractive and 
energy branches into the Communal Economy, and to regulate their production and distribution 
through the Communal Economy (pp. 31-32). 
 The second Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils took place on 8-14 April 1919, a 
day after the Bavarian soviet republic was proclaimed. The Second Congress was dominated by the 
SPD affiliated delegates with 146 seats as opposed to the USPD with 56 seats (Fowkes, 2014, p. 
46), and was strongly biased towards rural areas dominated by the SPD due to the voting system 
(Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 125). The delegates rejected the very idea of councils and voted on setting up 
“Chambers of Labour”.38 The SPD resolution on the question of councils stated that the socialist 
democracy could be best achieved through occupationally-based Chambers of Labour. Each trade 
should set up an Economic Council which included the representatives of both employees and “the 
managers of enterprises”. These Economic Councils had to then elect delegates to the Chambers of 
Labour.39 This formation was to be replicated at the district, province, and state levels. These 
chambers were to work alongside other representative bodies such as the Reichstag, which the 
resolution called “People’s Chamber” (Volkskammer). If a bill was of an economic nature, it would 
first go to the Chamber of Labour and, if of a political and cultural nature, it would be first 
discussed in the People’s Chamber. It identified the trade unions as the representatives of the 
workers, and factory councils as their executive organs at the factory levels.  
The purpose of the resolution was clearly to put a nail in the coffin of the workers’ councils 
by reestablishing parliamentary politics within a corporatist structure. It empowered the 
 
37 The notion of Communal Economy is not necessarily a socialist one. It is perfectly compatible with a corporative 
model which can operate within some type of public-private partnership.  
38 The resolution can be found in “SPD Resolution on the Question of Councils…” (Central Council, 2014b, pp. 63-65).  
39 It appears from the articles 3 and 4 of the resolution that the workers delegates to these Chambers of Labour were 
rhetorically called “workers’ councils”.  
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representatives of employers and trade unions to have seats in the core organs of the economic 
planning of the state. It is hard to see much difference between this formulation and the ZAG 
agreement. The strengthening of the unions within the new state was also clear to the ordinary 
workers. They flocked to join the ADGB whose membership reach a staggering 5,479,073 (38 per 
cent of the workforce) in 1919 and 7,890,102 (54.7 per cent) in the following year, compared to 
1,664,991 (11.5 per cent) in 1918 (Fowkes, 2014, p. 332).  
Kautsky gave a speech at the Second Congress on socialization. He renewed his warning 
against either full or accelerated socialization, while criticizing the lack of government’s 
commitment to the challenges of the socialization process. He called for the institution of a Central 
Socialization Office, modelled after a similar office in Austria, with far-reaching powers including 
expropriation of land and mines. In reality, however, nothing came out of this programmatic effort, 
as it was already evident in the Socialization Law passed a few weeks prior. In fact, at the SPD 
party congress in June, Wissell (Central Council, 2014a) discussed the general failure of the 
government to deliver on economic demands. He saw this as the cause behind a slide to the left 
notably the increased popularity of the USPD. He saw the solution in the Communal Economy as a 
pathway towards socialism. Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of the SPD delegates were 
against even that level of a planned economy.40  
Aside from the legislative and military suppression of the councils at the national level, most 
other workers’ councils died out either voluntarily or due to the funding cuts by the various levels 
of government. For example, as early as May 1919, the workers’ councils in Düsseldorf were forced 
to dissolve themselves after their funding was cut, forcing them to borrow money (Carsten, 1972, p. 
176). Similarly, the state in Karlsruhe cut all funding to the workers’ councils in July 1919 after 
declaring their role as over in May (pp. 157-158). In some cities, the government got rid of the 
remaining workers’ councils by making them illegal. For example, the government of Stuttgart 
declared the workers’ councils illegal on 15 July shortly after calling them unnecessary (p. 160).  
To summarize, the second period saw a bifurcation in the form of council movement, with 
no significant crossover between the two branches. There was a change in the gravitational centre of 
politics after the early election to the National Assembly was called for. It marked a decisive shift 
among organizations to focus their energy to gain hegemony over the revolutionary process from 
councils to the National Assembly. It also inflated the indirect programmatic interventions of non-
 
40 After the Second Congress, there were a number of important theoretical elaborations among the council theorists on 
the question socialization. The most notable of these were written by Karl Korsch (“What is Socialization?” published 
in May) and Anton Pannekoek (“Socialization” published in September). Notwithstanding their theoretical insights, 
these elaborations, which tellingly lacked much practical details, could not be implemented by the council movement 
even in Ruhr region and Central Germany.  
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socialist parties on the question of “citizens’ control” and “workers’ control” which fundamentally 
impacted the political horizons of the movement within the consolidating legal-administrative state 
within post-war corporatist industrial relations. On both accounts, the country moved decisively 
towards a liberal parliamentary understanding of “citizens’ control” and a corporatist understanding 
of “workers’ control” on the basis of codetermination between trade unions and employers.41 
Broadly speaking, councils were now operating in a context in which they were seen by the 
majority of political forces, including the SPD, as a transitory phenomenon that had to practically 
be made superfluous or suppressed after the convocation of the National Assembly. This unmaking 
of the movement did not imply rapid withdrawal of the forces for the council movement. But it 
implied a systematic dismantling that still required continued involvement of political forces, either 
directly or indirectly, to ensure a coordinated strategic response. Under the auspices of such 
transformations, the movement bifurcated along the radical trends within it.  
Along the dimension of radical “citizens’ control” on the basis of councils, the case of 
Bremen, Bavaria, and Berlin stand out as three cases in point. Depending on the political landscape 
of each region, the principal organizing forces behind these included the KPD (largely in Bremen 
and Berlin), Obleute (largely in Berlin), left-wing of the USPD (minority in the three regions), and 
anarchists (largely in Bavaria). The organizational capacity of the newly founded KPD was quite 
limited (e.g. their near absence in Bavaria). Its inability to absorb or establish a strong working 
alliance with the Obleute into the party further severed it from an organic link with a large and 
critical mass within the working class. The Obleute had its stronghold in Berlin among the 
metalworkers and operated at best indirectly in other regions through its impacts on the USPD 
general strategic orientation. The left-wing of the USPD could operate with a significant margin of 
freedom in different regions due to the party’s heterogeneity and decentralization. However, the 
party’s evolving relations with the rapidly consolidating state (which always includes relations with 
other political organizations) particularly after the election to the National Assembly forged the 
overall strategic horizons of its left-wing.42 
 The dimension of radical “workers’ control” on the basis of councils are most vividly 
manifested in the case of Ruhr, Central Germany, and Berlin. The principal organizing forces 
behind the council movement in this context included the KPD and USPD dominated General 
Mining Union (largely in the Ruhr region), the syndicalist FVdG (largely in Ruhr and Central 
Germany), the KPD (mainly in Berlin and Central Germany), as well as some influence from the 
 
41 This was pushed forward in the second period not only on the basis of ZAG but also under later schemes such as the 
Economic Councils and the Chamber of Labour. 
42 This included, for example, a rift that was created between the USPD and the KDP due to the decision and the result 
of the election. 
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SPD (particularly as part of the Commission of Nine). This period saw a definite shift towards a 
growing influence of syndicalist forces in the Ruhr region and Central Germany. The exodus of 
members from the Free Trade Unions to the General Mining Union and later to the FVdG was a 
manifestation of that development. This process was fueled by the failure of the Socialization 
Commission and very limited achievements made by the Commission of Nine to make concrete 
steps towards meaningful socialization. 
The radical programmatic efforts along the dimension of “citizens’ control” appeared most 
notably in Bremen, Bavaria, and Berlin. In Bremen, activists sought to institute “control” (in the 
sense of supervision) over the Council of Deputies. In Bavaria, as the alignment of forces after the 
election to the National Assembly made Eisner’s “third-way” scheme increasingly infeasible, the 
programmatic fault lines were being drawn between liberal democratic and council republic, with 
the balance of forces decisively towards the former. The political shock after the assassination of 
leading political figures tips the scale and enabled a progressive shift, first under the socialist unity 
government and then under the short-lived Bavarian Republic, towards a more radical conception of 
“citizens’ control” with the councils playing a more significant role within the programmatic 
schemes. In Berlin, the radical vision of “citizens’ control” under a council republic was elaborated 
on in the journal Arbeiter-Rat, where leading members of the Obleute developed the notion of “pure 
councilism”.  
The theoretical elaboration along “workers’ control” in this period revolved around the 
militant actions in the Ruhr region and Central Germany. These were ignited by the decision of the 
First Congress at the end of the first period to begin an immediate socialization of the mining sector. 
Contrary to largely top-down state-centred scheme geared towards increasing economic efficiency 
that were later put out by the Socialization Commission, the Commission of Nine outlined a much 
more bottom-up cooperative socialization process. Negotiations with the government in Central 
Germany led to the formal recognition of factory councils. The shift towards syndicalism 
manifested itself also in a radical programmatic articulation of these factory councils. This in effect 
prepared them to potentially become institutions of rank-and-file militant actions.  
The movement trajectory towards radical “citizens’ control” on the basis of a council system 
led to new alliances between the anarchists, the leftwing of the USPD, and the KPD. This came at 
the cost of the breakdown of the alliance between the USPD and the BBB. Furthermore, due 
partially to the consorted efforts of the other peasant associations to organize the peasants against 
the socialist forces and partially due to the fear of peasants themselves towards the prospect of a 
revolutionary socialist government for their material interests, there was a general alienation among 
the peasants against the council movement.  
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The SPD continued its unrelenting suppression of the council movement by all means 
necessary including military intervention, partisan takeover, alliance with non-socialist parties 
within the state, legislative interference, and budgetary restrictions. By the end of the second period, 
the movement within the “political” sphere was effectively terminated. However, the wave of 
strikes across the industrial heartland of Germany pointed to a decisive shift in the trajectory of the 
council movement from the question of workers’ councils to factory councils in the third period.   
Third Period (15 April 1920 – 7 October 1920)  
The trade union leadership had been relatively reactive towards the revolutionary 
development in its initial periods. However, the upheavals in the industrial heartland seriously 
undermined their ability to control their members. Furthermore, the growing popularity and 
concrete expansion of factory councils, which no longer bracketed the question of power relation 
within the workplace but were primarily interested in direct democratization of enterprises, 
threatened the authority of trade unions over workplace relations. The challenge to the trade union 
leadership was not confined to the Ruhr region and Central Germany. This was also distinctly felt 
within the German Metalworkers’ Union (Deutscher Metallarbeiter-Verband, DMV) with over a 
million members43 when a member of the Obleute, Otto Tost, replaced Adolph Cohen as the head 
of the Berlin section of the DMV on 1 March 1919. In the third period, the left within the DMV 
succeeded in taking over many union branches in Bremen, Halle, Brunswick, and Stuttgart 
(Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 130).  
In response to these developments, the strategy of the union began to shift into a more 
proactive position from February 1919, particularly by latching onto the distinctly radical 
programmatic vision of Theodor Leipart, the Chairman of German Woodworkers’ Union 
(Deutscher Holzarbeiterverband, DHV) (Potthoff, 1987, p. 153-5).44 From early on in the 
Revolution, the leadership of the DHV were a strong proponent of socialization since they saw 
socialization as inseparable from socialism; that is, economic democracy as a necessary 
continuation of political democracy. Leipart considered councils (both in their operational and 
territorial forms) as representative bodies, democratically elected by workers, to realize co-
determination in all questions of production and operation (Plener, 2009, pp. 83-7). On the question 
of the relationship between unions and councils, Leipart considered unions as indispensable in the 
process of socialization and argued that councils should “draw on the trade unions for solutions to 
economic issues” (as quoted on p. 87). Compared to the more radical vision of some of the leaders 
 
43 The DMV reported 1.6 million members in October 1919 (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 135). 
44 The strategic intention of the trade union leaders was hinted at when Hermann Sachs, the President of the German 
Miners’ Union, said in February 1919, “If workers’ committee in the factories were called workers’ councils, the people 
would have been thrown a bone to chew on” (as quoted in Potthoff, 1987, p. 163). 
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of the DMV, Leipart was positively critical yet sufficiently flexible to offer a pathway to appeal to 
both radicalized and moderate segments of the working class in an effort to contain the movement.  
In addition to such rhetorical strategies, the old union leadership tried to push back against 
the leftwing efforts to replace the old union functionaries. Even though they failed to block this 
within the DMV, they succeeded in the first post-war General Union Congress on 5 July. The 
rhetorical strategy of the union leadership became apparent when ironically Legien, the Chairman 
of the Free Trade Unions under whose leadership the unions participated in the Burgfrieden, and 
Robert Dissmann, the political rival of Müller in the DMV, delivered the position of the left “in 
place of bureaucratic fossilized thinking” (as quoted in Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 132) within the union 
leadership. And yet, the newly formed General German Trade Union Federation (Allgemeiner 
Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, ADGB) ensured leadership continuity by electing Legien as its first 
Chairman.  
A watered-down version of the councils found its way into the new constitution that was 
being drafted in Weimar and was adopted on 11 August. Article 165 of the constitution stated 
workers and employees were to negotiate with the employers “on an equal footing” on the 
regulation of wages and work as well as “the whole economic development of the productive 
forces”. It called for the formation of Factory Workers’ Councils (Betriebsarbeiterräten) as well as 
District Workers’ Councils (Bezirksarbeiterräte) and the Imperial Workers’ Council 
(Reichsarbeiterrat). Workers’ representatives in the latter two organizations were to meet and 
cooperate with the employers’ representatives on economic issues in the Economic Councils at both 
district and national levels (i.e. Bezirkswirtschaftsräten and Reichswirtschaftsrat). Despite all its 
ambiguities, Article 165 was explicit in delimiting the general scope of negotiations that councils 
could engage in both in terms of substance (regulation of wages and working condition) and form 
(subordinating Factory Workers’ Councils and the Economic Councils in their tasks and formation 
to the Reich government). However, even this seemed too much in the government’s eyes and it 
tried to modify Article 165 to limit the power of workers’ committees.  
In the months that followed, the debate within the organized labour movement with regards 
to “workers’ control” continued along the lines of the relation between the unions and the councils. 
During the 14th congress of the DMV in October 1919, Dissmann presented the outline of his 
programme for the democratization of unions essentially through decentralization them. He 
proposed giving greater financial authority to the local unions, holding more frequent local general 
assemblies, and electing union officials on an annual basis. While giving lip service to factory 
councils, he did not want to use them as the basis for democratic restructuring of the union 
(Hoffrogge, 2015, pp. 133-5). Müller, on the other hand, pushed towards industrial unionism by 
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calling for merging trade unions to form “powerful industrial organization” as the “foundation of an 
organically developing council system” (as quoted in p. 133). Ultimately, none of these two 
proposals reached the two-third threshold needed to make structural changes to the union. 
While these struggles were unfolding within socialist unions especially in industrial cities, 
the council movement in the Ruhr region continued its shift towards syndicalism under the growing 
programmatic influence of the anarcho-syndicalist theorist, Rudolf Rocker. In December 1919, the 
FVdG merged with the anarchist union Free Workers’ Union (Freien Arbeiter Union, FAU) to form 
the anarcho-syndicalist Free Workers Union of Germany (Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands, 
FAUD).45 It unanimously adopted Rocker’s “Declaration of Principles of Syndicalism”. In the 
Principles, Rocker, who was deeply influenced by the anarcho-communist theorist Peter Kropotkin, 
argued that contrary to capitalism where the economic order was left entirely to the self-
determination of the capitalist class facilitated by the state, socialism was organized on the basis of 
self-determination of the associated producers. He characterized the state, regardless of the external 
form that it took, as the political expression of a class society. Therefore, he rejected all forms of 
political engagement through the channels of the state to implement transformative projects, 
including nationalization, political parties, and parliamentary activities, as a means to bring about 
socialism. On the question of unions, he considered them not as a temporary product of the 
capitalist society but as “the nucleus of the future socialist economic organization.” These 
revolutionary unions had to resist subordination to any central office and maintained complete self-
determination. These unions were to be linked federally within each sector, and then linked in a 
supra level across professions to form the Federation of Industrial Associations. The organization of 
the sphere of consumption was left to the Federation of Workers’ Exchanges.46 Factory councils 
appeared as the entities through which factories and workshops were to be organized. The 
transformative vision of anarcho-syndicalists in the Principles differed from that of “pure 
councilists” in its strictly economic reorganization of society.  
Amidst the growing centralization of the KPD, the party published its view on trade unions 
on 23 October. While identifying trade unions in their present forms as “a tool of the bourgeoisie 
and the counter-revolution” (as quoted in Fowkes, 2014, p. 89), it called for communists to continue 
agitating within those organizations to isolate the union bureaucracy from the masses rather than 
resigning from the union. The declaration did not mention the potential role of the councils in the 
struggle against union bureaucracy. Furthermore, Levi put out a declaration of communist 
principles in October. While emphasizing the primacy of political struggle led by the party over “an 
 
45 In its congress in December 1919, the FAUD reported 111,675 members (Jenko, 2007, p. 18). 
46 The relation between factory councils and “revolutionary unions” is not entirely clear in the Principles. 
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economic revolution”, he called on communists to “join together to form factions within these 
workers’ councils and endeavor by using appropriate slogans to raise them to the height of their 
revolutionary mission and to win the leadership of the workers’ councils and the masses of 
workers” (Levi, 2014, p. 86). Strict rejection of federalist ideas, emphasis on the primacy of the 
party, and the openness to potentially engage in parliamentary struggle increasingly alienated the 
left communists within the KPD among whom there were leading council theorists such as Anton 
Pannekoek. This led to their split in April 1920 to form the anti-parliamentary Communist Workers’ 
Party of Germany (Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands, KAPD).  
The USPD, with an eye on the prospect of joining the Third International, released its action 
programme in December 1919 (see Fowkes, 2014, pp. 339-42). In its vision of achieving proletarian 
struggle for the conquest of political power, it identified the need for an independent social 
democratic party committed to revolutionary socialism, trade unions to be transformed into fighting 
organizations for the revolution, and “revolutionary Council System, through which joins the 
workers together for the purpose of revolutionary action” (p. 340). It committed to replacing the 
capitalist state with a system of political workers’ councils to institute the self-determination of the 
working people. On the specific points of action, it did not move significantly from its previous 
practical position. Aside from its revolutionary rhetoric with consistent references to workers’ 
councils, most of which had been dismantled in various ways at that point in time, it did not include 
any guidelines on the party’s orientation towards factory councils.  
The legislation on factory councils was debated towards the end of 1919 and became the 
Factory Council Law on 4 February 1920. This came about despite strong opposition from the 
USPD and the KPD demanding “a full right of control over the running of the factories” (p. 66), and 
bloody protests on the streets. This time, however, the blue- and white-collar workers had to be 
represented by separate councils (see Article 6 of the law). Excluding the essential task of 
collaborating with the employers on wages and working conditions, it limited the role of the factory 
councils “to give advice to the factory management; to cooperate in the introduction of new 
methods of work; to negotiate with the employer on labour regulations, within the framework of 
existing wage contracts; to take note of complaints by the Workers’ Council and to work towards 
dealing with them in joint negotiations with the employer” (Fowkes, 2014, p. 67). They were also 
entitled to receive quarterly reports by the employers regarding the situation and progress of the 
firm. Additionally, there was a clause regarding profit sharing for firms with more than 300 
employees (see Article 71 and Article 72 of the law, p. 68). 
Amidst the dwindling prospect of any breakthrough for the council movement, a coup was 
staged by the right-wing forces on 13 March 1920 in Berlin. What became known as Kapp Putsch 
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was met by an unprecedented wave of general strikes across the country in the following days that 
brought the counter-revolutionary forces to their knees. Although this event brought the left-wing 
opposition forces to act together in parallel against the right-wing assault on the revolution, it could 
not result in an alliance between the SPD-ADGB and the KPD-USPD, particularly in Berlin. In 
Ruhr, where communists and syndicalists came together to form a Red Army to fight the 
reactionary forces,47 the fundamental schism reappeared after the coup was defeated. As significant 
as the March events were for the history of the German working-class and socialist movements, it 
did not have much impact on the trajectory of the council movement. This was due not only to the 
misalliance between the key organizing forces behind the movement and their programmatic 
ambiguities towards the movement in its present form but also to the legislative hurdles against the 
possibility of the revival of the movement. In response to the renewed calls for immediate 
socialization, the government convened the second Socialization Commission in March 1920. 
However, it was staffed mostly with personnel from business associations, trade unions, and 
political parties.48 Until its dissolution in 1923, none of its reports and proposals had any political 
impact (Fermbach, 2019, pp. 10-11). Even the result of the Reich election in June 1920 which saw a 
significant increase in the vote share of the USPD (17.6 per cent, 83 seats), largely in exchange for 
the decline of the SPD (21.9 per cent, 103 seats), could not help the council movement to recover.  
The final nail in the coffin of the council movement in Germany came at the end of the 
national conference of German factory councils on 5-7 October 1920. Despite the best efforts of 
council activists such as Müller to carve out some level of independence in the relationship between 
trade unions and councils, the delegates voted to subordinate the councils to the unions and to 
transfer all decisions of significance to the ADGB’s executive board (Hoffrogge, 2015, pp. 142-3).  
To conclude, the council movement in the third period experienced a decisive shift towards 
the struggle for “workers’ control” within the “economic” sphere. This brought the trade unions 
face-to-face with the movement since, in both substance and form, it challenged their authority over 
industrial relations. The unions then sought to contain the movement through rhetorical and 
legislative means. The DMV led the movement for independent factory councils within the socialist 
unions. Despite their best efforts to exert a leftward push within the ADGB and to achieve 
considerable success in replacing the old union functionaries with council activists in some of the 
key industrial cities, they could not break through the large and complex machinery of the union 
bureaucracy. It was in this period that the anarcho-syndicalist FAUD became a dominant force in 
the Ruhr region.  
 
47 The members of the FAUD are believed to have formed 44.9 percent of the Ruhr Red Army (Jenko, 2007, p. 21). 
48 See Frambach (2019, p.10f) for the list of the members of the second Socialization Commission. 
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The KPD could not influence the trajectory of the movement significantly. This was because 
of its limited organizational capacity and its structural and ideological restructuring that made it 
difficult to work with any other forces within and outside the socialist camp (perhaps with an 
exception of the USPD only in extraordinary circumstances such as during Kapp Putsch). However, 
the ideological position of the KPD towards what it perceived to be syndicalist trends, as well as its 
openness to parliamentary struggle alienated the left communists, some of the leading members of 
which were council theorists, leading to the formation of the KAPD. Council movement was 
suffering from internal fragmentation which led to a missed opportunity amidst massive 
mobilization in the wake of Kapp Putsch. In the meanwhile, the movement was redirected 
legislatively. This severely limited the scope of the activities of the councils and ultimately 
subordinated them to the union executive board.  
The programmatic efforts in this period were carried out both inside and outside the trade 
union movement. These articulations were being formulated on the background of careful and 
multifaceted strategies of the ADGB leadership as well as the government more broadly, including 
rhetorical and legislative interventions, to contain the movement from within and isolate the 
movement from without. Radical elements within the DMV and DHV put forward different views 
along “workers’ control” dimensions on the basis of councils that spanned from industrial unionism 
(e.g. Müller) to broad and active co-determination (e.g. Leipart). Outside the formal bounds of the 
trade union movements, the FAUD put forward an anarcho-syndicalist view towards revolutionary 
unionism and strict rejection of all forms of political engagement with the state. Furthermore, the 
USPD continued to express commitment to the council ideas. However, it failed to present a 
concrete strategy to build on the movement in its present form of “factory councils” rather than its 
previous form of “workers’ council” that was no longer in sight. Ultimately, these programmatic 
efforts could not compete with the legislative power of the state and the organizational power of the 
ADGB.  
Given the high degree of organizational fragmentation within the movement and the 
geographic and sectoral confinement of the movement in this period, the horizon of possible 
alliance was quite limited. This became evident in the failure of the movement to muster any 
significant and durable alliances that could expand its social base and influence the trajectory of the 
movement.  
Concluding Remarks  
 Radical democratic struggles that proliferated in Germany at the end of the war found its 
institutional form in the councils. Conditioned by the specific form of war mobilization, the 
breakdown of the state apparatus, the formation of a formal corporatist alliance between capital and 
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labour after the war, all came together to locate the primary locus of “council democratic” 
movement along the “citizens’ control” dimension in the first period. This went beyond democratic 
challenges within the state apparatus and extended to the self-governing networks of workers’ and 
soldiers’ councils that facilitated the distribution of food and demobilization of soldiers in the first 
period. However, without revolutionary changes to the structure of the state, such self-governing 
bodies were bound to be transitory.  
 The SPD and the Free Trade Unions were deeply invested in facilitating their inclusion in 
the political and economic structures of Germany. While this had already begun before the war, 
their maturation accelerated in the course of the war, making the social democratic forces 
indispensable not only to the conduct of the war but to the post-war transition. Their organizational 
capacity, relative internal cohesion, and structural position in the emerging state and new class 
alliances in the revolutionary context at the end of the war put the SPD and the Free Trade Unions 
in a far superior position than any other organizations to direct the course of the revolution. Having 
been thrown at the centre of a revolution it did not want, the SPD leadership could not possibly 
afford not to engage actively with the “council democratic” movement. The leadership of the Free 
Trade Unions, in contrast, could temporarily defer open conflict with the movement at least until 
the third period. Nevertheless, even their seemingly passive support for the SPD’s policies 
contributed significantly to the ability of the party to influence the trajectory of the movement. 
Moreover, the substantial concessions that they drew from the ZAG empowered the leadership of 
the Free Trade Unions to maintain control of its massive membership.  
 On the left of the SPD, the USPD was an organization of ideologically diverse tendencies 
that had united together in 1917 to coordinate the struggles of various anti-war forces through a 
political party. This main adhesive element that had brought these forces together was no longer 
available after the war. Therefore, the USPD suffered from a lack of internal cohesion. The USPD 
also lacked sufficient organizational capacity to exert its influence in the vast majority of the 
country. Furthermore, its position within the emerging state dwindled rapidly, especially after its 
electoral results in ad its refusal to participate in the Central Council in the second period. This 
weakened the party to facilitate the movement through its structural position within the state. 
However, the party did have an affiliated critical mass, most notably the Obleute, among industrial 
working class in Berlin. The influence of the Spartacus League on the trajectory of the movement 
remained marginal and confined to Berlin. However, given the popularity of some of its leading 
figures and uncompromising militancy at the height of the revolution in the first period, it perhaps 
had some impacts on the movement by exerting leftward pressure on the USPD. After its 
transformation into the KPD in the second period, it began to expand its organizational capacity, 
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internal cohesion, and social base. However, these contextually conditioned and strategically 
selective factors, could not catch up with the processive pace of the movement’s trajectory to give 
the KPD a determining role in the evolution of the movement.  
  The failure of the movement to realize its radical democratic demands in the first period 
weakened the movement quantitatively as many councils dissipated and radicalized various 
tendencies within it. In the second period, this led to a bifurcation of the movement that sought to 
revive the movement along radical articulation of “citizens’ control” and “workers’ control”. This 
development broadened the spectrum of organizing forces engaged within the movement and 
included syndicalist and anarchist forces particularly in the Ruhr region and Central Germany.  
Further consolidation of political power after the suppression and containment of the 
movement in the second period pushed the locus of the struggle further along the “workers’ 
control” dimension. This manifested itself not only in further and radical socialization, which 
involved the FAUD, but also in struggle towards democratization of industrial relations on the basis 
of councils. It was at this juncture that the ADGB leadership got involved more directly in the 
development of the movement. The leadership of the trade unions was successful in deflecting these 
internal challenges through organizational, rhetorical, and legislative strategies. The external 
challenges could not muster enough force, due to their relatively limited organizational capacities, 
narrow social base, and strictly external relation with the state,49 to match the hegemony of the 
socialist trade unions over the movement.  
 Regarding programmatic efforts, the leadership of the SPD and the Free Trade Unions 
firmly believed that a liberal democratic state (indeed even a constitutional monarchic state for that 
matter) and corporatist industrial relations would offer the best possible option for the German 
working class (not to mention their own positions within it). Having realized the indispensable role 
of councils as the primary organizational form of the struggle of democratization after the war, they 
cast councils as transitory institutions to absorb the initial shock of the state breakdown and to take 
on some basic social functions such as food distributions and army demobilization.  
For the SPD, “citizens’ control” was a process strictly mediated between individual citizens 
and the state, by party representatives and state functionaries. The SPD leadership could not even 
accept a mild form of indirect supervision of the councils over the conduct of the state at different 
levels, seeing it as disruptive interference. Hence, they orient all their strategic actions towards 
electing a National Assembly as soon as possible. Similarly, “workers’ control” was understood as a 
strictly mediated process by the elected union representatives. In this sense, the union leadership 
 
49 The KPD’s openness towards parliamentary activities makes it an exception in this regard. 
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could swallow the presence of workers’ councils in the relations of production as long as they were 
strictly subordinated to the trade unions and could help the unions to expand their scope of 
influence, particularly within the large enterprises. The socialization demands were acceptable in a 
very limited scope and slow pace, and only insofar as they could be articulated within the general 
framework of the ZAG agreement. 
The USPD encapsulated an incompatible array of programmatic orientations towards the 
councils. These ranged from positions that were very similar to those of the SPD on key issues such 
as the short transitory nature of the councils and the need for the speedy convocation of the National 
Assembly, to a mixed or parallel system that reserved some more permanent role for the councils in 
the post-war state and society and postponement of the election to the National Assembly, to a total 
rejection of liberal representative democracy in favour of a council system. Therefore, there were 
fundamentally competing articulations of “citizens’ control” within the USPD ranging from liberal 
democratic to council communist understanding. This is in contrast to the relatively coherent 
programmatic vision of the Spartacus League which called for “all power to the councils” in both 
the economic and political spheres.  
The horizon of the USPD’s programmatic efforts on “citizens’ control” narrowed 
substantially after the decision of the First Congress and then the election of the National Assembly. 
However, given the decentralized character of the USPD, various elements within the party could 
still participate in programmatic efforts within the movement along its trajectory in the second and 
the third period. With regards to the “workers’ control” dimension, the USPD first sought to 
influence the debate both through the formal institutions (e.g. Socialization Commission) and 
outside those institutions (e.g. General Miners Union). In any case, the USPD’s programmatic 
vision for councils revolved around various degrees of supervision by the councils over the conduct 
of the state institutions or employers. A notable exception to this is the affiliated “pure councilists” 
that gathered around Arbeiter-Rat. They developed a scheme that assumed a far greater role for the 
councils beyond supervision.  
 As the movement became increasingly radicalized in the second period along its both 
dimensions, the programmatic efforts of the syndicalist and anarchist forces impacted the 
movement more significantly. However, given the contextual as well as ideological factors 
concerning those efforts, these forces often failed to transcend any given dimension of “council 
democracy” in their analysis. In fact, as the prospect of the movement faded, their position 
radicalized further.  
A significant part of the programmatic efforts in the third period focused on the 
democratization of unions either by transforming them from within or remodelling them from 
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outside (e.g. on the basis of industrial unionism or revolutionary unionism). To contain the 
movement, trade union leadership had to orient itself strategically to absorb the majority of workers 
through programmatic readjustments and isolate the radical factions through legislative 
manoeuvring. 
Regarding the alliance patterns, the SPD, which had entered into the provisional government 
with the USPD, generally showed more eagerness to work with non-socialist forces to its right than 
others to its left. Such alliances with liberal or conservative forces were more appropriate for 
maintaining the fundamental shift of class alignment that had begun towards the end of the war, and 
ensure its relative hegemony over the working-class movement in the post-war era. The USPD, 
which itself was a broad coalition of diverse socialist tendencies, found it hard to form an effective 
alliance with other forces. The SPD had already blockaded the forces to its right and was 
uninterested in sharing power to a splinter party which not long ago it had expelled. The KPD was 
the former Spartacus League which formed the communist party precisely in response to the 
inability of the USPD to effectively lead the revolution. The large improbability of such alliances 
was a reminiscence of the rapid split in the former SPD, first creating the USPD and then the KPD 
in a span of 2 years. Although there were short-term tactical alliances between the 
syndicalist/anarchist and USPD during the course of the movement in different regions, their 
ideological positions were divergent enough that could not sustain the alliance. With regards to the 
KPD, its continued organizational centralization and hardening ideological anti-
syndicalism/anarchism hindered effective alliances with the syndicalist and anarchist forces.  
Regarding the possibility of alliance with broader social classes, the socialist forces were 
generally inactive in not only expanding their organizational reach within other social classes, 
particularly the peasants, but also developing programmatic details to bring non-working-class 
subalterns into the hegemonic project of the movement. The only notable exception took place in 
Bavaria, between the USPD and the BBB. However, even that was largely on the basis of personal 
connection between the leaders of the two parties rather than the strategical alignment of the two 
organizational forces. Therefore, the movement did not expand much beyond the working class and 
some segments of the enlightened intellectual sector. The relatively rapid demobilization of the 
soldiers, many of whom were of peasant origins in rural Germany, quickly depleted the class 
character of the movement. Even while soldiers’ councils were active within the movement, they 
were under strong dominance of the SPD which had no desire in leading the “council democratic” 
movement towards success.  
 It was through such complex processes that the trajectory of the movement was inscribed. 
They involved a multiplicity of organizing forces whose strategic-relational struggles for hegemony 
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within the movement, always already connected with their existing projects within the society and 
in relation to the state, led to conjunctural transformation of the movement and in turn the 
transformation of their own characteristics. The evolving balance of organizing forces within the 
movement, with their programmatic efforts concerning the movement, and their alliance patterns in 
relation to other forces, all in relation to the developing state and consolidating class relations 
eventually pacified the movement in both of its constitutive dimensions. Therefore, “council 





The Trajectory of the “Council Democratic” Movement in Italy (1919-1920) 
 
Introduction  
 Chapter 3 offered an analysis of the processes that laid the groundwork for the emergence of 
the “council democratic” movement during the biennio rosso. While preconditioned by the material 
condensation of pre-war struggles that shaped the relations of class forces and the state, these 
processes were forged by the ways through which the war mobilization was carried out in Italy.  
The rapid dismantling of the military structure of the state back to formally parliamentary 
system after the war demanded a swift reorientation of the political organizations of social classes 
to the new post-war reality. Amid the severe economic and political pressures and the impossibility 
of a return to the pre-war trasformismo, the Italian state fell into a profound crisis. Soon, the 
contradictions and capacities created during the war caught up with the post-war realities and 
opened up space for radical movements to emerge. The formation of “council democratic” 
movement in Italy began precisely from the radicalization of the internal commissions whose 
institutional genesis went back to the war time. However, due to the changing relations of forces 
both within and outside the labour movement and the state, the trajectory of “council democratic” 
movement in Italy moved increasingly towards its syndicalist axis and manifested itself in factory 
occupations.  
The chapter analyzes the trajectory of the “council democratic” movement during the 
biennio rosso in relational terms, using organizational links, programmatic efforts, and alliance 
patterns as its primary analytic framework. The evolution of the movement is contextualized within 
the broader yet relevant changes that the state and society underwent during the biennio rosso. The 
discussion is divided into three periods. The first period begins in June 1919 when the burgeoning 
militancy of factory workers in Turin found the epicentre of its programmatic efforts among a small 
group of socialists who gathered around a weekly newspaper, l’ordine nuovo. This period ends just 
before the first post-war general election for the Chamber of Deputies in mid-November 1919. 
During this period, the movement evolved primarily along the “workers’ control” dimension as the 
question of “citizens’ control” was posited to the liberal-parliamentary channels. The second period 
begins from the election on 15 November 1919 to August 1920, before the wave of factory 
occupation in the following months. During this period, the balance of organizing forces within the 
movement shifts decisively toward the syndicalist forces. As a result, the programmatic articulation 
of the movement shift towards syndicalism. The third period examines the events during the late 
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August to September 1920 when a wave of factory and land occupations swept across the country. 
Even though the movement carried forward under an implicitly syndicalist articulation of “workers’ 
control”, the formal leadership of the CGL and the PSI directed the structural resolution of the 
movement into a corporatist model within a capitalist framework. The concluding section of the 
chapter highlights the factors that significantly impacted the particular trajectory of the “council 
democratic” movement in Italy.  
The Trajectory of “Council Democratic” Movement of the Italian Case 
First Period (21 June 1919 – 14 November 1919) 
Before delving into the discussion of this period, it is worth recounting briefly the socio-
political context of Italy between the end of the war and the beginning of this period. The peace 
process that commenced in January 1919 profoundly affected the relations of forces within the state 
and society. The Italian delegates went to Paris with the hope to get what was outlined under the 
secret London Agreement of 1915 as well as Fiume. While President Woodrow Wilson was 
prepared to give Southern Tyrol and Brenner to Italy, he was inflexible with regards to Italy’s other 
demands, particularly on the question of Fiume.1 After months of diplomatic struggle, the Italian 
delegation failed to get the widely expected concessions. This was far from just a diplomatic failure. 
It discredited the conservative faction within the Liberal Union (unione liberale; UL) and 
strengthened the ideological position of both the interventionist and the anti-interventionist forces 
outside the liberal bloc. Among the former, there were the anarcho-syndicalist Italian Union of 
Labour (unione Italiana del lavoro; UIL) and the proto-fascist forces which labelled the failure as a 
“mutilated victory” (vittoria mutilata);2 among the latter, there were the PSI and the USI which 
found further proof of their anti-war position. It also strained Italy’s relationship especially with the 
Americans, making it more difficult to obtain the much-needed credit for the post-war economic 
recovery.  
The loss of confidence in the ability of the government to lead the country through the 
difficult post-war transition led to the fall of Prime Minister Orlando on 23 June 1919. However, 
there was no viable political force that could take the place of the liberal bloc. Among the two 
parties with the largest popular support, the PSI had already voted against taking office on its 
January 1919 session and the Italian People’s Party (Partito Popolare Italiano; PPI), founded only 
on January 1919, had no seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Amidst a crumbling hegemony of the 
 
1 While citing the principle of national self-determination from his Fourteen Points for his position on Fiume, he was 
concerned that such concession might tilt the emerging Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (what alter became 
Yugoslavia) towards the Russian influence. 
2 The term was probably inspired by Gabriele D’Annunzio’s poem, published in corriere della Sera on the anniversary 
of Caporetto on 24 October 1918, wrote: “our victory will not be mutilated” (vittoria nostra, non sarai mutilata).  
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UL, Francesco Saverio Nitti, the Minister of Finance in the Orlando government, became the new 
Prime Minister on 24 June.  
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the employers’ organizations in the industrial triangle 
(e.g. the LIT) came to the realization that the processes pioneered as a part of war mobilization had 
set in motion a series of largely irreversible, albeit incomplete, changes in labour relations. Initially, 
they tried to get ahead of the curve by bringing this process to completion under their terms to meet 
their interests. As explained in the previous chapter, the corporatist structure that had been 
conceived during the second period of war mobilization was halted as the militarized state sought to 
bypass the workers’ unions and engage directly with the internal commissions. The employers had 
always seen the internal commissions and the militarization of the factory as a direct challenge to 
their managerial authority. With the termination of the latter at the end of the war, the solution they 
sought to secure their managerial authority was to initiate a process of reconciliation with the large 
workers’ unions by giving serious concessions in return for the unions to accept the absolute 
managerial authority and the intensification of Taylorism while maintaining control of their 
members (Adler, 1995, pp. 196-8; on Fiat’s position, see Castronovo, 2005, pp. 90-2). On the other 
hand, the workers’ union leadership saw this as an opportunity to assert its position in the post-war 
labour relations while winning long-fought reforms from the employers.  
The most significant instance of such a conciliatory move in the immediate aftermath of the 
war was the Fiat Agreement, signed between the FIOM and the Fiat employers. It came to effect on 
18 March 1919 after the CGL launched its 8-hour day campaign in January. They conceded on the 
long-standing demands of the union for 8-hour day and 48-hour week, and granted some increases 
in hourly wages and piece-rates (Mazzacurati, 2017, pp. 68-9). However, the industrialists used this 
to limit the ability of the workers to engage in militant action by banning unofficial “economic” 
strikes, and to increase the disciplinary power of management.3 This was done by creating a 
complex arbitration process that made a legal strike incredibly difficult.4  
Such concessions in exchange for gaining labour discipline and a possible increase in labour 
productivity would make economic sense for large firms, such as Fiat, which were hit to a lesser 
degree by the massive economic downturn after the war due to the continued demand for certain 
commodities such as cars. It also fitted well with the ideological commitment of large industrialists 
 
3 The management was granted the power to fine or dismiss workers for reasons such as leaving their posts without 
justification, working slowly or carelessly, subordination, etc. It also forced the internal commissions to meet outside 
the working hours and prohibited them from freely circulating among the rank-and-file (see Gluckstein, 1985, pp. 179-
80). 
4 The regulative provisions within the Agreement for dispute and legal strike demanded that the dispute is first brought 
up between the internal commission and the directorates; if the agreement is not reached, then the matter is escalated to 
the Industrial Committee and the Confederation of Industry; only if the dispute cannot be settled at the national level 
then workers are allowed to launch a legal strike (see Maione, 1975, p. 10). 
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towards productivism (Sarti, 1967). The General Confederation of Italian Industry (Confederazione 
generale dell’industria italiana; Confindustria), established in February of 1919,5 was using the 
agreement ideologically as a symbol of their conciliatory attitude towards the organized labour in 
exchange for the union’s sense of responsibility and commitment to post-war economic recovery. 
However, the precedence that it set for other sectors was quite concerning especially for smaller 
companies and intransigent employers. This began to create a schism between fractions of capital. 
However, since the small companies did not have an organized force for independent action, they 
followed the direction, at least temporarily, determined by the large capitalist interests.  
In the meanwhile, although the union leadership hailed the Agreement as a great 
achievement, it sparked dissatisfactions among the rank-and-file for its restriction on the operation 
of internal commissions, their rights to strike, and other demands on working condition (see 
Mazzacurati, 2017, pp. 96-7 for workers’ letters published by the Turin section of Avanti!; see also 
Levy, 2000, p.134). Therefore, the agreement brought the top echelons of the employers’ 
organization and the union together while radicalizing the lower echelons of both.6 The failure to 
adequately implement and generalize the agreement in different industries, strengthened the 
intransigent fractions within both the employers and labour organizations.  
 The militant struggles of workers during the war, the continued economic pressure after the 
war, and the possibility of gaining serious concessions from the employers further radicalized the 
rank-and-file beyond the parameters of the new corporatist arrangement. Between 14-17 March 
1919, around 2,000 workers occupied the Franchi-Gregorini steelworks in Dalmine and continued 
the production, after the employers dismissed their demands for eight-hour day, a minimum wage, 
and Saturdays off. In addition to these demands, the workers insisted on the recognition of their 
council and the right to be consulted before the implementation of any technological changes to the 
production process. In other words, they saw the core reformist measure as inseparable from the 
right to maintain control over the production process. What was unique about this act of militancy 
was its use of factory occupation not to stop but to continue the production process. It was a direct 
violation of the principle of private ownership of the means of production and a subversion of the 
 
5 At the time of its official inauguration on 9-10 April 1919, the membership of Confindustria included 55 associations 
with nearly 6,000 firms. This increased to 144 association by 1922. Although the confederation had a national intent 
and outlook with 14 of the 17 regions having some representation by 1922, the majority of its members were still 
located in the North (Sarti, 1967, pp. 22-4, 40-1). 
6 This became evident within the rank-and-file not only in their open letter critical of the agreement which was 
published in Avanti! on 15 March and the subsequent response of the union leadership 12 days later defending the 
Agreement as the best possible option, but also in the collapse of the industrial truce after less than a month in Fiat 
when the workers launched action to increase piece-rate. On the other side, many employers refused to go along with 
the agreement.  
161 
 
notion of workers as wager-earners within the capitalist relations of production. Instead, it treated 
the means of production as “associative property” within which workers operate as “producers”. 
The socialist forces failed to understand the significance of this new type of rank-and-file 
militancy and absorb it in its programme of struggle for a socialist transformation. This fell in the 
hands of revolutionary syndicalist forces such as the UIL and Mussolini. Writing in Il Popolo 
d’Italia on 19 March after 1,500 soldiers forced workers out (Bertrand, 1982, p. 388), Mussolini 
highlighted the distinct nature of this action while giving it a distinctly nationalist twist. He saw it 
as the “proof of the proletariat’s ability to directly manage the factory” compared to the “traditional 
method of strike” that was “harmful to class and nation alike”. He argued that “the formation of the 
workers’ council, which for three days has managed the direction of the factory by assuring its 
functioning ... represents an honest and painstaking effort and a worthy ambition to supersede the 
self-proclaimed bourgeois class in the control of production” (as quoted in Rutigliano, 2002, pp. 
272-3; with some modifications). This was an indication that the emerging radicalizations of 
workers were open spaces in which various forces could participate in to articulate it in particular 
ways. 
Amid growing rank-and-file dissatisfaction, the month of May saw a huge rise in food prices 
and a severe shortage of certain consumer goods, which led to food riots in mid-June and July. This 
wave started from the syndicalist strongholds in Liguria into the rest of the North and Emilia 
(Williams, 1975, p. 71). The situation put the labour organizations under increasing pressure to 
evaluate their stance on the militancy of the population in the aftermath of the war. This led to a rift 
within the labour movement between the CGL and the Chamber of Labour. The CGL used this 
opportunity to broaden its role within the corporatist structure beyond industrial relations by helping 
to create joint commissions with the representatives of the government and labour to address the 
food shortages. In contrast, the Chamber of Labour rejected that path and began organizing local 
autonomous efforts to address the food crisis (see Maione, 1975, pp. 31-4).  
The growing dissatisfaction of the rank-and-file with the outcome of the Fiat Agreement and 
the worsening food crisis inspired workers to assert their power through the shop-floor organization 
of internal commissions. However, given the institutional constraints imposed on the internal 
commissions by the Fiat Agreement, the only way to revive them was to radically transform them. 
This is where the role of the newly established weekly newspaper, l’ordine nuovo,7 launched on 1 
May 1919, to construct the theoretico-ideological background for this emerging institutional order 
 
7 Despite its relatively small circulation number around 6,000 copies, the newspaper was hugely influential in Turin. It 
was also received quite positively by the Turinese anarchists and wrote a number of contributions in the newspaper 
(Levy, 2000, pp. 141-4).  
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became important (Mazzacurati, 2017, p. 45). The group included figures such as Antonio Gramsci, 
Angelo Tasca, Palmiro Togliatti, and Umberto Terracini.8 
Gramsci wrote an article entitled “Workers’ Democracy” (21 June 1919) which can be 
considered the first step towards the theoretical articulation of the council movement. In this 
landmark article, Gramsci (1977) singles out the internal commissions as the “organs of workers’ 
democracy” and the embryonic form of the socialist state, while acknowledging the need to 
supersede their current limitations. This was to be done through “election of vast assemblies of 
delegates” (p. 66) with the aim to incorporate the representatives of all categories of workers in the 
factory. He argued that creating a “genuine workers’ democracy” required articulation of already 
existing institutions of potential proletariat power (i.e. the internal commissions) into a coordinated 
and cohesive whole. This articulated whole should be capable of giving “disorderly and chaotic 
energies” “a permanent form and discipline” (p. 66) in order to replace the “bourgeois state”. In 
drawing a qualitative continuity from the proletarian power at the workshop level to the state level, 
Gramsci underscored the importance of including peasants into the transformative programme 
through the formation of workers’ and peasants’ councils.  
Shortly after, l’ordine nuovo launched a campaign for the formation of factory councils and 
continued its theoretical elaboration on the topic. In an article on 26 June, Gramsci identified a 
fundamental contradiction in post-war Italy that, in his eyes, had begun with the installation of the 
Nitti government. On the one hand, the post-war era had ushered the return of economic and 
political freedom; and yet, the former would lead to mass starvation and the latter to popular power 
towards the overthrow of the government. He saw the resolution of this contradiction in the ability 
of the proletariat to take over this mission “by eliminating class struggle and private property within 
the national sphere” (p. 72). In a later article on 12 July, l’ordine nuovo elaborated on the nature of 
the conquest of the state. It rejected both the syndicalist/anarchist path for its dismissal of the fight 
against the state and parliamentary socialists for believing that the socialist state can be embodied in 
the institutions of the capitalist state. Instead, it defined the notion of the conquest of the state in 
“replacement of the democratic-parliamentary state by a new type of state, one that is generated by 
the associative experience of the proletarian class” (1977, p. 76).  
Therefore, the solution to the joint crisis of the post-war era had to be sought in the ability of 
working class to take power through the generalization of a system that connected “various 
workshops of a factory together to form a basic economic unit”. These were to further link up with 
the agricultural industry in a “horizontal and vertical planning” to “construct the harmonious edifice 
 
8 On Gramsci’s knowledge of the experiences of the Russian soviets and the British Shop Stewards movement, see 
Levy (2000, pp. 135-7). 
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of the national and international economy, liberated from the obstructive and parasitical tyranny of 
the private property-owners” (p. 77). In these articles, he was rethinking the possibility of “council 
democracy” in the particular context of post-war Italy in which the crisis of the state was deep but 
not (yet) terminal, therefore leaving less room for radical struggles to project themselves 
immediately within the state. 
Gramsci was also elected to the executive board of the Turin section of the PSI which 
provided the movement with a direct link to the party. Gramsci began presenting the new direction 
to the Turin branch of the PSI from 23 June and steering it towards adopting a more radical and 
independent stance (see Clark, 1977, pp. 79-80). The programme of l’ordine nuovo towards the 
formation of factory councils did not at first raise an alarm for the CGL since they could be seen as 
decentralization of the union operations towards a more effective, albeit potentially more militant 
actions.  
 From 23 August, workers in different branches of Fiat began to re-elect members of the old 
internal commissions, charged with the task of appointing workshop commissars (shop stewards) at 
all departments. As representatives of their units on the factory councils, the commissars were to 
perform the basic tasks of the old internal commissions that included maintain discipline in the 
event of a strike, and observe the daily managerial operation (Clark, 1977, pp. 56-7). On the same 
day, l’ordine nuovo published an article to clarify the distinct role of factory councils in relation to 
“soviets”. It argued that since “soviets” as such did not exist in Italy as it did in the context of 
revolutionary Russia, the programmatic slogan of “all power to the soviet” was not only nonsensical 
for the Italian case but can damaging to the prospect of a revolutionary transformation as it would 
diffuse the organizing efforts away from the existing loci of proletarian power.  
The attitude of the socialist party and the union towards these emerging institutions began to 
change around the same time. By this time, the PSI had launched its election campaign and had to 
clarify its ideological stance towards the developments in Turin in relation to its revolutionary 
rhetoric. Also, once the question of giving voting rights to non-union members in the factory 
council elections became central and even put into practice in some branches at the end of August 
(e.g. Brevetti-Fiat plant and, soon after, fifteen other metalworking factories),9 the union leadership 
felt that it could no longer maintain control over the evolution of these institutions. This became 
ever more pressing as the councils spread rapidly throughout Turin in September 1919.10  
 
9 See Levy (2000, p.147). 
10 The month of September saw the election of 32 commissars representing 11 sections which later in October spread to 
each of Fiat’s 42 divisions (Davidson, 1975, p. 35) 
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l’ordine nuovo continued to provide the programmatic outline of the movement in clearer 
terms; or in its own words, “to give concrete expression to an aspiration” (Gramsci, 1997, p. 94). In 
an article on 13 September, it argued that the workers’ organization that exercised communist social 
power could be nothing other than “a system of councils”, developed through the creation of central 
organs “for every group of workshops, every group of factories, every city and every region, right 
up to a supreme national workers’ council” (p. 97). On the same day, Amadeo Bordiga, the leader 
of the abstentionist wing of the PSI, published an article in the journal Il Soviet to clarify the 
position of the abstentionist wing with regards to the question of factory councils. Rejecting the 
theoretical position of l’ordine nuovo on the essence and strategic significance of factory councils, 
he argued for the primacy of soviet as the true “political representation of the working class with 
deputies representing local constituencies” (Bordiga, 2020, p. 127). He did not see factory councils 
as organs of revolutionary transition as well as the basic structure of the communist society after the 
revolution. He preserved that dual character for the soviets. In the “early stages” of the transition, 
the political nature of soviets would dominate while their economic and constructive role would 
dominate their nature after the bourgeoisie is largely expropriated (p. 127). In another article in Il 
Soviet on 21 September, he further limited the role of the soviets as means of revolutionary 
transition to the conscious operation of the communist party outside the electoral system of 
bourgeois democracy (p. 131). He also elaborated on the Council of the Economy as the organ 
“responsible for the technical implementation of the socialization measures decreed by the political 
assembly” (p. 129). Trade federations and local economic councils (including factory councils) fell 
under this organ. He declared his position in favour of “a system of representation that is clearly 
divided into two divisions: economic and political” (p. 130). Therefore, his difference with the 
position of l’ordine nuovo group was not simply with regards to a primarily territorial as opposed to 
a sectoral basis of proletarian power. His scheme reinstated the separation between the “economic” 
and the “political” sphere of social life in the structure of communist representation. This is 
precisely what the l’ordine nuovo was trying to overcome. 
As these developments were taking place in Turin, a profoundly consequential event took 
place in the Adriatic. On 12 September, a group of war veterans and mutinous soldiers, led by 
D’Annunzio, occupied Fiume. The PSI, following its anti-interventionist position, categorically 
distanced itself from the action but saw it as yet another sign that the Italian bourgeoisie was 
standing on its last leg. Therefore, it was left to forces other than socialists to articulate this 
mutinous act. Among these forces, there was the UIL whose General Secretary, Alceste De Ambris, 
saw the occupation as a possible path towards the Italian Revolution (Bertrand, 1982, p. 388). The 
takeover of Fiume initiated a process of consolidation of nationalist anti-parliamentary forces, such 
as the UIL, that sought to establish “a form of representation which wanted to bring to the forth the 
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real producers of national wealth, the real source of national strength” (Tasca, 1938, p. 43). The 
government understood the gravity of this mutiny in its ability to control its armed forces and 
effectiveness in internal affairs; it inspired the formation of a parallel military wing, “Royal Army” 
(Gooch, 2014, p. 315-17; Mondini, 2006, p. 475).  
Amidst these developments, the PSI held its congress in Bologna on 5-8 October 1919 to 
examine its programmatic orientation in the post-war era and its policy towards the upcoming 
parliamentary election. The internal composition of the Congress was essentially divided into three 
groups: the Maximalists (including Giacinto Menotti Serrati, Nicola Bombacci, Egidio Gennari, and 
Costantino Lazzari); the reformists (including Filippo Turati and Claudio Treves); and the 
abstentionists (including Bordiga and Ruggero Grieco).11 After much debate, the delegates in the 
Congress voted in favour of Maximalist electionist programme, proposed by Serrati, the leader of 
the Maximalist wing and the editor of Avanti!, to participate in the elections in order to propagate its 
revolutionary ideas towards the ultimate goal of establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat through 
an ultimately violent seizure of power to be handed over to the workers’ and peasants’ councils. 
The Congress also passed the resolution for the PSI to officially join the Third International that had 
been established in March 1919.12 Even though this might seem like a great opportunity for the 
party’s involvement in the expansion of a council-type organization, the programme did not 
recognize the councils as the vehicle of such revolutionary transformation but as the form of the 
socialist state after the revolution. Hence, on the one hand, its revolutionary rhetoric inhibited its 
parliamentary performance while its Maximalist orientation crippled its facilitation role towards the 
councils.  
In the meanwhile, the factory councils were expanding in Turin.13 L’ordine nuovo published 
an article on 11 October that highlighted the growing bureaucratization of working-class 
organizations and its consequent soul-crushing effects on workers. In pointing out the historical and 
structural limitations of unions, the article made a distinction between the proletariat as “wage 
earners” and “producers” (Gramsci, 1977, p. 100). The foremr is the ontological basis of unions and 
the latter of councils. In contrast to the understanding of the PSI outlined above, the article 
identified councils as both organs of revolutionary struggle and the basis of the new society after 
the revolution. Furthermore, it recognized a parallel transformation from wage-earner to producers 
 
11 L’ordine nuovo group supported the key Maximalist resolutions in Bologna Congress, despite their important 
differences. Therefore, we do not list them as a separate tendency in this juncture. 
12 See the full debate in Spartaco (1958, pp. 69-80). Specifically, for an outline of Treves’ critique of the Maximalist 
belief in a violent overthrow and his contrasting view on the radical possibility of electoral and parliamentary activities, 
see McNally (2017).  
13 By mid-September, factory councils were formed in almost all the metalworking factories in Turin and some other 
sectors (e.g. chemical factories), representing more than thirty thousand workers (Spriano, 1971, p. 54). 
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in the social sphere from “citizens” to “comrades”. It claimed that “the Factory Council is the model 
of the proletarian State” with all of the problems of the latter already embodied in the former (p. 
100). Despite its criticism of unions, it did not dismiss their importance entirely, arguing that they 
can play a positive role but should be directed by an autonomous organization of the working 
class.14 
In the first meeting of the factory commissars on 17 October, it was decided that the non-
unionized workers should participate in the council elections precisely to expand their 
representativeness and intensify their autonomy. It also distanced itself from the Chamber of Labour 
for its decision to accept the local government’s ban on a mass meeting to protest the seizure of 
Fiume (Clark, 1977, p. 84), therefore highlighting the need for a new institutional order to carry out 
the working-class struggle. The commissars in metal and automobile sectors elected a Study 
Committee (Gruppo di Studio) at the end of October to formulate its programmatic groundings and 
coordinate the campaign for factory councils. On 8 November, the Study Committee presented its 
“Programme of the Workshop Delegates” which became the bedrock of the council movement in 
Turin.  
The programme recognized the factory delegates as “the sole and authentic social (economic 
and political) representative of the proletarian class since they are elected by all workers in the 
workplaces on the basis of universal suffrage” (Gramsci, 1977, p. 116). As an embodiment of 
working-class power organized at the plant basis, factory councils were “the anthesis to the 
employers’ authority” (p. 117). It outlined the selection process of the delegates, the duties, power 
of the factory commissars and the executive council, and the relation between the commissars and 
the unions. The programme summed up the role of delegates during working hours as “control”, 
defining it as ensuring that the agreements were faithfully adhered to, defending the interests and 
concerns of workers, maintaining orders on the job, gaining information on the capital employed 
and the output produced, and preventing removal of machinery by the owners. In their executive 
role, delegates had to negotiate with the management and to process complaints. While recognizing 
unions as “indispensable form of organizations” (p. 116) and calling on all workers to join a union, 
the programme subordinated unions to the executive committees of the factory councils in their 
negotiations with the employers and conditioned the ratification process to the approval from an 
assembly of the commissars, who could be recalled any point by a majority of the members (p. 
119).  
 
14 See also l’ordine nuovo article on 25 October that elaborated further on the question of the role of unions. It 
encountered the syndicalist perspective on the role of trade unions according to which “the job of the trade unions 
should have been to train the workers for control over production” (Gramsci, 1977, p. 105). The article called this an 
illusion since union leadership had never been based on industrial but juridical and bureaucratic competence.  
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 The union leadership reacted to these in the union’s annual assembly in early November. 
Their vehement resistance against the voting rights to non-unionized workers and the subordination 
of the unions to the councils had both ideological and practical dimensions. On the former, some 
like Emilio Colombio, a member of the national secretariat of the FIOM, insisted that unions were 
an expression of the working class and not just workplaces as with the factory councils. Giving 
voting rights to non-union workers would mean allowing the corporative interests of the 
workplaces, rather than the union, to direct the working-class struggle (Di Paola, 2011, p. 138). This 
was echoed by the PSI leadership when Serrati wrote around the same time against the voting rights 
to non-unionized workers by arguing that this had confused the nature of union struggle in England 
and the United States with that in Italy. 
At the practical level, the union leaders argued that the scheme cannot guarantee the election 
of experienced activists capable of navigating the negotiation process. The only point that the union 
was willing to concede was the official recognition of the factory councils and the commissars 
under the condition that they remained under the control of the unions. This could be viewed 
strategically as a way not only to maintain some control over the factory council movement but also 
use the workshop organization to increase union’s institutional capacity in the midst of rapid 
membership growth. Despite the opposition of key figures in the leadership position, a motion was 
passed on 1 November to recognize the workshop commissar and to grant voting rights to the non-
unionized workers; however, with the compromise that the commissars and the members of the 
internal commission had to be union members. The union leadership at the national level reaffirmed 
their disagreement regarding this decision at the FIOM’s national meeting in Florence on 9-10 
November.   
 Despite the organizational and programmatic tensions between the Turin section and the 
national leadership of the PSI, l’ordine nuovo espoused a Maximalist line in the lead-up to the 
election arguing for the use of election to occupy the parliament through an electoral success in 
order to halt its functioning to strip “the democratic mask away from the ambivalent face of the 
bourgeois dictatorship and reveal[] it in all its horrible and repugnant ugliness” (Gramsci, 1977, p. 
128).  
  The relative absence of the union and the party from the developments in Turin (including 
the strikes in August and September) due to their preoccupations with the strike actions in 
Lombardy, Liguria, and Emilia towards securing minimum pay-scale allowed the space for the 
growth of factory councils in Turin (Clarke, 1977, p. 81). However, those efforts led to massive 
electoral success for the PSI at the 15 November elections (see, Lewin and Elazar, 2002).  
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 To conclude, it was in this period that the “council democratic” movement emerged in Italy. 
The principal organizing forces involved with the movement were linked with the actions of the 
Turin section of the PSI and the FIOM. While the internal tensions had begun to emerge between 
the factory council movement and the CGL especially after expanding of voting rights to non-
unionized workers, it had not yet been threatening enough to the corporatist direction of trade union 
strategy for the national leadership to take a strong position against it. The national leadership of the 
PSI was also too preoccupied with its Bologna Congress and the election campaign to pay sufficient 
attention to the unique developments in Turin. The two main syndicalist forces, the USI and the 
UIL, had weak organizational capacities within and ambivalent programmatic orientation towards 
the movement and were observing the developments from the sidelines.15  
The programmatic efforts of the movement in this period were largely by l’ordine nuovo 
group. While progressively clarifying the distinct nature of the movement and laying out the 
theoretical foundation of the movement, their articulation was not devoid of certain ambiguities due 
largely to a degree of diversity within l’ordine nuovo on some key issues as well as external 
constraints related to organizational embeddedness of the larger labour movement. This was 
particularly evident in the question of the relation between factory councils and the union.  
In terms of alliance patterns in this period, the movement was mostly confined to the urban 
socialist movement mainly in the city of Turin, with some following in the other centres within the 
industrial triangle. Despite the theoretical elaboration of l’ordine nuovo regarding the importance of 
incorporating the peasants into the council movement,16 it could not go beyond the programmatic 
rhetoric because of the organizational weakness of the socialist movement within peasant 
dominated regions, its ideological position towards the war that created bitterness among peasant-
soldiers, and its programmatic ambiguities towards the peasant question.  
The alliance with syndicalists did not seem urgent for the Turin section. At the national 
level, while the PSI leadership tried to form alliances with the USI and even with UIL in 1919, its 
basic parameters of such an alliance that required political subordination were unacceptable to the 
syndicalists (Bertrand, 1969, pp. 259-62). After the takeover of Fiume, working with the UIL was 
no longer a viable option. An alliance with the Catholic unions, particularly the national federation 
 
15 The USI was thus far unsure about its orientation towards the council movement and had not been able to extent its 
sphere of influence into the industrial triangle in this period. The UIL was largely focused on the events of Fiume and 
its struggle towards the strategic direction of the organization (see Bertrand, 1969, pp. 277-92). 
16 See, for example, the article published in l’ordine nuovo on 2 August 1919, which examined the profound effect of 
the war on the mentality of peasants and drew parallels between the conditions in Russian and Italy with respect to 
peasant-soldiers. The article argued for the importance of industrial transformation of agriculture under the leadership 
of the proletariat as the precondition of effective incorporation of peasants into the communist movement. 
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of Catholic unions (confederazione Italiana dei Lavoratori, CIL) established in 1918,17 did not play 
a significant part in the strategic calculations of the Turin section. During 1918-19, there was a 
relative period of calm and even alliance on certain issues such as the eight-hour workday between 
the socialist and Catholic unions. However, the fundamental difference in the ideological and 
political orientations,18 as well as their overlapping constituencies especially within the textile 
sector regions (notably in Lombardy, Piedmont, and the Veneto) made effective alliance strenuous 
(Foot, 1995, pp. 268-70, 273; Horowitz, 1963, p. 114).  
Second Period (15 November 1919 – 24 April 1920) 
 What dramatically changed the landscape of the political forces was the 1919 national 
election. It consequently impacted the relations of forces within which the “council democratic” 
movement was embedded. The PSI came out on top with 156 seats (32.3 per cent of the total vote), 
followed by the PPI with 100 seating (20.5 per cent). Northern and Central Italy were dominated by 
the PSI and the PPI, while the South was largely in the Liberals, Democrats and Radicals electoral 
alliance (Liberali, Democratici e Radicali) which obtained 96 seats (15.9 per cent of the vote). The 
election result marked the effective collapse of the UL. The liberal bloc had to form a coalition 
government with the PPI. Given its religious charm among the Catholic population, its 
programmatic appeal to rural Italy especially among landowners, sharecroppers, and peasantry, and 
its stainless image of nonparticipation in the war decisions made the PPI a potent political force 
with a broad base (see Webster, 1961, pp. 61-3). 
Given the profoundly different readings of the election result by the major factions within 
the PSI, it indeed widened the tensions within the PSI. The electionist Maximalists saw it as a clear 
sign that the bourgeoisie was standing on its last leg and an affirmation of their political strategy to 
use the electoral success of the socialist party to paralyze the “bourgeois parliament” from within.19 
The reformists saw the election result as a great opening to consolidate the socialist position with 
the capitalist state to push their progressive measures forward.20 For different reasons but now for 
both major factions within the PSI, there were fewer reasons for them to facilitate the 
transformative proposals of the Turinese councilists.  
 
17 The membership of the CIL grew rapidly from 162,000 in 1918, to 700,000 members in 1919, to 944,812 in 1920 
(Foot, 1995, p. 292f52; Neufeld, 1961, pp. 368-9). The bulk of its membership was among sharecroppers, peasants and 
smaller land-owners, female textile workers, and urban bureaucrats (Foot, 1995, p. 268).  
18 The CIL followed policies towards class collaboration, arbitration, and increase of small properties, and transition 
from sharecropping to rented property (Foot, 1995, p. 269). 
19 l’ordine nuovo echoed a similar interpretation of the election result in an article published on 29 November 1919. It 
called on the socialist deputies to “paralyze the functioning of parliament as the constitutional form of political 
government” (Gramsci, 1977, p. 131).  
20 See Treves’ conception of “integral socialist strategy” that he elaborated on in an article published in Critica Sociale, 
no. 20 (16–31 October 1919). See also McNally (2017, pp. 323-4). 
170 
 
As the horizon of a possible alliance between the Turinese “council democrats”, and the PSI 
and the GCL at the national level was closing, new alliances were being sought by the “council 
democratic” activists.21 L’ordine nuovo group used their presence in the local PSI to pass a motion 
on 11 December to recognize councils and set up a group to promote their expansion. Gramsci also 
sought the alliance of the abstentionists wing of the PSI as well as the USI. In the meanwhile, the 
Chamber of Labour announced its full support of the movement (including the voting rights for the 
non-unionized workers despite the opposition of the leaders of the Chamber of Labour) after a 
special session on 14-15 December and called on the CGL and the PSI to facilitate the creation of 
councils throughout Italy.22 The union was not ready to simply abide by the decision. Nevertheless, 
the decision of the Chamber made it difficult for the union to openly resist the creation of new 
councils and therefore paved the wave for a rapid expansion of the movement into other industries 
through local actions.  
Amidst its growing popularity,23 the USI focused its Congress in December on two central 
themes: factory councils, and working-class unity (Bertrand, 1969, p. 292). This was a clear sign 
that, despite its initial reluctance towards the idea of factory councils, the USI had begun to show 
interest in extending its influence within the movement (Di Paola, 2011). The General Secretary of 
the USI, Armando Borghi, recognized the merits of factory councils as linked to the long-standing 
strategic orientation of the USI towards industrial autonomy. But he expressed concerns since the 
factor council movement was originated in Turin, which for him, was the centre of socialist 
reformism. Although not all leading figures in the USI agreed with the transformative potential of 
the factory councils, the delegates passed a motion to express their “sympathetic support” for the 
council movement but did not go further (Bertrand, 1969, pp. 293-5). The USI saw factory councils 
as “the organs which keep alive in the proletariat a clear understanding of the end towards which we 
aim (expropriation) and which prepare the office workers who will, the day after the revolution, 
guarantee the functioning of production in the proletarian directed factories without upset or 
difficulties” (as quoted in p. 295). To expand its influence among the industrial workers in urban 
centres, the USI moved its Headquarter from Bologna to Milan in February 1920 (Bertrand, 1982, 
p. 392).  
 
21 L’ordine nuovo published a number of articles (e.g. 29 November 1919, 6-13 December 1919, 3 January 1920) on the 
horizon of possible alliance and the structure of such alliances especially between workers and peasants. It is here that 
the group opens its theoretical framework to the potential strategic benefit of peasant land occupation (e.g. see Gramsci, 
1977, pp. 132-3, 140-1, 147-8). Gramsci and Togliatti argued that “factory control and land seizure must be seen as a 
single problem” (p. 141) linked to the uneven development between the North and South of Italy.  
22 In an article on 27 December, l’ordine nuovo showed optimism in including the trade unions and the socialist party in 
the “network of institutions in which the revolutionary process is unfolding” (Gramsci, 1977, p. 146). 
23 In December 1919, the USI claimed 1030 local sections with 305,000 members, the majority of which were 
agricultural workers in the North. Nevertheless, its appealed had been growing in Lombardy and Piedmont (see 
Bertrand, 1982, p. 392).  
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 At the beginning of 1920, a massive wave of strikes shook the country.24 The PSI’s strategic 
orientation towards such widespread radicalism continued to be governed by the Maximalist line. 
After its delegates walked out of the Chamber of the Deputies in December in a symbolic show of 
their disregard for bourgeois parliamentarism, the Maximalist delegates, such as Bombacci and 
Gennari, introduced schemes during the PSI’s national meeting (11-13 January) for the 
constitutions of “soviets” under the full control of the party in Italy.25 Once again, this was a 
preemptive extension of Maximalism that served little more than countering councilist efforts at an 
ideological level while preserving the Maximalist outlook of the PSI.  
L’ordine nuovo published a series of articles between 24-31 January extremely critical of the 
existing socialist party in its capacity to lead a revolutionary transformation (see Gramsci, 1977, p. 
156). The group published the Action Programme of Turin Socialist Section calling for a 
generalization of the demand for control to encapsulate the broadest section of people and laying 
out plans for transforming municipalities, trade unions, and the socialist party. Against “reformist” 
measures that would absorb the councils into the corporatist structure of the capitalist state, it 
argued that “control must be exercised by purely proletarian organs, and the working class must 
make it the vehicle for their mass revolutionary action” (Gramsci, 1977, p. 159). In the transition 
period, councils were conceived of as the organs of “constant criticism of Parliament and the 
bourgeois State” and “for direct control of the municipalities.” (p. 159). It argued that the municipal 
elections should be fought on the slogan of “all real power of decision to the Workers’ Councils” (p. 
160). The Turin socialist section was to facilitate the formation of “communist groups” in every 
league and union to “carry out revolutionary propaganda within the organization” (p. 160) and 
criticize or block reformism and opportunism. These groups should promote from within the unions 
the establishment of industrial unions with the task “together with the Factory Councils, of drawing 
up and creating the higher institutions of workers’ control and communist management of 
production, thereby surpassing in effect the correct phase of struggle over hours and wages” (p. 
160). The Turin section of the PSI was further called to focus its efforts towards arming the 
proletariat and building alliance with the peasants and small landholders.  
 Bordiga published a series of articles in January and February on the establishment of 
workers’ councils in Italy. After reiterating his disagreement with the Turin conciliates and position 
on the primacy of the conquest of political power under the leadership of the communist party, he 
 
24 These included state postal and telegraph workers (13 January), students (14-19 January), railway workers (20-28 
January), textile workers (18-20 January), General Strike in Milan (1 March), and agricultural workers in Po Valley 
(February to July). On February 24, 60,000 farmers went on strike mainly in the north and central Italy (Neufeld, 1961).  
25 Such schemes for the formation of soviets became a central theoretical discussion among the Italian socialists from 
June to April 1920 (Forti, 2014). 
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stated that “‘workers’ control’ has a revolutionary and expropriative significance only after central 
power has passed into the hands of the proletariat” (p. 215). In response, l’ordine nuovo published 
an article on 14 February arguing that in the context of Italy, factory councils had primacy over 
soviets because empirically they were where the Italian working-class struggle had found itself. It 
argued that factory councils were the invaluable source of building consciousness among the 
working classes and the foundation for the appropriation of the means of production.  
 The relation of forces within the labour movement began to shift from mid-February. There 
were a number of factory occupations, led predominantly by syndicalist workers, that took place in 
Sestri Ponente (Liguria) on 17 February due to the breakdown of negotiations over pay-rates which 
quickly resulted in settlements (Clark, 1975, p. 93). The remarkable point about these was that the 
factory councils played a central role in running these factories during the occupation (p. 94). The 
strategy of factory occupation took a new form when it took place in the heartland of the council 
movement in Turin. On 28 February, the workers at the Mazzoni’s cotton mill near Turin occupied 
the workplace after a month of strike reached an impasse. The action was indeed planned by the 
union as a method of resolving the dispute with the reactionary employer. It came to an end after a 
few days when the government put the factory under state management (it was returned to the 
employers later) and enforced an agreement to recognize the internal commission and the union 
(with no mention of factory councils), readmission of dismissed workers, and repayment for the lost 
days.26  
This development triggered a few small events elsewhere, including one in Bianchi 
Metallurgical factory in Milan under the leadership of anarchists (see Buttà, 2015, p. 204).27 In 
response to the use of police violence that resulted in casualties among workers, the syndicalists and 
anarchists called for a General Strike. However, it could not be realized due to the lack of support 
from the socialist organizations. This widened schism between the USI and anarchist organizations, 
notably the Italian Anarchist Union (Unione Anarchica Italiana, UAI),28 and the socialist 
organizations (pp. 204-5; Bertrand, 1982, p. 393). L’ordine nuovo group became suspicious of 
occupations as a path to a socialist revolution (Maione, 1975, p. 110); syndicalists saw it as an 
example of workers’ willingness to engage in syndicalists’ preferred method of militancy;29 the 
 
26 Martin Clark (1977) presents some evidence that supports the hypothesis that the union leaders requests the state 
intervention (p. 95f). 
27 See Spriano (1975, p. 32) for other instances of occupations in February and March. 
28 By the summer of 1920, the membership of the UAI reached around 20,000 members (Levy, 2000, p. 119). 
29 Alibrando Giovannetti, the secretary of the USI’s metalworkers’ union, saw the non-violent peaceful occupation of 
factories as a preferred method of struggle than the old insurrectionary methods (Levy, 2000, p. 240). Errico Malatesta, 
one of the most popular and influential Italian anarchists, reached a similar conclusion in his article on 17 March in the 
widely read Milanese anarchist newspaper (Buttà, 2015, p. 186), the Umanita Nova, founded in that month (2015, p. 
143). He called for takeover of all factories, arguing “the method certainly has a future, because it corresponds to the 
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union understood it as a legitimate method of forcing the employers to settle; and the employers 
realized that the government is not likely to take their side on such instances.30  
In response to these shifts in the relations of forces, l’ordine nuovo group published a series 
of articles between 28 February and 6 March in which they emphasized the essential leadership role 
of the socialist party in the revolutionary transformation of society and the role of councils in 
creating the necessary conditions for the party to become the governing party of the working class 
by transforming the working class as a whole into “the executive power of the workers’ state.” The 
factory councils were identified as the first step for the Italian working-class movement “towards 
self-government in a workers’ state” (Gramsci, 1977, p. 171). The group also provided an analysis 
of the notion of “proletarian unity”, a concept dear to anarchists and syndicalists,31 in which it 
identified “the opportunists and reformists” as well as the “anarcho-syndicalists” as obstructions 
against achieving organizational unity of the working class; the former due to its perpetuation of 
capitalist logic within the labour movement and the latter due to its revolutionary phrase-mongering 
and its dilution of working-class organizations away from the socialist ones.  
 In the meanwhile, the weakness of the coalition government in the face of such widespread 
labour militancy encouraged the employers to form national organizations in industrial (and, later in 
the agricultural) sectors to coordinate their actions among each other and with local Prefects.32 
Their hegemonic counteraction went beyond the institutional and political coordination and 
included an intellectual effort to study the new forms of labour militancy in relation to the Russian, 
Hungarian, and German experiences and to examine the extent to which it could provide an 
instrument for class collaboration (Maione, 1975, pp. 94, 119). It pushed the issue of factory 
councils at the forefront of employers’ insurgency. On 22 February, the General Assembly of the 
Industrial League33 issued a declaration stating its intent to fight against the factory councils (p. 
121), two days after the director of the main Fiat factory announced his refusal to recognize Factory 
Commissars (Clark, 1977, p. 97). The decision to fight the factory councils by a coordinated action 
among employers was reaffirmed in the inaugural session of Confindustria in a speech by its 
 
ultimate ends of the workers’ movement and constitutes an exercise preparing one from the ultimate general act of 
expropriation” (p. 142).  
30 In the newspaper Corriere della Sera, Luigi Einaudi, a liberal economist, wrote “the case of Mazzoni is one of the 
milestones of a profound transformation that took place in the relationship between capital, labor and the state”. 
31 These articles (28 February – 6 March) were in fact written as a rebuttal to another article by Alfonso Leonetti 
published in l’ordine nuovo that was extremely critical of Malatesta and led two anarchist factory commissars to block 
the distribution of the newspaper in their workplace (Levy, 2000, p. 155). 
32 For examples of such coordination with local Prefects, see Williams (1975, pp. 200-1), Di Paola (2011, p. 140), and 
Clark (1977, p. 98). 
33 The Industrial League was a well-established employers’ organization in Piedmont, emerged in Turin since 1868, 
with Olivetti as its secretary.  
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General Secretary, Gino Olivetti on 7 March.34 The April events Turin provided an ample 
opportunity for the employers’ organization to exercise coordinated actions among different 
employers.  
 The increased militancy of the employers targeting specifically the internal commissions to 
reclaim their managerial authority was increasingly evident. Two examples can demonstrate this 
vividly: one on 22 March at the Fiat-owned Industrie Metallurgiche works and another on 23 
March at the Acciaierie Fiat works. In the former, members of the internal commissions were 
dismissed in a Fiat factory when they asked the managers to set the hands of the factory clocks back 
to the solar time in opposition to the daylight-saving time – reminiscent of the wartime. The 
workers at the factory went on strike in solidarity with the internal commission. In the case of 
Acciaierie, the workers went on strike without going through the regular dispute procedure first 
when their demand for the members of the internal commission to be paid for the time they spent on 
their duties were denied.  
 On the one hand, the employers were adamant in using this opportunity to destroy the 
institution of factory councils as a condition for any settlement with the workers’ representatives. 
With the support of the local and regional state apparatus to deploy the armed forces to enforce 
lockouts, arrest workers, ban public meetings, etc., they had strong backing in pushing for their 
ideal outcome to regain control over the factories again. On the other hand, the members of the 
factory councils and the rank-and-file workers had a clear sense that this is a fight of principles. 
Hence, they overwhelmingly approved commissars’ call on 26 March for internal strikes in all 
metalwork factories, now under the direction of an elected Action Committee rather than the union. 
In turn, the employers responded on 29 March with a lockout, implemented by the state troops.  
Between these two intransigent poles,35 the role of the union and the party was crucial to tilt 
the balance. The representatives from both the Chamber of Labour and the National Committee of 
the FIOM led the negotiations and reached an agreement with the employers on both cases on 8 
April. The Turinese workers largely abstained by 77 per cent for the ratification vote (Di Paola, 
2011, p. 142). But when the two sides met to sign the agreement, the employers seized upon the 
opportunity to bring out the question of the function and regulation of the internal commission that 
in the draft of the agreement was to be postponed to the future (Clark, 1977, pp. 103-4). This threw 
the situation into a crisis when the factory commissars rejected the new proposal, despite the 
 
34 In the speech, he made it clear that in case of political pressure by the local governments to make concessions, “it is 
the duty of member organizations to refuse co-operation and to warn the Confederation immediately so that it can take 
any measures it thinks suitable” (quoted in Clark, 1977, p. 98).  




recommendation of the FIOM’s leader, Bruno Buozzi, and along with the Chamber of Labour as 
well as the Turin section of the PSI and the local branch of the FIOM, proclaimed a General Strike 
on 13 April, joining the large pool of striking workers in other sectors.  
 The question of the leadership of the General Strike at a local level was settled on 14 April 
when an Action Committee was formed between representatives from both the Chamber of Labour 
and the Turin section of the PSI. However, the question of the extension of this action throughout 
Piedmont and beyond proved complex and consequential. Such geographical expansion was vital 
for the movement’s success especially given the local state’s willingness to use thousands of troops 
to squash the workers’ actions (see Di Paola, 2011, p. 143). Already, the unusual involvement of the 
national union representatives in the negotiation process at the local level regardless of its severity 
had given the event a national outlook. To avoid further highlighting the logical extension of the 
movement at a national level, the CGL turned down the Confindustria’s proposal to meet in Milan 
for a new round of negotiation (Clark, 1977, p. 105, 105f46). Furthermore, their profound 
dissension towards the factory council movement that had developed in Turin prevented them from 
getting involved in a negotiation at the heart of which was the question of employers’ attack on 
those very institutions. In effect, the national union suffocated the “April Strikes” in Turin by 
containing it largely to Turin and preventing its expansion. The central government was happy to 
keep the General Strike contained as Nitti feared its expansion would have a negative effect on the 
Italian bonds when the economy was already under huge stress,36 and its containment using the 
army could worsen the fragile loyalty of the army after Fiume.  
The view of the PSI was articulated between 19-21 April, during its National Council in 
Milan. While debating all sorts of schemes for soviets in Italy, the top leadership either condemned 
the Turin’s actions as “localism” (e.g. Gennari), called for more time to set up communist principles 
and to prepare for a proletariat armed force (e.g. Bombacci), or simply supported the plan to reach 
an agreement with the government (e.g. Giuseppe Emanuele Modigliani) (see Williams, 1975, pp. 
207-8). The failure of the Maximalist leadership of the PSI at the national level to facilitate and 
generalize the militant actions should be seen in light of their understanding of the nature of the 
Italian state and the kind of movements required to carry out a socialist revolution in Italy, itself 
rooted in the experience of their intransigence past as well as the Maximalist model. These deeply 
affected their strategic orientation towards the “council democratic” movement and their potential 
roles in the Turin events.  
 
36 Nitti said that “the situation at Turin is acute because it is only political and the new requests are exclusively political, 
put forward while I am here. This worsens the foreign exchange rate and general conditions …” (as quoted in Clark, 
1977, p. 106). 
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By 19 April, the strike had organically gone beyond Piedmont into parts of Liguria, 
Tuscany, and Lombardy. While the leading socialist institutions at the national levels refused to 
assist the Turinese strikers concretely, the syndicalists in Liguria and Lombardy were actively 
supporting the movement. They not only led the demonstrations in Milan in support of the Turinese 
workers but also mobilized railway workers in Florence, Pisa, and Lucca, and dockyard workers in 
Genoa to refuse the transport of troops who were being sent to Turin (Gluckstein, 1985, pp. 206-7). 
Their active solidarity with the movement laid the ground for the increased popularity of 
syndicalists among the urban industrial workers later in this period.  
 As the dimming hopes for a successful conclusion of this prolonged General Strike37 – the 
longest in Piedmont history – were making the material toll on the strikers ever less tolerable, the 
new round of negotiation was commenced. The talks that first began between the CGL and the 
Confindustria and then transferred to the Chamber of Labour and the Turin Industrial League 
reached a devastating conclusion for the factory council movement. The strike was called off on 23 
April, after the agreement was signed off that conceded major points on the regulation of the 
internal commissions to the employers’ demands. The internal commissions lost many of their 
powers on the shop floor of the factories, including the ability to meet with the workers during the 
normal working hours.  
 The economic crisis continued to worsen into 1920 on many key economic indicators, both 
in terms of production and trade balance.38 Furthermore, the living cost continued to rise into 
1920.39 The program of Nitti’s government for an “economic partnership” to control over the 
supply of a wide range of products was no longer sustainable. In the absence of financial support 
from the United States and Britain, there was a growing need for tax reform to cut down on the war 
profits of major companies and banks (Esposti, 2015). This was unsurprisingly resisted and 
effectively blocked by the large interests.  
Amidst these economic challenges, there was a political crisis that was brewing in the 
parliament (see Maier, 1975, pp. 179-81). The PPI’s alliance with the liberals had been strained by 
Nitti’s disregard of the grievances of the “White” Catholic workers at the expense of the “Red” 
striking workers and the government’s delay in delivering the promised land transfer to the 
peasants. While his handling of the eastern border negotiation and the suppression of nationalist 
student protest on 24 May further radicalized the interventionist forces, his attempt to end price 
 
37 The General Strike involved 120,000 workers from all companies in the province (Castronovo, 2005, p. 93).  
38 In 1920, there was a decrease in the production of wheat, yarn and fabric, and iron ore compared to 1919. There were 
only slight increases in the production of coal, and hydroelectricity in 1920 compared to 1919. The trade balance was -
13.802 million lire in 1920 compared to -7.774 million lire in 1919 (see Esposti, 2015 for details).  
39 Just in the first six months of 1920, the cost of living increased from 124.67 lire to 153.9 lire (Clark, 1977, p. 144f43). 
177 
 
control over grain (through a decree issued on 4 June) deepened antagonism from all sides of the 
political spectrum, forcing him to resign on 9 June.40 His resignation was a further sign of the deep 
crisis of the liberal bloc, now under an electoral condition that had allowed the interjection of mass 
political parties under proportional representation. In such a context, it was not possible for Nitti to 
realize his economic vision for the postwar transition.  
The only replacement who had the relative support of all sides was Giolitti who formed a 
government on 20 June. However, Giolitti came back to the scene with the hope that he could turn 
back the clock and regain control on the basis of pre-war trasformismo. He tried to neutralized 
political rivals by giving key positions to representatives from all major political parties, including 
the PSI.41 He knew that the general direction begun by Nitti towards economic recovery had to be 
continued even more aggressively.42 But such political strategy was no longer possible in post-war 
Italy. His insistence, particularly on the taxation of war profit, further antagonized large capital 
interests linked to the war industries who saw this as the failure of the state to maintain their 
hegemony, causing them to fall back further on their own organizations. The war profit tax was 
generally supported by the farmers and small businesses that had not significantly benefited from 
the war contracts, as well as reformist in the CGL. Most industrialists (with some notable 
exceptions such as Fiat’s owner, Giovanni Agnelli) and financiers found these proposals 
unacceptable (Castronovo, 2005, pp. 97-8).  
 This had already begun towards the end of May when the Confindustria outright rejected all 
of the FIOM’s demands that it had put forwards during its Genoa Congress (20-25 May). These 
demands, which closely resembled those proposed by the CIL and the USI around the same time, 
included higher piece rate and wages. The USI continued to fiercely insist on the issue of internal 
commissions in their demands but they were also seeking to join forces with the FIOM to push the 
employers to come to the negotiating table (Clark, 1977, p. 150). This placed the FIOM in a 
difficult strategic position. It would make sense to force an alliance with the USI on such an 
occasion but did not want to reopen the issue of internal commissions. Even more than socialist 
organizations’ reluctance towards working with the syndicalists, they loathed the left-wing 
Catholics who had recently broken ranks with the PPI and were engaged in militant strike actions in 
Cremona in June while Federterra’s strike actions in Po Valley was going on (See Foot, 1997, 422; 
 
40 The decree was abandoned even though the subsidies costed the Treasury 7 billion lira (Spartaco, 1958, p. 153).  
41 The Minister of Justice (Luigi Fera) and the Minister of Labour and Social Security (Arturo Labriola) were from the 
PSI.  
42 It must be noted that similar proposals were already in Giolitti’s agenda during his election campaign in 1919 (Maier, 
1975, p. 127). Upon taking office, he pushed to end fixed price of bread, to crackdown on financial speculation, and 
introduce a tax system aiming at a “total call-back” of war profit (Esposti, 2015; Spriano, 1975, p. 37; Spartaco, 1958, 
p. 158). See Spriano (1975, pp. 43-44) for an overview of the scale of war profit of the large firms.  
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Dunnage, 2002, p. 49).43 In an attempt to prevent further diffusion of the working-class movement, 
the PSI extended an invitation in early June for a meeting to be held on 2 July with all Italian 
“revolutionary groups” towards building a “united front”.  
 While the process of relative dispersal of working-class struggle beyond the socialist bloc 
was unfolding, the gulf within the theoretical engine of the “council democratic” movement itself 
was becoming ever more visible. The fault line of this internal tension ran along the issue of the 
relationship between councils and trade unions.44 On 29 May, Tasca published an article to 
elaborate on the relationship between councils and trade unions. This initiated a series of fierce 
polemics between Tasca and Gramsci in the following months.  
Tasca argued that “the union is the master body growing the councils by productive sector, 
coordinating and disciplining their action” (1977, p. 252); hence it would be nonsensical to speak of 
a “pact of alliance” between union and councils since the latter is an integral part of the former (p. 
243). In a number of articles published in June, Gramsci clarified his position by arguing that 
councils “cannot possibly be confused with, co-ordinated with or subordinated to the trade unions” 
(p. 257). He held that trade unions and political parties emerged as “the affirmations and 
developments of liberty and democracy in general, and where the relations of citizen to citizen still 
exist.” Factory councils as “the negation of industrial legality” (p. 266) emerged “where freedom 
for the worker does not exist, and democracy does not exist” (p. 261). This was getting precisely at 
the limits of substantive democracy under liberal democracy and the necessity of extending that 
struggle into the social relations at the point of capitalist production. The difference between the 
unions and the councils lie in the primarily mediatory role of the former operating under the 
functional assumption of the reproduction of the existing social relations, and the primarily 
subversive role of the latter operating under the functional assumption of the self-empowerment and 
self-emancipation of the working class. Therefore, Gramsci believed that “the party and trade 
unions should not project themselves as tutors or as ready-made superstructures for [councils]” (p. 
264). 
Tasca sought to criticize Gramsci’s conception of the emancipatory power of workers’ 
council, what Tasca took to be a syndicalist conception (p. 281), by wrongly using the dialectical 
method that if councils are an antithesis of the capitalist power, they cannot logically also transcend 
it. He instead saw the synthesis in soviets (p. 273). Beneath this theoretical diversion at the heart of 
 
43 Gramsci was among the small number of voices within the socialist block who wrote against the PSI’s ideological 
rejection of alliance with the Left Catholics. This was while the Federterra’s strike actions in Po Valley (with its 
epicentre in Bologna) since February reached its peak in June. 




the “council democratic” movement was the profound strategic question with respect to the 
organizational source for the sustainment and growth of the movement. Tasca was looking into the 
socialist trade unions as the organizational source to carry this project forward; Gramsci was putting 
his hope in the factory councils themselves to carry out this transformative project prefiguratively 
and from the bottom-up.45  
In the meanwhile, the first regional Anarchist Congress in Lombardy was held on 30 May 
1920. According to the police report to the Milanese Prefect, the major themes of the discussion 
were the economic organization of workers, workers’ committees, and the soviets. The participants 
agreed that  
revolutions need to employ the tools of class struggle such as factory workers’ committees, 
and eventually taking possession of the factories themselves. In regards to factory worker 
committees, the Congress affirmed the necessity not to give them too much technical 
importance so that they do not become cooperationist organs but can remain revolutionary ... 
Finally, in regards to the constitution of Soviets, it was affirmed that Soviets must be the 
spontaneous outcome of the revolution rather than the imposition of a communist apparatus 
within a bourgeois regime (as quoted in Buttà, 2015, p. 206). 
This is a demonstration of the active involvement of the anarchist in programmatic efforts within 
the council movement toward developing a distinct vision. An important point here is that instead of 
Gramsci’s earlier suggestion to prevent the integration of the councils into a corporatist scheme by 
keeping the organizational base of their control “purely proletarian”, the anarchists sought remedy 
in preventing the councils to gain “too much technical importance”. Their position on the question 
of the soviets was aligned with that of Gramsci during his polemics with Bordiga.  
 The mutiny in Ancona that broke out on 26 June, under the leadership of syndicalist and 
anarchists, put the socialist organizations in an even more difficult position (see Levy, 1999, pp. 
120-1; Clark, 1977, pp. 144-5). Soon after the outbreak of the revolt, the PSI postpone the meeting 
that it had called for to bring together all revolutionary groups into a united front. On June 25, the 
PSI and CGL issued a statement opposing any local actions. They argued that the crisis of 
bourgeois forces was getting worst and the final clash was near. They warned against workers’ 
actions “which may split the concerted movement” (Tasca, 1938, pp. 68-9). There was a growing 
pressure on the FIOM to launch solidarity actions in munition industries in the industrial triangle, 
 
45 In an article in l’ordine nuovo on 3 July, the reason for why the German Revolution failed was associated with to 
substituted their political power with economic power, and a determination on the part of these proletarian masses to 
introduce proletarian order into factory, to make the factory the basic unit of the new state, to build the new state as an 
expression of the industrial relations of the factory system (Gramsci, 1977, pp. 306-7). This was precisely the bottom-up 
transformative prefiguration that Gramsci had in mind. 
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especially Turin. The FIOM leadership’s resistance to such calls and the CGL’s condemnation of 
the revolt created discontent among Turin metal workers, as expressed by internal commissions and 
factory commissars (Bertrand, 1982, p. 394; Clark, 1977, p. 145). In the meanwhile, the anarchist 
organization, many of whose activists were also members of the USI, met in Bologna and formally 
adapted Malatesta’s Programme (Buttà, 2015, p. 196). The Programme provided its essence as 
follows:  
expropriation of landowners and capitalists for the benefit of all; and abolition of 
government. And while waiting for the day when this can be achieved: the propagation of 
our ideas; unceasing struggle, violent or non-violent depending on the circumstances, 
against government and against the boss class to conquer as much freedom and well-being 
as we can for the benefit of everybody (p. 188). 
The rapid loss of ground, even at the FIOM’s stronghold, became evident when, in mid-
July, Turin metalworkers revolted against their union under the leadership of syndicalists. The issue 
of collaboration with the syndicalists and anarchists also created a crisis within the Turin section of 
the PSI in July by causing a breakdown of the alliance at the local leadership between l’ordine 
nuovo group and the abstentionists.46 This issue and the topic of participation in the next municipal 
election split l’ordine nuovo group and cost them the leadership of the Turin section of PSI. In the 
absence l’ordine nuovo group, the factory council revived in Turin but this time under the 
leadership of syndicalists.  
Malatesta published a series of important articles (5, 12, 15 August) in the Umanita Nova in 
which he argued against the reform measures such as minimum wage and mandatory arbitration as 
a method of perpetuating the proletarian condition and prolonging capitalism. Instead, he urged 
workers to “take possession of all the instruments of labour, all the wealth, land, raw material, 
houses, machinery, food stuff, etc.” and “sketch out as far as possible the new form of social life.” 
Discussing the occupation of factories, he argued that workers should “continue and intensify their 
work on their own account “to transform factories for the need of the community. He called on 
agricultural labour to enter “into direct relations with the industrial and transport workers for the 
exchange of product” (Malatesta, 2014, p. 399). He also called on railway workers to continue their 
work to facilitate the occupying workers.47 At the USI’s National Congress on 17 August, the 
 
46 While Tasca and Terracini were strictly against such collaboration, the abstentionist Giovanni Boero and Gramsci 
were open to it (Clark, 1977, p. 140). This along with the  




syndicalist metalworkers’ organizations declared the necessity to continue the struggle by all means 
necessary including the occupations of factories (Buttà, 2015, p. 208).48  
  To force the employers to negotiate on wage demands, the FIOM passed a motion in its 
Genoa Congress (16-17 August), which was attended by the leaders of the CGL and the PSI, to start 
“obstructionism” to slow down the production. There were two chief reasons behind such a 
strategic choice. First, the union would avoid embarking on a prolonged strike when the union’s 
financial resources were already depleted. Secondly, the union leaders were aware that it would be 
costlier for the employers to face reduced production than strike or lockout. However, under the 
growing pressure of the syndicalists which were calling for immediate occupations of factories,49 
union leaders conceded that in the case of a lockout, they would have no choice but to occupy the 
factories to continue the production. From the perspective of the employers, the refusal to engage 
with the labour negotiations was less about economic calculation, especially in the midst of rising 
inflation that would make an increase in wages less costly for them, but more about political 
pressure on the government to comply to their demands regarding reversal of tax reforms and other 
protectionist measures that would secure their short-term interests. They expected Giolitti’s 
government to repress the militancy of the workers not by unleashing a massacre but by engaging in 
the same level of repression as was done during the Turin uprising.  
The government in its own turn was hoping that the union’s announcement to start 
obstructionism would compel the industrialists to resume the negotiations. The government was 
also active in persuading the industrialists to avoid lockouts by warning them of the danger of such 
action and coordinate their decision with the government beforehand.50 The government believed 
that the industrialists were using the threat of lockouts to pressure the government into their line. 
Given the complexities of using the repressive forces to resolve the conflict, the government, 
therefore, pursued a neutral non-interventionist position (Clark, 1977, pp. 164-5). This impossible 
triad only needed a spark for all to crumble down.  
 To sum up the second period, the alignment of forces within the labour movement became 
progressively clearer and more antagonistic towards the Turinese councilists. L’ordine nuovo’s loss 
of the leadership of the Turin section of the PSI severed the group from an important organizational 
 
48 It was around this time when the Prefect of Milan cautioned Giolitti that many workers were leaving the FIOM and 
joining the USI (Bertrand, 1969, p. 311). 
49 Nevertheless, the USI did accept to go along with the FIOM’s plan for the sake of the proletarian unity (Clark, 1977, 
p. 154). 
50 Writing to Enrico Corradini, the under-secretary of Minister of Interior on 2 September, Giolitti clearly expressed the 
position of the government in the early days of the occupations. He said “With regard to dispute in metal industry I 
believe in would be best for government action to be as little overt as possible. Government, in principle, must not 
intervene unless summoned by both parties […] In Turin, I explained to the industrialists that they cannot count on the 
use of the security forces…” (see Appendix 1, Spriano, 1975, p. 174).  
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force. The movement seemed too radical for the corporatist aims of the CGL leadership and the 
reformist wing of the PSI, and too moderate for the Maximalist methods of the PSI leadership. The 
Maximalists largely dropped the discussion of soviets after the end of the April Strike; the 
abstentionist faction hailed the failure as proof of its reluctance to consider factory councils as 
revolutionary; and the reformist saw it as an opportunity to curb the revolutionary outlook of the 
party. Therefore, for different reasons, the national leadership of the CGL and key fractions of the 
PSI at the national level increasingly distanced themselves from the factory councils by not only 
containing the rank-and-file militancy geographically and sectorally, but also making agreements 
with the employers’ organizations that directly undermined the institutions of factory councils via 
the internal commissions. Yet, the employers’ organizations were adamant to destroy the organs of 
rank-and-file militancy and to regain their absolute managerial authority at the workplace. This 
made the issue of workplace democracy even more contentious.  
Dissatisfied with the conduct of the socialist organizations especially at the national level, 
the centre of gravity of rank-and-file militancy began to shift towards syndicalist and anarchist 
forces which had shown effective leadership and active solidarity with the movement notably 
during the General Strike. The increasing influence of the syndicalist forces within the “council 
democratic” movement accelerated after April. The battle over the internal commissions was a key 
entry point into the movement for the USI and its expansion within the urban industrial working 
class. As their hold deepened, they found it more difficult to work with the socialist trade unions to 
channel the ground power of the syndicalists to the administrative level of the state at the 
negotiating table. This was not only because of historically rooted antagonism between these two 
tendencies but also because the socialist trade unions did not want to give further platform to the 
council movement.  
The programmatic efforts concerning the “council democratic” movement also underwent 
important transformations in this period. L’ordine nuovo group, which continued to play the leading 
theoretical force behind the movement until at least middle of this period, focused largely around 
three topics: clarifying the distinction between the “soviet” model and the “council” model in 
response to Bordiga; criticizing the PSI’s lack of effective leadership towards revolutionary 
transformation and how the party had to be renewed; and expanding on various aspects of the 
peasant-worker alliance. As the syndicalist influence within the movement grew, l’ordine nuovo 
experienced internal struggles along programmatic visions for the movement. This manifested itself 
with regards to the question of the relation between the councils and the trade unions.  
In the meanwhile, the syndicalists and anarchists were becoming keener in programmatic 
efforts especially in relation to the “council democratic” movement. Building on the entry point of 
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“workers’ control”, they embraced the occupation of factories and lands as a strategic path towards 
a social revolution. The occupations of several factories in this period gave an appealing angle for 
the syndicalist (and anarchist) forces to make a distinct mark on the programmatic evolution of the 
movement.  
  The alliance patterns also underwent a series of transformations during this period. The 
decline in the organizational influence of the socialist forces reduced the willingness of the socialist 
movement to expand their alliance with syndicalist forces. In the meanwhile, this gradual 
withdrawal forged new alliances between syndicalist and anarchist forces involved in the council 
movement. The alliance possibilities beyond the left-wing forces and working class were heavily 
affected by the result of the November election. The PPI that had emerged as a powerful political 
party made it even more difficult for socialists/communists to break through the peasant and 
sharecropping population. The election also threw the liberal forces into a crisis. This made the 
powerful industrial and agricultural interests rapidly develop their own organizations and seek 
political alliances elsewhere. The resounding electoral success of the PSI made these interests 
deeply fearful of an impending “Bolshevik” revolution in Italy. They were, therefore, exceedingly 
cautious about their cooperation with the socialist forces. Lastly, the active involvement of the UIL 
after the takeover of Fiume as well as their shift towards “reformism” (Bertrand, 1969, p. 259) 
made any alliance with the socialists, anarchists, and the USI impossible.  
While the prospect of an alliance between the socialist and syndicalist organizations at first 
seemed limited, there was still some hope that they could collaborate at least conditionally on 
certain issues later in this period. The PSI’s attempt to regain control of the increasingly divergent 
labour movement by calling for a united front of all revolutionary groups failed after the Ancona 
revolt broke out. Moreover, the possibility of an alliance with the left-Catholic forces quickly 
vanished when they staged a challenge to the leadership of the socialists in militant strikes in the 
agricultural regions where the two organizations had substantial overlaps in their potential 
constituencies. The events had brought the anarcho-communists and the syndicalists considerably 
closer. As for alliance possibilities beyond the working class, despite the desire of the anarcho-
communists and syndicalists to mobilize sharecroppers and peasants, they faced similar limitations 
as l’ordine nuovo with respect to this social class. This had become ever more challenging and 
complex as the strength of the Catholic organizations had exponentially grown.  
Third Period (24 August 1920 – 30 September 1920) 
 The event that triggered the explosive deadlock at the end of the third period took place 
when the workers at Romeo Works in Milan occupied their factory on 24 August after the 
employers responded to their demands with a lockout. While desperately trying to control the 
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spread of the movement by limiting it to one city, the FIOM ordered the seizure of all factories in 
Milan.51 In response, the Confindustria ordered lockout throughout Italy. In a telegraph on 1 
September from the Prefect of Milan to the Ministry of Interior, we read about view of the 
industrialists in the metal sector, saying that obstructionism has “degenerated into a condition of 
complete anarchy in the factory” and the sit-down strikes had led to “a virtually complete stoppage 
of production”. They accused the occupying workers of committing acts of violence, concluding 
that “the firms affiliated to the federation proceed to a closure of the factories in a manner to be 
decided by individual consortia” (see Appendix 1 in Spriano, 1975).  
In a few days, the occupation took place in all major cities in the north and central Italy 
(Lyttelton, 1977, p. 70; Bertrand, 1969, pp. 321-2). L’ordine nuovo published an article on 2 
September on discussing the notion of occupation. The article rejected the idea that factory 
occupation on its own could produce “any new definitive position” since the power remains in the 
hands of capital. It pointed out the vulnerability of the proletariat to the sabotage of the technicians, 
shortage of raw material, and constraints in the distribution of products. Therefore, it concluded that 
“the occupation of the factories in and of itself [...] cannot be seen as an experience of communist 
society” (Gramsci, 1977, p. 327) and saw it as nothing more than “the reformist and anarcho-
syndicalist utopia” (p. 328).  
In the days that followed, instances of factory occupation also occurred in Campania and 
Sicily (for a list of cities, see Spriano, 1975, pp. 60-2). The occupation took place in engineering 
and metal works factories, shipbuilding plants, chemical and textile factories, stimulating factory 
council type activities everywhere (Clark, 1977, pp. 157-161; Franzosi, 1997, p. 291; Bertrand, 
1969, p. 322). Altogether, half a million workers were involved in factory occupations across Italy 
(Spriano, 1975, p. 60). The occupations were conducted peacefully, and the occupied factories were 
run in an orderly fashion. Although desertion became a significant issue at least in some factories in 
the second week (see Bertrand, 1969, p. 324), the majority of the absentees were workers from the 
countryside who did not directly participate in the occupation. Furthermore, the supply of raw 
material, despite the active support of railway workers, soon became a major obstacle (Maione, 
1975, p. 244). To prevent sabotage, there was a strict procedure put in place by the workers in many 
factories to protect the periphery of the factory and not to allow strangers in. Police reports came 
out that workers were smuggling and distributing arms into the factories (p. 252). This had an 
important consequence on the attitude of the industrialists as they began to take the possibility of 
insurrection more seriously. While continuing its “active non-interventionist” role of trying to bring 
the two sides together and making it clear that the government has no intention to use force on the 
 
51 By 31 August, there were 280 factories where occupied in Milan alone (Tasca, 1938, p. 76). 
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occupiers without provocation, the Prefects began making arrangements for possible armed 
conflicts with the workers after a few days into September.52  
Amidst the upheaval in the industrial sector, peasants accelerated the land occupations at the 
beginning of September. However, there was a profound disconnect between the two radical 
movements in ways that crippled any meaningful alliance. Some of the social and institutional 
reasons behind such disconnect has already been discussed above. The land occupations were often 
led by veterans and sometimes by the Catholic peasant leagues. The weakness of socialists in the 
South (with the exception of modest presence in Latium and Apulia) and their ideological 
detachment from the peasant movement inhibited the socialists to have any influence in this 
process. The USI and the anarchists were the only organizations that consistently argued for the 
peasants to occupy the uncultivated land during the third period.  
As early as 4 September, the USI intensified its call on workers to occupy their factories, 
mines, lands, and banks across Italy. The socialist organizations had to move fast to stay on top of 
the movement that was not only already expanding at their own pace but also were prone to fall into 
the leadership of the syndicalist forces. The representatives of the PSI, the CGL, and the Chamber 
of Labours, therefore, met in Milan on 4-5 September to discuss the situation. They decided that if 
no satisfactory solution was reached either due to employers’ intransigence or government’s break 
of neutrality, then they would have to commence “the objective of control over the industry to 
achieve collective management and the socialization of means of production” (as quoted in Spriano, 
1975, p. 73). Such radical discourse was surely part of the strategy of the socialist organizations to 
put pressure on the employers to come to the negotiating table and should not be taken as a sign of 
readiness of the socialist organizations to commence a social revolution. And yet, depending on 
how the processes unfolded, the unintended consequences of such manoeuvring could go well 
beyond the strategic calculation of the leadership and push the organization into a radical, albeit not 
necessarily irreversible, path. 
The CGL rediscovered the slogan of “workers’ control” as a possible middle ground 
between the demands of the occupiers and more radical elements within the labour movement, and 
the flexibility of the industrialists (Maione, 1975, p. 239). The ambiguity and malleability of the 
concept of “workers’ control” were perfectly suited for such a convoluted situation. In the absence 
of a widely recognizable and politically forceful articulation of its radical possibility, the concept 
could be cast by the reformist elements within the CGL in ways that would suit the return of the 
situation into normalcy and towards a corporatist path. The CGL leadership, therefore, added the 
 
52 As the news of possible armed conflict with the workers grew, the Prefect of Turin, Taddei, on 5 September, and the 
Prefect of Milan, Alfredo Lusignoli, on 7 September, requested additional troops to be deployed to their cities.  
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demand for “trade union control” to the negotiation, which was in fact also against factory council 
control. But even this was not acceptable to many industrialists, at least immediately (see Appendix 
IV, Spriano, 1975). To make sure that the industrialists navigate through this with utmost unity and 
agility, the Confindustria resorted to a high level of centralization in the exclusive hands of its 
Executive Council from 7 September. This itself led to serious tensions between more 
uncompromising and moderate groups of industrialists within the confederation (Sarti, 1967, p. 55). 
On 5 September, the CGL announced the commencement of a national council on 10 
September with all socialist leadership to discuss the socialization of industry. Once again, such a 
radical language was invoked to pressure the employers to cave. However, this announcement 
preempted the meeting of the USI on 6 September in Genoa, attended by powerful unions such as 
the Italian Railway Union (Sindacato Ferrovieri Italiani), postal, and shipyard sectors, during 
which the syndicalists decided to wait for the outcome of the CGL conference on 10 September (see 
Bertrand, 1982, pp. 396-7). Despite its general appeal among a sizable proportion of the rank-and-
file, the USI did not have access to the negotiating tables like the CGL or the Chamber of Labour. 
Short of a full-blown mass insurrection or strong alliance with the peasant movement, it had to play 
its strategies off of the decisions of the socialist unions and the party.  
 The most consequential meeting between the CGL and PSI took place between 9-11 
September in Milan.53 After a long discussion on whether the present situation was a political or an 
economic strike, the question of whether socialist organizations should call for a revolution was put 
on the table (see Spartaco, 1958). The CGL offered to leave the decision (and full responsibility) to 
the Maximalist leadership of the revolution to the PSI. The union leaders were clear about their 
objectives to push for union control over industry rather than revolution. They also knew that the 
party directorate did not have the resolve to take up such a challenge when even the Turin delegates 
were unprepared to carry out the movement offensively beyond the factories. Two motions, one in 
favour of union control of industry (drafted by Ludovico D'Aragona from the CGL) and another for 
the revolution (drafted by Ercole Bucco) were put to a vote. The latter was defeated by 590,000 to 
409,000 votes (with 93,623 abstention most of whom were from the FIOM) in favour of the former 
proposal (Spriano, 1975, p. 92). With the question of revolution put to rest, the issue was now to 
resolve the deadlock along the line of “workers’ control”.  
 It was time for industrialists and the government to make their moves. Any “neutrality” in a 
tense standoff would expire quickly. This was the predicament of the government as the occupation 
entered its second week. It was then that the government’s strategy shifted into a more active role 
 
53 Note that the USI representatives were not invited to this important convention and the representatives of the two 
important autonomous unions, the railway and maritime sectors, did not have a vote.  
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by using bank credits to pressure industrialists into negotiation with the labour leaders around the 
theme of “trade union’s control”. It even went as far as threatening to cut off all credits from the 
employers if they continued their intransigent position towards the CGL (Spriano, 1975, p. 99). The 
government knew that in the present economic and political situation, the promise of union’s 
control would face severe limitations but saw it as a necessary step to complete the corporatist 
scheme that it had envisioned for post-war Italy. As Giolitti told Corradini, “a final solution of the 
industrial question lies in the integration of workers, if necessary as shareholders, into the structure 
of the industry, in full practical participation” (as quoted on p. 99). Such interpretation of “control” 
fit with the vision of the PPI and the CIL. There was also the possibility that such a scheme would 
split the socialist party between the left and the left-wing socialists.54 Hence, even though the 
Catholic block was not directly present at the negotiating table between the capital and labour, its 
vision was captured in the particular interpretative framework that the government had put forward. 
In his meeting with the CIL and Confindustrial leaders on 15 September, Giolitti proposed to set up 
a joined commission of representatives from unions and employers to draft a factory council 
legislation (Maier, 1975, p. 186). The resolution expressed the Confindustrial’s agreement to 
“accept a control over industry [...]” towards “genuine collaboration and co-responsibility between 
the different factors of production”, provided that “this does not establish a trade union monopoly” 
(as quoted on p. 159f38). It had become apparent to many forces within the wide political spectrum 
that they have entered into a new regime of capital-labour relation on the basis of corporativism.55  
 The government’s handling of the situation did not go well with all the industrialists and 
caused profound resentments among some fractions within the capitalist class. But the government 
succeeded in bringing the key elements of both sides together on 19 September to sign an 
agreement that included measures such as wage increase, cost-of-living bounces, six days of paid 
holiday, and overtime pay. Regarding the issue of “control”, the agreement included the formation 
of a joint commission to prepare legislation along the lines of the CGL to “secure an improvement 
in disciplinary relations between the buyers and sellers of labour and an increase in production” (as 
quoted on p. 106). As such, it consolidated the traditional role of the union as the mediator in the 
transaction of commodified labour between workers and capital, with some modest provision for 
oversights of the operation of the enterprise.  
 
54 This played out differently since the split came not between the reformist and the Maximalist but the radical left wing 
which soon formed the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI). 
55 Although the initial reaction of the industrialists towards the CGL’s demand for the union control of industry was one 
of hostility (Castronovo, 2005, p. 103-4), they eventually came around as a result of the government pressure and their 
own realization, starting from some of the most influential members at the leadership of Confindustria such as Ettore 
Conti (Milanese industrialists who became the president of the Confindustria), Silvio Crespi (the owner of a textile 
factory and the Corriere della Sera and a director of Banca Commmersiale) and Olivetti, of what such a scheme would 
mean in reality (Maier, 1975, p. 187). 
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 The referendum held on 24 September syndicalists were deeply dissatisfied with the results. 
On 25 September, Borghi wrote on the position of the USI towards this settlement that “we advise 
the metalworkers to reject every offer of collaboration with ownership [...] to persist in the 
definitive conquest of the factories and in the realization of a new regime based on production and 
social equality” (as quoted in Bertrand, 1982, p. 400). Of those who voted, the majority went to the 
affirmative vote. The union, therefore, ordered the end of the occupation on 30 September and the 
return to the normal operation. By the time the government finally put a bill on the basis of the 
recommendations of the joint commission for a vote in the Chamber of Deputies in February 1921, 
the whole political scene shifted dramatically in the wake of the Fascist onslaught against the 
socialist’s organizations and finally, nothing came out of the legislation.  
The end of this period marked the effective end of “council democracy” movement in Italy. 
But beneath the façade of disheartening return to normalcy at the end of the occupations, there was 
a tectonic shift that had been taking place. Even though the corporativist regime of labour relation 
into the post-war order was temporarily extended, its particular evolution led to deep antagonism 
not only within the radical elements of the labour movement but crucially within the capitalist and 
agrarian bloc against the government and the socialist forces. The former went to establish the 
communist party and the latter found refuge under the Fascist regime.  
 To sum up, the third period emerged from the strategic response of the socialist union to 
employers’ unyielding position towards union’s wage demands as well as the growing pressure of 
the syndicalists and anarchists within the labour movement. It unleashed an astonishing wave of 
autonomous movements across Italy that was qualitatively different from the traditional forms of 
labour militancy such as strikes and obstructionism. Rather than withdrawing their labour power 
temporarily or quantitatively from the capitalist production in the form of limited strikes, the 
workers in the occupied factories took over the means of production in violation of private property 
and continued the production in varying degrees under their own management. Even though the 
method of struggle followed along the syndicalist lines, the direct involvement of the socialist 
organizations in this phase fundamentally influenced its evolution especially in the light of the 
numerical strength of their membership and their privileged position as potential negotiating 
partners. The strategic orientation of the socialist block towards the developments in this period was 
effectively in the hands of the reformist wing which used the fear of more radical possibilities to 
optimize its negotiating position with the employers. It was an opportunity for the socialist union to 
forcefully conclude the unfinished corporatist project that had begun in WWI.  
 The notion of “workers’ control” was at the centre of wildly different programmatic efforts 
in this period. The ordine nuove group, already significantly marginalized compared to the earlier 
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periods, distanced themselves from these occupations and called on socialists to warn the industrial 
workers of the futility of such methods to prevent their disheartening against the feasibility of 
communism due to what the group saw as an inevitable failure. The socialist union countered the 
syndicalist articulation of the notion of “workers’ control” by giving it a corporatist significance. 
While the anarchists and syndicalists continued their propaganda efforts along similar lines as in the 
previous period, the privileged position of the socialist organization limited their programmatic 
reach.  
 In some ways, this period presented the working-class organization with an exceptional 
wave of solidarity within a wide spectrum of professions and locations. There were, however, 
important gaps rooted in the previous periods with regards to the effective disconnect between 
factory occupations and the wave of solidarity around it, and the peasant land occupation that was 
largely by veteran peasant-soldiers and Catholic peasants. The continued lack of serious efforts 
among the socialist organizations to incorporate the peasant movement and their antagonism 
towards the Catholic movement hindered the possibility of developing such alliances. Furthermore, 
despite the programmatic interest of the syndicalists and anarchists towards radical peasant 
movements, their organizational weakness among that segment of the population fettered their 
ability to force an effective alliance with the peasant movement.  
Concluding Remarks 
 The ways the relation of forces linked to the “council democratic” movement evolved during 
the biennio rosso determined the particular trajectory of the movement. Under the condition of the 
war mobilization, the direct involvement of the state in the production process had coupled the 
democratization of the workplace more tightly to the democratization of the state. However, the 
rapid return to the liberal form of the state after the war created a buffer between these spheres, 
making the translation between the two more effectively mediated by various organizations. The 
locus of revolutionary class struggle after the war appeared primarily at the workplace level through 
the radicalization of the internal commissions. The industrial triangle and in particular Turin, the 
centre of war production and the hot spot of working-class militancy during the war, became the 
site where the “council democratic” movement emerged.  
 The socialist organizations initially had the most direct link to the movement whose majority 
of members were also members of these organizations (especially the CGL). Furthermore, the 
leading force behind the programmatic articulation of the movement, l’ordine nuovo group, were 
influential figures in the local branch of the party. Hence, the PSI had entered into a transformative 
project, not of its making but within its organizational influence. Given the political framework 
after the war, the PSI had to play a crucial role in facilitating the expansion of the movement and 
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the generalization of its project to press against the limits of the liberal state and transform the state 
from within. However, the party failed on two fronts: first, to facilitate the generalization of the 
movement by channelling its effects constructively within the state, and second to expand its 
organizational reach by developing institutions of local self-government outside the factories in 
parallel yet linked to the internal commissions.56 Therefore, the Maximalist strategy of the PSI at 
the national level blocked an effective inside-outside strategy even after its historic success in the 
1919 general election.  
 In the first period, the movement did not seem to raise many concerns among the CGL 
leadership. As long as the internal commissions could be kept under the control of the union, they 
could be seen as the institutional basis of the union at the factory level, functionally useful 
especially in the light of exponential growth of union membership after the war. However, the 
incomplete character of the corporatist scheme during the war had weakened the role of the unions 
to mediate between these rank-and-file organizations and the state. This made the internal 
commission susceptible to relatively independent rank-and-file militancy. This possibility became 
more realized when the factory councils in Turin gave voting rights to all workers regardless of 
their union membership to select their delegates who had to be union members. This was in line 
with the project of a radical democratization of the workplace, on the basis of the principle of 
imperative mandate and instant recall, to give a say to workers on their representatives.  
 The implications of the activities of the Turinese councilists began to worry the socialist 
union leadership. The leadership of the CGL used the April Strikes to spur the movement into 
submission. But the militant actions of the workers and the relative noninterventionist attitude of the 
liberal government made the employers ever more adamant to establish an absolute managerial 
authority through centralized coordination. The persistent intransigence of the employers in the 
context of the debilitating strategy of the union leadership towards the council movement 
intensified the rank-and-file struggle over workplace democracy. It was then that the organizational 
influence of syndicalist and anarchist forces within the movement grew significantly.  
 Under the rapidly increasing intransigence of the employers towards working-class 
demands, the unions, under the organizational pressure of the syndicalist and anarchist forces, 
engaged in more militant tactics such as obstruction and slow-down. This later escalated to union-
sanctioned factory occupations in response to employers’ national lockout. This sparked the 
enthusiasm of syndicalist forces linked to the movement since the form of the action corresponded 
 
56 The relatively large network of cooperatives or other local self-help entities that had been created in the course of the 




to their programmatic vision for the movement that they had already experimented with in earlier 
periods well. For the socialist trade unions, on the other hand, it was important to show their ability 
to manage this volatile situation despite its revolutionary outlook. This could potentially be used as 
a springboard to bring the internal commissions completely under its control but also to present 
itself as a powerful and indispensable partner in the corporatist management of industrial relations.  
 The asymmetry of access between the socialist and syndicalist forces to the legal-
administrative channels of the state caused the formers’ strategic orientation towards the movement 
to decisively shape the trajectory of the movement. Therefore, despite the increasing influence of 
the syndicalists within the movement, the trajectory of the movement followed the path laid out in 
the negotiations between the leaders of the socialist movement and the representatives of the 
leading capitalist organizations. These negotiations themselves were held upon the background 
support of the capitalist state.  
 Regarding the programmatic efforts, the movement benefitted tremendously from the 
elaborations of l’ordine nuovo group in the initial periods of its evolution. The group firmly 
believed that the vision for the transformative process should be appropriate to the particular 
contours of class struggle in Italy, rather than an artificial reverberation of the process elsewhere 
(notably, in Russia). They saw the internal commissions as the primary institutions that could 
potentially carry out a transformative project. This would start from radical democratization of the 
workplace, during which workers come to recognize themselves as producers capable of a 
disciplined movement towards self-management (a notion that had been utilized centrally during the 
war) rather than wage earners submissive to the authority structure of the workplace either imposed 
directly by the employers or mediated by the unions.  
 The programmatic efforts of the l’ordine nuovo group which had gone far in developing a 
strategic vision for the movement to transcend its primary locus of activity along “workers’ control” 
dimension into a general organization of the society on the organization basis of councils. However, 
as the prominent figures of l’ordine nuovo group were organizationally part of the socialist party, 
their programmatic vision eventually came into conflict with that of the national leadership. 
However, the failure of the PSI to generalize the movement as outlined above hindered the 
realization of the transitional programme of l’ordine nuovo group from the struggle over radical 
“workers’ control” towards a “council democratic” republic. The party leadership also did not offer 
a transformational programme to facilitate the expansion of the movement along the “citizens’ 
control” dimension. Indeed, the strict division between the leadership of the “political” and 
“economic” strikes between the PSI and the CGL respectively, reinforced in the Pact of Alliance at 
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the end of September 1918, further formally hampered the sublation of “workers’ control” and 
“citizens’ control’ as the constitutive modes of the movement. 
 Under the influence of anarchist thoughts as well as the concrete organizational strength of 
the syndicalist organizations, the programmatic centrality of the industrial working-class was 
weakened, loosening the delineation of the movement as a result. Therefore, anarchists and 
syndicalists envisioned a cascading process of occupations in various spheres of social life under 
the direction of councils towards self-management of society. Their effectiveness to shape the 
trajectory of the movement, however, was severely hindered by their organizational weakness to 
expand radical self-governing entities outside the factories.57 Nonetheless, the programmatic entry 
point into the sphere of industrial working-class without abandoning their former ideological ties 
and organizational strongholds was the notion of “workers’ control”. This notion took on a radical 
meaning in line with the anarchist and syndicalist ideological disposition. 
 Therefore, the struggle to define the trajectory of the “council democratic” movement in this 
juncture found its locus around the notion of “workers’ control”. Over time, the movement saw the 
programmatic influence of syndicalist forces grew, along with their organizational significance. The 
syndicalists and anarchists’ rejection of (party-) politics and the conquest of the state power 
influenced the democratic project of the movement. Their programmatic vision to achieve 
communism was more compatible with the tactic of occupation compared to the party-centred 
vision of l’ordine nuovo group. But this rejection in the context of the persistence of the juridico-
administrative structure of the state meant that the anarchists and syndicalists forces could only 
influence the important decisions being made within the state relevant to the context of the struggle 
merely, if at all, indirectly.  
 The socialist union had a strong incentive to push for an interpretation that effectively meant 
a “trade union control”, the extent of which was modest regulatory oversights. The absence of the 
more radical elements within the “council democratic” movement at the negotiating table prevented 
their interpretation from directly impacting the formulation of the emerging definition. This 
nominally caste the socialist trade union as a “partner” in a corporatist relation with the employers’ 
organizations. Once the process was transferred from the factory levels to the legal-administrative 
path, it was feasible for the government to regain control over the tempo and shape of its evolution. 
After a protracted process, nothing came out of the proposed legislation. Trade unions fell back on 
their familiar method of strikes in a bitter struggle to defend the gains they had won since the war. 
 
57 See Levy (2000, pp. 124-5) for a list of neighborhood anarchist affinity groups in Piedmont. 
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At the same time, they were faced with a rapid rise of fascist squads that existentially threatened the 
very foundations of the labour movement. 
 Lastly, the alliance patterns in relation to the forces operating within the movement evolved 
over these three periods. The geographical localization of the movement at its inception and the 
initial dominance of the socialist forces within the movement pushed the question of alliance to the 
background. L’ordine nuovo group did provide some elaboration on the importance of incorporating 
the peasantry into the council movement. However, such programmatic visions, as abstract and 
vague as they were, were hindered by the organizational and programmatic limitations of the 
socialist forces at the national level.  
 The socialist forces at the national level were trying to forge a series of tactical alliances 
with Catholic forces on certain reform issues in the first period. However, these primarily concerned 
the salariati, braccianti, as well as the sharecroppers in the mezzadaria58 among who Catholic 
organizations were an increasingly influential force. However, due to the perceived lack of 
significant overlap between the social base of the progressively dominant Catholic forces among the 
agricultural labour and that of the council activists among the industrial working-class, the 
significance of this alliance could not be translated into a relevant factor within the immediate 
strategic horizons of the council movement.  
 As the influence of syndicalist grew from the second period, there was initially some change 
of prospective alliance between the socialist and syndicalist organizations. This potentiality was 
accompanied by a number of initiatives by the PSI at the national level to form a revolutionary 
united front. However, aside from the complications on the way of such an alliance due to the 
organizational preconditions demanded by the socialists, the outbreak of the Ancona revolt 
effectively annulled such possibilities. Moreover, the strategic response of the socialist 
organizations towards the April Strike further alienated the syndicalists from the prospect of an 
alliance with socialist forces. In the meanwhile, the organizational expansion of syndicalist forces 
within the movement especially in the second half of the second period put the socialist council 
activists on the defensive and more hesitant to pursue alliance with the syndicalists. But this 
situation brought syndicalists and anarchists closer together in the second period. While they were 
also programmatically keen to incorporate the agrarian movement, they also suffered from 
organizational weaknesses in the south and large parts of the centre of Italy. 
 During the third period, even though the wave of factory occupations provided the 
(ultimately unrealized) possibility for an unprecedented alliance between various forces within the 
 
58 See Appendix B for the definition of these terms in the context of the agrarian production in Italy.  
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working-class movement, the organizational forces involved in the council movement failed to 
coordinate with the wave of land occupations especially in the south. Instead, these were led largely 
by veteran associations and some Catholic organizations. The consequence of the deep-rooted 
limitations in alliance possibilities between the militant forces in the North and the peasants in the 
South, which was never systematically tackled by the revolutionary organizations, became ever 
more visible at this juncture.  
 It was soon after the effective pacification of the revolution that the process of a violent 
passive revolution led by fascist forces began. It quickly sealed not only the fate of whatever was 
left of the legacy of the “council democratic” movement but also the very existence of the left-wing 





The Trajectory of the “Council Democratic” Movements in a Comparative Perspective 
 
Introduction 
 The past two chapters outlined the trajectories of the “council democratic” movements in 
Germany and Italy. The trajectory of these movements was discussed through the analysis of the 
transformations that these movements underwent in the immediate post-war years. By taking a 
relational approach, the analysis outlined how the evolution of the movements was shaped by 
strategic interactions between the forces engaged with the movements through their organizational 
links, programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns.  
 This chapter looks at the trajectory of the “council democratic” movements from a 
comparative perspective. It uses comparative movement analysis by taking Germany and Italy as 
“negative” cases and Russia as the “positive” case. Identification of the trajectories of these cases as 
“negative” and “positive” needs to be qualified. This characterization rests on the general 
framework discussed in the introductory chapter that conceptualizes the analytical form of “council 
democratic” movement as a dialectical relation between its two modes, “citizens’ control” and 
“workers’ control”. As outlined in the case studies, the lopsided trajectories of the movements in 
both Germany and Italy could not succeed in sublating the two modes into a realization of “council 
democracy”. It is in this sense that the trajectories of the movements in Germany and Italy are taken 
as “negative” cases and contrasted with the trajectories of the movements in Russia, between the 
February and the October Revolutions, as a “positive” case of successful sublation. This is not to 
imply a “happily ever after” narrative of the Russian Revolution. Indeed, the transformations that 
took place after the October Revolution stripped the movement of much of its essential 
characteristics. However, those processes were governed by a different set of factors and require 
their own analysis that falls outside the scope of the present study. For the purpose of the 
comparative analysis, it suffices to look at the trajectory of the “council democratic” movement in 
Russia between the February Revolution and the October Revolution.  
  Using the strategic-relational approach to movement analysis that deploys the concept of 
organizational links, programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns, the chapter first provides an 
overview of the key characteristics of the transformation of movement in Russia between February 
and October 1917. Then the comparative analysis contrasts the two “negative” cases of Germany 
and Italy with the “positive” case of Russia to link the specific transformations of the movement in 
each case to the relational dynamics that unfolded in these countries.  
196 
 
Overview of the Case of Russia 
  The trajectory of “council democratic” movement in Russia can be organized into three 
periods:1 from 23 February 1917 to mid-April 1917, which marks the beginning of the February 
Revolution through the period of “dual power” strategy, from 18 April 1917 to end of June 1917, 
which marks the beginning of the “April Crisis” through the first socialist-liberal coalition 
government, and from 1 July 1917 to 25 October 1917, which marks the beginning of the “July 
Crisis” to the Bolshevik insurrection and the beginning of the October Revolution.  
 Upon the downfall of the Tsar monarchy in late February 1917, a great number of councils 
emerged across the country.2 The historical roots of these self-governing bodies in Russia as the 
organizational expression of the popular demands for democratization in the “political” sphere go 
back to the 1905 revolution. In the context of a highly repressive absolutist state, the basic demands 
of the soviets in 1905 were the establishment of the Constituent Assembly and a democratic 
republic (Anweiler, 1975, pp. 50, 63). Attempts to establish an associational representation of the 
working class within the “economic” sphere go back to at least 1901 to create factory-wide 
workers’ committees (p. 26). The modest democratic gains, including the introduction of the State 
Duma, legalization of trade unions, and limited land reforms, that were achieved as the result of the 
1905 revolution were severely restricted or annulled by 1907.3  
 Notwithstanding the continuities that existed between the movement before and after the 
February Revolution, the collapse of the central state in 1917 fundamentally changed the political 
and social significance of the councils. Especially due to the absence of strong civil society 
organizations, the epicentre of popular power fell squarely on the councils, making the left-wing 
political parties keenly interested in them as organizations of mass politics.  
 Due to the organizational weakness of the rival socialist and anarchist organizations at the 
dawn of the revolution (Avrich, 1967; Engelstein, 2018), the movement was initially dominated by 
the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionary Party (Partija socialistov-revoljucionerov, SR) 
(Avrich, 1963; Hasegawa, 2018). Mensheviks were quick to issue a call to all workers a few days 
after the Revolution began to form soviets (Galili, 2019, p. 24; Hasegawa, 1977). Therefore, 
actively participating in the expansion and political direction of the movement. The party achieved 
 
1 The dates mentioned with regards to Russia follow the “Old Style” dates (according to the Julian calendar). Since the 
analysis does not make one-to-one chronological comparison between the cases, the dates are not converted to the 
“New Style” dates (according to the Gregorian calendar that was implemented in Russia on 14 February 1918).  
2 Oskar Anweiler (1974, p. 113) estimates that there were 400 soviets in May 1917, 600 in August 1917, and 900 in 
October 1917. 
3 By 1914, the membership of the Bolshevik or the Menshevik factions of the Social Democrats hovered around 0.5 to 
0.8 per cent of the industrial workforce. Also, the trade union membership in 1914 was around 1.2 to 4.6 per cent of the 
industrial workforce (Albert, 2014) 
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the leadership of the most influential soviet in the country, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Deputies. In Moscow, the second largest and industrialized city in Russia at the time, 
Mensheviks were also dominant in the soviets and the factory committees in the first two periods of 
the revolution (Anweiler, 1975, p. 126). The composition of Menshevik’s executive committee was 
strongly moderate belonging to the group which operated legally during the war (Galili, 2019, p. 
26). Hence, it was this group that determined the political strategy of the party in the early stage of 
the revolution. The SR was uniquely advantageous over other forces in villages.4  
The foundation for what became the chief programmatic vision of the movement in the first 
period was laid out after a series of mutinies in the army between 28 February and 1 March. In 
response, the Petrograd Soviet issued the so-called “Order No. 1” on 1 March calling for the 
formation of committees and the election of soldiers’ representatives in all military units throughout 
the country. The units were formally subordinated to the Soviets and their committees; yet, they 
were to follow all orders issued by the Military Commission of the State Duma unless the order 
counters decrees issued by the Soviet. It also granted full citizenship rights to soldiers while not on 
duty. This was the first instance of the general strategy of “dual power” (dvoevlast'e) that dominated 
the movement in the first period within both the “political” and the “economic” spheres. It is 
important to consider “dual power” not as a natural condition of any revolutionary situation but a 
specific strategy with its own real or imagined possibilities, limitations, and contradictions in the 
context of a given balance of class forces. 
The formation of “dual power” strategy at the state level still required substantial 
programmatic effort by the Menshevik leadership. Julius Martov, one of the leading members of the 
Menshevik executive committee belonging to the “Internationalist” faction, cautioned against 
giving unconditional support to the provisional government and even more so against participating 
in a coalition as this would run the risk of depriving the social democrats of their independent 
proletarian policy or turn the proletariat against the party (Galili, 2019, p. 37). This stemmed from 
the conclusion reached within the “Internationalist” faction that the “camp of democracy” lacked 
sufficient legitimacy within the state agencies, the army, and Zemstvo, therefore requiring 
cohabitation with the liberal Constitutional Democratic Party (Konstitutsionno-Demokraticheskaya 
Partiya, Kadet) (pp. 59-60). The SR was on the same page with regards to the Provisional 
Government (p. 100-1). 
The Agreement towards establishing “dual power” strategy without any institutional 
linkages between the two was concluded between the executive committee of Petrograd Soviet and 
 
4 Despite the state repression during the war against the activities of the SR, the party thrived rapidly after the war by 
building on its already established reputation in the villages (Badcock, 2010, pp. 134-6). 
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the State Duma on 2 March (Galili, 2019, p. 63). This general political strategy secured the formal 
independence of the soviets from the provincial government, thereby sustaining the class character 
of the revolution as embodied in the “duality” of this “power” while paradoxically devising the 
possibility of a conditional social peace deemed necessary for the success of the long-term goals of 
the revolution. It laid out the condition of a generalized “citizens’ control” over the conduct of 
government without interfering directly with it. This was indeed similar to the idea of “workers’ 
control” in the “economic” sphere. However, there the Mensheviks were far less innovative and 
enthusiastic about the prospect of a “dual power” strategy at the point of production. 
The unions were generally not as strong as the factory committees after February (Anweiler, 
1975, pp. 126-7; Smith, 2004, p. 21).5 There was also a considerable overlap between the two 
organizations, on the matters related to the recognition of factory committees and trade unions, as 
well as the participation of factory committees and trade unions in hiring and firing practices 
(Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, p. 176). 
As early as 5 March, the Petrograd Soviet called for the formation of factory committees 
(fabricno-zavodskoy komitety).6 Many workers saw the downfall of the Tsar regime as an 
opportunity to end the despotism within the factory, particularly in state enterprises (Koenker and 
Rosenberg, 1989, p. 101) and to improve their working condition. Workers’ demands for 
democratization of workplace were based on the revolutionary ideals to be treated in ways 
“deserving of a worker and a free citizen” (as quoted in Galili, 2019, p. 73). The factory committees 
were in charge of representing workers at each enterprise vis-à-vis the employers and other 
institutions on issues related to wages, working hours, and working conditions, observing the 
application of regulations, supervising hiring and firing practices at the enterprise, and overseeing 
the military conscription of workers (Smith, 2017, p. 82). Any impasse between factory committees 
and management was to be dealt with by arbitration committees.7  
In the most abstract sense, the disposition of the factory committees towards power relation 
within the factory resembled the “dual power” strategy in the other spheres. The factory committees 
refrained from direct involvement in the management of production and instead assumed a 
supervisory role over the employers who retained their general albeit conditional managerial 
authority. Such democratic control, as modestly limited as it was during the first period (see 
Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, p. 127; Smith, 2017; Avrich, 1963), was perfectly compatible with 
 
5 For the diversity of the trends within the Russian trade unions, see Shkliarevsky (1992). 
6 For the links between these factory committees and the tradition of electing stewards (starosty) that go back to at least 
1905, see Smith (2017, pp. 57-8), Avrich (1963), and Shkliarevsky (1992).  
7 Establishment of such arbitration committees was agreed upon between the Petrograd Soviet and the Society of 
Factory and Works Owners (SFWO) on 10 March for the purpose of avoiding unofficial rank-and-file actions in the 
case of deadlock between the factory committees and the employers (Smith, 2017, p. 77).  
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the great bulk of factory committees’ activities focusing on the improvements of the economic and 
working conditions of workers. Such congruence was further entrenched in the context of the 
absence of established trade unions strong enough to monopolize a delimited set of “economic” 
struggles. The slogan “united around one revolution and organizational centre” was the most 
popular among Petrograd workers in this period (as quoted in Galili, 2019, p. 106). It effectively 
supported the “dual power” strategy to go along with the government insofar as it followed the 
resolutions of the soviets. 
Such a “dual power” strategy in the “economic” sphere was not possible without at least a 
passive collaboration of the capitalist class. In the first period, capitalists were more concessional 
towards the demands of the labour. On 10 March, the negotiations between the Petrograd Soviet 
and the leading capitalist association, the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners (PSFPO), 
reached an agreement to introduce 8-hour day, minimum wage, double-paid overtime, and the 
recognition of factory committees (Gaili, 1989, pp. 239-42).8 Some of the leading industrialists 
believe that further radicalization of the revolution could be averted through an alliance between the 
progressive bloc and the moderate socialists (Galili, 2019, p. 24). 
Just as the working class saw the end of the Tsar regime as an opportunity to break the 
despotism in the factories, the Russian peasants, who did not play a significant part in the uprisings 
leading to the February Revolution (Anweiler, 1975, p. 119), saw it as a chance to break free from 
traditional roles (Retish, 2008, p. 2). For the peasants, the notion of citizenship was an integral part 
of the revolution. Peasants were eager “to become full citizens and to play a major role in 
reconstructing the nation” (p. 67). Therefore, their aspirations went beyond land rights and included 
demands for freedom and equality (p. 83). The announcement by the Provisional Government in the 
first days of the revolution to abolish all hereditary and class restrictions and to prepare for an 
immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly as well as representatives to local self-governing 
bodies on the basis of universal male suffrage9 was a strong indication towards such desire for 
freedom and equality. Besides its substantial symbolic power, the convocation of the Constituent 
Assembly was seen as a necessary step towards legitimizing land reforms.10  
In the first period of the revolution, the Peasant Union movement swept across the country 
and began preparing peasants to vote in the forthcoming Constituent Assembly election. However, 
the soviets, led principally by the SR whose views were generally more radical than the Peasant 
Unions, began challenging the authority of the Peasant Union in the countryside (Retish, 2008, pp. 
 
8 For the agreement between the Petrograd soviet and the PSFPO, see Hickey (2011, Document 4.11). 
9 Suffrage was extended to women in July 1917.  
10 See the report of the Samara Provincial Peasant Congress held between 25-29 March that tied the full legitimization 
of land reform to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (Hickey, 2011, Document 5.6).  
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85-9). Soon, peasant soviets began to emerge especially in the urban centres. These were largely 
independent of workers’ and soldiers’ councils. The SR played a central role in the organization of 
these councils (Anweiler, 1975, pp. 121-2). Nevertheless, the relationship between the soviets and 
the Peasant Unions was not in the form of a hostile takeover or frontal challenge, but one of 
domination through a diversified collaboration including information affiliations, joint electoral 
lists, etc. (Badcock, 2010, p.137).11  
Contrary to Mensheviks’ deep distrust of peasants as the symbol of Russia’s 
“backwardness” (Galili, 2019, p. 29), the SR had long oriented itself ideologically and 
organizationally towards the Russian peasants and believed in their transformative power in the 
revolution (Anweiler, 1975, p. 91). Therefore, the collaboration between the Mensheviks and the 
SR within the soviets at different levels laid the foundation for a representational alliance between 
workers and peasants, giving the hegemonic project of the revolution a solid social foundation. Of 
course, this was meaningful only insofar as the social bases of these organizational representations 
stayed reasonably attuned to the parties. Despite the organizational weakness of the Bolsheviks in 
the rural areas, their programmatic vision on what needed to be done in the countryside was firmly 
articulately from early on. On 11 March, Bolsheviks’ Petrograd newspaper wrote “The revolution’s 
slogan must be to replace the old authorities in the countryside. The organized peasantry must take 
local power into its own hands [...] Democratic self-government in the army, villages, and towns!” 
(Hickey, 2011, p. 94).  
The continuation of the war effort despite the revolution created a fundamental contradiction 
at the heart of the revolutionary process. It continued to worsen the economic situation of the 
country and to heighten the social tensions associated with the war mobilization. Furthermore, it 
pressed on the tension that had already existed within those left-wing parties with a significant 
internal cleavage around the question of the war. This was notably the case for the Mensheviks and 
the SR, between their “internationalists” and “defensist” factions. In the context in which the class 
character of society has been revealed by the revolution and institutionally inscribed in the “dual 
power” strategy itself, the continuation of the war which now required the compliance of the soviets 
demanded serious programmatic efforts by the parties of the left.  
Two programmatic innovations emerged in this period, one by Irakli Tsereteli (Menshevik) 
and another by Lenin, that gave diametrically different answers to the dilemma of the orientation of 
the soviets towards the war effort. Tsereteli’s notion of “revolutionary defensism” (see Galili, 1982; 
Galili, 2019, pp. 134-40), formulated in late March, presented itself as a third way between 
 
11The end of the rise of the Peasant Union came after the First Provincial Peasant Congress in 6-10 June 1917 which 
was dominated by majority SR (Retish, 2008, p. 90). 
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“internationalism” and “defence”, thereby bringing the two factions within the Mensheviks together 
more coherently. It merged the idea of a continued war effort in defence of the revolution against 
German imperialism while insisting on a consorted effort to appeal to socialists in other countries in 
order to bring about a “just and universal” peace. This strategic shift was a remedy, albeit a 
temporary one, against the confrontation between the soviets and the Provisional Government on 
the question of the war; yet, it was entirely predicated upon demonstrable and effective steps by the 
Provisional Government towards peace without annexation. However, it led to another 
contradiction, undermining the very possibility of the “dual power” strategy, since “revolutionary 
defensism” required abandoning what Tsereteli called “the policy of an irresponsible opposition” 
(p. as quoted in Galili, 2019, p. 136). This position, which soon became the new ideological norm 
within the Menshevik executive committee, was not conceived originally as a departure from the 
“dual power” strategy but a strategy of pressing the Provisional Government to initiate the process 
of peace without annexation while continuing the “defensive war” as an existential struggle in 
favour of the revolution. Nevertheless, “revolutionary defensism” paved the way towards soviets’ 
greater “cooperation” with more “progressive” segments of the capitalist class, therefore, lending 
the Provisional Government a level of active support. This mediation shifted the contradiction 
between two factions within the party and tired the fate of the principal organizing forces behind the 
programme more intimately to the government’s handling of the war.  
  On 7 April, Lenin published “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution” (more 
commonly known as the “April Theses”) which articulated a “council republican” programme.12 
Having firmly rejected the “dual power” strategy by refusing “any support for the Provisional 
Government”, Lenin called for the transfer of power to the soviets to establish “not a parliamentary 
republic [...] but a Republic of Soviets of Workers’, Agricultural Labors’, and Peasants’ Deputies, 
throughout the country from top to bottom,” therefore demanding the establishment of what he 
called a “commune state”. Nevertheless, it condemned the Provisional Government for not having 
set an early date for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, thereby assuming that the 
promised democratic process would result in the transfer of power to the soviets.  
The programme considered the introduction of socialism as the immediate task of the 
revolution “to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the control of 
the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies”. It further called for “confiscation of all landed estate. 
Nationalization of all country’s land, which will be distributed by the local Soviets...” (see Hikey, 
2011, Document 3.15). This radical view was not only rejected by the majority of the Mensheviks 
 
12 The idea of soviet power did not appear in Bolsheviks’ manifesto, written by Vyacheslav Molotov on 28 February 
1917, which instead called for constitutional convention. 
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and SR leadership, calling it “absurd and impossible” (see Hickey, 2011, document, 3.16), but also 
majority members within the Bolshevik Party at least until the party conference in late April when 
Lenin’s view to win over the party, though far from unanimously so (Anweiler, 1975, pp. 155-7). 
Nevertheless, it was not disconnected from the sentiment of more radical segments of the rank-and-
file within the movement,13 even though the majority of workers, in general, were not ready to 
accept the programme of “all power to the soviets” (Galili, 2019, p. 157).  
As the economic situation continued to deteriorate, workers’ demands for higher wages and 
better working condition also grew. This was contrary to the expectation of the employers who had 
taken a more conciliatory approach to such demands earlier in the first period. This led to a shift in 
the orientation of the industrialists not only towards workers’ demands, but also their own 
organizations (Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, p. 146-8), further undermining the condition of the 
possibility of “dual power” strategy. 
 Amidst these transformations, a diplomatic debacle leading to massive protests effectively 
ended the first period. It began when the message by the Foreign Minister, Pavel Miliukov, to the 
Entente forces regarding Russia’s commitment to continue the war on the same principle as those of 
the Tsar regime was published on 18 April, sparking a political crisis known as the “April Crisis”. 
Protestors commonly demanded the resignation of Miliukov and the War Minister, Alexander 
Guchkov to resign; some even called for the dissolution of the entire cabinet (see, for example, 
Hickney, 2011, document 6.15 and 6.19).  
 The consolidation of the political crisis fell on the shoulders of the Menshevik and SR 
leadership, which in this period enjoyed a comfortable majority in key governing bodies of the 
soviets.14 The Menshevik leadership was at first skeptical about the consequence of abandoning the 
“dual power” strategy and forming a coalition with the liberal forces. A resolution passed in a round 
of meetings among the Menshevik leaders (21-25 April) stated that “[coalition] would fuse the 
soviet to the government and extinguish the soviet’s role as a revolutionary democracy’s institution 
that exercises control over the government.” It characterized coalition as “a radically unstable 
situation” which would cause an unavoidable collapse of the government (see Hickey, 2011, 
 
13 For example, a resolution passed on 4 April by the workers’ meeting at the large Novel Engineering plant in 
Petrograd read “the working class cannot trust any government that is made up of bourgeois elements and that depends 
upon the bourgeoisies.” It further called for immediate convocation of the Constituent Assembly and peace without 
annexation (see Hickey, 2011, Document 6.1). Similarly, workers at Staryi Parviainen plant, under the dominance of the 
(left) SR, passed a resolution on 13 April to “remove the Provisional Government ... and pass power ... to the soviet” (as 
quoted in Melancon, 2004, p. 152). 
14 The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies (3-24 June) was firmly under the 
dominance of “revolutionary defensist” Mensheviks and SR. The congress elected the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee (Vserossiysky Centralny Ispolnitelny Komitet, VTsIK) which was in charge of legislative and administrative 
tasks within the general framework outlined by the Congress. The Mensheviks and the SR were in strong majority also 
in the VTsIK. 
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document 6.23). The SR leadership was less wary of the prospect of “changing organizational 
dualism into organizational monism” (see Hickey, 2011, document 6.24). However, the crisis 
deepened the schism within the SR between the majority in the leadership and those on the left 
whose now-demonstrable suspicion towards collaboration with the Provisional Government to 
achieve peace led them to abandon the “dual power” strategy (Melancon, 2004, p. 152), though not 
at the cost of forming a coalition with the liberal forces. 
Amidst these considerations and hesitations, the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov and 
visible signs of defection among the soldiers against military command facilitated a change in 
Menshevik strategy towards a coalition. Tsereteli articulated this strategic shift as necessitated by an 
exceptional situation. He qualified the coalition as limited to the issue of war and peace while 
emphasizing the need for the soviet to declare full confidence in the Provisional Government 
(Galili, 2019, pp. 178-181). On 1 May, the Executive Committee of Petrograd Soviet voted in 
favour of the participation of socialists in the Provisional Government. Shortly after, the first 
liberal-socialist coalition government was created.15 This led to the diffusion of authority into the 
Provisional Government by virtue of the partial albeit significant participation of the Menshevik 
and SR representatives in it. This diffusion occurred while the soviets still retained, and in some 
areas such as foreign policy even increased, their “control” function over the Provisional 
Government on formal grounds (i.e. the effective continuation of the “dual power” strategy).  
This hybrid form of authority structure was an obstacle to pressing workers’ demand on the 
crucial questions of peace and economy. It was unpopular among workers as they were deeply 
suspicious of the “bourgeois government”. They rather see their socialist representatives take over 
the majority of seats in the cabinet in order to aggressively push for a peace policy and establish 
greater control over the conduct of the government; an alternative that was articulated by the 
remaining Menshevik “internationalists” (Galili, 2019, pp. 182-88).16 Therefore, the division 
between the rank-and-file within the movement and their leaders on the general issue of “citizens’ 
control” grew.  
 During May and June, there was an acute deterioration of the economic condition which 
manifested itself in the factories.17 Although still most strikes in this period revolved around 
economic demands (see Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, pp. 173-7), most factory committees 
 
15 Alexander Kerensky (Menshevik) became the Minister of War and Navy, Viktor Chernov (SR) became Minister of 
Agriculture, and Pavel Pereverzev (SR) the Minister of Justice.  
16 For example, Martov suggested a “pure democratic” government dedicated to radical reforms, most notably 
immediate armistice and democratization of the army, and immediate preparation for socialization (Galili, 2019, p. 
322). 
17 From the beginning of the revolution to the end of the second period, 563 enterprises, with 100,000 workers, had 
closed down (Avrich, 1963, p. 170). 
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expanded on their control activities and began monitoring supplies of raw material and fuel (Smith, 
2017, p. 149; Galili, 1982, pp. 252-3). It was also in the second period that the factory committees 
began considering ways to coordinate their actions in cities and even between provinces and 
Petrograd (Avrich, 1963, p. 175). 
In the hope to quell the radicalization of factory committees (Smith, 2017, pp. 63-4), the 
Provisional Government issued a decree on 23 April to give a more well-defined institutional and 
legal structure to them. However, the decree did not mention the “control” function of the factory 
committees. The leadership of the soviets and the Mensheviks also refused to sanction the exercise 
of control by the factory committees, and instead, called for regulation agencies. However, workers 
believed that neither the economic nor the political survival of the movement could be entrusted to 
the employers or the coalition cabinet. Also, that it was now up to them to impose greater control in 
their enterprises (Galili, 2019, pp. 250-3). In this sense, the growing division between the rank-and-
file and the leadership extended also to the issue of “workers’ control” within the “economic” 
sphere. 
In the meanwhile, the Bolsheviks intensified their activities within the factory committees. 
Their formulation of “workers’ control” also resonated with the syndicalist and anarchist tendencies 
among the workers (Anweiler, 1975, p. 127). The growing popularity of the Bolsheviks among 
workers in this period, particularly in the factory committees, is evident in the increasing number of 
factory deputies who were recalled and replaced with deputies affiliated with the Bolsheviks (Galili, 
2019, p. 297).  
In this period, the activities of anarchists became more pronounced, calling for “the 
immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government” (as quoted in Copp, 1993, p. 131).18 It was 
also around this time that many of the anarchist activists were arriving in Russia from exile for the 
first time after the February Revolution. From May 1917, anarchists in the capital began to focus on 
their organizational development and to cooperate with the Bolsheviks on certain issues (p. 134). 
For example, anarcho-syndicalists in Petrograd intensified their efforts via their activities in the 
factory committees to elaborate on the syndicalist tendencies in the factories in the form of 
“workers’ control” (p. 140). Furthermore, anarchist and Bolshevik activists jointly organized a mass 
demonstration in Petersburg against the government on 18 June (p. 132).  
Indeed, the issue of “control” proved to be the chief issue at the first Petrograd conference of 
factory committees held between 30 May and 5 June. In the conference, the Menshevik Minister of 
 
18 This position was to the left of the left-wing of the Bolshevik, such as that of Lenin who, in an article published on 22 
April, cautioned against “Blanquist attempt to ‘seize power’ [or] ‘arrest’ the Provisional Government” (see Hickey, 
2011, document 6.19). 
205 
 
Labour, Skobelev, called for “state control” rather than “workers’ control” over the industry, and 
that under the mediation of the trade unions rather than the factory committees (Avrich, 1963, p. 
166-7). The opposing formulated resolution by Lenin called for the institution of “genuine workers’ 
control,” “by means of a series of carefully considered measure, introduced gradually but without 
delay, leading to the complete regulation of production and distribution of goods by workers” (as 
quoted in Avrich, 1963, p. 167). The resolution also demanded two-third of all institutions of 
control be occupied by workers and that the government bring the war to a rapid conclusion. The 
Bolshevik resolution was passed with a strong majority, indicating the growing grip of the 
Bolshevik within the Petrograd factory committees. 
The widening gulf between the factory committees and the trade unions on key ideological 
and strategic questions became apparent during the 3rd All-Russian conference of trade unions in 
Petrograd in the last week of June. Following an undeniably Menshevik line of argument on the 
nature of the February Revolution, the trade union leaders in the conference argued that “the 
organizations of control must be such as are able to speak and act in the name of the entire 
revolutionary democracy of Russia...and not of only one interested portion – the workers” (as 
quoted in Avrich, 1963, p. 168). Despite the resolution presented by Vladimir Milyutin on the 
Bolshevik vision of “workers’ control”, the counter-resolution presented by N. Cherevanin 
(Menshevik) favouring broad participation of popular forces in the organization of state control 
over production won over the majority (p. 169). 
  In May and June, industrialists abandoned their faith in progressive labour policies and 
attempted to reverse the previous concessions. While their trust in the leadership in employers’ 
association declined, their sense of class interest increased in this period. They were pessimistic due 
to both the change in the composition of the Provisional Government and the relative loss of 
authority in their enterprises. Employers’ reaction shifted from passive resistance against workers’ 
demands in May to militant rejection of their demands and the decision of the arbitration 
committees in June (Galili, 1982, pp. 250-2; Galili, 2019, pp. 219-28; Rosenberg, 1974, pp. 172-3). 
The industrialist organizations also began voicing their opposition including what they perceived to 
be state intervention in the economy (p. 244).  
Regarding broader social classes, the end of the rise of the Peasant Union came after the 
First Provincial Peasant Congress, 6-10 June, following the First all-Russian Congress of Peasant 
Deputies during which an SR leadership was elected. The declining popularity of the Peasant Union 
was rooted in the dissatisfaction of the peasant members with the leadership’s vision towards the 
state power limited to supraclass social mediation at the time when the land question had become 
ever more contentious. There was a definite shift among peasants towards a more active 
206 
 
government with radical policies to address their grievances. The decline of the Peasant Union gave 
way to the soviets, under the majority SR leadership, to gain dominance among peasants. The First 
Peasant Congress pledged “loyalty to the Petrograd Soviet” and stood behind the “revolutionary 
defensist” strategy (Retish, 2008, pp. 90-1). However, the support of peasants for the soviet 
leadership was predicated upon meaningful land reform and the convocation of the Constituent 
Assembly, both of which were gravely hindered by the continuation of the war. In April, the 
Provisional Government set up a network of committees to prepare for land reform and to resolve 
land disputes. At first, the peasants were willing to cooperate with these committees. However, as 
the food crisis worsened, the peasants became less cooperative in giving up their products that they 
believed was rightfully theirs (pp. 97-8).  
 The “July Crisis” began when Kadet ministers resigned from the Provisional Government 
on 2 July in reaction to the decision by Kerensky and Tsereteli to give limited autonomy to Ukraine. 
Paradoxically, their resignations strengthened Revolutionary Defensists’ belief in the importance of 
a broad coalition. However, the mass mobilization and armed demonstrations against the 
Provisional Government on 3-7 July (“July Days”), in reaction to the Russian military offensive 
starting on 18 June, disrupted the attempts to solidify the coalition. Demonstrators called for a 
purely socialist government and “all power to the Soviets” (Galili, 2019, pp. 322-6). Despite all 
these backlashes, the programmatic orientation of the Menshevik-SR leadership towards the 
strategy of coalition did not change. In reaction to the growing popularity of Bolsheviks and 
anarchist among workers and soldiers, the Provisional Government and the Soviet leadership 
blamed the Bolsheviks for staging an insurrection and used this pretext not only to incite popular 
resentment against the Bolsheviks but also crack down on the party. The party was prohibited, its 
newspapers banned, and leaders arrested or exiled. In the short term, this damaged the 
organizational capacity of the Bolshevik. Nevertheless, in the long run, the government actions 
against the Bolsheviks moulded the popular image of the Bolsheviks as the polar opposite of and a 
widely (though not always clearly) known alternative to what the Provisional Government stood 
for. Furthermore, it also helped consolidate the differences within the Bolshevik party itself 
(Rabinowitch, 2007, p. 4).  
 In a series of articles immediately after the “July Day”, Lenin laid out a proposal for a 
programmatic adjustment by the Bolsheviks in response to the recent upheaval. In the article 
“Political Situation” written on 10 July and another “On Slogans” published in mid-July, 19 Lenin 
argued that the slogan “All Power to the Soviets!” in the sense of a peaceful transfer of power to the 
 
19 It should be noted that although “Three Crises” was written on 10 July and discussed extensively by the Central 
Committee on 13 and 14 July, it was not published until 2 August. 
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soviets was no longer adequate in the current non-peaceful situation. He instead pushed for a 
decisive mass uprising to overthrow the government and establishing the “dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the poor peasants”. The unique situation in the third period allowed for such a 
strategic position to be placed to the left of the soviet leadership without having to dismiss the idea 
of soviets as ultimately mass organizations for self-governance. Furthermore, the continued failure 
of the government not only to convene the Constituent Assembly but even to officially declare 
Russia a republic20 allowed Lenin to present this departure while staying committed to the idea of a 
rapid convocation of the Constituent Assembly.21  
 Despite Kerensky’s relentless efforts to form a coalition with the Kadets and despite the 
dismal result of the Kadets in the Municipal Duma elections in this period indicating the declining 
popularity of liberals,22 the leadership of the Kadets remained steadfast. Finally, the resignation of 
Kerensky on 21 July broke the intransigence of both sides to come together and form the second 
coalition government, with Kerensky as its “Minister-President”. This was achieved through a 
series of largely symbolic but not unimportant concessions such as standing in the government as 
“responsible” delegates rather than party or Soviet “representatives”. In certain respects, the 
coalition brought Kadets and the moderate socialists together on the question of forceful response to 
the Bolsheviks and the general orientation towards strengthening the military command. However, 
the political basis of coalition did not overcome the growing tensions between the Kadets and 
Mensheviks, and the SR leadership on the question of land reforms. Nor did it provide promising 
pathways to overcome worsening industrial conflicts (Rosenburg, 1974, pp. 191-5). 
In fact, by the end of July, the undeniable growth of the council movement in the 
communities, factories, and garrisons all over the country and the worsening and the growing 
militancy of the peasant movements in the countryside further weakened the left-wing of the liberal 
bloc which insisted on the continued collaboration with moderate socialists and strengthened the 
right-wing tendencies which saw right-wing military suppression of the soviets as the only way out 
of the deadlock. As a result, the party programmatically shifted towards the conservative groups and 
threw its full support behind General Kornilov.23 This trend intensified during August ever more 
explicitly and gave ample space for the right-wing counter-revolutionary forces to organize.  
 
20 This only happened on 1 September.  
21 For example, see Lenin’s two articles published on 3 and 13 October where he argued that as long as bourgeoisie and 
aristocratic landlords hold power (and now it is entirely theirs), the Constituent Assembly’s convocation is not 
guaranteed. [...] If the bourgeoisie is able to prevent the transfer of power to the soviets, it will disband the Constituent 
Assembly” (Hickey, 2011, document 12.5).  
22 See Rosenburg (1974, Table 3, p. 189) for the election results. 




In July and August, the economic crisis deepened. Employers were becoming more militant 
against the power of the factory committees, some of which had now moved further into controlling 
orders and finances. The situation brought the employers’ organizations in closer contact with the 
Kadets to coordinate their actions in their efforts to contain the advancements of the council 
movement and regain control of both the political and economic spheres.  
The rapid shift to the right reached its peak when General Kornilov attempted a military 
coup against the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet on 27 August. The putsch was 
crushed quickly and Kornilov was arrested. The failed coup showed the weakness of the Provisional 
Government and the complicity of the Kadets in such blatant counter-revolution attempt. Having 
lost their legitimacy as a force behind the democratic republic, the Kadets moved further to the 
right. This was evident in the majority view in their 10th congress in early October. 
The Bolsheviks saw their popularity grew exponentially after this event. Following the 
election of Trotsky as the Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet on 31 August, Kamenev’s resolution 
was adopted by the Petrograd Soviet on 1 September calling for an exclusively socialist 
government. This enabled the Bolsheviks to gain effective control of the Petrograd Soviet 
(Rabinowitch, 2007, p. 5). By 5 September, the majority of Moscow Soviet was Bolshevik 
affiliated. Therefore, after the early September elections in Petrograd and Moscow, it became clear 
that Bolsheviks had gained hegemony in the soviets. The Bolshevik slogan shifted back to the 
soviet power, but with an important caveat, calling for all power to “Bolshevik soviets” (Anweiler, 
1975, pp. 172).  
 It was around this time that Bolsheviks became concerned about the pace by which the 
influence of anarchists was growing among workers.24 However, given the organizational capacity 
of the anarchists compared to their effective alliance with the Bolsheviks in the previous period, the 
anarchists were not presenting a threatening alternative to the Bolsheviks. Rather, they were 
facilitating the alignment of the radical segments of the working class with the general orientation 
of the Bolsheviks towards soviet power. Nevertheless, from September, many Bolshevik resolutions 
qualified “workers’ control” of production as implying a state-wide control in order to distinguish 
their formulation from those of anarcho-syndicalist programme of factory seizures (Smith, 2017, p. 
165). 
In the context of the growing popularity of the Bolsheviks within the soviets, the 
Mensheviks, in an article published in Petrograd Menshevik newspaper on 15 September, distanced 
themselves from the idea of soviets as the foundation of a democratic republic. The article argued 
 
24 For empirical evidence on the growth of anarchists, see Copp (1993, pp. 169-70). 
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that “the soviets do not embrace the entire democracy. This is even truer now than in the 
revolution’s first months [...] Now, the lines are clearer and many of those functions [as the local 
self-government institutions that they were involved in at the beginning of the revolution] have 
passed from soviets to other democratic organizations” (Hickey, 2011, document 12.2). The SR 
Central Committee clarified its position on the question of soviet power in a similar vein in an 
editorial published in the SR Petrograd newspaper on 30 September. It argued that the formation of 
the soviets was the necessary element in the first phase of the revolution “because they were the 
only institutions in the country, the provinces, and the villages addressing economic and 
administrative chaos.” But, it argued, given the emergence of the new democratic institutions and 
the capitalist economic order that the Russian Revolution had to operate within, soviets “cannot 
constitute the basis for a state in a democratic republic” (Hickey, 2011, document 12.3). Given the 
weakness of formal democratic apparatus, the two parties could not effectively decentre the locus of 
popular power from soviets to other democratic institutions. In other words, the “other [or new] 
democratic organizations” that the Mensheviks and SR were referring to were severely lacking the 
capacity to offer a functioning alternative to the institutional power of councils. Therefore, as their 
organizational links with the soviets weakened, so did their institutional links with the popular 
movement as a whole.  
Lenin, who in the early September had argued for the formation of a purely socialist 
government to eventually transfer the power to the soviets, began articulating a more radical 
position at a meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee. In two letters on 12-14 September to the 
Central Committee, he argued that amidst a wave of peasant uprising around the country calling for 
the transfer of land to peasants and government’s military repression of these movements, the time 
has arrived to usher “all power to the soviets” as the only possible path to bring about immediate 
peace and land reform (Hickey, 2011, document 12.4). Despite such proposals that gravitated 
towards equating the notion of soviet power with insurrection, the Bolshevik Central Committee 
was not yet convinced of such a possibility especially given the bitter wounds of the “July Days”. 
They instead continued their call for the formation of all-socialist government before the 
convocation of the Constituent Assembly. This was aligned with the calls by factory workers for 
“homogenous socialist government” or “homogenous government of representatives of 
revolutionary democracy” (Smith, 2004, p. 26). It was not until 10 October that the majority within 
the Bolshevik Central Committee was convinced of this path forward and officially decided to 
prepare for insurrection. After this, the slogan of “all power to the soviets” became identical to 
insurrection (Anweiler, 1975, pp. 172-188). 
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 In September and October, the economic conditions continued to worsen, and industrial 
conflict intensified. The number of factory closures increased in these months. In such instances, 
factory committees took over the management of the enterprises to prevent their closure (Smith, 
2017, p. 149; Avrich, 1967, p. 172).25 By the end of September, the arbitration boards had lost all of 
their mediation power as the employers’ associations in Petrograd had become completely 
indifferent to their function (Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, p. 280). Increasingly, the employers 
refused to uphold the agreements that had been reached in the first period (Galili, 1982, p. 258). In 
the context of the growing radicalization of class struggle, the Bolsheviks and the left-SR joined 
forces on 21 September and called for an early convocation of the second national congress of 
soviets, to be scheduled for 20 October.26  
 The peasants had turned against the Provisional Government earlier in this period when the 
state agents sought to coercively get grain from the peasants. Also, the preparation process until 
August for the upcoming national election created tensions among peasants for the fear that the 
government was trying to get an inventory of their stock. By summer, the relationship between 
peasants and the political leaders had gone sore. Peasants sought to have representatives from their 
own ranks in the township elections in August and the upcoming constituent assembly. The 
Bolshevik rule did not affect the countryside until winter and particularly upon the implementation 
of the Land Decree (Retish, 2008, pp. 95-117). However, the SR continued to play a central role in 
the organization and articulation of the peasant movement. Indeed, the organizational activities of 
the left-SR among peasants was a crucial bridge between the Bolsheviks and the peasant 
movements to extend their hegemony beyond the working class.  
 To sum up, the “council democratic” movement in Russia emerged after the collapse of the 
Tsar regime. During the first period, the Mensheviks and the SR formed the main organizational 
forces behind the soviets and factory committees, making them the principal mediating force 
between the councils and the Provincial Government. Consequently, their programmatic vision of 
“dual power” strategy as a generalized form of “control” (in the sense of supervision) over the 
executive power in the “political” and “economic” spheres prevailed over others. The alliance 
between the Mensheviks and the SR was crucial in providing moderate socialists with a broad 
social appeal. The rapid growth of the SR after the February Revolution and their organizational 
activities within the peasant population alongside the Peasant Unions forged an important alliance 
 
25 By October, 289,000 workers (74 per cent of industrial workforce) worked in enterprises under some form of 
“workers’ control”. But even then, 90 per cent of small and medium size enterprises in Petrograd were untouched by 
“workers’ control” (Smith, 2017, p. 185).  
26 Lenin had argued in a letter on 30 August to the Bolshevik Central Committee that the Bolshevik should work 
particularly with the left SR to guide the masses “so they demand immediate transfer of land to the peasants” (Hickey, 
2011, document 10.14). 
211 
 
between the organizational representation of the working classes and the peasantry. The “dual 
power” strategy was not feasible without the collaboration of the forces involved. However, the 
continuation of the war, which was an absolute precondition for the collaboration of the Kadets with 
the moderate socialists, not only contributed hugely to the worsening economic condition of the 
country but also exacerbated tensions within and outside the political forces. It required a 
programmatic shift within the leadership of the Mensheviks and SR to come to terms with the 
continuation of the war efforts. This led to the emergence of “revolutionary defensism” as the 
programmatic resolution to this dilemma. However, it would not have been possible without closer 
collaboration between the soviets and the Provisional Government in the war effort. Therefore, 
what made it possible to exercise the “dual power” strategy paradoxically laid the ground to its 
termination or transcendence.  
 Amidst intensified political and economic crises in the second period, the “dual power” 
strategy was replaced with what can be described as a hybrid form of a socialist-liberal coalition 
government in which the socialists took a subordinate position while still maintaining the general 
authority of the soviets over the Provisional Government. Despite the continued dominance of the 
Mensheviks and SR in this period within the “council democratic” movement, the Bolsheviks 
expanded their organizational network particularly within the factory committees in key industrial 
cities. The Mensheviks and SR continued to pursue the “revolutionary defensism” that officially 
abandoned the generalized form of control over the executive power. The growing collaboration 
between the leadership of the soviets and the Provisional Government was taking place amidst 
intensifying class struggle in the workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ movements. This disparity made 
contestation over the articulation of “control” in theory and practice in both the “political” and 
“economic” spheres an important struggle. The programmatic vision of the left-wing Bolsheviks, 
first formulated by Lenin in his “April Theses”, began to gain tractions within the council 
movement. This shift was grounded in the contradiction of the “revolutionary defensism” that 
became apparent as Russia got more deeply involved in the war without clear signs of victory or 
peace.  
The third period saw a dramatic shift in the relations of organizational forces. Despite an 
immense set back in the aftermath of the “July Days”, the Bolsheviks quickly regained their support 
until they gained a hegemony among significant segments of the working-class population by the 
end of August. In the meanwhile, the left-SR expanded its organizing activities among key 
segments of the peasant population as well as strategically important segments within the working-
class population, creating the possibility of an alternative worker-peasant alliance to what was being 
pushed forward by the Menshevik and SR leadership. The liberal bloc, on the other hand, 
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progressively decoupled itself from the moderate socialists, starting from the beginning of this 
period, and aligned itself more tightly and explicitly with the conservative forces and the upper 
echelon of the military. The response of the moderate socialists to these developments was to seek a 
deeper coalition with the liberals while containing the militancy of the movement by legal and 
coercive means and gradually distancing themselves from the council movement. The 
programmatic vision of the Bolsheviks underwent several transformations during this period. 
Despite hesitations and disagreements, the executive committee was pushed towards the left until it 
authorized an insurrection, in alliance with the left-SR, to overthrow the Provisional Government.  
Comparing the trajectories of the movements in Russia, Germany, and Italy 
 This section examines the trajectories of the “council democratic” movements in Germany, 
Italy, and Russia comparatively. It focuses on the evolutions of these movements which, in the case 
of Russia, led to radical articulations and consolidation of “citizens’ control” and “workers’ control” 
and, in the case of Germany and Italy, the deradicalized articulation of the two dimensions of 
“council democracy” and the ultimate dissolution of the movements.  
The structure of the comparative analysis is different from that of the within-case analyzes. 
The latter was organized around the analytical categories of organizational links, programmatic 
efforts, and alliance patterns, across the respective periods, along the two constitutive dimensions of 
“council democracy” (i.e. “citizens’ control” and “workers’ control”). The within-case analysis 
followed a strategic-relational approach which required treating the movement itself as a terrain of 
contestation between various (endogenous and exogenous) organizing forces. In other words, the 
analysis of the movement is always mediated by the complex interactions between various 
organizing forces, each with its own formal aspects (i.e. internal structure, material/symbolic 
capacity, and relation within the state) and substantive aspects (i.e. programmatic effects, social 
base, and alliance patterns).27 This analysis reveals the micro-dynamics of contestation that come to 
shape the trajectory of the movement during a given period along a given constitutive dimension. 
Simplified summaries of these analyzes can be seen in Table 2, organized along the analytical 
categories. 
The comparative analysis presented here does not engage in a one-to-one examination of 
these analytical categories across the three cases. Instead, it compares the trajectory of the 
movement along the two constitutive dimensions across the cases. It offers a bird’s-eye view of the 
evolution of these movements, within their given contextual circumstances and structural 
conditions. In other words, it embeds the comparative evolution of the movements within 
 
27 In this sense, organizing forces themselves are more institutionalized or formalized movements in their own account.  
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contextual and structural factors specific to each case. The strategic-relational factor, with its 
organizational, programmatic, and coalitional dimensions, is what ultimately translates the 
significance of any conjuncture operating through any structure into political action. 
The comparative analysis begins by highlighting the differences in the initial conditions 
from which the movement in each case emerged. It then examines the comparative trajectory of the 
movement first along the dimension of “citizens’ control” and then along the dimension of 
“workers’ control”, across the three cases. The analysis compares the ability of the movement in 
each case to form alliances with broader popular classes, particularly with the peasantry. This 
emphasizes the ability of the movement in each case to broaden its hegemonic project beyond the 
working class.  
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Table 2: An Overview of Movement Trajectories along the Analytical Categories 
Case 
study 
Analytic Category Period 1 
(Germany: 1/11/1918 – 21/12/1918) 
(Italy: 21/6/1919 – 14/11/1919) 
(Russia: 23/2/1917 – 15/4/1917) 
Period 2 
(Germany: 24/12/1918 – 14/4/1920) 
(Italy: 15/11/1919 – 24/4/1920) 
(Russia: 18/4/1917 – 30/6/1917) 
Period 3 
(Germany: 15/4/1920 – 7/10/1920) 
(Italy: 24/8/1920 – 30/9/1920)  




SPD; Free Trade Unions; USPD; Obleute; Spartacus 
League 
SPD; USPD; Obleute; KPD; FVdG ADGB; DMV; KPD; FAUD 
Significant Programmatic 
Efforts 
SPD: councils as transitory to be dismantled after the 
convocation of the National Assembly as soon as 
possible; USPD: divergent views ranging from those of 
the SPD to council republic; Spartacus League: all 
power to the councils 
SPD: active dismantling of councils and full redirection 
of politics to the liberal democratic framework; USPD 
and the anarchists in Bavaria: radical republicanism; 
Obleute: “pure councilism”; Commission of Nine: 
bottom-up cooperative socialization process; FVdG: 
radical socialization  
ADGB: protection of union control and authority over 
labour relations; DVM: democratization of the ADGB, 






Free Trade Unions with leading capitalist organizations 
under the ZAG; SPD with elements of the old regime; 
USPD with BBB in Bavaria 
SPD with DDP and Center Party; USPD with KDP and 
anarchists in Bavaria; USPD, KDP, syndicalists in the 
Ruhr region and Central Germany 
Communists and syndicalists within the Red Army 








PSI (Turin section); FIOM PSI; FIOM; USI PSI; CGL; FIOM; USI; Anarchists  
Significant Programmatic 
Efforts 
ordine nuovo: transformation of factory committees to 
factory councils, radical democratization of trade unions, 
councils as institutions of transformative prefiguration 
towards establishing “workers’ democracy” 
PSI maximalists: dictatorship of the proletariat on the 
basis of soviets 
ordine nuovo: expanding on previous ideas, clarifying 
relationship between councils and unions; PSI 
abstentionists: rejecting ordine nuovo’s ideas about 
councils, calling for formation of soviets; USI and 
anarchists: “workers’ control” as an (anarcho-) 
syndicalist notion, linked to the occupation of the means 
of production 
USI and anarchists: “workers’ control” as generalized 
movement towards occupation of the means of 
production  




---  Some tactical alliance between PSI (Turin section) and 
the USI during the first half of this period; syndicalists 
and anarcho-communists  
syndicalists and anarcho-communists 
Dominant Accumulative 
Strategy 




Mensheviks; SRs; Bolsheviks Mensheviks; SRs; Bolsheviks; Anarchists Mensheviks; SRs; Bolsheviks; Left-SRs; Anarchists 
Significant Programmatic 
Efforts 
Menshevik-SR: generalized “supervision” by the soviets 
and the factory committees  
Menshevik and SR: councils’ more active cooperation 
towards ending the defensive war and protect the 
revolution; Bolshevik: council republicanism and self-
management of the means of production by the councils  
Bolsheviks: all power to the soviets; overthrow of the 
government to establish the dictatorship of the 




Mensheviks and SRs; Peasant Unions and SRs;  Mensheviks and SRs; Menshevik-SR with Kadet; SRs 
with peasant organizations; Bolsheviks and anarchists  




“dual power” “revolutionary defensism”  “all power to soviets” 
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The Initial Conditions in a Comparative Perspective 
The initial locus of the struggle for radical democracy at the time of the emergence of these 
movements different in the three cases. The movement initially was preoccupied with struggles 
along the “citizens’ control” dimension in the German case, and along the “workers’ control” 
dimension in the Italian case.  
As discussed previously, the German trade unions were integrated into the corporatist 
scheme that was set up during the war more deeply than their Italian counterpart. This was not only 
due to the organizational capacity and the numerical strength of the German trade unions but also 
their position towards the Burgfrieden during the war. Moreover, the realignment of principal class 
alliances that took place right before the German Revolution placed the trade unions at the centre of 
the post-war reconfiguration of class relations in Germany, allowing them to draw significant 
concessions from the employers. Their organizational capacity and structural position in the lead-up 
to the post-war transition enabled the German trade union leaders to fend off the thrust of radical 
democratic movements to undermine the fundamentals of industrial relations. The collapse of the 
militarized state apparatus facilitated the proliferation of the conciliar democratic struggle along the 
“citizens’ control” dimension. Therefore, the movement’s initial locus of struggle in Germany 
appeared largely along the “citizens’ control” dimension. 
In the case of Italy, the integration of trade unions into the state war mobilization, whose 
structure operated primarily at the factory level particularly in the last period of the war, was more 
limited and precarious. The bypassing of the trade unions weakened their structural position in their 
ability to contain the radicalization of the rank-and-file amidst a postwar economic crisis and 
conversely strengthened the structural position of the internal commissions as institutions of direct 
mediation. It is precisely through these institutions that the “council democratic” movement in Italy 
found its initial locus of struggle. Furthermore, while the Italian state entered into a period of deep 
crisis after the war, there was a continuity in the state apparatus which hindered the rapid expansion 
of the movement into the struggle for a radical democratization of the state along the “citizens’ 
control” dimension. Rather, the movement’s initial locus of struggle in Italy appeared first and 
foremost along the “workers’ control” dimension. 
In Russia, the “council democratic” movement found its loci in both “political” and 
“economic” spheres from the beginning. The breakdown of the autocratic regime brought the 
question of democratization within the “political” sphere to the forefront of the movement. At the 
same time, the movement extended itself to the “economic” sphere in which class relation between 
capital and labour was brutally undemocratic and largely unmediated. The trade union movement in 
Russia was relatively quite weak, having suffered years of illegalization and suppression both 
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before the revolution. Therefore, the terrain of struggle for economic democracy was far less 
contested, allowing the factory committees to expand their sphere of activities more freely within 
the “economic” sphere.  
The Comparative Evolution of the Movement along the “Citizens’ Control” Dimension  
The trajectory of the movement in Russia along “citizens’ control” during its first period 
evolved within the broader strategy of “dual power”. As a political strategy, “dual power”, at least 
as implemented in Russia, set up a control function over the executive branch that continued to 
serve the general interest of the capitalist class. It mirrored the relationship between the principal 
classes in a capitalist society onto the bifurcated structure of the state apparatus; thereby, the 
balance of class forces is inscribed in the very architecture of the state. 
Despite its form, it was based on cooperation between the classes. It did not seek to replicate 
the general form of industrial action in which the working class asserts itself by withdrawing its 
labour-power from production. Rather, it lent conditional support to continue the functionality of 
the state while preventing the executive power to engage in counter-revolutionary actions and to 
give an opportunity to working-class organizations to gradually build knowledge and confidence in 
the technical management of the state apparatus. It saw “citizens’ control” essentially as 
supervision” or “monitoring” (Kontrol') over the executive power of the Provisional Government 
enacted through the democratic organizations of subaltern classes (i.e. the soviets in the case of 
Russia). It was a republic whose class nature was made formally visible and whose sovereignty was 
divided along the lines of technical capability and popular legitimacy.  
The political interventions of councils as the new organizations of the popular struggle for 
democracy were largely mediated by other organizational forces. The significance of this went well 
beyond representational mediation since, in the context of “dual power” strategy, the very 
legitimacy of the state as a whole relied entirely on the ability of these forces (including those 
within the Provisional Government) to stabilize the deep disequilibrium of forces within the state. 
This was also predicated upon the ability of these forces to maintain control of their constituencies. 
The Mensheviks and SR took the role for the most part within the council movement. Their 
organizational capacity was more superior and their social base broader than other forces within the 
movement. The underlying ideology behind the programmatic vision of these two organizing forces 
rested on their conviction that the February Revolution was a “bourgeois revolution” during which 
the country would develop its institutional capacity within the liberal-democratic framework in the 
“political” sphere. Therefore, councils were seen as necessary but transitory entities to organize the 
society after the Revolution. Due to the weakness of the existing democratic institutions and the 
pressing requirement of the war, the election of the Constituent Assembly was delayed. This 
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retained the centrality of the soviets, which for the most part saw themselves as transitory, and yet 
primary institutions of self-government and popular sovereignty.  
However, given the continuous postponement of the election to the Constituent Assembly in 
Russia, the Bolsheviks, which were influential among a structurally powerful segment of the 
working class in Petrograd, had the opportunity to present a radical programme for the movement 
while insisting on the widely popular demands for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.1 In 
this way, the Bolsheviks were able to capture a wide range of democratic aspirations for “citizens’ 
control” under a relatively coherent programmatic vision that spanned from anti-statist anarchist to 
democratic parliamentarian. This allowed the articulation of the councils as radical institutions 
despite, or precisely because of, their democratic diversity.  
This bears an important similarity with the trajectory of the council movement in Germany 
during its first period. Like the Russian case, the collapse of the (militarized) state apparatus after 
the war created a space for a radical reconfiguration of the “political” sphere and articulation of 
“citizens’ control”. However, the purely socialist Provisional Government that was formed at the 
beginning of the revolution annulled the possibility of a “dual power” strategy in Germany. While 
the socialist composition of the Provisional Government formally gave unprecedented power to the 
socialist forces to reconfigure the newly proclaimed republic, it also obscured the class nature of the 
capitalist state. Furthermore, the growing integration of the SPD into the state that had accelerated 
in the last period of the war made the party leaders firmly determined to bring a swift end to the 
potential influence of the councils in the “political” spheres and put the country on the 
programmatic pathway that had already been outlined in the party’s Erfurt Programme. The 
political base of the Erfurt Programme was firmly anchored on a “republican” view of the state and 
the necessary reforms to get there. Such a “republican” political strategy meant that the councils 
were at best transitory organizations that emerged to maintain social order for a short period after 
the collapse of the militarized state at the end of the war and until the election of the National 
Assembly. Given the existing political culture and organizational capacity of the German state to 
hold such an election at a national scale quickly, such an election to the National Assembly could be 
held remarkably quickly after the Revolution. This was utterly impossible in Russia within the same 
time frame as in Germany. This reduced the length of time during which the political system had to 
rely on radical democratic organizations such as councils, if their programmatic vision could be 
formed to align with that of the SPD.  
 
1 The Bolsheviks turned against the Constituent Assembly only after the October Revolution. 
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The principal organizing forces behind the movement in this period was the SPD/Free Trade 
Unions and the USPD (and to a more limited sense the Obleute and Spartacus League). The SPD 
could activate its vast organizational network throughout large parts of the country to increase its 
influence within the council movement. The presence of the leading members of the SPD, all 
seasoned politicians, at the highest positions of state power and the relatively centralized structure 
of the party give the SPD a unique position to establish effective hegemony over the movement by 
coordinating the boundary of its strategic horizon outside and inside the state.  
The USPD’s limitations in organizational capacity significantly in its inability to bring the 
rapidly growing movement across the country under its direction. However, this by itself did not 
necessarily have to amount to coup de grace for the party. As we saw in the case of Bolsheviks 
whose sphere of influence on the movement in the first period was severely limited to radical 
segments in the capital, a combination of contextual factors and relative strategic clarity could over 
time make up for the initial organizational deficiencies. However, neither of those were to avail the 
USPD. The armistice at the onset of the Revolution augmented the internal tensions between 
various factions within the USPD whose basis of the alliance was the opposition to the war. This 
disoriented the party’s strategic response to the development into the first period, leaving the USPD 
unable to offer a coherent programmatic vision for “citizens’ control”. As discussed in the case 
study, there was great diversity within the USPD towards the political model of the new republic, 
including liberal-parliamentary democracy, hybrid models between parliamentarism and 
councilism, and council republicanism. The momentum behind a rapid convocation of the National 
Assembly as spearheaded by the SPD and supported for the most part by the majority within the 
leadership of the USPD pushed the radicals operating within the party to formulate “citizens’ 
control” in opposition to the National Assembly.  
The transmission of “council democratic” movement into the “political” sphere was far 
more limited in the Italian case during its first period. This was not only because of the continuity in 
the state apparatus after the war but also the role of the PSI leadership and their general strategic 
orientation. “Maximalist”, understood as a political strategy and at least as implemented in Italy, 
seeks to “hollow out” the unitary state either from within (“maximalist electionism”) or from 
without (“abstentionism”) in two ways. First, it does so by using the legal channels of liberal-
democratic state to progressively increase the presence of socialist forces within the state to 
ultimately cripple the functionality of the state apparatus. Second, it does so by denouncing the 
legitimacy of liberal-democratic framework by refusing to engage in its democratic process while 
building the power of socialist forces outside the state to ultimately overthrow the state apparatus. 
Therefore, despite its form, “maximalism” is based on disquieting noncooperation amidst formal 
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participation. One can say that “maximalism” is the political form of a general strike in the making. 
This is in sharp contrast to the characteristic of “dual power” strategy in the Russian case. In its 
electionist variation, it sought to use the liberal-democratic framework of political legitimacy, 
which was forced over time to include the representation of the working class into the state, as a 
means to enunciate its ultimate illegitimacy as an instrument of the ruling classes. In its 
abstentionist variation, it denounced the liberal-democratic framework as a facade with the sole 
reason of incorporating the working class into the state to pacify their revolutionary potentials. In 
building towards the inversion of the balance of class forces either within or outside the state, both 
variations would use the state apparatus as a political platform to increase the visibility of the 
socialist and working-class movement, but ultimately in an apolitical way. Within this broad 
political strategy, it was implausible to conceive of the council movement in its possible 
transformational prefiguration. Rather, councils were seen as the elemental form of the future 
socialist state effectively on stand-by until the revolutionary seizure of power by the party. 
The leading organizational force behind the movement in the first period was the l'ordine 
nuovo group in Turin whose leading figures were part of the PSI. Despite the programmatic efforts 
of the group to make sense of the emerging movement beyond its activities within the “economic” 
sphere, the party leadership at the national level whose general programmatic orientation towards 
the state followed a “maximalist electionist” framework did not facilitate the expansion of the 
movement as a generalized form of class struggle within and outside the state. The programmatic 
orientation outlined under “maximalist electionism” could not conceive of councils as means of 
revolutionary transformation in ways that were outlined in the programmatic vision of l'ordine 
nuovo group. This would require a different role for the party to channel the struggles outside the 
state into a strategic confrontation with various class forces within the state and facilitating the 
radical expansion of the movement using the state apparatus. In other words, it would require the 
party to act as a conveyer belt between the struggles inside and outside the state while being 
involved in the strategic articulation of movement in response to changing balance of forces in a 
given conjuncture. Instead, the majority of the party leadership saw councils as elements of the 
socialist state after the revolution rather than organizations that could facilitate the parallel 
transformation in the “economic” and “political” spheres.  
The programmatic vision outlined by the “abstentionist” wing of the PSI was unable to 
resolve the question of the transmission of the council movement into the “political” sphere. In 
seeking to bring the council movement into the “political” sphere, it dismissed the existing 
manifestation of the movement in the “economic” sphere as a moment in a larger process and 
instead insisted on a great leap to establish soviets and to push for “all power to the soviets” in Italy. 
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Its programmatic vision rests not only on a flawed assumption about the translatability between the 
Russian and the Italian contexts but also on a conception of the “council democratic” movement as 
a process that could unfold purely within the “political” sphere. Contrary to “maximalist 
electionism”, it did see councils (at least in their “political” mode) as means of revolutionary 
transition. It questioned the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic framework by withdrawing its 
consent from its channels of popular expression especially elections and strived towards building 
working-class power outside the state until it would be powerful enough to overthrow the ruling 
classes through a wave of revolutionary actions. In this sense, it was still a maximalist strategy. In 
both “maximalist electionism” and “abstensionism”, the party withdraws from direct engagement 
with class forces within the state and build towards a final stand-off.  
From the second period in the trajectory of the movement in Russia, the “dual power” 
strategy was progressively replaced with various coalition strategies between the liberal and 
socialist forces. In contrast to coalition formations in the parliamentary-democratic framework in 
which the legitimacy of the state relies on its popular-democratic basis, the coalitions that were 
formed in Russia prior to the Constituent Assembly carried the burden of the legitimacy of the state 
as a whole. In other words, whereas the failure of coalition strategies within the parliamentary-
democratic framework tend to be resolved endogenously, outside such a framework it could lead to 
the crisis of the state itself. Therefore, while not all coalition failures would result in a crisis, if it did 
then it would likely appear as a political crisis in the former case and a state crisis in the latter case. 
This is an important consideration to keep in mind when comparing the nature of coalitions and 
their failures in the cases of Italy and Germany, and Russia. In contrast to the Italian case in which 
the collapse of the coalition between liberal and Catholic parties in the third period did not lead to a 
generalized state crisis, the failure of the coalitions in Russia between the liberal and socialist 
parties starting from the second period always plunged the whole of the state into a crisis of 
legitimacy.   
The hybrid form of an authority structure that appeared in Russia in the second period 
presented a transitional phase between “dual power” and coalition strategies, legitimized on the 
basis of “revolutionary defensism”, was a move towards the formation of a unitary state 
architecture. As it brought together various parties into a coalition, it replaced the type of “citizens’ 
control” that asserted itself onto the executive power extrinsically as negation, with one in which it 
operated at best intrinsically as determination. In this way, the fault line of the potential crisis was 
no longer between the two political axes clearly inscribed in the bifurcated state architecture but 
within the singular axis of coalitional government in an increasingly undifferentiated unitary state. 
The latter configuration would implicate the leadership of the parties involved vis-a-vis their bases 
221 
 
much more directly than the former. As such, the failure in the latter case to realize “citizens’ 
control” substantively would more likely result in radical dissociation of the constituency from the 
leadership of the party. Combined with the consideration above regarding the nature of coalition 
different frameworks, we can make sense of why the failure of the coalition in Russia had such 
fundamental consequences on the legitimacy of the socialist parties and the state in contrast to that 
in Germany under the “Weimar Coalition”.  
While the Mensheviks and SR continued to dominate the council movement in the second 
period, the change of broad political strategy to “revolutionary defensism” had implications for the 
significance of councils in their programmatic vision. While participation in the coalition 
government carried greater risk for the stability of the state, it required the council movement to 
abandon the generalized form of “supervision” over the executive power and to embrace an active 
form of cooperation. This meant the end of the generalized form of “supervision” over the executive 
power. However, the implementation of such a programmatic shift proved ever more untenable 
amidst the deepening economic crisis and pressing demand for peace.  
In the meanwhile, the Bolsheviks expanded their organizational network particularly within 
the factory committees in key industrial cities. Lenin’s April Thesis outlined a clear and remarkably 
libertarian vision for the council movement. It not only facilitated the Bolsheviks to strategically 
orient themselves towards the movement more coherently but also for more radical tendencies 
within the working-class movement to form effective alliances with the Bolsheviks. The continued 
postponement of the election of the Constituent Assembly allowed the Bolsheviks to avoid 
positioning themselves against the broad democratic demands of the population. In other words, it 
made it possible to maintain a broad republican programme that encapsulated both parliamentary 
and council republican visions. This was precisely what the parties to the left of the SPD in 
Germany were deprived of after the first period. 
The prompt election of the National Assembly in Germany at the beginning of the second 
period, which served as both a constituent assembly and unicameral legislature, changed the terrain 
of struggle for “citizens’ control”. Contrary to the dominant tendency during the first period of the 
trajectory of the movement in Germany in which “citizens’ control” was to be carried out primarily 
through the supervisory work of councils elected on the basis of recallable delegates, the emergence 
of the National Assembly demanded the translation of “citizens’ control” as a contestation between 
the representatives of various political parties elected by individual citizens on the basis of universal 
suffrage in the terrains of parliamentary politics to devise laws and oversee their implementation by 
the executive power of the government. As such, “citizens’ control” was no longer embedded in the 
very institutional form of political contestation as is the case in the conciliar framework; rather, it 
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may appear at best as a secondary effect of parliamentary contestation between various political 
parties.2 Given the democratic legitimacy that the state and its parliamentary form of political 
contestation, workers’ loss of trust in the SPD, led not to a collapse of state legitimacy but a major 
shift in the electoral results in 1920 between the two socialist parties.  
Although assertion of “citizens’ control” within a formally liberal-democratic framework 
with substantial room for councils might still be possible, it would require strategic alliances, 
consorted programmatic efforts, and effective coordination of forces inside and outside the state in 
ways that could muster enough power to be able to wield the state towards a “council democratic” 
vision of “citizens’ control”. The role of political parties in this process remains crucial especially in 
their ability to wage effective struggles between various class forces within the state while actively 
translating the struggles outside the state into political contestation inside the state with the aim to 
transform the state. But given the dismal outcome of the election for the USPD, the party could not 
assert its more radical, though debilitatingly incoherent, programmatic vision for the movement in 
the “political” sphere through parliamentary activity either. 
One of the consequences of the shift to parliamentary struggle is that the organizational 
forces involved in the “council democratic” movement which either do not operate as (formal) 
political parties or fundamentally reject parliamentary struggle stand in a distinct disadvantage in 
their ability to shape the political process that concerns the framework within which the movement 
evolve. This does not mean that their activities are necessarily inconsequential. It is conceivable that 
by remaining outside the formal political process, they might gain a larger degree of freedom to 
engage in various activities concerning the movement or remain untainted by the real or imagined 
flaws of the existing framework and the performance of forces within it. In fact, such considerations 
played a part in the strategic calculation of some of the organizations that did not participate in what 
they deemed to be a bourgeois state. However, given the structure of political legitimacy and formal 
political process especially in its ability to contain political crises, those organizing forces wishing 
to assert their influence on the political process concerning the movement often have to form 
alliances with political parties inside the state while solidifying their support within the movement 
to stay a relevant organizational force to reckon with.  
The progressive radicalization of the movement in Bavaria towards a radical republican 
vision of “citizens’ control” is a case in point. This involved anarchists, the left radicals within the 
USPD, and a small minority from the newly established KDP. The impact of their uprising on the 
state and the movement as a whole remained quite limited and localized. A similar process of 
 
2 This is not to say that “citizens’ control” in conciliar framework is an unmediated phenomenon. As we have seen 
throughout the analysis of the movements, the role of organizational forces remains central in this process.  
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radicalization in Berlin could assert itself onto the state and expand its reach within the movement 
even less. The power of the USPD and the KPD within the state, both as the main organizing forces 
involved, had been severely weakened from the beginning of this period. The KPD had refused to 
participate in the election to the National Assembly. It also could not forge an alliance with the 
Obleute to expand its social base at least among the critical segments of the working class in the 
capital. The USPD, whose position within the emerging state had already been severely weakened 
at the end of the first period, saw its influence dwindled within the formal channels of the state after 
its poor electoral results. These diminished the ability of the radical trends within the movement to 
sustain their radical project.  
In the case of Italy, this limitation is evident in the way the syndicalist organizations, 
particularly the USI, was marginalized during the third period. Despite the significant shift within 
the movement towards syndicalism both in their organizational and programmatic activities, the 
inability of the USI to form an effective alliance with the PSI isolated them from the legislative 
process that fundamentally reshaped the evolution of the movement thereafter. Similar limitations 
concerned the anarchist groups in both Italy and Germany.  
By the end of the second period, the struggle for a radical democratic articulation of 
“citizens’ control” within the council movement in both Germany and Italy effectively came to an 
end. In Italy, the trajectory of the movement was largely isolated from influencing the formal 
political process. In Germany, the movement was rapidly contained and decoupled from the formal 
political process. In Russia, however, the activities of the movement along the “citizens’ control” 
dimension became even more vibrant towards the end of the second period and into the third period.  
Let’s sum up the evolution of the “council democratic” movements along the “citizens’ 
control” dimension. The evolution of the movement in the context of continued mobilization for the 
war in the case of Russia as opposed to the context of demobilization and post-war recovery in the 
cases of Germany and Italy already laid out profoundly different criteria for the trajectory of the 
movements. In the context of repeated postponement of the convocation of the Constituent 
Assembly in Russia that could potentially offset the popular struggles, on the basis of conciliar 
power, it became increasingly clear to ever-larger segments of subaltern classes that their most 
pressing demand, peace without annexation, could only come about by further democratization of 
the state to realize “citizens’ control” over the “political” sphere. The war also burdened the 
emerging political structure in Russia to continue a project that required a national unity towards 
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total mobilization. This was required at the time when the state apparatus was struggling to reshape 
itself after the Revolution and when the possibility of explosive class antagonism was at its height.3 
In Germany and Italy, the war question that had caused so much upheaval especially during 
the third period of the making of these movements was, from the outset of the emergence of the 
movements, replaced with the question of the transition to peacetime. This phase was surely not 
free of its own tensions and contradictions. But it allowed a transformation in the perceived essence 
of councils. This had implications for workers’ councils, soldiers’ councils, and peasants’ councils 
respectively. It meant that workers’ councils could be treated as institutions for peacetime 
production for economic recovery rather than industrial mobilization and war production and for the 
military-industrial complex. It also implied that soldiers’ councils could be seen as institutions of 
demobilization and public order rather than war mobilization and military order. Lastly, it entailed 
that peasants’ councils were to function as institutions of rehabilitation of demobilized peasant-
soldiers and maintenance of rural order rather than catering the army with new flesh and infusing 
the countryside with patriotic sentiment. 
Since the movement in each case was mediated through organizing forces with their own 
relationship to the state, some operating directing within and others at some distance from the state, 
the structure of the state influenced the evolution of the movement. Aside from their particular 
characters, the different ways in which contradictions and tensions were rendered through the state 
related to the difference in the state structure between these cases. In this regard, the presence or 
absence of a parliamentary-democratic structure plays a central role in the probability of containing 
political crises from becoming a generalized state crisis. This gave a different significance to 
political formations such as coalition in Russia on the one hand, and Germany and Italy on the 
other.  
The strategic responses of various forces, particularly those of political parties, are crucial in 
understanding the differences in trajectories of the movement. In this regard, the strategic role of the 
Bolshevik party in all the three analytical dimensions remained fundamental in exploiting the 
contextual and structural specificities of Russia to successfully press for radical implementation of 
“citizens’ control” on the basis of conciliar power as the only solution for realizing the basic 
aspiration of the movement. None of the organizational forces in Germany or Italy were able to do 
so with the same strategic precision.  
 
3 This is despite the fact that the country experienced a relative reduction of class antagonism during the first period of 
the trajectory of the movement, as the collapse of the aristocratic absolutist state temporarily brought capitalist and 
working classes together. As we saw in the outline above, the crisis that ended this period and reignited class 
antagonism had its roots precisely in the contradictions opened by the war.  
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The Comparative Evolution of the Movement along the “Workers’ Control” Dimension  
 The analysis now shifts to the trajectory of the movements along the “workers’ control” 
dimension. In Russia, the locus of the struggle for democratization appeared from the onset of the 
February Revolution not only within the “political” but also the “economic” spheres. Instituted 
formally as part of the generalized form of control established on the basis of “dual power” strategy, 
factory committees assumed authority over certain managerial aspects of labour relations. Even 
though the scope of such activities was quite modest especially in the first and second periods, they 
were seen as significant steps forward in the path towards the democratization of the relations of 
production along the organizational form of councils. 
Even though the structure of industrial relations in Russia in the context of the acute 
weakness of the trade union movement made such imposition of the factory committees inevitable, 
it was not possible without the collaboration of the dominant fractions or organizations of the 
capitalist bloc, just as the establishment of the “dual power” strategy in the “political” sphere was 
predicated upon the collaboration of the liberals. The background of that conditional collaboration 
was the war effort, albeit for different reasons. Indeed, this situation during the first period led to the 
general reduction of industrial conflict and class antagonism, and an increase in the concession 
made by the employers towards workers’ economic demands. However, after the end of the first 
period, when the “dual power” strategy began to be replaced with a coalitional strategy, the 
dynamics of class relations at the point of production increasingly radicalized amidst worsening 
economic condition and political crises.  
The Mensheviks were not very keen on pursuing the project of democratization of the 
“economic” sphere on the basis of conciliar power. They much preferred to empower the unions to 
establish a regulated industrial relation modelled after the idea of the Western European model of 
capitalist production. The Bolsheviks had some organizational presence in the factory committees 
and (to a lesser extent) in the soviets, especially in Petrograd. However, due to its limited 
organizational capacity after years of suffering from suppression, the Bolsheviks had to rebuild their 
organizational network and expand their social base. During the first period, the party still did not 
have a clear programmatic vision towards the council movement. Forces to the left of the 
Bolsheviks such as the anarchist and syndicalist groups were organizationally much weaker and 
scattered. Their relative absence meant that the Bolsheviks did not have to compete much against 
forces to their left.  
In Italy, the movement initially concerned itself with the democratization of industrial 
relations through factory committees. However, there was no supportive structure like what existed 
under the auspices of the Russian “dual power” strategy in post-war Italy. It is true that factory 
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committees had been empowered by the particular form of war mobilization that took place 
especially during the third period. Nevertheless, after the war, employers, especially those 
belonging to large industries, much rather deal with the trade unions than with the factory 
committees. Such strategic selectivity towards trade unions diminished the political space for a 
relatively uncontested evolution of factory committees. As part of the transition to peacetime 
industrial order, they were willing to make substantial economic concessions to the trade unions’ 
demands and thereby take the wind out of the sails of the factory committees whose tendency to 
intrude into authority structure of the enterprise they found deeply threatening.  
In turn, the trade unions, eager to affirm their position in the postwar era, initially found 
factory committees useful in extending trade unions’ reach to enhance trade unions’ presence at the 
enterprise level and press the employers to make concessions. Toward the end of the first period, 
the CGL leadership, supported by the leadership of the PSI, sought to contain the transformation of 
factory committees to a general proletarian institution by preventing the expansion of voting to non-
union members. Under the pressure of the rank-and-file, this strategic manoeuvre was only 
successful insofar as it managed to restrict factory commissars to union members only. Between 
these two pillars of power in the germinating industrial relations, factory committees had to carve 
out their sphere of authority and activities more vigorously on the question of “workers’ control” 
and more firmly at the enterprise level.  
Under the programmatic efforts of l’ordine nuovo group, the movement began a process of 
transforming the factory committees into factory councils. They were seen in their prefigurative 
possibility as institutions of the working class to transform the capitalist social relations 
generalizing itself from the “economic” sphere into the “political” sphere towards the 
transformation of the state. The relative organizational weakness of the syndicalist and anarchist in 
the first period especially in Turin gave more space to the programmatic efforts of the l’ordine 
nuovo group.  
 In Germany, the conditions for the growth of the movement in the “economic” sphere 
during the first period was even more restricted, even though the Revolution appeared to have 
opened a vast space for popular struggles for democratization. This was predicated upon the initial 
conditions discussed above within which the movement in Germany emerged. Therefore, the 
question of “worker’ control” in Germany was temporarily delayed and left to the Socialization 
Committee to offer a clear pathway towards the democratization of the economy.  
 The further radicalization of councils within the “economic” sphere upon worsening 
economic situation after the first period of the trajectory of the movements manifested themselves 
differently in the case of Russia compared to those of Italy and Germany. In Russia, the pressing 
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requirements of the war effort in the context of a weak trade union structure continued to give 
factory committees enormous leverage within the industrial relations.  
The strategic orientation of the Mensheviks towards the factory committees underwent a 
quiet transformation after the party’s turn towards “revolutionary defensism” in the second period. 
The active cooperation that the general political strategy required, amplified on the background of 
the Menshevik’s more fundamental view of the Russian revolution as a “bourgeois revolution”, 
pushed the party to focus its energy more on the development of trade unions. Given the weakness 
of the trade unions, however, it could not wholly abandon its activities within the factory 
committees. Nevertheless, this inclination allowed the more radical tendencies, most notably the 
Bolsheviks, to expand their influence within the factory committees.  
Furthermore, factory councils had institutional primacy not just in the struggle for “workers’ 
control” but the struggle for economic improvement. This allowed the councils to act as institutions 
that could capture a broad set of working-class demands without having to draw a line between 
“radical” and “reformist” and position themselves along such an axis. This gave the factory 
committees institutional flexibility to undergo radicalization without having to abandon its broad 
appeal. 
The Bolsheviks who have been active in the factory committees from early on intensified 
their organizational efforts within these working-class institutions and provided a clearer 
programmatic articulation of “workers’ control” on the basis of conciliar power. Their superior 
organizational capacity compared to those of anarcho-syndicalists and the appealing affinity of their 
programmatic vision to some aspects of anarcho-syndicalism paved the way for an informal alliance 
between the anarcho-syndicalist groups. Operating in such a setting was also hugely beneficial for 
the Bolsheviks. Just as they could maintain their appeal within the “political” sphere to broadly 
democratic demands for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly while calling for radical 
“citizens’ control” on the basis of conciliar power, they could insist on the broad economic demands 
of the working class while calling for radical “workers’ control” on the basis of conciliar power.  
 The process of radicalization of factory committees in Italy unfolded differently in the 
second period. In the context of postwar economic transition and the structural empowerment of 
trade unions, factory committees lost much of the institutional leverage that they did and perhaps 
could otherwise have. Given the active presence of trade unions in postwar economic struggles and 
the heightened attention of the union leaders to the independent activities of the factory committees 
that could potentially undermine their position in the industrial relations, factory committees fell 
increasingly under the organizational leadership of the syndicalist forces. The shift became ever 
more visible after the defeat of the April Strike in the second period.  
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The organizational force behind the growth of syndicalist influence in the movement in Italy 
was the USI. This process was accompanied by an increase in the programmatic efforts of the 
syndicalist within the movement along the “workers’ control” dimension. The shift towards 
syndicalism continued despite the limited alliances that were made between the left-wing socialists 
in Turin around l'ordine nuovo group and the USI in the early stages of the second period. The 
articulation of “workers’ control”, therefore, gravitated further towards the programmatic vision of 
the syndicalists.  
 In Germany, the radicalization of movement within the “economic” sphere emerged largely 
after the intense struggle within the “political” sphere during the first period. The first spark 
appeared early in the second period in the mining region of Ruhr where the socialist trade unions 
were relatively weak. This as well as the resolution passed by the First Congress to begin the 
socialization of the mining sector immediately created a unique space for the radical tendencies in 
the working-class movement to organize themselves around workers’ frustration with the deepening 
economic crisis and the constant deferral of the socialization program.  
Although syndicalist organizations in Germany were relatively weak, they were able to 
grow their organizational capacity by building on certain traditional tendencies in the mining sector 
that gravitated towards syndicalism. This process, amplified by the repeated failure of the socialist 
forces to meet worker’ demands in the region, allowed organizations such as the FVdG to become 
mass organizations in a relatively short span of time. Furthermore, under the influence of the FVdG, 
the programmatic vision of the movement in the region approached a broadly defined syndicalist 
understanding of “workers’ control”. Despite the growing popularity of the syndicalist forces, their 
external and often intransigent relation with the state made it extremely difficult to transmit their 
organizational strength incrementally and to influence the balance of class forces within the state.  
In the second period, the movement sought to appeal to the legal-administrative channels of 
the state, as in the case of negotiations with the Essen delegates who managed to gain formal 
recognition of factory councils although outside the legal framework applied to the workers’ 
committees. Similar actions took place in Central Germany but more along the line similar to the 
activities of the council activists in Turin towards the democratization of unions by opening up 
voting rights to workers’ committees to all workers. In their programmatic vision, the articulation of 
their radical demands still revolved around the idea of the general socialization plan, however, with 
expanded control rights over management to prepare the industries for socialization and a bottom-
up organization of the socialized industries.  
In Russia, the radicalization of the movement in the “economic” sphere accelerated into the 
third period as the capitalist and liberal blocs increased their intransigence towards the movement 
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and resorted to reactionary tactics such as lockouts and putsches to gain control of the political 
process. This parallel yet interconnected development created the condition for the sublation of the 
two constitutive modes of the movement, under the organizational and programmatic work of the 
Bolshevik in alliance with the left-SR and other radical left groups. Thereby, they were able to 
successfully transform the accelerating gravitation towards self-management into an articulated 
whole.  
 In Italy, there was a growing radicalization of the movement along the “workers’ control” 
dimension in the third period. The influence of the syndicalist forces continued to deepen within the 
movement in this period. Although the wave of factory occupations that surfaced during the third 
period had strong affinities with syndicalist programmatic visions and substantively influenced by 
their organizational efforts before and during the period, its evolution was formed primarily by the 
overarching activities of the PSI and the CGL in negotiation with the central government. The 
structural position of the socialist forces as the legitimate and preferred negotiating partner allowed 
them to assert their strategic position and shape the course of the movement in its most radical 
period. Through the mediation of the socialist forces, the liberal government found a way to place 
the trajectory of the movement on the legal-administrative path on the basis of its own deradicalized 
and corporatist interpretation of “workers’ control”. 
 In Germany, the further evolution of the movement along the “workers’ control” dimension 
in the third period continued under the influence of anarcho-syndicalist organizations such as the 
FAUD as well as militant factions within the socialist trade unions including the DMV. Both 
pursued some version of radical unionism to democratize the trade union movement on the basis of 
the councils. The former aimed at circumventing the existing trade unions and establishing 
revolutionary unions. The latter sought to transform the union movement from within by radically 
democratizing it and instituting industrial unions.  
The struggles for democratization within the DMV resembles the activities of council 
activists in Turin around l'ordine nuovo. Like their Italian counterpart, they also had to struggle in 
and through powerful socialist trade unions and position themselves with respect to the policies of 
the socialist party at the local and national levels. Their struggle towards radical organizational and 
programmatic activities eventually drew the attention of the union leaders and led to a frontal attack 
between union leadership and council activists. Similar to the case of Italy, the structural position of 
the socialist trade unions in the postwar industrial relations, which was far more superior than what 
existed in Italy, allowed them to effectively contain the leftward push exerted internally by radical 
socialists within the DMV and externally by anarcho-syndicalists in the Ruhr region.  
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Let’s sum up the evolution of the “council democratic” movements along the “workers’ 
control” dimension. While movement trajectories in all three cases underwent radicalization, the 
ways in which the process unfolded differed profoundly between the positive and negative cases. 
The context of war after the Revolution in Russia loomed large as a multifaceted factor behind the 
ways in which the contradictions of imposing “workers’ control” influenced the trajectory of the 
movement. While giving the working-class organizations at the point of production a unique 
capacity to put forward various demands for economic improvement and democratization of the 
workplace in exchange for their continued participation in the war effort, it simultaneously limited 
how much they could expand their demands before they would undermine the very condition of 
their wartime empowerment. The transition to a peacetime economy in Germany and Italy opened 
the space for rapid realignment of class forces and fundamental recomposition of industrial relations 
in ways that potentially benefited certain forms of working-class organizations over others.  
The structure of industrial relations in Russia with weak trade union organizations put 
factory committees in a superior position to shape the contours of “workers’ control”. Conversely, 
after the February Revolution, the Russian capitalists, whose class organizations and consciousness 
were relatively weak compared to those in Germany and Italy, lost the support of the repressive 
apparatus of the state that they had so heavily relied on for years to maintain industrial order and 
assert managerial authority. In both Germany and Italy, the presence of relatively strong socialist 
trade unions and their role as the preferred partner in the eyes of capitalists created an explicit 
competition between various trade unions and the factory councils.  
It was within these contextual and structural factors that the strategic orientation of the 
Bolsheviks can be understood. This includes their concerted efforts to grow organic support in the 
factory committees and exert a left-ward push within the labour movement towards “workers’ 
control” on the basis of conciliar power and form effective alliances with other radical forces. In 
both Germany and Italy, the strategic orientations of the main socialist parties were either 
diametrically opposed to the realization of the movement (as in the case of the SPD) or profoundly 
confused regarding the nature of the movement (as in the case of the PSI). Other left-wing parties 
were either organizationally weak, programmatically incoherent, or coalitionally too distant from 
the channels that could exert forces within the state.  
Hegemonic Reach of the Movement in Comparative Perspective  
The horizons of popular struggle for democratization of social relations expanded in these 
countries in varying degrees when peasants began to assert themselves onto the existing feudal class 
relations. While in Russia and Italy, these took the particularly militant form of widespread land 
occupations and redistributions, they can be seen as part of the general struggle for democratization 
231 
 
of the existing social relations in all these cases. However significant on their own account, the 
implication of those struggles on the “council democratic” movements are examined in the analytic 
framework presented in this study as part of the alliance patterns with social classes outside the 
movement. If we understand “council democratic” movement as essentially a working-class project, 
the ways in which the movement could link up with other social classes were fundamental in their 
ability to create and stabilize an intraclass hegemonic order.  
Regarding broader popular classes, it was only in Russia that the peasant movement was 
brought into the orbit of “council democratic” movement. It went beyond the formation of peasants’ 
councils or the inclusion of some peasant representatives into the existing councils at various levels. 
The SR whose theoretical stance towards and organizational activities within the peasantry went 
back to pre-revolutionary years, was the chief force behind this alliance. As outlined above, the 
contours of the relationship between the SR and the peasant movement changed over time. 
However, in the first period, the ability of the SR to establish an effective alliance with the 
organizational forces in the villages, most notably the Peasant Unions, and the success of their 
programmatic efforts to effectively articulate some of the major grievances of the rural population 
paved the way for the party to gradually assert itself as a leading organizational force within the 
peasant movement. In addition to the SR, some of the leading members of the Bolshevik executive 
committee had paid serious attention to the peasant question in the revolutionary process in Russia 
that allowed the party, despite its organizational weakness in the countryside, to remain attentive to 
the incorporating the peasant movement in its programmatic articulation for the council movement.  
In contrast, the leading socialist forces in Germany lacked both concrete organizational 
networks within the peasant population and theoretical elaboration on the potentially active role of 
the peasant movement in the revolutionary process. The only notable attempt to build an alliance 
with organizational forces within the peasant movement was the USPD in Bavaria. However, as 
discussed in the case study, even this was rather limited in scope and time. Alliance with the 
peasant movement was even more deficient in the Italian case, even though the peasant movement 
itself in its aspirations and activities resembled that in Russia in many ways. Similar to the German 
case, the organizational weakness and theoretical negligence of the socialist party towards the 
peasant question contributed centrally to failure to link up with the peasant movement. Furthermore, 
the acute absence of formal peasant organizations in Italy as institutions of active mediation made 
the task of alliance formation particularly complex even in the instances, such as in the case of 
l'ordine nuovo group, where programmatic articulations provided some elaboration on the question. 
These were the processes, shaped by the conjunctural, structural, and strategic particularities 
in each case, that came together to shape the relative divergence between the trajectory of 
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movement in Russia and those in Germany and Italy. In Russia, the movement achieved a sublation 
between its “political” and “economic” aspects and establish a relative hegemony over the subaltern 
classes. In Germany and Italy, there was a fundamental incongruence between the two aspects of 
the movement and a failure to establish a hegemonic order within the working-class movement 







This study makes an empirical contribution to the comparative study of “council 
democratic” movements. Furthermore, it makes a number contributions to the fields of historical 
sociology, contentious politics, and state theory. This chapter begins by providing an overview of 
the broader implications of this study for the above fields before turning to its theoretical and 
empirical contributions to the study of “council democracy” more specifically. It then surveys areas 
of future research before presenting the concluding remarks. 
An Overview of Broader Contributions and Implications  
 Among the vast array of topics that have been the subject of studies in the field of historical 
sociology, there has been relative neglect in analyzing the radical democratic movements that 
emerged after WWI. This gap in the English language literature becomes more pronounced when 
contrasted to the great number of studies conducted on other aspects of the interwar period, 
particularly regarding the rise of fascism in Europe. The unique importance of these movements, as 
part of the historical moments when these countries came closest to social revolutions and in many 
ways offered untravelled pathways towards democratic socialism as a third way between 
Bolshevism and social democracy, has been largely overshadowed by the Russian Revolution on 
the one hand and the fascist movements on the other.  
 The comparative analysis of these movements in their relations to the particular form of war 
mobilization in each country sheds light on the reciprocal relationship between war, state, and 
society. By looking at the state in relational terms, the study goes beyond the established wisdom 
that relates state-making to war making and examines the precise ways in which different forms of 
war-making, themselves shaped by class struggle within and outside the state, result in different 
kinds of state making, which further impacts the terrain of class struggles in ways that enable the 
emergence of different kinds of radical movements.  
   At the methodological level, the study deploys the relatively underutilized comparative 
process tracing innovatively by applying it to highly volatile contexts and relatively ephemeral 
processes. This is in contrast to the way comparative process tracing has been typically used to 
uncover path dependencies that require a relatively stable phase of institutional reproduction after 
the critical conjuncture juncture. This methodological expansion as exemplified here allows 




 The study makes a novel contribution to the field of contentious politics by offering a 
strategic-relational approach to movements from a Marxist perspective that brings in class struggle 
at the centre of its analytic framework. It differs from the recent attempts to incorporate insights 
from Marxism into social movement studies in the way it takes organizational mediation as 
essential in analyzing the dynamics of subaltern politics. 
Furthermore, by conceptualizing movements in relational terms, it overcomes the common 
tendency in the field, including in the dynamic model of contention (McAdam et al., 2001) as one 
of the most widely used frameworks in social movement studies, to theorize movements as self-
contained and stable entities that come into external and direct relations with the state. The 
framework used in this study instead sees movements themselves as a terrain of struggle between a 
diverse set of forces, either endogenous or exogenous to movements, with their own historicity, 
organizational capacities, ideological orientations, relation to the state, etc. This approach is more 
powerful to understand the reciprocal influences between states and movements that go beyond 
some strategic calculations at the level of “attribution of threats/opportunity” and “innovative 
collective action” as in the dynamic model of contention.  
The study also contributes to the strategic-relational perspective in Marxist state theory by 
expanding the empirical implications of this approach beyond the study of the formation or crisis of 
authoritarian states, or the regulation and stabilization of the capitalist state. The primary focus of 
these studies has been the state itself, either in its exceptional or normal forms. Movements have at 
best taken a back seat in these analyses. The present study brings the question of the formation of 
movements to the forefront of the analysis while firmly embedding them, both in their process of 
making and trajectory, in the state processes. It shows how this approach can be used to understand 
the (de-)formation of radically subversive movements in relation to the transformations of the 
capitalist state. Therefore, it expands the applicability of the strategic-relational approach to the 
state and potentially brings it closer to the sphere of social movement studies.  
 
Contributions to the study of “Council Democracy” 
Theoretical Contributions to the Study of “Council Democracy” 
 The research grounds its empirical approach in a general conceptualization of “council 
democracy”. It embeds the formal structure of “council democracy” in that of capitalist social 
relations. Hence, “council democracy” ceases to either stand in an entirely “external” relation to 
capitalism or operate entirely “within” its structural parameters. Rather, it is conceived as “integral” 
to the dynamics of class struggle in capitalist social relations. This says something different, or 
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perhaps more, than the claim that “council democracy” is always already present in the “shell of the 
old” society either as an ideational possibility or partial actuality. The conceptualization relies on 
the centrality of (intra- and inter-) class struggle as the dynamic force behind capitalism in its 
reproduction, transformations, crises, and transcendence. Being integral to such a complex nexus of 
class struggle implies that, both at the level of ideation and actualization, “council democracy” is 
the result of contingent, indetermined, unstable, and dialectical processes. Therefore, one cannot 
speak of its “existence” as a unified phenomenon either at the “edges” or “under the surface” of the 
capitalist social relations. This is precisely why it is examined in its “making” and “trajectory”, 
rather than its law-like development. This approach highlights the fact that history is the concrete 
unfolding of processes that are made by creative agents whose very constitutions as actors and 
conditions of engagement are themselves the ever-changing products of the past and present 
struggles.  
The constitutive dimensions (or more accurately, “dialectical modes”) of “council 
democracy”, “citizens’ control” and “workers’ control”, reflect the loci of a diverse set of struggles 
mapped onto the formal separation between the “political” and the “economic” spheres in 
capitalism. As discussed before, this is not to say that struggles can indeed be classified as either 
political or economic. However, this formal separation has made it possible for the dynamics of 
struggle within one sphere to be relatively decoupled from the other. Also, this has made it possible 
to conceive of transformative projects in one sphere, even those of quite radical nature, without 
directly and immediately implying the necessity of extending the project into the other sphere.  
Therefore, it is possible for the two constitutive dimensions of “council democracy” to 
evolve asynchronously and involve a seemingly unrelated or independent set of struggles. 
Furthermore, the two constitutive dimensions can have their own diverse articulations that can well 
deviate from the transformative potential of “council democracy”. In other words, while “citizens’ 
control” and “workers’ control” are dialectical modes of “council democracy”, they do not 
exclusively belong to its transformative project.  
This places the struggle for “council democracy” (i.e. “council democratic” movements) 
within broader struggles for the articulation and realization of “citizens’ control” and “workers’ 
control”. These notions can be mobilized under various transformative projects, involving a diverse 
set of forces with their own political and ideological traditions. Such a diffusional effect requires the 
analysis of the forces involved in these struggles beyond those in the labour and socialist 
movements. This gives a certain “openness” to “council democracy” that allows a broader set of 
forces (e.g. radical republicanism, anarchism, syndicalism, etc.) to come into the piecemeal 
(trans)formation of certain aspects of “council democracy”.  
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The two notions could also be utilized as instruments of pacification, either by engaging 
explicitly in the process of deradicalized articulations, or implicitly through legislative and 
institutional manoeuvring to hinder radical possibilities. Such articulative ambiguity is indeed an 
essential aspect of examining the (de-)formation of “council democratic” movements. This gives a 
certain “instability” to the dialectical process behind “council democracy”.  
The conception of “council democracy” in terms of class struggle requires the analysis of its 
concrete historical manifestations in particular movements, rather than dynamics of law-like 
structures or transformation of ideas. As such, the analytical framework itself is dependent on the 
specificities of the concrete movements that are being studied.1 Nevertheless, the state remains a 
crucial, if not a central, factor in shaping the terrain of class struggle in capitalist society. This is 
due to its essential, though contradictory and crisis-prone, role in organizing the political hegemony 
of certain classes, and disorganizing the collective power of other classes. Therefore, the analytical 
framework used in the first part of this study serves as the basis for more complex frameworks that 
may be needed when considering the manifestation of the phenomenon in other contexts.  
Understood in strategic-relational terms, the state’s response to any particular project within 
a given conjuncture cannot be fully predicted in advance or understood in the abstract. The struggle 
between these forces further depends on various creative agents whose strategic engagement within 
the state can have significant consequences for the form and substance of the state. In other words, 
the state is seen as a politically privileged extension of class struggle in the shape of a form-specific 
relationship between various forces, with their own incongruent relationship with various classes 
and class fractions. Given the centrality of the state in a capitalist society, all these have profound 
consequences for the form and substance of class struggle within and outside the state, which in 
turn can impact the form and substance of the state itself. While these transformations can provide 
the conditions for the possibility and form of fundamental challenges to the capitalist state and 
social relations, they can also yield the pathways to resolve those contradictions and tensions. 
Which way the scale is tipped in a given conjuncture depends on the balance of forces and their 
strategic engagements in relation to the capitalist state with its own structural specificity and 
strategic selectivity.  
The discussion of the making of these movements illustrates how the strategic responses to 
various crises of the state by the forces which struggle within the state may transform the formal as 
well as the substantive aspects of the state in ways that could create a particular type of radically 
 
1 These may include the relation between the movement and the particular phase in the development of capitalism. It 
can also involve the entanglement of the movement with other, albeit certainly interlinked, circuits of exploitation such 
as colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, the analytical framework used in this study is not a comprehensive scheme 
that can be applied to all cases of “council democratic” movements. 
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subversive movement. This possibility is contingent not only on the balance of forces within and 
outside the form-specific state but also on the specific strategic responses of these forces to 
challenges that the state faces. Therefore, the form specificity and strategic contingency make the 
concrete analysis of each case unavoidable.  
 Part II shifts the focus to the movements to trace their trajectories. It treats the movement 
itself as a loosely defined terrain of struggle on which various class forces struggle for hegemony. 
This struggle, therefore, is mediated by endogenous or exogenous organizational forces that engage 
within the movement. These organizational forces give materiality to the movement as a relational 
entity.2 The degree of relationality of the movement – the degree of its openness to the intervention 
of various forces within it – might change over time. In effect, it can itself become an organizational 
force on its own account with more well-defined boundaries and internal cohesion. It, nevertheless, 
remains within the ecology of other organizing forces within and outside the state.  
 The mediating role of organizational forces within the movement implies that the formal and 
substantive aspects of the movement are relegated to the accumulative effects of those organizing 
forces. Therefore, to analyze the evolution of the movement requires an examination of the 
changing relations of forces within the movement given the case-specific structural and 
conjunctural conditions and in the context of broader societal transformations. Furthermore, the 
strategic contingency and historicity of these organizations require a concrete analysis of the 
constellation of these forces in each case.  
One of the corollaries of the discussion in Part II concerns the question of dual power. It is 
common to associate the emergence of councils as a clear sign of the formation of dual power, itself 
a defining moment in the revolutionary process. However, as this study recounts, the emergence of 
“dual power” was not only a particular strategy that was made possible in a specific conjuncture and 
within specific structural conditions, but in important ways that it had a stabilizing effect. This is in 
contrast to the way the emergence of “dual power” is often seen as the marker of a “revolutionary 
situation”.3 In fact, it is not in the duality of power that one has to conceive the significance of 
 
2 At a deeper level, each organizational force itself can be seen as a “movement”, perhaps with more well-defined 
boundaries depending on the level of bureaucratization and internal coherence, with various ideological fractions 
competing for hegemony. Therefore, the engagement of these organizational forces within another movement can have 
impacts on the relations of forces within the organization itself. This might also lead to internal crises and splits within 
these organizational forces. However, this ontological claim about organizational forces can be bracketed when 
analyzing a movement by treating each organizational force as a relatively stable and coherent entity. This is unless the 
internal fragmentation significantly impact the strategic relation of that force within the movement.  
3 Charles Tilly (1978), one of the most influential theorists of contentious politics, introduced two distinct notions 
“revolutionary situation” and “revolutionary outcome” to dissect the periods of emergence and outcome of revolutions. 
He defined the essential characteristics of revolutionary situation as “the presence of more than one bloc effectively 
exercising control over a significant part of the state apparatus” (p. 190) and revolutionary outcomes as “the 
displacement of one set of power holders by another” (p. 193). These notions remain quite central in the movement 
studies (Foran and Goodwin, 1993; Tilly, 1993; Goodwin, 2001; Maher-Ciccariello, 2007; Rockefeller, 2007 Bennani-
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councils. Rather, it is the struggle towards radical democracy whose distinct organizational form is 
the council form. This is a notable change in the conception of councils. Seen in the latter sense, the 
democratic struggle need not necessarily take the form of a duality in the state structure but can, and 
indeed has to, pursue its transformative project both within and outside the state.  
Empirical Contributions to the Study of “Council Democracy” 
As stated in the introductory chapter, there is a relative gap in the literature on the 
comparative analysis of the radical democratic movements that emerged in the immediate aftermath 
of WWI in Europe. This gap includes both the analysis of their makings and their trajectories. The 
present study addresses this gap by analyzing two of the most important cases of such movements 
in Western Europe, Germany and Italy. Using comparative process tracing, the study gives an 
account of the making of “council democratic” movements in Germany and Italy, in contrast to 
their absence as such in France, and their trajectories after their emergence in these two countries, in 
contrast to a comparable movement in Russia.  
In all belligerent countries involved in WWI, the state-led war mobilization created a 
situation of direct and heavy intervention of the state into the political and economic life of the 
society. However, there were fundamental differences between the way these states engaged in this 
massive project. These differences are understood by taking a strategic-relational approach to the 
state and by examining the consequences of states’ involvement in the war on the terrain of class 
struggle.  
The analysis in Part I shows the formation of a militarized corporatist state during the war 
operating on the basis of a “two-nations” hegemonic vision in Germany and Italy. The study 
illuminates the reciprocal relationship between such transformations that provided the conditions 
for the emergence of “council democratic” movements after the war and the struggles between 
various class and popular forces within or at some distance from the state. The “two-nations” 
hegemonic vision in these countries failed to create a coherent and unifying ideological framework 
to bring together historically and structurally antagonistic social forces behind the war effort. This 
not only weakened the legitimacy of the state-led war project but also forced the state to intervene 
more directly in preserving the unstable equilibrium of compromise between different class forces. 
The marginalization of the parliament and militarization of the state prevented class struggle from 
being refracted through parliamentary channels and linked contradictions and tensions of the state 
 
Chraïbi and Fillieule, 2013; Akder and Özdemir, 2015). Tilly developed these concepts by building on Leon Trotsky’s 
concept of “dual power” (Tilly, 1978, p. 190; Goodwin, 2001, p.12; van der Linden, 2009, p. 261). However, he 
qualified Trotsky’s formulation by allowing the power blocs to contain more than one social classes and the possibility 




(including those within the military apparatus) more directly to those within the capitalist labour 
relations and society more broadly. The corporatist arrangement extended the boundaries of the 
integral state and tied the working-class organizations more actively to the state’s war project. 
Under these conditions, alienation from and resistance against the militarized corporatist state and 
the war project implied that the scope of democratization struggles had to be extended to the whole 
of the integral state and society.  
This was in contrast with the formation of a transversal tripartite state operating on the basis 
of a “one nation” hegemonic vision in the case of France whose form of labour militancy after the 
war resembled the more “traditional” form of strikes. The “one nation” hegemonic vision in France 
deepened the self-mobilization of the society. It reduced the state’s burden of maintaining 
ideological unity and decentralized the ideological operation by multiplying the layers, particularly 
outside the state, that could arbitrate to maintain the legitimacy of the war effort. The continued 
authority of the parliament and the non-militarized transversality of the French state succeeded in 
diluting class struggle and balancing the interest of the industry and general public within its larger 
war project. This relatively decoupled contradictions and tensions within the state (including those 
within the military apparatus) and those within the capitalist labour relation and society. The 
structural hybridity and flexibility of tripartism allowed working-class organizations to maintain a 
positional ambiguity toward the state-led war project as an insider-outsider with relation to the 
integral state. It enabled the diffusion of working-class struggle at different levels of potential 
intervention and preserved the tie between the leadership of the working-class movement and the 
rank-and-file.  
 The analysis further examines the differences between the case of Germany and Italy to 
make sense of why the “council democratic” movements that emerged in these countries gravitated 
towards one or the other of its two constitutive dimensions. This set the initial condition for the 
emerging movement to find its primary locus of struggle along the “citizens’ control” dimension in 
the case of Germany and the “workers’ control” dimension in the case of Italy. It shows that the 
German trade unions were integrated into the corporatist scheme more deeply than their Italian 
counterpart. This was not only due to the organizational capacity of the German trade unions but 
also their position towards the Burgfrieden during the war. Moreover, the realignment of principal 
class alliances that took place right before the German Revolution placed the socialist trade unions 
at the centre of the post-war reconfiguration of class relations in Germany, allowing them to draw 
significant concessions from the employers. All of this came together to shift the locus of the 
struggle of the “council democratic” movement in Germany initially to the “political” sphere. In the 
case of Italy, the integration of trade unions into the state war mobilization, whose structure 
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operated primarily at the factory level particularly in the last period of the war, was more limited 
and precarious. The bypassing of the trade unions weakened their ability to contain the 
radicalization of the rank-and-file amidst a postwar economic crisis and conversely strengthened the 
structural position of the internal commissions as institutions of direct mediation. Furthermore, 
while the Italian state entered into a period of deep crisis after the war, there was a continuity in the 
state apparatus which shifted the locus of the “council democratic” movement in Italy away from 
the “political” sphere.   
The analysis in Part II shows how the trajectories of “council democratic” movements 
should be understood by examining the changing relationship of organizational forces within the 
movement and their strategic orientation towards it. These, over time, shaped the formal and 
substantive aspects of the movement. These movements were themselves a subset of the larger 
social relations (which includes the entangled evolution of the state, civil society, and society, with 
these organizational forces directly or indirectly active within them). Hence, their transformations 
along the two constitutive dimensions of the movement should be understood within the structural 
and conjunctural conditions specific to each case.  
The comparative analysis in Part II emphasizes the crucial differences in structural, 
conjunctural, and strategic aspects between these cases and their roles in the particular trajectory of 
the movements. The movement in Russia developed in the context of the continued war effort by a 
structurally weak state that had to rely on radicalized soldiers, workers, and peasants while having 
to deal with an organizationally weak and unstable capitalist class. The context of the war focused 
the democratization project of the council movement towards achieving peace without annexation 
and protecting the revolution. In contrast, the emergence of the movement in Germany and Italy 
after the end of the war redirected the focus of their democratization projects on the question of 
demobilization, improvement in the lives of the subaltern classes, and expansion of collective 
control over the “political” and “economic” spheres. One might say that in Russia, the peace was a 
means to protect the revolution; in Germany and Italy, the revolution was a means to protect the 
peace.  
 In Russia, due to the structural weaknesses of the state apparatus, pressing the condition of 
the war, and a lack of commitment from the leading forces, elections to the Constituent Assembly 
were continuously postponed. This prevented the formation of a parliamentary system and a 
democratic constitution for the new republic that could carry a broad democratic legitimacy. Hence, 
class contradictions and tensions traversed through the state more generally. This was reflected 
either in the very architecture of the state in the form of “dual power” or inwardly in the coalitional 
form of two supposedly opposing forces within the provisional government. As a result, the 
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Mensheviks and SR were drawn into a spiral of growing popular discontent in the face of the 
unending war and deepening political and economic crises. In this context, the Bolsheviks presented 
themselves as the articulators of and organizational force behind the rising tension between the 
antagonistic classes. Hence, their programmatic vision eventually won over the movement.  
In contrast, in Germany, due to the capacity of the state apparatus, more forgiving 
conditions after the war, and the fierce commitment of the leading forces, elections to the National 
Assembly were held extremely quickly after the revolution. In Italy, the parliamentary form was 
reinstituted after the war. Therefore, class contradictions and tensions could be refracted in these 
two cases into the parliamentary structure, thereby containing more radical possibilities of “citizens’ 
control”. This, in the German case, further disoriented the diverse composition of the USPD with a 
segment gravitating towards the parliamentary path (which itself was split between the social 
democratic tendency and democratic socialist tendency), and another segment drawn to the radical 
republican path (which, in its radical form, coincided with council republicanism). Furthermore, the 
KPD was organizationally too weak and ideologically uncommitted to participate in the elections 
for the National Assembly. It was also disconnected from the loci of council activities and 
organizationally too thin to build its base independently within the movement to bring a fast-
declining movement under its leadership. 
 With respect to the forces outside the socialist bloc, the relative weakness of the anarchist 
and syndicalist forces in Russia and the programmatic plasticity of the Bolsheviks after the adoption 
of the April Theses, which could encapsulate the ideological aspirations of more radical forces to 
their left, freed the Bolsheviks from having to compete for hegemony against the syndicalist and 
anarchist forces. In contrast, the syndicalist and anarchist forces in both Germany and Italy 
exercised a gravitational pull within the working-class movement to capture the growing discontent 
with respect to the unachieved goals of the democratization project. In Germany, the radical 
manifestations of the movement were, for the most part, crushed brutally by the (para-)military. In 
the case of Italy and what remained in Germany after the crackdown, they were marginalized and 
contained due to their structural inaccessibility to the formal channels of politics. Instead, the 
trajectory of the movement was determined in the negotiations led, on the side of the working 
classes, by the reformist wing of the socialist forces, which was uninterested in a further 
radicalization of the movement and was keen to bring the situation back to “normal politics”. 
Therefore, despite the sudden eruption of militancy in both Italy and Germany in the final period of 
each case, both with the critical presence of radical forces including syndicalist and anarchist forces, 
the movement was contained through a formal legislative process.  
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 The analysis also illuminates the processes that allowed the movement in Russia to establish 
effective alliances with the peasantry to establish a broad hegemonic project in ways that the 
movements in Germany and Italy failed to do. In Russia, peasants were radicalized not just on the 
question of land reform or improvement of their living conditions but also on the question of 
becoming citizens and being recognized for their ongoing sacrifices for the nation. Therefore, 
frustration with the constant delays not only in land reform but also the elections to the National 
Assembly increasingly radicalized the Russian peasants. Due to the organizational influence of the 
SR (and the left-SR in the last period) among the peasants, they remained organizationally linked 
with the council projects.  
In contrast, the Italian peasants had no such aspirations to become active citizens and, in any 
case, they had been included in an expanded franchise. The national project was too alien to them 
since they could not see themselves historically as part of the political unity of the country designed 
and imposed by the affluent North. What the Italian peasants wanted was land reforms and relative 
improvement of their living conditions. The former was authorized by the liberal government. The 
fact that there was almost no organizational link between the peasant and socialist movements made 
them further isolated from the democratic project that was taking place in the North. The German 
peasants, who had been included in the expansion of the franchise shortly after the Revolution, 
quickly withdrew from the council movement since the demobilization process (in which councils 
played a crucial role) efficiently brought the peasant-soldiers back to the rural regions. Afterwards, 
they were content with focusing on reviving their ways of living and improving their lives. 
Furthermore, the strength of political representation of the supposed general interest of the agrarian 
classes, the Center Party in Germany soon after the election to the National Assembly, coupled with 
the organizational weakness of the socialist forces within the peasant movement led to further 
isolation of the peasants from the revolutionary process.     
Areas for Future Research  
Further Investigation into the Case Studies  
 There are several areas in which research into the study of the “council democratic” 
movements in Germany and Italy can be improved. This section provides a list of important 
considerations that are ripe for future research.  
 The influence of the Russian Revolution on the formation of the council movements needs 
careful examination. Such investigation should go beyond the indications of general inspiration, as 
important as they were, and should look into the ways and the extent to which activists and ordinary 
workers knew about the council movement in Russia. In the case of Germany, this requires not only 
looking at the leading theorists and activists but also soldiers on the Eastern Front who might have 
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come in contact with Russian soldiers and been exposed to the Bolshevik propaganda. Given the 
fact that the Germany military used to draft militant working-class organizers, such as Richard 
Müller, to the army as a form of punishment, it is likely that they might have come in contact with 
Russian soldiers and learned about the experiences in Russia. The activities of the Bolshevik 
government in Germany and Italy both during and after the war can be further incorporated into the 
analysis.  
 As discussed in the study, women played a central role in the making of the “council 
democratic” movements. However, more research needs to be done on the agitational, subversive, 
and prefigurative activities of women in Germany and Italy during the war both inside and outside 
the factories. A comparative analysis of women’s activities in other belligerent countries could 
illuminate the specificities of those countries in which the council movement emerged. Such 
research should extend its scope to examine the transformation of these activities and networks after 
the war as well as the role of women in the council movement and their perception of the movement 
as it unfolded.  
 There is a tendency, in maintaining the centrality of organizations in the present study, to 
overshadow the day-to-day, non-organizational, and unaffiliated activities of workers and citizens 
who were involved in the movement. Even though organizational forces remain the key actors in 
the strategic-relational approach to the movement, paying more attention to the aspirations and 
perception of workers in their daily activities within and around the councils, can shed light on the 
ways in which the trajectory of these movements influenced by, resonated with, and reflected the 
perception of the workers who were directly involved in them.  
  More research needs to be conducted on the peasants in Germany and Italy with regards to 
their aspirations towards the movement, particularly along its “citizens’ control” dimension, during 
the German Revolution and the biennio rosso. This requires a more detailed analysis of not only the 
relation between the peasantry and the nation-state as well as the industrial working class, but also 
the pattern of mobilization and demobilization of peasant-soldiers. Furthermore, the organizational 
structure of peasant movements in these two countries can be investigated and incorporated further 
into the analysis to better understand the dynamics behind the inability of the movement to establish 
viable alliances with the peasants.  
 The present study systematically integrates the influence of the syndicalist and anarchist 
forces into the analysis. As we saw, they played a crucial role, despite the limitations they faced, in 
shaping the trajectory of these movements in Germany and Italy. With some notable exceptions, the 
existing studies have not paid enough attention to the significance of the syndicalist and anarchist 
forces in the evolution of “council democratic” movement. Such research would involve further 
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incorporation of the existing literature in German and Italian as well as archival studies on these 
forces, their leading figures, and workers’ perception of their activities. This would help to better 
clarify the distinct contributions of these forces to the organizational and programmatic activities 
related to the movement as well as their overlap with socialist forces. 
 One of the limitations of the present study is its primary focus on the working class 
(although broadly defined but mainly preoccupied with the industrial working class), the capitalist 
class (primarily the large capitalists and capitalist organizations), and the peasantry. There were 
some elaborations on the role of the Catholic organizations in relation to the movement. However, 
the potential contributions of other social classes (or certain fractions in the above classes) are not 
systematically analyzed. This requires a broader definition of social classes to include economic, 
political, and ideological axes to consider the direct involvement and indirect influences of these 
forces on the evolution of the movement.  
  Lastly, the present study largely bracketed the embeddedness of the nation-states and the 
national economies in the larger context of regional and international state-system and economic 
relations. Although there was a much lesser degree of internationalization in the period of this study 
compared to the later phases in the development of capitalism, supernational forces have already 
placed considerable pressure on the nation-states and national economies in ways that influenced 
the horizons of possible strategic actions and structural conditions. This is even more notable for the 
defeated countries, like Germany, or those victorious ones which were considered a burden for the 
Entente, like Italy. Therefore, the impact of these supranational forces on the evolution of the 
council movements in Germany and Italy can be further analyzed.  
Broadening the Scope of the Research into “Council Democratic” Movements  
 The conceptualization and analytical schemes proposed in this research to study “council 
democracy” allow us to detect other historical manifestations of the phenomenon and examine their 
makings and trajectories both individually and comparatively. This would make it possible to trace 
a distinct trend within the broadly defined socialist tradition without losing sight of its incredible 
diversities in different contexts. As mentioned before, the analytical framework would need to be 
modified especially when studying the phenomenon in different phases of the development of 
capitalism. Nevertheless, the general conceptualization and the analytical framework introduced 
here can provide a backbone for such elaborations. To begin such a project of writing a tradition of 
“council democratic” movements, one can broaden the scope of the research into “council 
democratic” movements by including other cases around the WWI era, analyzing the revival of 
these movements after the Second World War until the mid-1970s, and again the re-emergence of 
such movements in the 21st century.  
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 In addition to the cases studied in this research, there were a number of other important 
cases of “council democratic” movement in the WWI era, each of which can reveal certain aspects 
of the phenomenon that are not captured here or further highlight the commonalities with the 
transformative processes outlined in this research. These cases include Austria, Hungary, Poland, 
and Norway.  
 Austria and Hungary present a situation in which the making of these movements took place 
under the Dual Monarchy. How the peculiar structure of the state and the specificities of state-led 
war mobilization under the Dual Monarchy impacted the making of these movements could shed 
light on a unique set of factors that influenced the emergence of these movements in Austria and 
Hungary after the war. Furthermore, the trajectories of these movements after their emergence, 
given the significant economic, political, and social disparities and differences between the two 
territories, could present a useful comparative perspective on the factors governing the evolution of 
these movements.4  
 Poland did not become an independent republic until after the collapse of the German 
Empire in 1918. Before that, the Polish territories were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the 
German Empire, and the Russian Empire. Since these three Polish territories developed under very 
different political, economic, and social conditions and were subject to very different regimes of 
state-led war mobilizations, the process of the making of these councils and possible differences in 
their composition after their emergence makes Poland an intriguing case study. Furthermore, the 
entanglement of the nationalist movement in the Polish territories with the transformative project of 
the “council democratic” movements after the war can be particularly insightful regarding the real 
and potential ethnonational aspects of the council movement.  
 Norway presents a curious case in which the council movement emerged without the 
country having been formally involved in the war.5 It was neutral during the war but strongly 
leaned towards the Entente in trade agreements, effectively becoming the neutral ally of Britain 
after 1917. Inspired by the Russian Revolution, radicals within the Norwegian labour movement 
called for the formation of workers’ councils during a general workers’ congress in the spring of 
1917. Workers’ councils appeared in numerous places across the country between December 1917 
and May 1918 among the metalworkers. This resonated with the growing frustration of many 
workers towards the leadership of the trade unions and the labour party to meet their demands. The 
 
4 For notable secondary literature on the Austrian case, see Carsten (1972), Hautmann (1978; 1987), Garamvölgyi 
(1983), Haumer (2015), Leder et al. (2019), and Bauer (2021). For notable secondary literature on the Hungarian case, 
see Tökés (1967), Janos and Slottman (1971), Volgyes (1970; 1971), Kovrig (1975), Hajdu (1979), Péteri (1984), 
Borsányi (1993), Varga (2010), Pritz (2010), Krausz and Vertes (2010), and Apor (2015).  




demands of these councils were largely limited to the eight-hour day and the control of the 
production of necessary goods. Hence, it should be analyzed largely along the “workers’ control” 
dimension.  
 The “council democratic” movements that emerged between 1956 and 1980 can be 
categorized into three general groups: those that appeared in the Eastern Bloc formally under the 
actually-existing socialism (including Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia), those that 
emerged in the Western countries under liberal democratic capitalist system (including France, 
Italy, Portugal), and those that appeared in the so-called global south (including Algeria, Chile, 
Iran). Generally speaking, they can be mapped onto the general conceptual scheme of “council 
democracy”, with the case of Hungary standing as the most vivid example of the evolution of the 
movement along its “citizens’ control” dimension and the case of France along its “workers’ 
control” dimension. Furthermore, the role of the state, as well as the constellation of organizational 
forces in both their making and their trajectories, remain central to any systematic analysis of these 
movements. Nevertheless, this phase presents new theoretical challenges that need to be addressed 
and incorporated into the analytical framework. As a whole, the emergence and trajectory of these 
movements should be understood in the context of capitalist dynamics, growing internationalization 
of the state-system, the presence of the socialist bloc. It is also possible that the prior theoretical 
elaborations on “council democracy” might have influenced these movements. Each group also 
presents a distinct set of challenges, making comparative studies within each group and across 
groups potentially fruitful.  
 The cases in the Eastern Bloc can shed light on how conditions for the emergence of 
“council democratic” movements under formally socialist states and economies and how the radical 
democratic projects of these movements impacted and were impacted by the communist parties and 
unions in power. This did not always take an outright antagonistic form but, in the case of 
Yugoslavia for example, took a constructive form (although certainly with its own limitations and 
contradictions especially in the light of their development under market socialism).  
The analysis of cases in the West can illuminate the complex relationship between the 
explosive events of 1968 (especially in the case of France), the emergence of stagflation in the 
1970s (especially in the case of Italy), and the transition from dictatorship to democracy (in the case 
of Portugal). Lastly, the cases in the global south brings forth the question of the relation between 
the radical democratic project of the council movements, and anti-colonial and anti-imperialist 
movements in both the making and the trajectories of these movements.  
 There has been a new phase in the manifestation of “council democracy” since the 2000s. 
This has surely been significantly different from and in many ways strikingly more limited than the 
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earlier phases. With some important exceptions such as the case of Venezuela which has offered a 
novel mutation in the evolution of “council democracy”,6 it has most notably appeared in the form 
of worker-recuperated enterprises in several countries around the world.7 There has also been a 
revival of theoretical elaborations on various aspects of “council democracy”, with some focusing 
more on the “citizens’ control” dimension, and others including elaborating more on the “workers’ 
control” dimension.8  
 Furthermore, the recent cases of workers’ recuperated enterprises particularly in Argentina 
should be studied as the contemporary development of “council democracy” along its “workers’ 
control” dimension. Also, the recent movements for “commons” to expand the locus of the 
socialization process from workplace to community, often under the organizational form of 
councils, is another area that can be seen under the conceptual umbrella of “council democracy”. 
Lastly, some of the recent experiments towards establishing radical democratic governing structures 
under the organizational form of what can be taken as councils and with clear socialist sensibilities 
might be worth analyzing as contemporary cases of “council democracy” along its “citizens’ 
control” dimension.  
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the deepening crises of capitalism since the 2008 
financial crisis, there has been a renewed interest in thinking about alternative social arrangements 
to capitalism and alternative models of socialism different from those actually-existing socialism of 
the 20th century. This has provided the ground for burgeoning interest in “council democracy”. The 
movements studied here in many ways exemplify these democratic socialist aspirations that the 
recent interests in alternatives find attraction in. In this lies the importance of studying these 
“council democratic” movements historically. It is only by re-examining the past critically and 
facing its contradictory legacies that we can rearticulate our programmes, our strategies of struggle, 
and our actions for a future informed by yet profoundly different from our past experiences and 
 
6 Without ignoring its significant and numerous limitations and shortcomings in the transformation of the state and the 
economy, the case of Venezuela can bring out a lot on how socialization of the means of production along with a 
transformation of the state in which there is a symbiotic relationship between the forces within and outside the state 
could potentially emerge and develop. The Venezuelan government also created the concept of “direct social property” 
which refers to “common property managed directly by the people, through workers’ councils together with [] 
community councils” (Azzellini, 2011, p. 386). 
7 For example in early 2016, there were about 360 cases of workers’ recuperation in Argentina, involving more than 
15,000 workers, 78 cases of workers’ recuperation in Brazil, involving more than 12,000 workers, several hundred 
workers’ recuperation and workers’ councils in Venezuela, two dozen cases in Uruguay, and several in Mexico, India, 
and Indonesia (Azzellini, 2016, p. 5). There have also been some cases of recuperation in France (ex-Fralib, ex-Pilpa), 
Italy (Officine Zero, Rimaflow), Greece (Vio.Me, ERT3), Bosnia (Dita), Croatia (ITAS), Egypt (Kouta Steel Factory, 
Cleopatra Ceramics), Turkey (Kazova) and the United States (New Era Windows, Serious Energy). 
8 This is not to say that each do not extend the discussion explicitly and considerably to the other dimension of “council 
democracy”. The above classification is only with regards to particular focus each gives to one or another dimension 
with one leading towards radical republicanism and the other towards syndicalism. 
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present predicaments – for a future thoroughly democratic, free, and unalienated as every human 







Socio-Political Context of Germany before WWI 
 
 Prior to the unification of Germany under Otto von Bismarck, Germany was a highly 
parcelized nation, with a large number of sovereign principalities, “free states” and Kingdoms. 
After several attempts towards unification in the 19th century under the leadership of its most 
powerful state, the Kingdom of Prussia, the German Empire was formed in 1871.  
 The general agrarian structure of Germany can be summarized as high parcelization in the 
Southwestern and the Rhineland (largely Catholic) regions, with a high concentration of small-land 
owners and peasant classes, and unparcelized land in the Northern and Eastern (largely Protestant) 
regions, with large-land ownership and farmworkers (Aldenhoff, 1996). Germany could no longer 
be considered a primarily agricultural state at the turn of the century, as the share of the industrial 
sector surpassed that of the agricultural sector.1  
 The rapid growth of industrial capital in Germany (see Berghahn, 2001) was accompanied 
by a parallel growth in financial capital. Contrary to American and British banks, German banks, 
particularly the so-called “universal banks” which operated under limited liability laws in contrast 
to the private banks, could legally trade companies’ shares on the stock market and potentially 
attained voting rights as shareholders meetings. This led to a close relationship between powerful 
financial institutions and industries, with the financial capital having decision power within these 
firms and stake on the long-term health of these companies (Berghahn, 2005, pp. 21-7; Tipton, 
1996, pp. 80-1).2  
 The political supremacy of Prussian ruling classes, the Protestant landed aristocracy 
(Junker) and the growing industrial capitalists, over the Empire was secured in the new constitution 
of the German Empire. The structural power of Junkers within the state put that social class 
primarily in charge of carrying out the transition to capitalism while protecting the class position of 
conservative agrarians. The German Emperor (Kaiser), who was also the King of Prussia and the 
President of the Federal Council (Bundesrat), was in charge of appointing and dismissing the 
chancellor, who was also the Prussian Prime Minister and the chairman of Bundesrat (i.e. the head 
of the government) and only accountable to the Emperor. The Bundesrat was elected on the basis of 
 
1 In terms of the percentage of workforce engaged in agricultural work, German reached 34.5 per cent in 1913 
compared to 49.5 per cent in 1871, the majority of which were female workers (Broadberry et al., 2010). 
2 An example of this intertwinement is the involvement of Deutche Bank, Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, and Bankhaus 
Delbruck, Leo & Co. in the creation of the electrochemical giant, Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG) 
(Berghahn, 2005, p. 22). 
250 
 
a three-class voting system to preserve the privileged position of the wealthy aristocrats. Prussia 
retained the largest number of seats within the Bundesrat in order to maintain the differential power 
of Prussian aristocrats over those in other regions. Although Germany had a parliament (Reichstag)3 
whose members were elected on the basis of universal male suffrage (over 25 years old), its real 
governing power was severely limited since it could only veto the legislations that were put forward 
by the Bundesrat and could not hold the executive branches of government accountable.4 
The military was one of the primary elements within the state apparatus through which 
landed aristocracy, especially the Junkers,5 sought to preserve their power (Förster, 1996, pp. 460).6 
This was conceived in the triangular structure of the German constitution, with Kaiser as the 
supreme commander of the armed forces. The link between the military and the government was the 
Prussian War Minister, whose position was weakened in the 1880s to further isolate the government 
from the military decision-making process. The government had very little say in military affairs. 
As a result of a compromise, Kaiser’s authority to determine the strength of the army during 
peacetime was counterbalanced by the ability of the Reichstag to approve the military budget (p. 
461).  
 Two processes threatened the hegemony of the landed aristocracy within the army. First, 
technological advancement increased reliance on heavy industries and the technical staff in the 
army echelon (Kitchen, 1968, p. 31; Förster, 1996, p. 455).7 However, through structural and 
socialization methods, the aristocrats largely retained their class power at the upper echelon of the 
military. Another factor was the universal male conscription that was conceived to give the German 
army numerical advantage over those of the neighbouring countries, especially France. But 
conscription was potentially dangerous as it would put arms in the hands of ordinary people and 
would open the military ranks to democratization pressures. Therefore, the conscription was not 
fully implemented and was sharply skewed towards the rural population (Förster, 1996, p. 465).  
 The Junkers were fearful of the possibility of Catholic forces, particularly the Church and 
the newly established Catholic Centre Party (Deutsche Zentrumspartei), to mobilize the Catholic 
 
3 The Reichstag was the result of the political alliance that Bismarck made with the liberal nationalists whose party, 
National Liberal Party (Nationalliberale Partei; NLP) in 1866. The NLP dominated the Reichstag and the Prussian 
parliament (Landtag) in the 1870s.  
Bismarck sought in vain to undermine the electoral power of the liberals by passing a universal male suffrage upon the 
unification of Germany in the hope that the rural population would vote for conservative candidates.  
4 For an overview of constitutional structure of Imperial Germany, see Berghahn (2005, pp.178-84) and Lerman (2001, 
pp. 165-71). 
5 In 1888, 197 of 239 officers of the General Staff were Prussian (Kitchen, 1968, p. 5).  
6 The General staff remained predominantly of aristocratic origin. By 1906, still 60 per cent of all army generals were 
noblemen. (Kitchen, 1968, p. 23). By 1913, 22 or 25 commanding generals were aristocrats (Förster, 1996, p. 464). 
7 in 1860, 65 per cent of officers in the Prussian army were aristocrats. By 1913, this number was reduced to 30 per cent 
(Kitchen, 1968, p. 22). 
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population against the Reich. Bismarck launched the so-called Kulturkampf in the futile hope of 
undercutting the possible formation of that mass movement by repressive means. Instead, this 
campaign unified Catholics and strengthened the electoral outcome of the Centre Party (see 
Fairbairn, 1996, pp. 311-12). By 1875, Bismarck abandoned the Kulturkampf. This came at the time 
when the economic pressure in the context of the deepening recession shifted the state’s economic 
policies from free trade towards protectionism, effectively ending the political alliance with the 
liberals.8 The German Conservative Party (Deutschkonservative Partei) was established in 1876. 
The protectionist policies primarily served the interest of the dominant Prussian classes. They also 
led to a split in the liberal party in 1880 between the left-wing, the advocates of liberal values and 
free trade, and right-wing liberals, the advocates of powerful industrialists in Prussia and state 
protectionism. Thereafter, the government no longer needed to find a balance between the liberals, 
on the one hand, and the industrialists. Tariff legislations after 1879 helped to solidify the Junker-
industrialist alliance (see Nolan, 1986, pp. 357-8; Aldenhoff, 1996, pp. 46-7).  
There was an increasing number of trade associations that emerged shortly after the 
unification to lobby the government and unify the collective action of the capitalists.9 One of the 
earliest and most influential trade associations was the German Iron and Steel Industrialists (Verein 
deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrieller; VdESI), founded in 1874. Despite some internal and 
external tensions and oppositions, the VdESI was generally successful in creating a hegemonic 
unity within the sector and the manufacturer that revolved around steel and iron (Feldman and 
Nocken, 1975). Another powerful umbrella organization that operated at a national level was the 
Central Association of Employers of Germany (Centralverband deutscher Industrieller; CDI), 
founded in 1876, which also largely focused on mining and heavy industries.10 One of its main 
objectives was to push for protective tariff and export policies that were in the interest of its 
members. As German export grew, the light industries (not including the electrochemical industries) 
formed their own association, the Federation of Industries (Bund der Industriellen; BdI) in 1895 to 
push for more free trade policies (Feuchtwanger, 2001, pp. 115-16). The aftermath of labour 
militancy in the opening years of the 20th century, led to the establishment of the Head Office of the 
German Employers’ Organizations (Hauptstelle Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbänd) and Federation of 
German Employers’ Associations (Verein deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände) in 1904 to coordinate 
employers’ strikebreaking actions in different sectors. Besides these employers’ associations in the 
 
8 It should be noted that Bismarck brought the National Liberals into the government bloc in 1887 to form an electoral 
cartel not only to counter the growth of the Catholic Centre and the socialist party, but also to split the liberals. 
9 There were 8 business associations in 1875, 70 in 1877, 143 in 1895, and 673 in 1910, with highest concentration in 
mining, paper, iron, and cement industries. By 1907, about three-quarter of mining production and half of iron and steel 
production were under the control of these associations (Berghahn, 2005, p. 25-6; Feuchtwanger, 2001, pp. 100-1).  
10 Many of the VdESI personnel also worked in the CDI (Feldman and Nocken, 1975, p. 418). 
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industrial sectors, organized agrarian interest groups also grew around 1890. Two of the most 
notable ones were the German Agricultural Society (Deutsche Landwirtschafts-gesellschaft) 
founded in 1885 and Agricultural Chambers (Landwirtschaftkammern) founded in 1894 (see 
Aldenhoff, 1996, pp. 33-40).  
 Towards the end of the 1870s, Bismarck focused his attention on the rising power of 
German socialist parties and industrial working classes. He also believed that this could rally the 
industrialists and Junkers behind the project of unification (Nolan, 1986, p. 360). He imposed a 
series of repressive anti-socialist laws in 1878 to abolish associations with socialist tendencies and 
to prohibit socialist publications (Lidtke, 1966, p. 79). However, the law did not ban the Socialist 
Workers’ Party of Germany (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands; SAPD) from running in 
the Reichstag elections in the subsequent years. Hence, even though it hinders its electoral and 
membership growth, the state repression was ineffective in curtailing its upward trajectory. 
Nevertheless, the structural features of the state that inserted the masses into politics also hindered a 
meaningful translation of their political influence. 
To further preempt the socialist appeal among the working class, Bismarck introduced a 
series of laws to create a corporatist safety net in the 1880s (Nolan, 1986, pp. 360-1; Tegel, 1987).11 
The federal government was also hoping to use these provisions to concentrate the budget in the 
hands of the Reich. Although these measures covered millions of workers, they did not have the 
effect that the government was hoping for (Lees, 1996, pp. 221-5; Tegel, 1987, pp. 17-18). On the 
one hand, the provisions failed to satisfy workers as they rather than employers were made to 
provide the large majority of the funds. On the other hand, they failed to strengthen the budgetary 
power of the federal government as it was sidelined in the majority of these programs, except partly 
in the pension scheme (Lees, 1996, p. 222). Yet, the activities of the state here created an embryonic 
form of labour-capital alliance. This is especially because the administrative implementation of 
these schemes later required the assistance of trade unions (see Steinmetz, 1991). Simultaneously, 
the repressive measures of the state against the socialist organization, in fact, rallied workers more 
firmly behind the socialist organizations as it nakedly showed the class character of the state and 
laid the ground for the emergence of “state within the state” in the following decades (Berger, 1995, 
p. 72). After the end of the anti-socialist laws, the impressive electoral strength of the socialist 
party, now renamed The Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
 
11 These wide-ranging measures included health insurance for workers (1883), accident insurance (1884), and the old-
age and disability insurance (1889). 
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Deutschlands, SPD), as well as the exponential membership growth of the Free Trade Unions 
clearly exhibits the rising power of the Socialist and labour movement.12 
 After the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, the government continued to facilitate the 
condition of the Junker-industrialist alliance by imposing agrarian tariffs and initiating a project of 
developing a German battle fleet at the end of the 1890s and beginning of the 1900s. The new 
Emperor, Wilhelm II, who was determined to play a more direct role in the politics of Germany 
using his constitutional position, sought to pursue more liberal internal policies, notably towards 
improving the working condition, while much more aggressive and confrontational foreign policies, 
especially in Africa.  
Despite the end of open hostility towards the socialist movement, the government continued 
to try to take the wind out of the socialist sails through social reform measures.13 Nevertheless, the 
impetus behind the labour movement after years of suffering from state repression could not be 
contained by such measures. An important bill in 1891 to try to contain labour militancy at the shop 
floor sought to establish workers’ committees in all companies over 20 employees through which 
they could communicate their demands to the employers. Unsurprisingly, the employers fought hard 
against making these institutions permanent bodies. Given their organized pressure within the state, 
they succeeded in preventing any significant advancement of this initiative (Berghahn, 2005, pp. 
30-1). In the Ruhr mining sector, there was a comparable institution that was established by the 
government after the 1899 strikes called Trade Court (Gewerbegericht). Although the union 
candidates dominated these institutions in the following years, their practical effects were quite 
limited (Hickey, 1985, pp. 243-4). 
A major shift occurred in the programmatic orientation of the SPD in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1890 election. The Erfurt Programme, replacing SPD’s Gotha Programme, was 
adopted in 1891. A deterministic interpretation of “Marxism”, itself a theoretical expression of the 
socio-economic developments in Germany and the political limitation of the state structure, became 
the official ideology of the party. Accordingly, the socialist transformation was portrayed as 
inevitable both in its ends in the collapse of capitalism and its means in the growing social 
antagonism and struggles. The party did not need to specifically prepare workers’ capacity for 
carrying out the coming revolution. It could at best give a sense of conscious unity to the 
heightening struggles while, at the practical level, focusing on reformist measures. Given the 
 
12 See Geary (1989) and Nolan (1986, pp. 369-70) for other reasons behind the successful growth of social democracy 
among the working-class communities. 
13 Some of the expansions of social provision in this period include improving on the social insurance schemes, 
launching of industrial courts to mediate between employers and workers, establishing industrial inspection to check the 
working condition, regulating of the employment of women and children, and abolishing Sunday work (Feldman, 1992, 
p. 24; Lees, 1996, pp. 223-4).  
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relative weakness of the anarchist and syndicalist movements in Germany (see Carlson, 1972; 
Gabriel, 2011; Bock, 1990), the socialist framework became strongly hegemonic within the left. 
After the end of the anti-socialist laws with their detrimental effects on socialist unions 
(Lidtke, 1996, p. 285-6), the socialist trade union movement experienced a revival.14 However, its 
growth within the working class did not remain unchallenged. The Centre Party established its own 
Catholic trade union in the hope that it could utilize the hesitation of many Catholic workers from 
joining the socialist movement. However, it was never able to reach the level of the socialist union.  
After 1890, the socialist trade union saw the gradual defeat of the localist tendencies by 
those, such as Carl Legien, the Chairman of the General Commission of German Trade Unions, 
towards centralization and the national coordination of trade union movement, as well as 
rationalization of industrial militancy (Moses, 1987, pp. 29-32; Lidtke, 1996, p. 286).15 This was at 
least partially due to the increasing coordination of the employers to defeat local strikes through 
extensive and coordinated use of lockouts (see e.g. Domansky, 1989, p. 339). Notwithstanding all 
the centralization and membership strength, the union’s efforts to expand collective agreement fell 
far short of what was expected.  
A similar process of centralization that took place within the trade union movement 
occurred within the SPD, although later from 1903 after a series of debates between the federalists 
and centralists eventually laid the ground for the centralized bureaucratic party structure (Tegel, 
1987, p. 20; Nolan, 1986, p. 384). Under the anti-socialist conditions, the party had operated in a 
very loose organizational form and guidelines. In the 1890s, despite the spectacular expansion of its 
network, it could not evolve beyond certain limits as it was legally forbidden to organize across the 
borders of federal states until this ruling was overturned in 1899. At the turn of the century, the 
party began to organize at the state (Land) levels, especially in the southern states (Schorske, 1983, 
pp. 120-1). The party was creating an electoral machine especially designed to maximize its 
chances of electoral success. 
 Amidst these developments, Legien spearheaded the debate with the localists about the 
need for the unions to take a more neutral position in party politics. This marked the beginning of 
the divergence between the union and the party (Schorske, 1983, pp. 11-13). The growing 
 
14 The socialist union grew exponentially in the prewar period since 1890. The membership of the Free Trade Union 
increased from 619,556 at the turn of the century and 2,200,000 by 1914 (Bock, 1990, p. 61). This pattern was different 
in the Ruhr region. There was also a 90 per cent loss in union membership among the Ruhr miners between 1889 to 
1895 due to “economic crisis, religious differences, and the persistence of traditional views” (Nolan, 1986, p. 383). 
However, the membership of the Old Association (Alter Verband) whose leaders were associated with the socialist 
movement saw a significant improvement after the turn of the century, peaking at 29.4 per cent of the Ruhr mining 
workers in 1905 (see Hickey, 1985, p. 234). However, the problem of mobilizing the Catholic workers, particularly the 
Polish migrant workers remained a central issue for the socialist movement in the Rurh (pp. 249, 260-1).  
15 See Block (1990) for some of the factors contributing to the marginalization of localist unions.  
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independence and the dominance of the union over the party (Lidtke, 1996, p. 285-8; Nolan, 1986, 
pp. 384-5) found its official expression in the 1906 Mannheim agreement between the SPD and the 
union requiring the Party to consult the union before a substantial change of programme. Given the 
rapid growth of the union membership, the locus of executive power of the workers’ movement 
shifted towards the trade unions, which in turn steered the party’s policies on key issues (see 
Berger, 1995, p. 72; Schorske, 1983, pp. 51-3, 108-9), such as mass strike and foreign policies, 
towards those of the union.  
Nonetheless, the party was far from abandoning its extra-parliamentary agitation. The 
economic downturn of 1910 and the failure of the new chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, to pass its 
modern proposal for reforming the Prussian three-class voting system in that year, fueled one of the 
largest active class agitations by the SPD and the Free Trade Unions in the prewar years.16 The 
employers did not hesitate to engage in the class war by extensive use of lockouts to exhaust the 
financial resources of the unions (Schorske, 1955, pp. 180-181). The apparent militancy and 
organizational power of the socialist movement attracted more workers to join the Free Trade 
Unions and the SPD so that by 1912, the union claimed over 2 million and the party about 1 million 
members.17  
Despite the electoral and numerical strength, the SPD could not achieve any significant 
victory through its parliamentary activities before WWI except for some moderate tax reforms 
which came as a consequence of the passage of the 1913 Army Bill. It introduced some direct taxes 
at the cost of a massive expansion of the German military and caving to the demands of rapidly 
growing pro-military extra-parliamentary pressure group, Army League. Similarly, the trade union 
movement could not achieve significant concessions from the employers nor enforce the collective 
agreement on various sectors.18 The socialist movement sought the solution to this paradox in 
republican aspiration to establish “free people’s state” by expanding the democratic capacities of 
the working class people through the suffrage reform until, as they believed, capitalism crumbles on 
its own weight.  
The most powerful class alliance within the state was not free of contradictions either. The 
Junkers and the industrialists differ sharply on the issue of direct versus indirect taxes. The latter 
was uncompromisingly against direct and inheritance taxes, and the latter quite wary of direct tax. 
The conservatives in the Reichstag refused to even vote on the bill. The resignation of Bülow from 
chancellorship was a sign that the alliance between the parties that stood for the agrarian interests 
 
16 369,011 workers engaged in work stoppages in 1910 (Schorske, 1983, p. 180). 
17 The annual income of the union in 1912 was M. 88 million (Broué, 2005, p. 14). 
18 By 1914, only about 16 per cent of the German workers were covered under a collective agreement (Geary, 1989, pp. 
122-3). See Hickey (1985, pp. 244-8) for the limitation of the union movement in the Ruhr region.  
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and those that represented the industrial and commercial interests have reached a point of 
bifurcation – a large scale war that would preserve the supremacy of the Junkers through the 
military apparatus while advancing the interest of heavy industries could delay this process, as it 
did. The colonial expansionism coupled with the agrarian protectionism of the state was favoured 
by the ruling classes but its funding (i.e. different tax schemes) created class fragmentations and 
realignments. 
The collapse of the Bülow Bloc – a coalition of parties against the socialist and catholic 
parties – created the impetus among the right-wing of the SPD to try to expand its basis and win the 
votes of small employers. This would entail toning down the party’s revolutionary rhetoric and 
extra-parliamentary agitations and working towards a partnership with the liberal party (Broué, 
2005, p. 19). After a series of debate and considerable confusion during the 1909 Leipzig Congress, 
the party overturned its previous objection in principle to parliamentary collaboration with the 
liberal parties, which after the end of the Bülow Bloc have moved towards the left and away from 
the governing centre of politics. This opened the possibility of new strategic alliances within the 
state. In 1910, amidst significant waves of strikes, the new Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-
Hollweg, tried to make modest reforms to the three-class suffrage but failed as it was blocked by the 
conservatives. Despite this structural limitation, the SPD achieved its best electoral result in the 







Socio-Political Context of Italy before WWI 
 
 The process of Italian Unification (Risorgimento) instated a political system that, in the 
condition of limited suffrage1 and the lack of effective party competition, operated on the basis of 
informal representation of a wide range of interests, co-option of political oppositions through 
patronage and corruption, and manipulation of the electoral process – what is referred to as 
trasformismo (see Valbruzzi, 2015). This manufacturing of centrism that had already started under 
Cavour’s broad coalition (Connubio) was perfected under Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, who 
dominated the Italian politics from 1901 until WWI. The weakness of the political party structure in 
Italy created an acute incoherence between the economic interests and political representation. The 
two large political blocs before the turn of the century, the Historic Right and the Historic Left were 
vague identifiers that contained heterogeneous and even contradictory sets of policies. Generally 
speaking, the former, gravitating towards the interests of the Northern rentiers and some Southern 
aristocrats, stood for free trade, a strong army, and a balanced budget, a nationalized railway. The 
latter, gravitating towards the interest of Northern and Southern small businesses and professional 
classes, stood for expanded public education, a wider franchise, public works, expanded navy, and 
colonial adventures especially after the 1890s (Clark, 2008, pp. 75-6; Donovan and Newell, 2008).  
Despite the rapid growth of industries after the turn of the century, Italy remained a largely 
agrarian society before WWI. In 1870, 61 per cent of the population worked in the agricultural 
sector (Broadberry et al., 2010, p. 61). This number decreased to 59 per cent at the turn of the 
century (De Grand, 1989, p. 16), and still 55.4 per cent in 1913 (Broadberry et al., 2010, p. 61). The 
agrarian social relations varied geographically: Latifundia in the South, mezzadria in the Centre, 
and agrarian capitalist in the North (Snowden, 1989; Lewin and Elazar, 2002; Elazar, 2001, pp. 40-
8; Clark, 2008, pp. 15-19). The latifundia was characterized by a high level of land monopolization 
in the hands of a small number of aristocratic families who generally lived far away from the lands, 
whose power was undisputed by the effective absence of the central government. In these areas, the 
tenants were under perpetual and massive debt to the landlords. Besides the many small peasant 
holdings, it also generated a significant number of day workers and seasonal workers. The 
mezzadaria system in the central region of Italy was dominated by sharecroppers, who not only had 
 
1 Until 1912, Italy had a very restrictive suffrage. Before 1882, voters had to be over 25 years old, literate, and pay at 
least 40 lire a year in taxes. These requirements reduced the eligible voters to only 8 per cent of the male population (or 
2.2 per cent of the total population). Despite some reforms in 1882, the percentage remained below 10 per cent of the 
male population (see Clark, 2008, pp. 77-8).  
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to give up half of their products but also had to pay for tools, seeds, and machinery owned by the 
landlord. This entailed a direct and hegemonic control by the landlord over the labour and lives of 
the tenants, making this type of agrarian social relations less volatile than in the South. It also made 
this system less likely to transform due to the limitation in capital supply. In the Northern regions, 
there was a rather high level of land monopolization albeit much smaller than that in the South. 
However, there was general commercialization of agriculture in the North which transformed the 
agrarian social relation into a capitalist type, based on wage labour and landed bourgeoises. The 
dominant forms of agricultural labour in the North were workers with a fixed wage on annual 
contracts (salariati) and migrant day-labourers employed on a seasonal basis and paid on an hourly 
basis (braccianti) (Lewin and Elazar, 2002, p. 617; Brustein, 1991, p 655). There were also resident 
farm servants paid in goods and services (garzon) (Brustein, 1991, p. 655). In Emilia and Romanga, 
where the agrarian relations were of a capitalist nature, the urban elites maintained dominance over 
the agricultural business, even though the old aristocracy remained influential in places like 
Bologna (Maier, 1975, p. 42). These explain the underlying condition for the strong presence of 
socialist forces in both industrial and agricultural sectors in the North.2 The PSI had a rather strong 
presence in the North, especially in the Po Valley, where the rural organization of the PSI, 
Federterra, established its stronghold.3 There was generally a profound difference between the 
interests and hopes of the agricultural workers and the peasant proprietors and stable tenants (De 
Grand, 1989, p. 32).  
The aristocratic class as a political force underwent a slow disappearance from 1848 when 
the nobility’s absence in the new parliamentary order significantly reduced its direct and 
independent political power and institutional status. Through the constitutional position of the 
monarchy in unified Italy, as formulated in the Statuto Albertino of 1848, they preserved special 
status and played prominent albeit few and decreasing roles in key institutions of the state such as 
the Senate and the military (Cardoza, 1997, pp. 55-6, 69-71). However, they failed to enter into the 
new political space by forming a conservative party or significantly utilize the popularity of 
Catholicism to affirm their existence.4 Nevertheless, aristocratic families continued until WWI to 
 
2 The social relations of production do not completely explain the influence of socialist in every region, especially in 
Central Italy. Tuscany, for example, was predominantly a share-cropping region but it has a strong socialist presence 
(although less than in the Northern regions). Nevertheless, the differences between the social relations in the Central 
and Northern Italy and its relation to the state becomes a crucial factor behind the support of the landowning class for 
fascism after the biennio rosso (see Elazar, 2001). Mezzadro sharecroppers could potentially be incorporated into the 
socialist program (and to some extent they did); however, changing economic and political conditions that emboldened 
the contradictions between their interests and the socialist program. 
3 Federterra sets its principle program to “ameliorate the condition of agricultural labourer while setting the basis for 
eventual socialization of the land” (Brustein, 1991, p. 657). 
4 The inability to assert their influence through the Church has to do with the antagonism between the Church and the 
State that was particularly acute in Italy. This was due to the process of unification that came into direct confrontation 
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own large landed estates and remain among the wealthiest individuals in the country.5 The supreme 
power of the King was assumed under the Statuto Albertino. As the head of the armed forces, he 
held extensive, albeit not exclusive, power over foreign and military policies. The legislative power 
was technically shared between the King, the Senate (appointed by the King for life), and the 
Chamber of Deputies. The important task of taxation, appropriation of bills, and allocation of army 
budget had to be originated in and voted by the Chamber of Deputies.  
The military played an essential role, albeit a conflicting one due to its repressive nature, in 
nation-building project in Italy (Clark, 2008, p. 62; Gooch, 2014, pp. 7-15). Reminiscent of the 
structure of the Prussian army designed to shield the military from the intervention of the 
parliament, the strategic and administrative authority was transferred after 1882 from the Minister 
of War to the Chief of Staff, leaving the former as the spokesperson of the army in the government. 
Contrary to the universal conscription in Germany, however, the Italian military was deeply 
suspicious of citizen militia. Yet, similar to the predominance of Prussia within the German 
military, the army officers were overwhelmingly drawn from Piedmont, a trend that continued until 
the turn of the century (Clark, 2008, pp. 59-62).   
Much of the industrial development and urbanization took place in the North (Corner, 2002, 
p. 19), henceforth increasing the divide with the South (Clark, 2008, pp. 29-30). The distribution of 
the population who worked in industry and services change slightly from 1873 to 1913 (p. 61). 
Although the government pursued free trade policies in the first few years after the unification, the 
global recession that began in the 1870s led to changes in state policies towards protectionism (De 
Cecco, 2002, pp. 64-5; Clark, 2008, p. 34; Coppa, 1971). The rapid industrial growth from 1896 
that accelerated the trend of the 1880s (Gerschenkron, 1962, pp. 75-6) brought with itself newer 
fractions of the capitalist class, including industrialists and financiers (see Adler, 1995, pp. 23-4). 
The shortage of private capital made the role of the state and commercial banks critical in the 
industrialization process. Particularly in the industrial triangle (i.e. Turin, Milan, and Genoa), Turin 
was dominated by interests linked to the steel and metal sectors such as Ilva Fiat, Milan to the 
textile and finance sectors such as Banca Commerciale Italiana, and Genoa to the engineering and 
manufacturing companies and financial firms such as Ansaldo and Banca Italiana di Sconto (Clark, 
2008, p. 247). There was a bitter rivalry between Banca Commerciale with its German-inspired 
mixed banking and to a lesser degree the Credito Italiano, on the one hand, and Banca di Sconto 
with its commercial-style banking, on the other (see Adler, 1995, p. 118 and Forsyth, 1993, p. 12).  
 
with the Vatican as well as the King’s foreign policies against Austria (a Catholic country) and governments’ efforts to 
abolish the privileges enjoyed by the Church.  
5 Anthony L. Cardoza (1997) reports that “two-third of the large landed estates and nine of the eleven wealthiest 
landowners [...] between 1901 and 1912 still came from the ranks of the aristocratic elite” (p. 201). 
260 
 
After the financial crisis in the 1890s, the government engaged in a series of bank rescue 
operations that became a durable method of state intervention at the time of crisis. In 1907, the 
Bank of Italy was established and took charge of the rescue missions of failing banks (De Cecco, 
2002, pp. 70-2). However, the general weakness of the Bank of Italy (Forsyth, 1993, p. 41) and the 
vulnerability of mixed banking to the decline in industrial activity made these antagonisms within 
the capitalist bloc consequential for the politics of the country, especially with regards to 
interventionist policies and nationalist ideologies.6  
 Prior to the 1890s, the anarchist movements, which had gained significant traction among 
Italian workers since 1870, were effectively suppressed by the state in the 1880s (see Pernicone, 
1993). External suppression and internal defection led to the decline of the anarchist movement in 
Italy. The Catholic church had a complicated relationship with Risorgimento. The state-building 
project not only threatened the material interests of the Church but also countered its supranational 
project. Any systematic engagement in the political project set up by the state after unification was 
seen as an implicit recognition of the political supremacy of the nation-state over the Church. 
Therefore, the Church pursued an intransigence strategy before 1898. But the Church had to 
respond to the growing internal pressure to use the political space, especially in light of (modest) 
expansion of suffrage, to further Catholic social aims. Hence, the Church began a process of 
developing political capacities to assert its power within the state (see Webster, 1961, pp. 3-25). 
However, in the absence of overt state repression like Kulturkampf in Germany, this process took 
on a slow and conciliatory path.  
 The growth of mass politics after the emergence of the PSI in 1893 and the Catholic 
movement presented the liberal class with new challenges. It was no longer possible to maintain the 
balance of forces through individual patronage and threats; although still an effective way of 
dealing with the South. In this context, Giolitti elevated the old trasformismo into a process of 
pacification through strategic inclusion and appeasement by engaging in a larger political project to 
satisfy certain elements within major political blocs. Catholic forces proved a more pliable force. 
After a wave of militancy in 1904, the Catholic movement worked with Giolitti against the 
“subversive” blocs that included the PSI and the newly established the Italian Radical Party 
(Pernicone, 1993, pp. 12-14).  
 
6 Perrone brothers, the owners of Ansaldo, mobilized their resources to undermine its rivals such as Ilva and Banca 
Commerciale by funding conservative and nationalist press to attack their links to the German interests (see Forsyth, 
1993, pp. 159-162; Adler, 1995, p. 118). These campaigns intensified particularly in the lead up to Italy’s intervention 
in WWI and went a long way in swinging the public option (see Papadia, 2016). Generally, the key Turinese capitalists 
and their powerful association, with close links to Giolittian politics, showed a lack of support for nationalist program 
and interventionist policies both in the case of the war with Libya and Italy’s involvement in WWI (Adler, 1995, p. 83). 
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Founded in 1904, the Radical Party emerged out of the Historical Far Left (estrema sinistra 
storica). Its program was strongly republican and anti-clerical in substance, such as the complete 
separation of church and state, independence of the judiciary from political influence, universal 
suffrage for men and women. It also contained socially progressive measures such as free and 
compulsory education, reduction of working hours, unemployment assistance, and progressive 
taxation. The ideological focus of the Radical Party on republican values limited the ideological 
horizon of the PSI (particularly its reformist wing) from anchoring its vision distinctly on the 
democratization of the state through universal suffrage, welfare measures, progressive taxation, and 
institutional accountability. The Radical Party had a stronger base in Southern Italy and some of its 
leading figures such as Francesco Saverio Nitti and Ernesto Nathan were representatives of 
Southern Italy. Giolitti was very successful in absorbing the Radicals into his projects as they lost 
some of the principal objections towards the state in the light of a more moderate King, absence of 
threat to the democratic institutions, and Giolitti’s social programs (Clark, 2008, p. 169). He 
brought in some of the leading figures of the Radical Party into his cabinet.7  
Despite the consolidatory attitude of the reformist leaders of the PSI in the early years of 
Giolitti’s tenure, it was more difficult to absorb the labour movement into the political structure. 
The PSI remained at the centre of Giolitti’s political project until 1912 (Miller, 1990, pp. 26-29). 
The working-class organizations had entered a new phase in 1891 when the first Chamber of 
Labour was established in Milan on the model of the French Bourses to coordinate local labour 
actions, to serve as employment services, and to settle labour disputes (Horowitz, 1963, p. 43). 
They were organized geographically rather than by sectors or trades, which limited their ability to 
negotiate with employers but allowed the unskilled to gain membership and have representation. 
However, they were an effective organizational setup to coordinate strikes actions (Levy, 1999, p. 
20). Even though they first had an apolitical and intraclass character in the 1890s, they eventually 
shifted towards socialism after the growth of socialist organizations in the 1900s. At the dawn of the 
Giolittian era, the Chambers of Labour began a process of establishing National Union Federations 
in 1901 which rapidly grew, reaching 27 federations with a membership of around 48,000 members 
in 1902 (Horowitz, 1963, p. 62). The most important one of these was the FIOM, and the National 
Federation of Agricultural Workers (Federazione nazionale fra i lavoratori della terra, Federterra), 
founded in 1901. The PSI had a rather strong presence in the North, especially in the Po Valley, 
where the rural organization of the PSI, Federterra, established its stronghold. It sets its principle 
 
7 For example, Nitti became the Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce during Giolitti’s term in office from 
1911 to 1914.  
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programme to “ameliorate the condition of agricultural labourer while setting the basis for eventual 
socialization of the land” (Brustein, 1991, p. 657). 
The wave of radical working-class actions between 1903 and 1906, during which the 
Chambers of Labour played a crucial organizing role, resulted in the control of Chambers by the 
revolutionaries and the National Union Federations by the reformists (with the exception of the 
railway sector). The internal conflicts between the revolutionaries and the reformists during the 
1905 strikes led to the formation of the CGL in 1906. The reformists controlled the CGL firmly 
until it was destroyed by fascist forces. In any case, the CGL was never a highly centralized 
organization with sufficient authority over its affiliates (Horowitz, 1963, p. 77) and, given the large 
membership of the Chamber of Labour in the prewar years and its presence in the South (see Davis, 
1989, p. 214), its strong local networks, and its militant character, it remained the focal authority 
within the Italian working class in the prewar period (Horowitz, 1963, p. 78).  
It was around the time of the founding of the CGL that the PSI underwent major 
transformations. The syndicalists, whose hegemony rapidly declined after the strikes of 1905 
(Horowitz, 1963, p. 53), broke from the party in 1906 but remained active within the CGL as well 
as among the agricultural workers of the North (especially in the Po Valley and Emilia-Romagna). 
A year later, the relationship between the union and the party was worked out at the CGL Congress. 
Resolutions were almost unanimously passed that demanded the leadership of the strikes be left to 
the CGL, Avanti! to be editorially approved by the union, and the party to coordinate its decisions 
both legislatively and executively with the CGL. This move was to preserve the independence of 
the CGL from the PSI and to protect the union policies from the potential radicalism of the party. 
The situation improved the relationship between the union and the party largely because the 
reformists played a hands-off attitude towards the union. But the membership of the party dropped 
significantly and its presence in the South further diminished (see Table 11 and Table 12 in Miller, 
1990, pp. 165-6). 
To contain the socialist movement, Giolitti made key promises to the socialists, including 
organizational freedom and legalization of strikes (Forsyth, 1993, p. 25; Corner, 2002, pp. 22-3) in 
return for their support of the liberal government. He did so strategically to empower the reformist 
wing of the PSI and the more moderate forms of labour actions. He went further and twice offered 
cabinet positions to the reformist socialists (in 1903 and 1911), also in the hope to split the PSI 
between its reformist and revolutionary wings (Di Scala, 1996, p. 29; De Grand, 2001, pp. 113-14, 
166). Moreover, he treated labour unrest differently in terms of the use of the repressive measures, 
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depending on whether they occurred in the private or the public sector,8 whether they had 
“economic” or “political” claims, whether they took place in the North or the South, and finally 
whether they were led by the reformist or revolutionary elements (see Di Scala, 1996, pp. 24-6). In 
the meanwhile, he began a series of welfare measures and social reforms, precisely to undercut the 
socialist appeal.9 Nevertheless, Giolitti was convinced that modernization of the country could not 
be carried out without the entry of certain segments of the socialists into the state. His project, 
therefore, was to manage this process in a strategic manner and without establishing a lasting 
institutional framework for systematically dealing with the socialist. However, maintaining such a 
fragile equilibrium of forces essentially depended on his abilities as a shrewd politician (De Grand, 
1989, p. 19).  
The apparent left-ward shift of the state to accommodate rising working-class politics 
alarmed the employers and encouraged them to coordinate their actions by developing broader and 
stronger associations. After the general strike of 1904, the landowners and the industrialists began a 
process of forming employers’ associations to coordinate their actions in response to the scale of 
workers’ militancy. Turinese industrialists took the lead and formed the Industrial League of Turin 
(lega industriale di Torino, LIT) in 1906. Also, an extremely militant association among the 
landowners in Po Valley was formed around the same time (Davis, 1989, pp. 226-7). The success of 
the Turinese employers in coordinating their actions to defeat the general strike of 1907 led to the 
extension of the association to Piedmont region under the name of the Piedmontese Industrial 
Federation (federazione industriale Piemontese) in 1908, and later to the whole of the northern 
industrial region under the Italian Confederation of Industry (confederazione Italiana dell'industria, 
CIDI) in 1910 (see Adler, 1995, pp. 48-9).10 Alongside the employers’ organizations, the 
Association of Italian Joint-Stock Companies (Associazione fra le Societa Italiane per Azioni) 
began a parallel organization in 1910 to lobby for reducing tax burdens on businesses and 
protectionism.11 Ideologically, the LIT leaders held a liberal understanding of the state and free-
market ideology, that besides protecting the private property rights and civil order outside the 
factories, it rejected government interference in industrial affairs (see Adler, 1995, p. 52). They also 
 
8 For example, see the government’s reaction to the 1905 railway workers’ dispute, imposing a ban on strikes and a 
mandatory arbitration in railway industry (De Grand, 1989, p. 21). 
9 See Forsyth (1993, pp. 25-6) for the list of social reform measures from 1902 to 1912. Giolitti argued that 
modernization of Italy into a capitalist economy would be achieved “not by shooting the workers, but rather by 
instilling in them a deep affection for our institutions so that we ourselves and not the socialists will be seen as the 
promoters of progress and as the ones who are trying to do everything possible in their favor” (as quoted in Davis, 1989, 
p. 191). 
10 According to Adler (1995), the LIT initially had a membership of 200 firms that employed 27,800 workers. By 1914, 
this number grew to 639 firms that employed 65,319 workers (p. 39). 
11 Although there was a great divide among the different branches of the industry on the question of protectionism, (see 
Sarti, 1967, pp. 63-4). Given the influence of the heavy industry within the confederation, the Confindustria opted for 
pressuring the government to impose higher tariffs.  
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upheld the principle of employers’ absolute managerial authority in the workplace as sacrosanct 
(see pp. 45-6). They showed no tolerance for the trade unions’ or the state’s interference with this 
principle and fought tooth-and-nail to preserve it. They were even willing to give some concessions 
to the unions in exchange for preserving the managerial authority (e.g. see pp. 62-4). 
As early as 1902, when the first demand for shop floor representation in the form of internal 
commissions was put forward by striking metalworkers in Turin, the Turinese industrialists already 
felt would amount to a breach in their workplace authority (Adler, 1995, pp. 36-7).12 This was not 
the case necessarily with the workers’ unions as they generally did not intend to undermine the 
managerial authority but to negotiate for better wages and working conditions. This can be 
illustrated by pointing out the example of the negotiation of car manufacturing employers and 
FIOM in 1911.13 The employers were willing to concede to the union’s demands for higher wages, 
shorter working hours, and the unionization of newly employed workers, in return for the abolition 
of the internal commissions, the right to fire without notice, among other demands. Although 
workers overwhelmingly rejected the offer and went on strike in response, the employers defeated 
the strike and enforced their demands onto the union. This shows the importance of preserving 
managerial authorities for employers. This is precisely what came to the centre of workers’ 
militancy during the biennio rosso.  
However, besides the fragmentation within the capitalist bloc which hindered the rapid 
development of cross-regional and national employers’ organizations, the ideological diversity of 
the leading figures in the capitalist bloc added additional complications in the use of the 
organizational capacity of their associations to launch into a political project (Adler, 1995, p. 52). 
Therefore, the liberal bloc remained in charge of consolidating a diverse set of interests14 which no 
longer just meant the capitalist interests but also certain elements of the working-class interests as 
well. The government responded to the lockout action on May 1913 against the FIOM strike by 
refusing to assure the industrialists of protecting their factories from potential workers violence and 
even going as far as threatening them to publicize their intention to take a neutral position on this 
 
12 Davis (1989) argues that the first internal commissions emerged with the approval of progressive employers who 
believed that, in the absence of trade unions, such organizations would make the negotiations easier and wildcat strikes 
less likely (pp. 214-15). This could be the case insofar the internal commissions were involved with the wage 
negotiations. However, their negotiation over the technical aspect of production was likely to be the point of contention 
(Adler, 1995, pp. 36-7, 45).  
13 At that time, FIOM was still numerically small (1,517 of approximately 5,000 car workers were FIOM members) and 
was distrusted by the non-unionized workers. These factors weakened FIOM’s bargaining position (Levy, 1999, pp. 46-
7). 
14 In the case of Italy, such tendencies not only conditioned by the sharp divisions between the North and the South but 
also by the fact that the Italian state after unification was largely modelled on the Piedmontese state and peopled with 
many politicians with deep ties to the interests of that region.  
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matter. This created a deep distrust between powerful sections of the capitalist bloc and the liberal 
state.  
Giolitti’s attempts to resolve the deep and growing contradictions at the heart of 
Risorgimento through a skilful implementation of trasformismo ultimately and inevitably failed in 
the face of burgeoning mass politics, swelling antagonisms, and the economic downturn in the 
second decade of the 20th century. The watershed point arrived in 1911 when Giolitti, believing that 
he had already “domesticated” the socialists, decided to go to war with Libya to gain the support of 
the right-wing of the liberal bloc,15 while trying to diminish the anti-war outcry of the socialists by 
expanding the suffrage and offering a cabinet position to Leonida Bissolati. This not only caused a 
deep crisis in the PSI that resulted in reformists’ loss of control of the party and their eventual 
expulsion but also, after an expensive war campaign, only furthered the imperialist appetite of the 
interventionist conservatives. In the light of the radicalization of the PSI under the leadership of the 
Maximalists and increasing pressure of the right-wing liberals, Giolitti’s last attempt in maintaining 
the unstable equilibrium of forces was to give way to the pressure from the Radical Party to 
significantly expand the size of electorate by passing near-universal male suffrage in 191216 and 
switching the centre of his political alliance by winning the support of the Catholics after the 1913 
election.17 But this only resulted in the break of the Radicals from the government, the eventual 
resignation of Giolitti, and the coming of Antonio Salandra to power in 1914. 
The crisis caused by the Libyan War and the Bissolati affair put the revolutionaries in 
control of major organs of the PSI, namely, Avanti!, the Directorates, and the National Congress. 
The revolutionaries moved aggressively to centralize the party structure that hitherto was quite 
decentralized and unbureaucratic (see Miller, 1990, pp. 44-53) by subordinating all the organs as 
much as possible to the Directorate, and to purge the reformists from the party.18 But these changes 
were responded to differently by the CGL. In May 1912, the CGL Directive Council announced the 
expulsion of the syndicalists from the union, decrying the incompatibility of their visions. 
Syndicalists were against state interventionism and its seemingly progressive legislation and 
emphasized the factory as the basis of union action rather than the craft or the geographic position 
(Levy, 1999, pp. 9-10). Syndicalists then found their own union, the USI, in 1912 while remaining 
active within radical Chambers of Labour. The CGL reacted to the changes within the PSI further 
 
15 See Gooch (2014, p. 38) for the historical roots Italy’s military engagement in Libya.  
16 The reform expanded suffrage to all literate men above 21 years old, those who had completed military training, and 
all men above 30 years old regardless of their literacy (Clark, 2008, p. 188). 
17 In what became known as the Gentiloni Pact, the Catholic Electoral Union came to an agreement with Giolitti to 
transfer the Catholic vote to the government candidates in exchange for promises of supporting Catholic policies. 
18 By 1913, as Miller (1990, p. 164) reports, about half of the deputies elected in 1909 had been forced out of the party. 
But the revolutionaries were relatively unsuccessful in subordinating the Parliamentary Socialist Group (gruppo 
socialista parlamentare, GPS), in charge of drafting policies, to the Directorate.  
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by going as far as supporting initiatives to establish a labour party (Miller, 1990, pp. 169-70; Davis, 
1989, p. 194). There was, therefore, a divergent drift between the party and the union on the 
political and the ideological questions after 1912. As the party moved towards more intransigent 
Maximalism, the union further embraced reformism. However, the relative independence that the 
union assumed for itself with respect to the party from the founding years prevented the total 
breakdown of the relationship. Nevertheless, this dynamic left the party, which was never a mass 
party in the prewar years despite its sizable presence in the parliament especially after the 1913 
election, without a mass base that it could readily mobilize. It also left the union without a reliable 
political wing to press for its reformist ambitions at the state level.  
Between 1912 to 1914, there was a multifaceted bifurcation within the working-class 
movement roughly along the axis of revolutionism and reformism: between the party and the union, 
between the syndicalists and socialists, between the Maximalist and reformist socialist, and between 
the Chamber of Labour and the Federation of Unions. This dynamic created a situation in which, 
different types of actions could be carried out with less internal resistance if it was launched in the 
appropriate organization, and state repression or government’s consolidatory projects could be 
directed more discriminately to more militant organizations. Also, transformative processes were 
more likely to unfold across these organizations rather than within them, making a general 
radicalization of the working-class movement more difficult. Having said that, there were still 
structural elements that could direct potential contradictions differently. For example, both the 
Chamber of Labour and the Federation of Unions gained parity within the CGL by 1912, making it 
possible for the radicalization of the Chamber of Labour to affect the CGL internally.19 However, 
some of the basic organs of the PSI such as the GPS was still under the control of the reformists and 
the party sections continued to have considerable independent power, making it more complex to 
formulate a unified action for the party.20  
By the time Salandra became the Prime Minister, the liberal state was in a crisis. The 
fragmentation of its essential elements and the anti-interventionism of its major forces largely 
blocked the possibility of preserving the liberal order during the war. Once the country caved in 
under the pressure of the interventionists and entered the war on the side of the Entente, the state 
was rapidly transformed into an authoritarian form which extended well beyond the governing 
structure of the state and led to militarization of the civil society. 
  
 
19 Further level of complication is the fact that the reformism of CGL leadership made such perturbation process more 
difficult to traverse within the organization.  
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